





John Adams.

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THE
H I S T O R Y
OF
ANCIENT GREECE,
ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earliest Accounts till the
Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East:

Adams. 12
Vol 2

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF
LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

VOL. II.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

Εκ μὲν τοιγὲς τῆς ἀπαντῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμπλοκῆς καὶ παραθέσεως, ἐπὶ δὲ ὁμοιο-
τήτος καὶ διαφορᾶς, μόνως αἱ τίς ἐφίκοιτο καὶ δυνηθεὶ κατοπτέυσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
χρησίμον καὶ τὸ τέρπνον ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας λαβεῖν. POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

1518
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MAP containing the EASTERN DIVISION of the GRECIAN COLONIES and CONQUESTS.



T H E
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Consequences of the Athenian Misfortunes in Sicily.—Formidable Confederacy against Athens.—Peculiar Resources of free Governments.—Naval Operations.—Battle of Miletus.—Intrigues of Alcibiades.—The Athenian Democracy subverted.—Tyrannical Government of the Four Hundred.—Battle of Eretria.—Democracy re-established in Athens.—Naval Success of the Athenians.—Triumphant Return of Alcibiades.—The Eleusinian Mysteries—and Plynteria.

IN the populous and extensive kingdoms of modern Europe, the revolutions of public affairs seldom disturb the humble obscurity of private life; but the national transactions of Greece involved the interest of every family, and deeply affected the fortune and happiness of every individual. Had the arms of the Athenians

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proved

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Extent of the
Athenian
misfortunes
in Sicily.

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XXI.

proved successful in Sicily, each citizen would have derived from that event an immediate accession of wealth, as well as of power, and have felt a proportional increase of honour and security. But their proud hopes perished for ever in the harbour of Syracuse. The succeeding disasters shook to the foundation the fabric of their empire. In one rash enterprise they lost their army, their fleet, the prudence of their experienced generals, and the flourishing vigour of their manly youth '—Irreparable disasters! which totally disabled them to resist the confederacy of Peloponnesus, reinforced by the resentment of a new and powerful enemy. While a Lacedæmonian army invested their city, they had reason to dread that a Syracusan fleet should assault the Piræus; that Athens must finally yield to these combined attacks, and her once prosperous citizens destroyed by the sword, or dragged into captivity, atone by their death or disgrace for the cruelties which they had recently inflicted on the wretched republics of Melos and Scioné.

The news
brought to
Athens.
Olymp.
xci. 4.
A. C. 413.

The dreadful alternative of victory and defeat, renders it little surprising that the Athenians should have rejected intelligence, which they must have received with horror. The first messengers of such sad news were treated with contempt: but it was impossible long² to withhold belief from the miserable fugitives, whose squalid and dejected countenances too faithfully attested the public calamity. Such evidence could not be refused; the arrogance of incredulity was abashed, and the whole republic thrown into consternation, or seized with despair. The venerable members of the Areopagus expressed

¹ Thucyd. l. vii. p. 557. Cicero goes farther. *Hic primum opes illius civitatis visæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt: in hoc portu Atheniense nobilem imperij, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur.* Cic. in Verrem, v. 37.

² The calamity was so great that the bold-est imagination had never dared to conceive its existence. Their minds being thus un-

prepared, the Athenians, says Thucydides, disbelieved *καὶ τοὶ παύ των στρατιῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν διαπεφυκῶσι* even those soldiers who escaped from this melancholy business. The stories of Plutarch in Nicias, of Athens, &c. may be safely condemned as fictions, since they are inconsistent with Thucydides's narrative.

the majesty of silent sorrow; but the piercing cries of woe extended many a mile along the lofty walls which joined the Piræus to the city, and the licentious populace raged with unbridled fury against the diviners and orators, whose blind predictions, and ambitious harangues, had promoted an expedition eternally fatal to their country².

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The distress of the Athenians was too great to admit the comfort of sympathy; but had they been capable of receiving, they had little reason to expect, that melancholy consolation. The tidings so afflicting to *them* gave unspeakable joy to their neighbours; many feared, most hated, and all envied a people who had long usurped the dominion of Greece. The Athenian allies, or rather subjects, scattered over so many coasts and islands, prepared to assert their independence; the confederates of Sparta, among whom the Syracusans justly assumed the first rank, were unsatisfied with victory, and longed for revenge: even those communities, which had hitherto declined the danger of a doubtful contest, meanly solicited to become parties in a war, which they expected must finally terminate in the destruction of Athens³.

Combination
in Greece
against
Athens.

Should all the efforts of such a powerful confederacy still prove insufficient to accomplish the ruin of the devoted city, there was yet another enemy behind, from whose strength and animosity the Athenians had every thing to fear. The long and peaceful reign of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, expired four hundred and twenty-five years before the Christian æra. The two following years were remarkable for a rapid succession of kings, Xerxes, Sogdianus, Ochus; the last of whom assumed the name of Darius, to which historians have added the epithet of Nothus, the bastard, to distinguish this effeminate prince from his illustrious predecessor⁴. The first years of Darius Nothus were employed in confirming his disputed authority,

Abetted by
the resentment
of
Persia.

² Thucyd. l. viii. p. 558, & seqq.

⁵ Diodor. l. xii. p. 322. Ctesias. Persic.

⁴ Thucyd. *ibid.* & Diodor. l. xiii. p. 348. c. xlv. & seqq.

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XXI.

and in watching the dangerous intrigues of his numerous kinsmen who aspired to the throne. When every rival was removed that could either disturb his quiet, or offend his suspicion, the monarch sunk into an indolent security, and his voluptuous court was governed by the feeble administration of women and eunuchs⁶. But in the ninth year of his reign Darius was roused from his lethargy by the revolt of Egypt and Lydia. The defection of the latter threatened to tear from his dominion the valuable provinces of Asia Minor; a consequence which he determined to prevent by employing the bravery of Pharnabazus, and the policy of the crafty Tissaphernes, to govern respectively the northern and southern districts of that rich and fertile peninsula. The abilities of these generals not only quelled the rebellion of Lydia, but extended the arms of their master towards the shores of the Ægean, as well as of the Hellespont and Propontis; in direct opposition to the treaty which forty years before had been ratified between the Athenians, then in the height of their prosperity, and the unwarlike Artaxerxes. But the recent misfortunes of that ambitious people flattered the Persian commanders with the hope of restoring the whole Asiatic coast to the great king⁷, as well as of taking exemplary punishment on the proud city, which had resisted the power, dismembered the empire, and tarnished the glory of Persia.

The Athenian allies prepare to revolt.

The terror of such a formidable combination might have reduced the Athenians to despair; and our surprise that this consequence should not immediately follow, will be increased by the following reflection: Not to mention the immortal trophies of Alexander, or the extensive ravages of Zingis Khan, Tamerlane, and the Tartar princes of their race; the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and other nations of modern Europe, have, with a handful of men, marched victorious over the effeminate or barbarous coasts of the eastern and western world. The hardy discipline of Europe easily prevailed over

⁶ Ctesias. c. xlvii.

⁷ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 560, & Ctesias. Persic. c. li.

the unwarlike softness of India, and the savage ignorance of America. But the rapid success of all these conquerors was owing to their military knowledge⁸ and experience. By the superiority of their arms and of their discipline, the Romans subdued the nations of the earth. But the Athenians afford the only example of a people, who, by the virtues of the mind alone, acquired an extensive dominion over men equally improved with themselves in the arts of war and government. They possessed, or were believed to possess, superior courage and capacity to the nations around them; and this opinion, which should seem not intirely destitute of foundation, enabled them to maintain, by very feeble garrisons, an absolute authority in the islands of the Ægean, as well as in the cities of the Asiatic coast. Their disasters and disgrace in Sicily destroyed at once the real and the ideal supports of their power; the loss of one-third of their citizens made it impossible to supply, with fresh recruits, the exhausted strength of their garrisons in foreign parts; the terror of their fleet was no more; and their multiplied defeats, before the walls of Syracuse, had converted into contempt that admiration in which Athens had been long held by Greeks and Barbarians.

But in free governments there are many latent resources which public calamities alone can bring to light, and adversity, which, to individuals endowed with inborn vigour of mind, is the great school of virtue and of heroism, furnishes also to the enthusiasm of popular assemblies the noblest field for the display of national honour and magnanimity. Had the measures of the Athenians depended on one man, or even on a few, it is probable that the selfish timidity of a prince, and the cautious prudence of a council, would have sunk under the weight of misfortunes, too heavy for the unsupported

Peculiar resources of free governments.

⁸ If that of the Tartars should be doubted, the description of the Manners of the Pastoral the reader may consult *Monf. de Guignes*, *Asiat. Res.*, v. li. *Hist. des Huns*, and *Mr. Gibbon's* *adm.*

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XXI.

strengthen of ordinary minds. But the first spark of generous ardour, which the love of virtue, of glory, and the republic, or even the meaner motives of ambition and vanity, excited in the assembled multitude, was diffused and increased by the natural contagion of sympathy; the patriotic flame was communicated to every breast; and the social warmth reflected, from such a variety of objects, became too intense to be resisted by the coldness of caution, and the damps of despair.

Prudent and
vigorous
measures of
the Athe-
nians.

With one mind and resolution the Athenians determined to brave the severity of fortune, and to withstand the assaults of the enemy. Nor did this noble design evaporate in useless speculation; the wisest measures were adopted for reducing it to practice. The great work began, as natural reformation ought always to begin, by regulating the finances, and lopping off every branch of superfluous expence. The clamour of turbulent demagogues was silenced; aged wisdom and experience were allowed calmly to direct the public councils; new levies were raised; the remainder of their fleet was equipped for sea; the motions of the colonies and tributary states were watched with an anxious solicitude, and every proper expedient was employed that might appease their animosity, or render it impotent^o. Yet these measures, prudent and vigorous as they were, could not, probably, have suspended the fall of Athens, had not several concurring causes facilitated their operation. The weak, dilatory, and ineffectual proceedings of the Spartan confederacy; the temporising, equivocal, and capricious conduct of the Persian governors; above all, the intrigues and enterprising genius of Alcibiades, who, after involving his country in inextricable calamities, finally undertook its defence, and retarded, though he could not prevent, its destiny.

^o Thucyd. l. viii. p. 559. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 349.

In the year following the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Spartans prepared a fleet of an hundred sail, of which twenty-five galleys were furnished by their own sea-ports; twenty-five by the Thebans; fifteen by the Corinthians; and the remainder by Locris, Phocis, Megara, and the maritime cities on the coast of Peloponnesus. This armament was destined to encourage and support the revolt of the Asiatic subjects of the Athenians. The islands of Chios and Lesbos, as well as the city Erythræ on the continent, solicited the Spartans to join them with their naval force. Their request was enforced by Tissaphernes, who promised to pay the sailors, and to victual the ships. At the same time, an ambassador from Cyzicus, a populous town situate on an island of the Propontis, entreated the Lacedæmonian armament to sail to the safe and capacious harbours which had long formed the wealth and the ornament of that city, and to expel the Athenian garrisons, to which the Cyzicenes and their neighbours reluctantly submitted. The Persian Pharnabazus seconded their proposal; offered the same conditions with Tissaphernes; and so little harmony subsisted between the lieutenants of the great king, that each urged his particular demand with a total unconcern about the important interests of their common master¹⁰. The Lacedæmonians held many consultations among themselves, and with their allies; hesitated, deliberated, resolved, and changed their resolution; and at length were persuaded by Alcibiades to prefer the overture of Tissaphernes and the Ionians to that of the Hellestines and Pharnabazus.

The delay occasioned by this deliberation was the principal, but not the only cause, which hindered the allies from acting expeditiously, at a time when expedition was of the utmost importance. A variety of private views diverted them from the general aim of the confederacy; and the season was far advanced before the Corinthians, who had been distinguished by excess of antipathy to Athens,

C H A P.
XXI.

The Peloponnesians and Ionians prepare to act against the Asiatic dependencies of Athens.
Olymp. xcii. 1.
A. C. 412.

Dilatory measures of the confederates.

The Athenians discover and defeat the designs of the Corinthians and the Chians.
Olymp. xcii. 1.
A. C. 412.

¹⁰ Thucyd. p. 561. & 562.

were

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP.
XXI.

were prepared to do. They determined, from pride, perhaps, as well as superstition, to celebrate, before leaving their harbours, the Isthmian games, consecrated to Neptune, the third of the Grecian festivals in point of dignity and splendour. From this ceremony the Athenians, though enemies, were not excluded by the Corinthian magistrates; and they did not exclude themselves, though oppressed by the weight of past misfortunes, and totally occupied by the thoughts of providing against future evils. While their representatives shared the amusements of this sacred spectacle, they neglected not the commission recommended by their country. They secretly informed themselves of the plan and particular circumstances of the intended revolt, and learned the precise time fixed for the departure of the Corinthian fleet. In consequence of this important intelligence, the Athenians anticipated the designs of the rebels of Chios, and carried off seven ships as pledges of their fidelity. The squadron which returned from this useful enterprise, intercepted the Corinthians as they sailed through the Saronic gulph; and having attacked and conquered them, pursued and blocked them up in their harbours¹².

Successful
operations
of the con-
federates.

Meanwhile the Spartans and their allies sent to the Ionian coast such squadrons as were successively ready for sea, under the conduct of Alcibiades, Chalcideus, and Astyochus. The first of these commanders failed to the isle of Chios, which was distracted by contending factions. The Athenian partisans were surprised, and compelled to submit; and the city, which possessed forty gallees, and yielded in wealth and populousness to none of the neighbouring colonies, became an accession to the Peloponnesian confederacy. The strong and rich town of Miletus followed the example: Erythræ

¹¹ "Πῶς τὰ ἱερὰ διατάσσονται." The scholiast justly observes, the force of the "δὲ," "thoroughly, completely," *i. e.* until they had celebrated the games, the complete number of days, appointed by antiquity. Vid. *Æ. Port.* ad loc. p. 563.
¹² Thucyd. p. 564.

and

and Clazomené surrendered to Chalcideus; several places of less note were conquered by Aftyochus.

CHAP.
XXI.

When the Athenians received the unwelcome intelligence of these events, they voted the expenditure of a thousand talents, which, in more prosperous times, they had deposited in the citadel, under the sanction of a decree of the senate and people, only to employ it in a moment of the utmost danger. This seasonable supply enabled them to increase the fleet, which failed, under Phrynichus, and other leaders, to the isle of Lesbos. Having secured the fidelity of the Lesbians, who were ripe for rebellion, they endeavoured to recover their authority in Miletus, anciently regarded as the capital of the Ionic coast. A bloody battle was fought before the walls of that place, between the Athenians and Argives on one side, and the Peloponnesians, assisted by the troops of Tissaphernes, and the revolted Milesians, on the other. The Athenian bravery defeated, on this occasion, the superior numbers of Greeks and Barbarians to whom they were opposed; but their Argive auxiliaries were repulsed by the gallant citizens of Miletus: so that, in both parts of the engagement, the Ionic race, commonly reckoned the less warlike, prevailed over their Dorian rivals and enemies. Elevated with the joy of victory, the Athenians prepared to assault the town, when they were alarmed by the approach of a fleet of fifty-five sail, which advanced in two divisions, the one commanded by the celebrated Hermocrates, the other by Theramenes the Spartan. Phrynichus prudently considered, that his own strength only amounted to forty-eight galleys, and refused to commit the last hope of the republic to the danger of an unequal combat. His firmness despised the clamours of the Athenian sailors, who insulted¹³, under the

Battle of
Miletus.
Olymp.
xcii. 2.
A. C. 412.

The Athe-
nian fleet
retires.

¹³ Like Fabius,

“Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.”
ENNIVS apud Cic.

which Thucydides expresses with more vigour, “ἐδὲ ποτὶ τῷ ἀσχυρῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐξῆς ἀδολῆς διακινδυνεύου,” p. 574.

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name of cowardice, the caution of their admiral; and he calmly retired with his whole force to the isle of Samos, where the popular faction having lately treated the nobles with shocking injustice and cruelty, too frequent in Grecian democracies, were ready to receive with open arms, the patrons of that fierce and licentious form of government.

The Athenian affairs
retrieved by
Alcibiades.

The retreat of the Athenian fleet acknowledged the naval superiority of the enemy; a superiority which was alone sufficient either to acquire, or to maintain, the submission of the neighbouring coasts and islands. In other respects, too, the Peloponnesians enjoyed the most decisive advantages. Their galleys were victualled, their soldiers were paid by Tissaphernes, and they daily expected a reinforcement of an hundred and fifty Phœnician ships, which, it was said, had already reached Aspendus, a sea-port of Pamphylia. But, in this dangerous crisis, fortune seemed to respect the declining age of Athens, and, by a train of accidents, singular and almost incredible, enabled Alcibiades, so long the misfortune and the scourge, to become the defence and the favour, of his country.

His intrigues.

During his long residence in Sparta, Alcibiades assumed the outward gravity of deportment, and conformed himself to the spare diet, and laborious exercises, which prevailed in that austere republic; but his character and his principles remained as licentious as ever. His intrigue with Timea, the spouse of king Agis, was discovered by an excess of female levity. The queen, vain of the attachment of so celebrated a character, familiarly gave the name of Alcibiades to her son Leotychides; a name which, first confined to the privacy of her female companions, was soon spread abroad in the world. Alcibiades punished her folly by a most mortifying but well merited declaration, boasting that he had solicited her favours from no other motive but that he might indulge the ambitious desire of giving a king to Sparta. The offence itself, and the shameless avowal, still more provoking than the offence, excited the keenest

resentment

resentment in the breast of the injured husband¹⁴. The magistrates and generals of Sparta, jealous of the fame, and envious of the merit of a stranger, readily sympathised with the misfortune, and encouraged the revenge of Agis; and, as the horrid practice of assassination still disgraced the manners of the Greeks, orders were sent to Aftyochus, who commanded in chief the Peloponnesian forces in Asia, secretly to destroy Alcibiades, whose power defied the laws, which, in every Grecian republic, condemned adulterers to death¹⁵. But the active and subtle Athenian had secured too faithful domestic intelligence in the principal families of Sparta to become the victim of this execrable design. With his usual address he eluded all the snares of Aftyochus: his safety, however, required perpetual vigilance and caution, and he determined to escape from a situation, which subjected him to such irksome constraint.

Publicly banished from Athens, secretly persecuted by Sparta, he had recourse to the friendship of Tissaphernes, who admired his accomplishments, and respected his abilities, which, though far superior in degree, were similar in kind to his own. Tissaphernes was of a temper the more readily to serve a friend, in proportion as he less needed his services. Alcibiades, therefore, carefully concealed from him the dangerous resentment of the Spartans. In the selfish breast of the Persian no attachment could be durable unless founded on interest; and Alcibiades, who had deeply studied his character, began to flatter his avarice, that he might ensnare his protection. He informed him, that by allowing the Peloponnesian sailors a drachma, or seven-pence sterling, of daily pay, he treated them with an useless and even dangerous liberality: that the pay given by the Athenians, even in the most flourishing times, amounted only to three oboli; which proceeded, not from a disinclination to reward the skill and valour of their seamen, but from an experience, that if

His conference with
Tissaphernes.

¹⁴ Plutarch, ii. 49. in Alcibiad.

¹⁵ Lycias in defence of Euphiletus, &c. p. 419.

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they received more than half a drachma each day, the superfluity would be squandered in such profligate pleasures as enfeebled and corrupted their minds and bodies, and rendered them equally incapable of activity and of discipline. Should the sailors prove dissatisfied with this equitable reduction, the Grecian character afforded an easy expedient for silencing their licentious clamours. It would be sufficient to bribe the naval commanders, and a few mercenary orators, and the careless improvident seamen would submit, without suspicion, the rate of their pay as well as every other concern, to the influence and authority of those who were accustomed to govern them¹⁶.

Persuades
him to diminish his subsidies to the Peloponnesians.

Tissaphernes heard this advice with the attention of an avaricious man to every proposal for saving his money; and so true a judgment had Alcibiades formed of the Greeks, that Hermocrates the Syracusan, was the only officer who disdained, meanly and perfidiously, to betray the interest of the men under his command: yet through the influence of his colleagues, the plan of œconomy was universally adopted, and, on a future occasion, Tissaphernes boasted that Hermocrates, though more coy, was not less corruptible than others, and that the only reason for which he undertook the patronage of the sailors, was to compel his own reluctance to comply with the exorbitance of his demands. This reproach illustrates the opinion entertained by foreign nations of Grecian virtue; but it is probably an aspersion on the fame of the illustrious Syracusan.

Alienates
him from the interest of
Sparta.

The intrigues of Alcibiades had sown jealousy and distrust in the Peloponnesian fleet: they had alienated the minds of the troops both from Tissaphernes and their commanders: the Persian was ready to forsake those whom he had learned to despise; and Alcibiades profited of this disposition to insinuate that the alliance of the Lacedæmonians was equally expensive and inconvenient for the

¹⁶ Thucyd. p. 584, & seq.

great king and his lieutenants. "That these haughty republicans were accustomed to take arms to defend the liberties of Greece, a design totally inconsistent with the views of the Persian court. If the Asiatic Greeks and islanders aspired at independence, and hoped to deliver themselves from Athenian governors and garrisons, without submitting to pay tribute to Persia, they ought to carry on the war at their own expence, since they would alone reap the benefit of its success. But if Tissaphernes purposed to recover the ancient possessions of his master, he must beware of giving a decided superiority to either party, especially to the warlike Spartans. By an attention to preserve the balance even, between the hostile republics, he would force them to exhaust each other. Amidst their domestic contests an opportunity would soon arrive, when Darius, without danger or expence, might crush both, and vindicate his just hereditary claim to the dominion of all Asia."

These artful representations produced almost an open breach between Tissaphernes and his confederates. The advantage which Athens would derive from this rupture might have paved the way for Alcibiades to return to his country: but he dreaded to encounter that popular fury, whose effects he had fatally experienced, and whose mad resentment no degree of merit could appease; he therefore applied secretly to Pisander, Theramenes, and other persons of distinction in the Athenian camp. To them he deplored the desperate state of public affairs, expatiated on his own credit with Tissaphernes, and insinuated that it might be yet possible to prevent the Phœnician fleet at Aspendus from sailing to assist the enemy. Assuming gradually more boldness, as he perceived the success of his intrigues, he finally declared that the Athenians might obtain not merely the neutrality, but perhaps the assistance of Artaxerxes, should they consent to abolish their turbulent democracy, so odious to the Persians, and entrust the administration of government to men worthy to negotiate with so mighty a monarch.

Alcibiades,
in order to
pave the way
for his return
to Athens,
conspires
against the
democracy.

When

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This measure had been already in agitation both in the city and in the camp.

When the illustrious exile proposed this measure, it is uncertain whether he was acquainted with the secret cabals which had been already formed, both in the city and in the camp, for executing the design which he suggested. The misfortunes, occasioned by the giddy insolence of the multitude, had thrown the principal authority into the hands of the noble and wealthy, who, corrupted by the sweets of temporary power, were desirous of rendering it perpetual. Many prompted by ambition, several moved by inconstancy, a few directed by a just sense of the incurable defects of democracy, were prepared to encounter every danger, that they might overturn the established constitution. In the third and most honourable class was Antiphon, a man of an exalted character, and endowed with extraordinary talents. The irresistible energy of his eloquence was suspected by the people. He appeared not in the courts of justice, nor in the assembly; but his artful and elaborate compositions often saved the lives of his friends. *He* was the invisible agent who governed all the motions of the conspiracy; and when compelled, after the ruin of his party, to stand trial for his life, he discovered an activity and force of mind that astonished the most discerning of his contemporaries¹⁷. Pisander, Theramenes, and the other leaders of the aristocratical party, warmly approved the views of Alcibiades. The Athenian soldiers, likewise, though they detested the impiety, admired the valour, of the illustrious exile, and longed to see him restored to the service of his country. All ranks lamented the dangerous situation of Athens; many thought that their affairs must become desperate, should Tissaphernes command the Phœnician fleet to co-operate with

¹⁷ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 600. A few lines above Thucydides describes the character of Antiphon with expressive energy: *αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίων τῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀρίστη τε βένος ὄρετος, καὶ κρατίστως ἐκτρέφόμενος γένεσσι, καὶ ἀ γένος, ἡλικίᾳ.* "An Athenian, in virtue second to no man then living, endowed with the greatest vigour of thought, and the greatest power of expression." Plutarch in the very inaccu-

rate and imperfect work, intitled, *The Lives of the Ten Orators*, tells us, that Antiphon was the first who wrote institutions of oratory; and that his pleadings were the most ancient that had come down to posterity. The character given by Plutarch of the writings of Antiphon agrees with the high commendation of Thucydides.

that of Peloponnesus; and many rejoiced in the prospect of a Persian alliance, in consequence of which they would enter at once into the pay of that wealthy satrap¹⁸.

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One man, the personal enemy of Alcibiades, alone opposed the general current. But this man was Phrynichus, whose prudent firmness as a commander we have already had occasion to remark. The courage with which he invited dangers many have equalled, but none ever surpassed the boldness with which he extricated himself from difficulties. When he perceived that his colleagues were deaf to every objection against recalling the friend of Tissaphernes, he secretly informed the Spartan admiral Aftyochus, of the intrigues which were carrying on to the disadvantage of his country. Daring as this treachery was, Phrynichus addressed a traitor not less perfidious than himself. Aftyochus was become the pensioner and creature of Tissaphernes, to whom he communicated the intelligence. The Persian again communicated it to his favourite Alcibiades, who complained in strong terms to the Athenians of the baseness and villainy of Phrynichus. The latter exculpated himself with consummate address; but as the return of Alcibiades might prove fatal to his safety, he ventured, a second time, to write Aftyochus, gently reproaching him with his breach of confidence, and explaining by what means he might surprise the whole Athenian fleet at Samos; an exploit that must for ever establish his fame and fortune. Aftyochus again betrayed the secret to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades; but before *their* letters could be conveyed to the Athenian camp, Phrynichus, who, by some unknown canal, was informed of this second treachery, anticipated the dangerous discovery, by apprising the Athenians of the enemy's design to surprise their fleet. They had scarcely employed the proper

Phrynichus
counterplots
Alcibiades.

¹⁸ What influence this consideration must have had, may be conjectured from the information of Andocides, Orat. iii. who says, that in the course of this war the Spartans

received, from their Persian allies, subsidies to the amount of five thousand talents, about a million sterling. The sum is prodigious, considering the value of money in that age.

means

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Progress of
the conspi-
racy against
the democra-
tical govern-
ment.

means to counteract that purpose when messengers came from Alcibiades to denounce the horrid perfidy of a wretch who had basely sacrificed to private resentment the last hope of his country. But the messengers arrived too late; the prior information of Phrynichus, as well as the bold and singular wickedness of his design, which no common degree of evidence was thought sufficient to prove, were sustained as arguments for his exculpation; and it was believed that Alcibiades had made use of a stratagem most infamous in itself, but not unexampled among the Greeks, for destroying a man whom he detested¹⁹.

The opposition of Phrynichus, though it retarded the designs of Alcibiades, prevented not the measures of Pisander and his associates for abolishing the democracy. The soldiers at Samos were induced, by the reasons above-mentioned, to acquiesce in the resolution of their generals. But a more difficult task remained; to deprive the people of Athens of their liberty, which, since the expulsion of the family of Pisistratus, they had enjoyed an hundred years. Pisander headed the deputation which was sent from the camp to the city to effect this important revolution. He acquainted the extraordinary assembly, summoned on that occasion in the theatre of Bacchus, of the measures which had been adopted by their soldiers and fellow-citizens at Samos. The compact band²⁰ of conspirators warmly approved the example; but loud murmurs of discontent resounded in different quarters of that spacious theatre. Pisander asked the reason of this disapprobation. "Had his opponents any thing better to propose? If they had, let them come forward and explain the grounds of their dissent: but, above all, let them explain how they could save themselves, their families, and their country, unless they

¹⁹ Thucyd. p. 587—590.

²⁰ Or rather bands, according to Thucydides. Pisander was at pains to gain over to his views τὰς συνωμοσίας, αὐτῶν στρατιῶν πολεμῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τῇ θάλασσᾳ καὶ ἀγροῖς.

"The factions or juntos already formed in Athens, with a view to thrust themselves into the seats of judicature and the great offices of state." Thucyd. p. 592.

omplied with the demand of Tissaphernes. The imperious voice of necessity was superior to law; and when the actual danger had ceased they might re-establish their ancient constitution." The opponents of Pisander were unable or afraid to reply: and the assembly passed a decree, investing ten ambassadors with full powers to treat with the Persian satrap.

Soon after the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet on the coast of Asia, the Spartan commanders had concluded, in the name of their republic, a treaty with Tissaphernes; in which it was stipulated, that the subsidies should be regularly paid by the king of Persia, and that the Peloponnesian forces should employ their utmost endeavours to recover, for that monarch, the dominions of his ancestors, which had been long unjustly usurped, and cruelly insulted, by the Athenians. This treaty seemed so honourable to the great king, that his lieutenant could not venture openly to infringe it. It is possible, that in the interval between his intrigues with Alcibiades, and the arrival of the Athenian ambassadors at Magnesia, the place of his usual residence, Tissaphernes might receive fresh instructions from his court to make good his agreement with the Spartans. Perhaps the crafty satrap never entertained any serious thoughts of an alliance with the Athenians, although he sufficiently relished the advice given him by Alcibiades to weaken both parties. But whatever motive determined him, it is certain that he shewed a disinclination to enter into any negotiation with the Athenian ambassadors. Alarmed at the decay of his influence with the Persians, on which he had built the flattering hopes of returning to his country, Alcibiades employed all the resources of his genius to conceal his disgrace. By solicitations, intreaties, and the meanest compliances, he obtained an audience for his fellow-citizens. As the agent of Tissaphernes, he then proposed the conditions on which they might obtain the friendship of the great king. Several demands were made, demands most disgraceful to the name of Athens: to all of which the

Negotiation
with Tissa-
phernes.
Olymp.
xcii. 1.
A. C. 412.

Artifices of
Alcibiades.

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ambassadors submitted. They even agreed to surrender the whole coast of Ionia to its ancient sovereign. But when the artful Athenian (fearful lest they should, on any terms, admit the treaty which Tissaphernes was resolved on no terms to grant) demanded that the Persian fleets should be allowed to sail, undisturbed, in the Grecian seas, the ambassadors, well knowing that should this condition be complied with, no treaty could hinder Greece from becoming a province of Persia, expressed their indignation in very unguarded language, and left the assembly in disgust. This imprudence enabled Alcibiades to affirm, with some appearance of truth, that their own anger and obstinacy, not the reluctance of Tissaphernes, had obstructed the negotiation, which was precisely the issue of the affair most favourable to his views²¹.

The democracy over-
turned in
Athens.
Olymp.
xcii. 2.
A. C. 411.

His artifices succeeded, but were not attended with the consequences expected from them. The Athenians, both in the camp and city, perceived, by this transaction, that his credit with the Persians was less than he represented it; and the aristocratical faction were glad to get rid of a man, whose restless ambition rendered him a dangerous associate. They persisted, however, with great activity, in executing their purpose; of which Phrynichus, who had opposed them only from hatred of Alcibiades, became an active abettor. When persuasion was ineffectual, they had recourse to violence. Androcles, Hyperbolus²², and other licentious demagogues were assassinated. The people of Athens, ignorant of the strength of the conspirators, and surprised to find in the number many whom they least suspected, were restrained by inactive timidity, or fluctuated in

²¹ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 593.

²² Thucydides paints his character in few words: 'ὑπερβολὸν τι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μηδ' ἔτι αὐτοῦ πιν ὠστρακισμῶν καὶ διὰ δουρατῶν καὶ ἀξιώματός φέροι, ἀλλὰ διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἀσχυρίαν τῆς πόλεως.

"One Hyperbolus, a worthless fellow, and banished by the ostracism, not from fear of

his power and dignity, but on account of his extreme profligacy, and his being a disgrace to the city." The ostracism was thought to be for ever disgraced by being applied to such an unworthy object, and thenceforth laid aside. See Plut. in Nicias, and Aristoph. in Pac. ver. 680.

doubtful

doubtful suspense. The cabal alone acted with union and with vigour; and difficult as it seemed to subvert the Athenian democracy, which had subsisted an hundred years with unexampled glory, yet this design was undertaken and accomplished by the enterprising activity of Pisander, the artful eloquence of Theramenes, the firm intrepidity of Phrynichus, and the superintending wisdom of Antiphon²³.

He it was who formed the plan, and regulated the mode of attack, which was carried on by his associates. In a deliberation concerning the means of retrieving the affairs of the public, Pisander proposed the electing of ten men, who should be charged with the important trust of preparing and digesting resolutions, to be on an appointed day laid before the assembly of the people. When the day arrived, the commissioners had but one resolution to propose: "That every citizen should be free to offer his opinion, however contrary to law, without fear of impeachment or trial;" a matter essential to the interests of the cabal, since by a strange contradiction in government the Athenian orators and statesmen were liable to²⁴ prosecution before the ordinary courts of justice, for such speeches and decrees as had been approved and confirmed by the assembly. In consequence of this act of indemnity, Pisander and his party boldly declared, that neither the spirit nor the forms of the established constitution (which had recently subjected them to such a weight of misfortunes) suited the present dangerous and alarming crisis. That it was necessary to new-model the whole fabric of government; for which purpose five persons (whose names he read) ought to be appointed by the people, to choose an hundred others; each of whom should select three associates; and the four hundred thus chosen, men of dignity and opulence, who would serve their country without fee or reward, ought immediately to be invested with the ma-

Government
of the four
hundred.

²³ Thucyd. *ibid.* & *Lyfias advers. Agorat.*

²⁴ By the *γραφῆν προσωπομαχίας*. See Vol. I. p. 466. Chap. xiii.

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jeſty of the republic. They alone ſhould conduct the adminiſtration uncontrouled, and aſſemble, as often as ſeemed proper, five thouſand citizens, whom they judged moſt worthy of being conſulted in the management of public affairs. This extraordinary propoſal was accepted without oppoſition: the partiſans of democracy dreaded the ſtrength of the cabal; and the undiſcerning multitude, dazzled by the impoſing name of five thouſand, a number far exceeding the ordinary aſſemblies of Athens, perceived not that they ſurrendered their liberties to the artifice of an ambitious faction ²⁵.

Their tyranny renders them odious.

But the conduct of the four hundred tyrants (for hiſtorians have juſtly adopted the language of Athenian reſentment) ſoon opened the eyes and underſtanding of the moſt thoughtleſs. They aboliſhed every veſtige of ancient freedom; employed mercenary troops levied from the ſmall iſlands of the Ægean, to overawe the multitude, and to intimidate, in ſome inſtances to deſtroy, their real or ſuſpected enemies. Inſtead of ſeizing the opportunity of annoying the Peloponneſians, enraged at the treachery of Tiſſaphernes, and mutinous for want of pay and ſubſiſtence, they ſent ambaffadors to ſolicit peace from the Spartans on the moſt diſhonourable terms. Their tyranny rendered them odious in the city, and their cowardice made them contemptible in the camp at Samos. Their cruelty and injuſtice were deſcribed, and exaggerated, by the fugitives who continually arrived in that iſland. The generous youth, employed in the ſea and land ſervice, were impatient of the indignities offered to their fellow-citizens. The ſame indignities might be inflicted on themſelves, if they did not vindicate their freedom. Theſe ſecret murmurs broke out into loud and licentious clamours, which were encouraged by the approbation of the Samians. Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, two officers of high merit and diſtinction though not actually

Their partiſans at Samos deſtroyed by Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus.

²⁵ Thucyd. & Lyſias, ubi ſupra.

entrusted with a share in the principal command²⁶, gave activity and boldness to the insurgents. The abettors of the new government were attacked by surprise: thirty of the most criminal were put to death, several others were banished, democracy was re-established in the camp, and the soldiers were bound by oath to maintain their hereditary government against the conspiracy of domestic foes, and to act with vigour and unanimity against the public enemy.

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Thrasybulus, who headed this successful and meritorious sedition, had a mind to conceive, a tongue to persuade, and a hand to execute, the most daring designs. He exhorted the soldiers not to despair of effecting in the capital the same revolution which they had produced in the camp. But should they fail in that design they ought no longer to obey a city which had neither wealth nor wisdom, neither supplies nor good counsel to send them. They were themselves more numerous than the subjects of the four hundred, and better provided in all things necessary for war. They possessed an island which had formerly contended with Athens for the command of the sea, and which, it was hoped, they might defend against every foe, foreign and domestic. But were they compelled to forsake it, they had still reason to expect that, with an hundred ships of war, and with so many brave men, they might acquire an establishment not less valuable elsewhere, in which they would enjoy, undisturbed, the invaluable possession of liberty. Their most immediate concern was to recal Alcibiades, who had been deceived and disgraced by the tyrants, and who not only felt with peculiar sensibility, but could resent with becoming dignity, the wrongs of his country and his own. The advice of Thrasybulus was approved; soon after he sailed to Magnesia, and returned in company with Alcibiades.

The former
conducts Alcibiades to
the Athenian camp.

²⁶ Neither generals nor admirals; for Thrasybulus only commanded a galley; and Thrasyllus served in the heavy-armed infantry, whether as an officer, or in the ranks, the expression leaves uncertain. The scholiast, however, considers *οπλασινοῦσι* as synonymous with *τῇ ἐπιπληρῇ ἀρχῇ*. Thucyd. p. 604.

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He addresses
his country-
men.

Near four years had elapsed since the eloquent son of Clinias had spoken in an Athenian assembly. Being presented by Thrasylbulus to his fellow-citizens, he began by accusing his fortune, and lamenting his calamities. " Yet his banishment ought not to affect him with permanent sorrow, since it had furnished him with an opportunity to serve the cause of his country. This event, otherwise unfortunate, had procured him the acquaintance and friendship of Tissaphernes; who, moved by his entreaties, had withheld the stipulated pay from the Peloponnesian forces, and who, he doubted not, would continue his good offices to the Athenians, supply them with every thing requisite for maintaining the war, and even summon the Phœnician fleet to their assistance." These were magnificent but flattering promises. In making them, Alcibiades however did not consult merely the dictates of vanity. They raised his credit with the army, who immediately saluted him general²⁷; they widened the breach between Tissaphernes and the Spartans; and they struck terror (when his speech got abroad) into the tyrants of Athens, who had provoked the resentment of a man capable to subvert their usurpation.

His message
to the ty-
rants.

Alcibiades left the care of the troops to his colleagues Thrasylbulus and Thrasyllus, and withdrew himself from the applauses of his admiring countrymen, on pretence of concerting with Tissaphernes the system of their future operations. But his principal motive was to shew himself to the Persian, in the new and illustrious character with which he was invested; for having raised his authority among the Athenians by his influence with the satrap, he expected to strengthen this influence by the support of that authority. Before he returned to the camp, ambassadors had been sent by the tyrants, to attempt a negociation with the partisans of de-

²⁷ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΗ—They associated him with the former commanders. But Thucydides immediately adds, καὶ τὰ πρᾶγματα ταῦτα ἀνετίθεσθαι, and referred every thing to his management, p. 609.

mocracy, who, inflamed by continual reports of the indignities and cruelties committed in Athens, prepared to sail thither to protect their friends, and take vengeance on their enemies. Alcibiades judiciously opposed this rash resolution, which must have left the Hellespont, Ionia, and the islands, at the mercy of the hostile fleet. But he commanded the ambassadors to deliver to their masters a short, but pithy message: "That they must divest themselves of their illegal power, and restore the ancient constitution. If they delayed obedience, he would sail to the Piræus, and deprive them of their authority and their lives²⁸."

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When this message was reported at Athens, it added to the disorder and confusion in which that unhappy city was involved. The four hundred, who had acted with unanimity in usurping the government, soon disagreed about the administration, and split into factions, which persecuted each other as furiously as both had persecuted the people²⁹. Theramenes and Aristocrates condemned and opposed the tyrannical measures of their colleagues. The perfidious Phrynichus was slain: both parties prepared for taking arms; and the horrors of a Corcyrean sedition were ready to be renewed in Athens, when the old men, the children, the women, and strangers, interposed for the safety of a city which had long been the ornament of Greece, the terror of Persia, and the admiration of the world³⁰.

Tumults in
Athens.

Had the public enemy availed themselves of this opportunity to assault the Piræus, Athens could not have been saved from immediate destruction. But the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus, long clamorous and discontented, had broken out into open mutiny, when they heard of the recall of Alcibiades, and the hostile intentions of Tissaphernes. To the duplicity of the satrap, and the treachery of their own captains, they justly ascribed the want of pay and subsistence, and all the misfortunes which they felt or


Mutiny in
the Pelopon-
nesian camp.

²⁸ Thucyd. *ibid.* & Plut. ii. 54. in Vit. Alcibiad.

²⁹ Lyfias adv. Agorat.

³⁰ Thucyd. p. 610.

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Amidst the
tumults in
Athens, the
Peloponne-
sian fleet ap-
pears on the
coast.

dreaded. Their resentment was violent and implacable. They destroyed the Persian fortifications in the neighbourhood of Miletus; they put the garrisons to the sword; their treacherous commander, Aftyochus, saved his life by flying to an altar; nor was the tumult appeased until the guilty were removed from their sight, and Myn-darus, an officer of approved valour and fidelity, arrived from Sparta to assume the principal command³¹.

The dreadful consequences which must have resulted to the Athe-nians, if, during the fury of their sedition, the enemy had attacked them with a fleet of an hundred and fifty sail, may be conceived by the terror inspired by a much smaller Peloponnesian squadron of only forty-two vessels, commanded by the Spartan Hegesandridas. The friends of the constitution had assembled in the spacious theatre of Bacchus. Messengers passed between them and the partisans of Antiphon and Pisander, who had convened in a distant quarter of the city. The most important matters were in agitation, when the alarm was given that some Peloponnesian ships had been seen on the coast. Both assemblies were immediately dissolved. All ranks of men hastened to the Piræus; manned the vessels in the harbour; launched others; and prepared thirty-six for taking the sea. When Hegesandridas perceived the ardent opposition which he must encounter in attempting to land, he doubled the pro-montory of Sunium, and sailed towards the fertile island of Eubœa, from which, since the fortification of Decelia, the Athenians had derived far more plentiful supplies than from the desolated territory of Attica. To defend a country which formed their principal re-source, they sailed in pursuit of the enemy, and observed them next day near the shore of Eretria, the most considerable town in the island.

Battle of
Eretria.

The Eubœans, who had long watched an opportunity to revolt, supplied the Peloponnesian squadron with all necessaries in abun-

³¹ Thucyd. p. 611.

dance;

dance; but instead of furnishing a market to the Athenians, they retired from the coast on their approach. The commanders were obliged to weaken their strength, by detaching several parties into the country to procure provisions; Hegesandridas seized this opportunity to attack them: most of the ships were taken; the crews swam to land; many were cruelly murdered by the Eretrians, from whom they expected protection; and such only survived as took refuge in the Athenian garrisons scattered over the island³².

The news of this misfortune were most alarming to the Athenians. Neither the invasion of Xerxes, nor even the defeat in Sicily, occasioned such terrible consternation. They dreaded the immediate defection of Eubœa; they had no more ships to launch; no means of resisting their multiplied enemies: the city was divided against the camp, and divided against itself. Yet the magnanimous firmness of Theramenes did not allow the friends of liberty to despair. He encouraged them to disburden the republic of its domestic foes, who had summoned, or who were at least believed to have summoned, the assistance of the Lacedæmonian fleet, that they might be enabled to enslave their fellow-citizens. Antiphon, Pisander, and others most obnoxious, seasonably escaped; the rest submitted. A decree was passed, recalling Alcibiades, and approving the conduct of the troops at Samos. The sedition ceased. The democracy, which had been interrupted four months, was restored; and such are the resources of a free government, that even this violent fermentation was not unproductive of benefit to the state. The Athenians completed whatever had been left imperfect in former reformations³³; and determined to defend, to the last extremity, the ancient glory of the republic.

Democracy
re-established
in Athens.
Olymp.
xcii. 2.
A. C. 411.

By

³² Thucyd. p. 622.

³³ The government was brought back to its original principles, as established by Solon. Among other salutary regulations, it was

enacted, that no one should receive a salary for any public magistracy. "And now," says Thucydides, "for the first time, in the present age at least, the Athenians modelled their

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The Athenians victorious at sea. Olymp. xcii. 2.
A. C. 411.

By the imprudent or perfidious conduct of their commanders, and the seditious spirit of their troops, the Peloponnesians lost a seasonable opportunity to terminate the war with equal advantage and honour; and having neglected the prosperous current of their fortune, they were compelled long and laboriously to strive against an unfavourable stream. The doubtful Tisaphernes hesitated between the part of an open enemy, or a treacherous ally; the Spartans, who had formerly rejected the friendship, now courted the protection, of his rival Pharnabazus; to whose northern province they sailed with the principal strength of their armament, leaving only a small squadron at Miletus, to defend their southern acquisitions. The Athenians, animated by the manly counsels of Thrasylbulus and Thrasyllus, the generous defenders of their freedom, proceeded northwards in pursuit of the enemy; and the important straits, which join the Euxine and Ægean seas, became, and long continued, the scene of conflict. In the twenty-first winter of the war, a year already distinguished by the dissolution and revival of their democracy, the Athenians prevailed in three successive engagements, the event of which became continually more decisive. In the first, which was fought in the narrow channel between Sestos and Abydos, the advantages were in some measure balanced, since Thrasylbulus took twenty Peloponnesian ships, with the loss of fifteen of his own. But the glory remained entire to the Athenians, who repelled the enemy, and offered to renew the battle³⁴. Not long afterwards, they intercepted a squadron of fourteen Rhodian vessels, near Cape Rhægium. The islanders defended themselves with their usual bravery. Myndarus beheld the engagement from the distance of eight miles, while he performed his morning devotions to Minerva in the

their government aright; and this enabled Athens again to raise her head.³ Thucyd. p. 623. It is remarkable, that neither Diodorus, Plutarch, nor any of the orators, make

the least mention of those salutary regulations, which, however, lasted not long after the return of Alcibiades.

³⁴ Thucyd. 1. viii. p. 626.

lofty

lofty temple of Ilium. Alarmed for the safety of his friends, he rushed from that sacred edifice, and hastened with great diligence to the shore, that he might launch his ships, and prevent, by speedy assistance, the capture or destruction of the Rhodians³⁵. The principal Athenian squadron attacked him near the shore of Abydus. The engagement was fought from morning till night, and still continued doubtful, when the arrival of eighteen galleys, commanded by Alcibiades, turned the scale of victory. The escape of the Peloponnesians was favoured by the bravery of Pharnabazus, who, at the head of his Barbarian troops, had been an impatient spectator of the combat. He gallantly rode into the sea, encouraging his men with his voice, his arm, and his example. The Spartan admiral drew up the greatest part of his fleet along the shore, and prepared to resist the assailants; but the Athenians, satisfied with the advantages already obtained, sailed to Sestos, carrying with them a valuable prize, thirty Peloponnesian galleys, as well as fifteen of their own, which they had lost in the former engagement. Thraſyllus was sent to Athens, that he might communicate the good news, and raise such supplies of men and money as could be expected from that exhausted city³⁶.

The Spartans yielded possession of the sea, which they hoped soon to recover, and retired to the friendly harbours of Cyzicus, to repair their shattered fleet; while the Athenians profited of the fame of their victory, and the terror of their arms, to demand contributions from the numerous and wealthy towns in that neighbourhood. The several divisions returned to Sestos, having met with very indifferent success in their design; nor, without obtaining more decisive and important advantages, could they expect to intimidate such strongly fortified places as Byzantium, Selembria, Perinthus, on the European, or Lampſacus, Parium, Chalcedon, on the Asiatic, coast. It was determined, therefore, chiefly by the advice of Alci-

Alcibiades
surprises, and
takes the
whole Pelopon-
nesian
fleet.

³⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. Diodor. xiii. p. 354.

³⁶ Id. *ibid.*

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The Athenians diligently improve their advantages. Olymp. xcii. 3.
A. C. 410.

biades, to attack the enemy at Cyzicus; for which purpose they sailed, with eighty gallees, to the small island of Proconnesus, near the western extremity of the Propontis, and ten miles distant from the station of the Peloponnesian fleet. Alcibiades surprised sixty vessels in a dark and rainy morning, as they were manœuvring at a distance from the harbour, and skilfully intercepted their retreat. As the day cleared up, the rest sailed forth to their assistance; the action became general; the Athenians obtained a complete victory, and their valour was rewarded by the capture of the whole Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan ships, which were burned, in the face of a victorious enemy, by the enterprising Hermocrates. The circumstances and consequences of this important action were related in few, but expressive words, to the Spartan senate, in a letter written by Hippocrates, the second in command, and intercepted by the Athenians: "All is lost; our ships are taken; Myndarus is slain; the men want bread; we know not what to do"²⁷."

The fatal disaster at Cyzicus prevented the Peloponnesians from obstructing, during the following year, the designs of the enemy, who took possession of that wealthy sea-port, as well as of the strong city Perinthus; raised a large contribution on Sclembria; and fortified Chrysopolis, a small town of Chalcedonia, only three miles distant from Byzantium. In this new fortress they placed a considerable body of troops; and guarded the neighbouring strait with a squadron of thirty sail, commanded by Theramenes and Eubulus, and destined to exact, as tribute, a tenth from all ships which sailed through the Bosphorus into the Euxine sea²⁸. The Peloponnesians were assisted by Pharnabazus in equipping a new

²⁷ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. & Plat. p. 60, in Alcibiad.

²⁸ It is well known, that Mahomet the Second obtained the same end, by fortifying two castles, one on the Asiatic, and another on the European side. That near to Chry-

sopolis is called by the modern Greeks Neocastron; but the name of the town itself is now changed to Scutari, a place deemed by the Turks one of the suburbs of Constantinople. TOURNEFORTE, Lettre 15.

fleet;

flect; but were deprived of the wise counsels of Hermocrates, whose abilities were well fitted both to prepare and to employ the resources of war. The success of the Asiatic expedition had not corresponded to the sanguine hopes of his countrymen; the insolent populace accused the incapacity of their commanders; and a mandate was sent from Syracuse, depriving them of their office, and punishing them with banishment. The conduct of Hermocrates is worthy of admiration. Having called an assembly, he deplored his hard fortune, but recommended the most submissive obedience to the authority of the republic. He then exhorted the sailors to name temporary commanders, till the arrival of those who had been appointed by their country. But the assembly, especially the captains and pilots, tumultuously called out, "That he and his colleagues ought to continue in the command." Hermocrates then conjured them "not to rebel against the government. When they should return home, they would then enjoy a fair opportunity to do justice to their admirals, by recounting the battles which they had won, by enumerating the ships which they had taken, and by relating how their own courage, and the conduct of their commanders, had entitled them to the most honourable place in every engagement by sea and land." At the earnest and unanimous entreaty of the assembly, he consented, however, to retain his authority, till the arrival of his successors. His colleagues imitated the example; and soon after this memorable scene, Demarchus, Mysco, and Potamis, the admirals named by the state, took the command of the Syracusan forces. Yet the soldiers and sailors would not allow their beloved leaders to depart, before taking in their presence a solemn oath to revoke their unjust banishment, whenever they themselves returned to Syracuse. On Hermocrates in particular, the captains and pilots bestowed many distinguished tokens of their affection and respect, which his behaviour had justly merited; for every morning and evening he had called them together, communicated his designs,

Admirable
behaviour of
Hermocrates
the Syra-
cusan.

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asked their opinion and advice, reviewed the past, and concerted the future, operations of the war; while his popular manners and condescending affability secured the love of those who respected his skill, his vigilance, and his courage¹⁹.

*Thrasylus, at first successful, is defeated in the battle of Ephesus. Olymp. xcii. 4. A. C. 409.

Meanwhile Thrasylus obtained at Athens the supplies which he had gone to solicit; supplies far more powerful than he had reason to expect. They consisted in a thousand heavy-armed men, an hundred horse, and fifty galleys, manned by five thousand experienced seamen. That the sailors might be usefully employed on every emergence at sea or land, they were provided with the small and light bucklers, the darts, swords, and javelins, appropriated to the Grecian targeteers, who, uniting strength and velocity, formed an intermediate and useful order between the archers and pikemen. With these forces, Thrasylus sailed to Samos, hoping to render the twenty-third campaign not less glorious than the preceding; and ambitious to rival, by his victories in the central and southern parts of the Asiatic coast, the fame acquired by Alcibiades and Thrasylus in the north. His first operations were successful. He took Colophon, with several places of less note, in Ionia; penetrated into the heart of Lydia, burning the corn and villages; and returned to the shore, driving before him a numerous body of slaves, and other valuable booty. His courage was increased by the want of resistance on the part of Tissaphernes, whose province he had invaded; of the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus; and of the revolted colonies of Athens. He resolved, therefore, to attack the beautiful and flourishing city of Ephesus, which was then the principal ornament and defence of the Ionic coast. While his soldiers, in separate divisions, were making their approaches to the walls of that place, the enemy assembled from every quarter to defend the majesty of Ephesian Diana. A vigorous sally of the townsmen increased the strength of Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians, the latter of whom had been

¹⁹ Xenoph. p. 431.

seasonably reinforced by a considerable squadron from Sicily. The Athenians were defeated, with the loss of three hundred men; and retiring from the field of battle, they sought refuge in their ships, and prepared to sail towards the Hellespont⁴⁰.

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During the voyage thither, they fell in with twenty Sicilian galleys, of which they took four, and pursued the rest to Ephesus. Having soon afterwards reached the Hellespont, they found the Athenian armament at Lampacus, where Alcibiades thought proper to muster the whole military and naval forces: but, on this occasion, the northern army gave a remarkable proof of pride or spirit. They, who had ever been victorious, refused to rank with the soldiers of Thrasyllus, who had been so shamefully foiled before the walls of Ephesus. They submitted, however, though not without reluctance, to live in the same winter-quarters; from which they made a conjunct expedition against Abydos. Pharnabazus defended the place with a numerous body of Persian cavalry. The disgraced troops of Thrasyllus rejoiced in an opportunity to retrieve their honour. They attacked, repelled, and routed the enemy. Their victory decided the fate of Abydos, and their courage was approved by the army of Alcibiades, who embraced them as fellow-soldiers and friends.

His soldiers
regain their
honour be-
fore the walls
of Abydos.

For several years the measures of the Athenians had been almost uniformly successful; but the twenty-fourth campaign was distinguished by peculiar favours of fortune. The invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians prevented that island from sending any effectual assistance to their Peloponnesian allies. The dangerous revolt of the Medes withheld the Persian reinforcements, which were necessary to support the arms of Pharnabazus⁴¹. Both nations were repeatedly defeated by the Athenians, driven from their encampments and fortresses near the shore, and pursued into the inland country, which was plundered and desolated by the victors. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which still declined sub-

Alcibiades
takes Byzantium. His
successes by sea
and land.
Olymp.
xciii. 1.
A. C. 408.

⁴⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 434.

⁴¹ Diodorus, l. xiii.

mission;

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mission; an undertaking in which Alcibiades displayed the wonderful resources of his extraordinary genius. By gradual approaches, by sudden assaults, by surprise, by treason, or by stratagem, he in a few months became master of Chalcedon, Selembria, and at last of Byzantium itself. His naval success was equally conspicuous. The Athenians again commanded the sea. The small squadrons fitted out by the enemy successively fell into their power; and these multiplied captures, which were made with little difficulty, accumulated the trophies of the well-fought battles, which we have already described. It was computed by the partisans of Alcibiades, that, since assuming the command, he had taken or destroyed two hundred Syracusan and Peloponnesian galleys; and his superiority of naval strength enabled him to raise such contributions, both in the Euxine and Mediterranean, as abundantly supplied his fleet and army with every necessary article of subsistence and accommodation⁴².

His triumphant return to Athens.
Olymp. xciii. 2.
A. C. 407.

While the Athenian arms were crowned with such glory abroad, the Attic territory was continually harassed by king Agis, and the Lacedæmonian troops posted at Decelia. Their bold and sudden incursions frequently threatened the safety of the city itself; the desolated lands afforded no advantage to the ruined proprietors; nor could the Athenians venture without their walls, to celebrate their accustomed festivals. Alcibiades, animated by his foreign victories, hoped to relieve the domestic sufferings of his country; and after an absence of many years, distinguished by such a variety of fortune, eagerly longed to revisit his native city, and to enjoy the rewards and honours usually bestowed by the Greeks on successful valour. This celebrated voyage, which several ancient historians studiously decorated with every circumstance of naval triumph⁴³, was performed in the twenty-fifth summer of the war. Notwithstanding all his services, the cautious son of Clinias, instructed by

⁴² Xenoph. Hellen. Diodor. l. xiii. Plut. in Alcibiad.

⁴³ Duris apud Plut. in Alcibiad.

adversity, declined to land in the Piræus, until he was informed that the assembly had repealed the decrees against him, formally revoked his banishment, and prolonged the term of his command. Even after this agreeable intelligence he was still unable to conquer his well-founded distrust of the variable and capricious humours of the people; nor would he approach the crowded shore, till he observed, in the midst of the multitude, his principal friends and relations inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidst the universal acclamations of the spectators, who, unattentive to the naval pomp, and regardless of the other commanders, fixed their eyes only on Alcibiades. Next day an extraordinary assembly was summoned, by order of the magistrates, that he might explain and justify his apparent misconduct, and receive the rewards due to his acknowledged merit. The public anticipated his apology, by contrasting the melancholy situation of affairs, when Alcibiades assumed the command, with the actual condition of the republic. "At the former period Athens yielded the command of the sea: the enemy were every where victorious; the state was oppressed by foreign war, torn by sedition, without resources, and without hope. The address and dexterity of Alcibiades were alone capable to have disunited the councils, to have weakened and afterwards repelled the efforts, of a powerful confederacy; his activity and courage could alone have animated the dejection of the citizens to pursue the measures of offensive war: his abilities, his virtue, and his fortune, could alone have rendered those measures successful."

Before judges so favourably disposed to hear him, Alcibiades found no difficulty to make his defence; but it was difficult both for him and his friends to moderate the excessive transports of the people, who would have loaded their favourite with honours incompatible with the genius of a free republic, and which

His reception there.

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{

might, therefore, have proved dangerous to his future safety. He received, with pleasure, the crowns and garlands, with other accustomed pledges of public gratitude and admiration; but he respectfully declined the royal sceptre, expressing a firm resolution to maintain the hereditary freedom of his country⁴⁴. Athens required not a king, but a general with undivided power, capable of restoring the ancient splendour of the commonwealth. To this illustrious rank, which had been filled by Themistocles and Cimon, the son of Clinias might justly aspire. He was appointed commander in chief by sea and land⁴⁵. An hundred galleys were equipped, and transports were prepared for fifteen hundred heavy-armed men, with a proportional body of cavalry.

The Eleu-
sian mythe-
ries.

Several months⁴⁶ had passed in these preparations, when the Eleusian festival approached; a time destined to commemorate and to diffuse the temporal and spiritual gifts of the goddess Ceres, originally bestowed on the Athenians, and by them communicated to the rest of Greece⁴⁷. Corn, wine, and oil were the principal production of Attica; each of which had been introduced into that country by the propitious intervention of a divinity, whose festival was distinguished by appropriated honours. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was regarded as far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable solemnities. Various also were the professions of gratitude expressed, in stated days of the spring and autumn, to the generous

⁴⁴ Com. Isocrat. Orat. pro Alcibiad. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

⁴⁵ *Ἀρχὴν ἀνατὸν ἡγεμὸν αὐτοκράτην.*
“He was chosen absolute commander of all.” Xenoph. p. 140.

⁴⁶ For the festivals Plynteria and Eleusinia, mentioned in the text, it appears that he arrived in July, and sailed in November.

⁴⁷ *Eleusina* apud Gronov. Thefaur. has collected all the passages in ancient writers

respecting this festival. It is said to have been celebrated in the month Boedromion, which, according to Father Petaut, answers to our November. But as the Attic year was Lunar, the months of that year could not exactly correspond to those of ours. In the computation of their months, the Greeks agreed not with other nations, nor even among themselves. Vid. Plut. in Vit. Romul. & Aristid.

author of the vine. The worship of Ceres returned, indeed, less frequently; but was partly, on that account, the more solemn and awful; and partly, because distinguished by the Eleusinian mysteries, those hidden treasures of wisdom and happiness, which were poured out on the initiated in the temple of Eleusis. Fourteen⁴⁸ centuries before the Christian era, the goddess, it is said, communicated these invaluable rites to Eumelus and Keryx, two virtuous men, who had received her in the form of an unknown traveller with pious hospitality⁴⁹. Their descendants, the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, continued the ministers and guardians of this memorable institution, which was finally abolished by the great Theodosius, after it had lasted eighteen hundred years⁵⁰. The candidates for the initiation were prepared by watching, abstinence, sacrifice, and prayer; and before revealing to them the divine secrets, the most awful silence was enjoined them. Yet enough transpired among the prophane vulgar to enable us still to collect, from impartial⁵¹ and authentic testimony, that the mysteries of Ceres expressed by external signs the immortality of the human soul, and the rewards prepared in a future life for the virtuous servants of heaven. The secrecy enjoined by her ministers, so unworthy the truths which they taught, might justify the indifference of Socrates⁵², whose doctrines, not less divine, were inculcated with un-

⁴⁸ Marb. Arund. Epoch 14.

⁴⁹ Diodor. l. v. Isocrat. Panegy. Polux, l. viii. c. ix.

⁵⁰ Lozim. Hist. l. iv.

⁵¹ I say *impartial*, because Isocrates, the scholar of Socrates, cannot be supposed to exaggerate the merit of ceremonies, which his master is said to have despised. The passage is remarkable: "Though what I am going to relate may be disfigured by tradition and fable, the substance of it is not the less deserving of your regard. When Ceres travelled to Attica in quest of her daughter, she received the most hospitable treatment, and those particular good offices

which are known to the initiated. The goddess was not ungrateful for such favours, but in return conferred on our ancestors the two most valuable presents which either heaven can bestow, or mankind can receive; the practice of agriculture, which delivered us from the fierce and precarious manner of life, common to us with wild animals; and the knowledge of those sacred mysteries which fortify the initiated against the terrors of death, and inspire them with the pleasing hopes of an happy immortality. See Panegy. p. 24. & Euseb. Præpar. Evang. l. iii.

⁵² Laert. in Diogene.

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reserved freedom. But the fate of Socrates may justify, in its turn, the circumspection of the Hierophants of Ceres.

Alcibiades
conducts the
Eleusinian
procession.

Besides the mysterious ceremonies of the temple, the worship of that bountiful goddess was celebrated by vocal and instrumental music, by public shows, and exhibitions, which continued during several days, and above all, by the pompous procession, which marched for ten miles along the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis⁵². This important part of the solemnity had formerly been intermitted, because the Athenians, after the loss of Decelia, were no longer masters of the road, and were compelled, contrary to established custom, to proceed by sea to the temple of Ceres. Alcibiades determined to wipe off the stain of impiety which had long adhered to his character, by renewing, in all its lustre, this venerable procession. He prepared to defend, by an armed force, the peaceful ministers and votaries of the gods, persuaded that the Spartans would either allow them to pass undisturbed, which must lessen the military fame of that people, or, if they attempted to interrupt the ceremony, must be exposed not only to the dangerous resistance of men animated by enthusiasm, but to the disgraceful charge of irreligion, and the general detestation of Greece. The priests, the heralds, and the whole body of the initiated, were apprised of his intention, and requested to hold themselves in readiness by the appointed day. Early in the morning the cavalry explored the adjoining country; the eminences were occupied by the light infantry and targeteers; and, after sufficient garisons had been left to defend the Athenian walls and fortresses, the whole body of heavy-armed troops were drawn out to protect the Eleusinian procession, which marched along the usual road towards the temple, and afterwards returned to Athens, without suffering any molestation from the Lacedæmo-

⁵² Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv. & Plat. in Alcibiad.

nians; having united, on this occasion alone, all the splendour of war with the pomp of superstition⁵⁴.

Soon after this meritorious enterprise, Alcibiades prepared to sail for Lesser Asia, accompanied by the affectionate admiration of his fellow-citizens, who flattered themselves that the abilities and fortune of their commander would speedily reduce Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, and the other revolted cities and islands. The general alacrity, however, was somewhat abated by the reflection, that the arrival of Alcibiades in Athens coincided with the anniversary of the Plynteria⁵⁵, a day condemned to melancholy idleness, from a superstitious belief that nothing undertaken on that day could be brought to a prosperous conclusion. The celebrated Parthenon, whose remains still attest the magnificence of Pericles, was consecrated by the presence of a goddess, who realized the inspirations of Homer, as far as they were capable of being expressed by the genius of Phidias. Minerva, composed of gold and ivory, and twenty-six cubits high, was represented with the casque, the buckler, the lance, and all her usual emblems; and the warm fancy of the Athenians, enlivened and transported by the graceful majesty of her air and aspect, confounded the painful production of the statuary with the instantaneous creation of Jupiter. To confirm this useful illusion the crafty priests of the temple carefully washed and brightened the image, whose extraordinary lustre increased the veneration of the multitude. The Plynteria, during which this ceremony was performed, required uncommon secrecy and circumspection. The eyes and imagination of the vulgar might have become too familiar with their revered goddess, had they beheld her stripped of her accustomed ornaments, and observed every part of her form brightening into new beauty under the plastic hands of the priests. To prevent

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His glory
clouded by
the inauspi-
cious return
of the Plyn-
teria.

⁵⁴ Plut. in Alcibiad.

⁵⁵ Πλυνειν, to wash; πλυντηζ, πλυντηριος; and in the plural neuter, "the ceremony of ablution."

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this dangerous consequence, the Plynteria was veiled in mystic obscurity; the doors of the temple were shut; that sacred edifice was surrounded on all sides to intercept the approach of indiscretion or profanity; and the return of Alcibiades, the favourite hope of his country, happening on the inauspicious day when Minerva hid her countenance, was believed by many to announce the dreadful calamities which soon afterwards befel the republic⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ Xenoph. p. 438, & Plut. in Alcibiad.

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Character of Lyfander.—His Conference with Cyrus.—He defeats the Athenian Fleet.—Disgrace of Alcibiades.—Lyfander fucceeded by Callicratidas.—His Tranfactions with the Perfians—with the Spartan Allies.—Battle of Arginuffæ.—Trial of the Athenian Admirals.—Eteonicus checks a Mutiny of the Peloponnefian Troops.—Lyfander refumes the Command.—Battle of Ægos Potamos.—Spartan Empire in Afia.—Siege and Surrender of Athens.—Humiliation of the Athenians.

WHILE the fuperflitious multitude trembled at the imaginary anger of Minerva, men of reflection and experience dreaded the activity and valour of Lyfander, who, during the refidence of Alcibiades at Athens, had taken the command of the Peloponnefian forces in the Eaft. The forms of the Spartan conftitution required a rapid fucceffion of generals; a circumftance, which, amidft the numerous inconveniencies with which it was attended, enlarged the fphere of military competition, and multiplying the number of actors on the theatre of war, afforded an opportunity for the difplay of many illuftrious characters, which muft otherwife have remained in obfcurity. In the rotation of annual elections, offices of importance and dignity will often be entrusted to men unworthy to fill them; but in the vaft variety of experiments, abilities of the moft diftinguifhed order (if any fuch exift

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Lyfander
takes the
command of
the Peloponne-
fian forces
in the Eaft.
Olymp.
xciii. 2.
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in

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in the community) must some time be called into exertion, honoured with confidence, and armed with authority.

His character.

Such abilities the Spartans finally discovered in Lyfander; a shoot of the Herculean stock, but not descended from either of the royal branches. He had been educated with all the severity of Spartan discipline; and having spent his youth and his manhood in those honourable employments¹ which became the dignity of his birth, he approached the decline of life, when his superior merit recommended him to the chief command in a season of public danger. Years had added experience to his valour, and enlarged the resources, without abating the ardour, of his ambitious mind. In his transactions with the world, he had learned to soften the harsh asperity of his national manners; to gain by fraud what could not be effected by force; and, in his own figurative language, to “eke out the lion’s with the fox’s skin”. This mixed character admirably suited the part which he was called to act. His enterprising courage was successfully exerted in the hostile operations against the Greeks; his subtle and insinuating address gave him an ascendant in every negotiation with the Persians; and the re-union of those various qualities enabled him, in a few years, finally to terminate the war, and to produce an important and permanent revolution in the affairs of Athens, of Sparta, and of Greece.

His conference with Cyrus.
Olymp. xciii. 2.
A. C. 407.

Since the decisive action at Cyzicus, the Peloponnesians, unable to resist the enemy, had been employed in preparing ships on the coast of their own peninsula, as well as in the harbours of their Persian and Grecian allies. The most considerable squadrons had been equipped in Cos, Rhodes, Miletus, and Ephesus; in the last of which the whole armament, amounting to ninety sail, was collected by

¹ He had served in the army and navy; had been employed as ambassador in foreign states, &c. Plut. in Lyfander.

² This was said, in allusion to the lion’s skin of Hercules, to one who asked Lyfander,

“How he, who sprang from that hero, could condescend to conquer his enemies by fraud?” His character is diffusely described by Plutarch, t. iii. p. 4—15.

Lyfander. But the afsembling of fuch a force was a matter of little confequence, unlefs proper meafures fhould be taken for holding it together, and for enabling it to act with vigour. It was neceffary, above all, to fecure pay for the feamen; for which purpofe, Lyfander, accompanied by feveral Lacedæmonian ambaffadors, repaired to Sardis, to congratulate the happy arrival of Cyrus, a generous and valiant youth of feventeen, who had been entrusted by his father Darius with the government of the inland parts of Leffer Asia; or, in the language of the Perfian court, with the command of the numerous troops, who rendezvoused in the plains of Kaftolus³. Lyfander complained to the young and magnanimous prince, “of the perfidious duplicity of Tiffaphernes, by which the Athenians had been enabled to re-affume that afcendant in the Eaft, which had formerly proved fo dangerous and difgraceful to the Perfian name. That fatrap feemed, on one occafion indeed, to have difcovered the fatal tendency of his meafures; and had attempted to check the victorious career of thofe ambitious republicans, by feizing the perfon of Alcibiades⁴. Pharnabazus had more effectually ferved the caufe of his mafter, by his active valour in the field; by detaining the Athenian ambaffadors, who had been fent to furprife the unfufpecting generofity of Darius⁵; and by fupplying the Peloponnefians, after the unfortunate engagement at Cyzicus, with the means of preparing a new fleet, and with the neceffaries and conveniencies of life,

³ This was the ftyle of the letter, confirmed by the royal feal. Κατατίμω Κυρον παρὰν τῶν ἐς Καρὼν ἀφειζόμενον. Xenoph. p. 438.

⁴ This event, which happened in the twenty-firft year of the war, is related by Xenophon, p. 429. It was omitted in the text, becaufe Alcibiades foon effected his efcape; and the treachery of Tiffaphernes only difplayed his own worthleffnefs, without hurting his enemies.

⁵ This difhonourable tranfaction was ap-

proved even by Cyrus, which fhews the difregard of the Perfians to the laws of nations. He begged Pharnabazus to put the Athenians in his hands; at leaft, not to fet them at liberty, that their countrymen might be ignorant of the meafures in agitation againft them. But a remorse of confcience feized Pharnabazus, who had fworn, either to conduct the ambaffadors to the great king, or to fend them to the Ionian coaft; in confequence of which, the Athenians were releafed. Xenoph. p. 438.

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while they were employed in this useful undertaking. But Tissaphernes was unwilling, and Pharnabazus was perhaps unable, to discharge the stipulated pay, without which the Grecian seamen and foldiers could not be kept together, or engaged to act with vigour against the common enemy." Cyrus replied, "That he had been commanded by his father to assist the Lacedæmonians, and to pay their troops with the most exact punctuality. That, for this purpose, he had carried with him five hundred talents (near an hundred thousand pounds sterling); and if such a sum should be found insufficient, he would willingly expend his private fortune, and even melt down and coin into money the golden throne on which he sat."

The pay of
the Grecian
sailors, and
complement
of their ships.

This discourse gave extraordinary satisfaction to his Grecian auditors; and Lyfander endeavoured to avail himself of what, judging by his own character, he imagined might be nothing more than a sudden transport of generosity, by requesting that the seamen's pay might be raised from three oboli to an Attic drachma a day. Cyrus answered, "That, on this subject too, he had received express orders from his father⁷. That the pay should continue on the ancient footing, and the Peloponnesians regularly receive thirty minæ (above ninety pounds sterling) a month, for every ship which they fitted out." Lyfander acquiesced at present, determining to seize the first favourable opportunity to renew his petition. But this instructive conversation may enable us to discover an important matter of fact omitted by historians. As the military and naval officers of the Greeks were not distinguished above the common men by the excessive inequality of their appointments, we may compute, from the

* Και τοι θρονον κατακοψαι, εν ᾧ καθίητο, οἷα κερκυρη και χρυσον. Literally, "that he would cut in pieces the throne on which he sat," which was composed of silver and gold.

⁷ Xenophon makes Cyrus answer with more art than truth, "ὃ δὲ καλῶς μιν ἐφη αὐτῷ;

λεγειν, οὐ δυνατον δι' ἡμῶν παρ' ἡ Γραμμοῦ; ἐπεριδῶν αὐτον αλλα ποιειν." Cyrus answered, "that they (Lyfander and the Lacedæmonian ambassadors) spoke very reasonably, but that he could not act otherwise than he was commanded by his father."

monthly

monthly sum of thirty minæ, distributed at the rate of three oboli of daily pay, that the complement of each ship amounted to about two hundred and forty sailors; so that a fleet of ninety sail employed twenty-one thousand and six hundred men.

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Before Lyfander returned to Ephesus, he was invited by the Persian prince to a magnificent entertainment, at which, according to the custom of the age, the most serious matters were discussed amidst the freedom and intemperance of the table. This was a seasonable occasion for displaying the arts of insinuation and flattery, in which the Spartan was a complete master. He represented, without moderation, and without decency, the injustice and incapacity of Tissaphernes, who, as he was naturally the rival, might be suspected soon to become the personal enemy of Cyrus. He magnified the beauty, the strength, and the courage, of the young prince. His address in military exercises, and the extraordinary endowments of his mind (the fame of which had reached the most distant countries), were extolled with the most elaborate praise. It is not improbable that he might find a topic of panegyric in a quality of which Cyrus was not a little vain; the capacity of bearing, without intoxication, a greater quantity of liquor than any of his equals^a; and he might possibly suggest, that of all the sons of Darius, Cyrus was the best qualified to succeed his father, to fill with dignity the Persian throne, and to emulate the glory of that illustrious hero whose name he bore, the immortal founder of the monarchy. But whatever were the topics of which he made use, it is certain that he excited the warmest emotions of friendship in the youthful breast of Cyrus, who drinking his health, after the Persian fashion, desired him to ask a boon, with full assurance that nothing should be denied him. Lyfander replied, with his usual address, "That he should ask what it would be no less useful for the prince to give, than for him to receive: the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the mariners; an aug-

Lyfander is entertained at Sardis by the Persian prince.

His address in procuring an addition to the seamen's pay.

^a Plut. Sympoſ.

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Defeats the
Athenian
fleet in the
absence of
Alcibiades.
Olymp.
xciii. 2.
A. C. 407.

mentation which, by inducing the Athenian crews to desert, would not only increase their own strength, but enfeeble the common enemy." Struck with the apparent disinterestedness of this specious proposal, Cyrus ordered him immediately ten thousand Daricks (above five thousand pounds sterling); with which he returned to Ephesus, discharged the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, raised their daily allowance, and seduced innumerable deserters from the Athenian fleet⁹.

While Lyfander was usefully employed in manning his ships, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the small island of Andros. The resistance was more vigorous than he had reason to expect; and the immediate necessity of procuring pay and subsistence for the fleet, obliged him to leave his work imperfect. With a small squadron he failed to raise contributions on the Ionian or Carian coast¹⁰, committing the principal armament to Antiochus, a man totally unworthy of such an important trust¹¹. Even the affectionate partiality of Alcibiades seems to have discerned the unworthiness of his favourite, since he gave him strict orders to continue, during his own absence, in the harbour of Samos, and by no means to risk an engagement. This injunction, as it could not prevent the rashness, might perhaps provoke the vain levity of the vice-admiral, who, after the departure of his friend, sailed towards Ephesus, approached the sterns of Lyfander's ships, and with the most licentious insults challenged him to battle. The prudent Spartan delayed the moment of attack, until the presumption of the enemy had thrown them into scattered disorder¹². He then commanded the Peloponnesian squadrons to advance. His manœuvres were judicious, and

⁹ Plut. tom. iii. p. 7. Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 441. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 360.

¹⁰ Xenophon says, "Alcibiades failed to Phœcea," which is in Ionia; Plutarch says, "to the coast of Caria."

¹¹ Diodorus gives his character in few

words: "Ὁ δὲ Ἀντιόχος ἐν τῇ φρεσὶ προχέρος, καὶ σπεύδων διὰ ἑαυτοῦ τι πράξει λαμπρὸν." "Antiochus, naturally precipitate, and desirous, by himself, to perform some splendid exploit."

¹² "Δυσπαρηγίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ." Xenoph. p. 441.

executed with a prompt obedience. The battle was not obstinate, as the Athenians, who scarcely expected any resistance, much less assault, sunk at once from the insolence of temerity into the despondency of fear. They lost fifteen vessels, with a considerable part of their crews. The remainder retired disgracefully to Samos; while the Lacedæmonians profited of their victory by the taking of Eion and Delphinium. Though fortune thus favoured the prudence of Lysander, he declined to venture a second engagement with the superior strength of Alcibiades, who, having resumed the command, employed every artifice and insult that might procure him an opportunity to restore the tarnished lustre of the Athenian fleet.

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But such an opportunity never occurred to *him*. The people of Athens, who expected to hear of nothing but victories and triumphs, were mortified to the last degree, when they received intelligence of such a shameful defeat. As they could not suspect the abilities, they distrusted the fidelity, of their commander. Their suspicions were increased and confirmed by the arrival of Thrasylbulus¹³, who, whether actuated by a laudable zeal for the interest of the public service, or animated by a selfish jealousy of the fame and honours that had been so liberally heaped on a rival, formally impeached Alcibiades in the Athenian assembly. "His misconduct had totally ruined the affairs of his country. A talent for low buffoonery was a sure recommendation to his favour. His friends were, partially, selected from the meanest and most abandoned of men, who possessed no other merit than that of being subservient to his passions. To such unworthy instruments the fleet of Athens was entrusted;

Alcibiades
accused and
disgraced.

¹³ Thrasylbulus, we have seen, had a principal share in bringing about the recall of Alcibiades. Nor was the latter ungrateful to his benefactor. When the Athenians committed to him their whole military and naval force, "ἀπασι τοῖς δυνάμει," and allowed him to name his own colleagues, or rather substitutes, he named Thrasylbulus and Adimantus. Diod.

l. xiii. p. 368. Considering this interchange of good offices between Alcibiades and Thrasylbulus, it is remarkable that no Greek writer assigns any reason for the animosity that soon afterwards broke out between them. Plutarch says, that Thrasylbulus was the bitterest of Alcibiades's enemies, and imputes his accusation of him to enmity, not to patriotism.

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while the commander in chief revelled in debauchery with the harlots of Abydos and Ionia, or raised exorbitant contributions on the dependent cities, that he might defray the expence of a fortress on the coast of Thrace, in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, which he had erected to shelter himself against the just vengeance of the republic."

Ten commanders appointed in his stead.

Were it necessary to prove by examples the deceitful emptiness of popular favour, this subject might be copiously illustrated by the history of the Athenians. The same man, whom a few months before they found it impossible sufficiently to reward, was actually exposed to the rage of disappointment, and the fury of revenge. They regretted the loss of every moment which intervened between the rapid progress of their resentment, and the execution of their vengeance. In the same assembly, and on the same day, Alcibiades was accused, and almost unanimously condemned; and, that the affairs of the republic might not again suffer by the abuse of undivided power, ten commanders were substituted in his room; among whom were Thrasylus, Leon, Diomedon, whose approved valour, and love of liberty, justly recommended them to public honours; Conon, a character as yet but little known, but destined, in a future period, to eclipse the fame of his contemporaries; and Pericles, who inherited the name, the merit, and the bad fortune, of his illustrious father. The new generals immediately sailed to Samos; and Alcibiades sought refuge in his Thracian fortress¹⁴.

Callicratidas sent to command the Peloponnesian fleet.

Olymp. xciii. 3.
A. C. 406.

They had scarcely assumed the command, when an important alteration took place in the Peloponnesian fleet. Lyfander's year had expired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of a very opposite character, was sent to succeed him. The active, ambitious, and intriguing temper of the former had employed as much assiduous and systematic policy during the short term of his precarious power, as if his

¹⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. sub fin. Diodor. xiii. 67—74.

authority had never been to end. Though endowed with uncommon vigour of mind, and with consummate prudence (if prudence can belong to a character deficient in justice and humanity), he possessed not those amiable and useful qualities which alone deserve, and can alone obtain, public confidence and respect. Lyfander, sensible of this imperfection, had recourse to the ordinary expedient by which crafty ambition supplies the want of virtue. He determined to govern by parties¹⁵. The boldest of the sailors were attached to his person by liberal rewards and more liberal promises. The soldiers were indulged in the most licentious disorders. In every city and in every island Lyfander had his partisans, whom he flattered with the hopes of obtaining the same authority over their fellow-citizens, which the Spartans enjoyed over the inferior ranks of men in Laconia¹⁶.

It was the general expectation at Ephesus, that the Spartans would, for once, depart from established practice, in order to prolong the command of such an able and successful officer. An universal clamour arose, when Callicratidas displayed his commission in the council of the confederates. The friends of Lyfander affirmed, "That it was equally imprudent and ungenerous to check the victorious career of a deserving and fortunate commander; that the important charge of the fleet ought not to be entrusted to men who were destitute of experience, and perhaps of abilities; nor would it be just to sacrifice the interest of such a numerous and powerful confederacy to a punctilious observance of the Lacedæmonian laws." Lyfander maintained a decent silence concerning the character of his successor, only observing that he resigned to him a fleet which commanded the sea. The noisy acclamations of the assembly confirmed his assertion.

His insolent
reception.

¹⁵ His maxims breathed the odious party spirit. "That it is impossible to do too much good to friends, or *too much evil to enemies*. That children are to be deceived by trinkets, men by oaths, and others equally flagitious." Plut. in Lyfand.

¹⁶ Idem. *ibid.* & Xenoph. Hellen.

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His honesty
and firmness
confounds
the partisans
of Lyfander.

But Callicratidas had a heart untainted with reproach, and incapable of fear. Unabashed by the seditious turbulence of his opponents, he replied, That he must withhold his assent to the magnified superiority of the Peloponnesian fleet, unless Lyfander should set sail from Ephesus, coast along the isle of Samos (where the Athenians then lay) and surrender his victorious squadrons in the harbour of Miletus. The pride of Lyfander might have been confounded by this judicious and solid observation; but his ingenuity suggested a plausible or rather an elusive reply, "That he was no longer admiral."

Callicratidas then addressed the assembly, with the manly simplicity of an honest heart, which disdains the artifice of words, defies the insolence of power, and defeats the intrigues of policy. "Lacedæmonians and allies, I should have been contented to stay at home; nor does it greatly affect me that Lyfander, or any other, should be held a better seaman than myself. Hither I have been sent by my countrymen to command the fleet, and *my* chief concern is to execute their orders, and to perform my duty. It is my earnest desire to promote the public interest; but you can best inform me whether I ought to continue here or to return to Sparta." Wonderful is the power of honest intentions and unaffected firmness. The assembly listened with admiration; the partisans of Lyfander were abashed; none ventured to object; and, after a considerable pause, all unanimously acknowledged that it became both Callicratidas and themselves to obey the orders of the Spartan government¹⁷.

He meets the
arrogance of
the Persians
with equal
contempt.

Lyfander, not a little mortified by the language of the assembly, reluctantly resigned his employment; but determined to render it painful, and, if possible, too weighty for the abilities of his successor. For this purpose he returned to the court of Cyrus, to whom he restored a considerable sum of money still unexpended in the ser-

¹⁷ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. v. & seqq. & Plut. in Lyfand.

vice of the Grecian fleet, and to whom he misrepresented, under the names of obstinacy, ignorance, and rusticity, the unaffected plainness, the downright sincerity, and the other manly, but uncomplying, virtues of the generous Callicratidas. When that commander repaired to Sardis to demand the stipulated pay, he could not obtain admission to the royal presence. The first time that he went to the palace he was told that Cyrus was at table. It is well, said the unceremonious Spartan, I will wait till he has dined. The simplicity of this proceeding, confirmed the opinion which Lyfander had given the Persians of his character; and his honest frankness, which was construed into low breeding, seemed a proper object of ridicule to the proud retainers of the court. He returned on another occasion, but without being admitted to see the young prince. The injustice of this treatment might have deserved his resentment, but it chiefly excited his contempt. He left the royal city, despising the pride and perfidy of his Persian allies, whose accidental importance depended on the precarious advantage of riches, and lamenting the domestic dissensions of the Greeks, which obliged them to court the favour of insolent Barbarians.

But Callicratidas could not, with honour or safety, return to the fleet at Ephesus, without having collected money to supply the immediate wants of the sailors. He proceeded, therefore, to Miletus and other friendly towns of Ionia; and having met the principal citizens, in their respective assemblies, he explained openly and fully the mean jealousy of Lyfander, and the disdainful arrogance of Cyrus¹⁸. "The unjust behaviour of both compelled him, much against his inclination, to have recourse to the confederate cities (already too much burdened) for the money requisite to support the war. But he assured them, that, should his arms prove successful, he would

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Obtains voluntary contributions from the Ionians.

¹⁸ It will appear, in the sequel, that Callicratidas had formed a very false opinion of the Persian prince, whose neglect of a worthy man was occasioned by the perfidious suggestions of his retainers, the friends or creatures of Lyfander.

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repay their favours with gratitude. Their own interest required a cheerful compliance with his demands, since the expedition had been principally undertaken to vindicate their freedom. He had, however, sent messengers to require effectual supplies from Sparta; but until these should arrive, it became the Greeks in general, but especially the Ionians, who had suffered peculiar injuries from the usurping tyranny of the great king, to prove to the world that, without the sordid assistance of *his* boasted treasures, they could prosecute their just designs, and take vengeance on their enemies." By those judicious and honourable expedients Callicratidas, without fraud or violence, obtained such considerable, yet voluntary contributions, as enabled him to gratify the importunate demands of the sailors, and to return with honour to Ephesus, in order to prepare for action¹⁹.

He takes
Methymna.

His first operations were directed against the isle of Lesbos, or rather against the strong and populous towns of Methymna and Mitylené, which respectively commanded the northern and southern divisions of that island. Besides the numerous citizens of an age to bear arms, Methymna was defended by an Athenian garrison. The place made a brave resistance; but the persevering efforts of Callicratidas exhausted its strength: Methymna was taken by storm, and subjected to the depredations of the Peloponnesian troops. The garrison and the slaves were treated as part of the booty. The confederates advised, that the Methymnians also should be sold into servitude; but Callicratidas assured them, that, while *he* enjoyed the command, there should not any Grecian citizen be reduced to the condition of a slave, unless he had taken arms to subvert the public freedom²⁰.

Takes thirty
ships, and
blocks up the
rest of the
fleet in the
harbour of
Mitylené.

Meanwhile Conon, the most active and enterprising of the Athenian commanders, had put to sea with a squadron of seventy sail, in order to protect the coast of Lesbos. But this design was at-

¹⁹ Xenoph. Hellen. p. 444.

²⁰ Xenoph. ubi supra, Diodor. l. xiii. p. 373.

tempted too late; nor had it been more early undertaken, was the force of Conon sufficient to accomplish it. Callicratidas observed his motions, discovered his strength, and, with a far superior fleet, intercepted his retreat to the armament of Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coast of Mitylené, but were prevented from entering the harbour of that place by the resentment of the inhabitants, who rejoiced in an opportunity to punish those who had so often conquered, and so long oppressed, their city. In consequence of this unexpected opposition, the Athenian squadron was overtaken by the enemy. The engagement was more sharp and obstinate than might have been expected in such an inequality of strength. Thirty empty ships (for most of the men swam to land) were taken by the Peloponnesians. The remaining forty were haled up under the walls of Mitylené: Callicratidas recalled his troops from Methymna, received a reinforcement from Chios, and blocked up the Athenians by sea and land ²¹.

The condition of Conon was most distressful. He was surrounded on all sides by a superior force; the town of Mitylené was hostile; his men were destitute of provisions, incapable of resistance, yet unwilling to surrender. In this melancholy situation he attempted the only enterprise which could promise a hope of relief. The bravest and most experienced seamen were embarked in two swift sailing vessels, one of which eluding the vigilance of the enemy, escaped in safety to the Hellespont, and informed the Athenians of the misfortunes and blockade at Lesbos. The intelligence was immediately communicated to Samos and to Athens; and the importance of the object, which was no less than the safety of forty ships, and above eight thousand brave men, excited uncommon exertions of activity. The Athenians reinforced their domestic strength with the assistance of their allies; all able-bodied men were pressed into

The Athenians fit out a new fleet.

²¹ Idem, *ibid.*

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Battle of Arginusæ, in which Callicratidas is defeated and slain.
Olymp. xciii. 3.
A. C. 406.

the service; and, in a few weeks, they had assembled at Samos an hundred and fifty sail, which immediately took the sea, with a resolution to encounter the enemy.

Callicratidas did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty ships to guard the harbour of Mitylené, he proceeded with an hundred and twenty to Cape Malea, the most southern point of Lesbos. The Athenians had advanced, the same evening, to the islands, or rather rocks, of Arginusæ, four miles distant from that promontory. The night passed in bold stratagems for mutual surprise, which were rendered ineffectual by a violent tempest of rain and thunder. At the dawn both armaments were eager to engage; but Hermon and Megareus, two experienced seamen, and the chief counsellors of Callicratidas, exhorted him not to commit the weakness of the Peloponnesians with the superior strength and numbers of the enemy. The generous and intrepid Spartan despised danger and death in comparison of glory; but either his magnanimity had not overcome the last imperfection of virtuous minds, and was averse to sacrifice personal glory to public utility, or he imagined that this utility could not be separated from an inflexible adherence to the martial laws of Lycurgus. He answered the prudent admonitions of his friends in these memorable words, which, according to the construction that is put on them²², deserve our admiration or our pity. "My death cannot be destructive to Sparta, but my flight would be dishonourable both to Sparta and myself." So saying he gave the signal for

²² Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. xxiv. takes the unfavourable side. "Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed vitam etiam profundero pro patria parati essent: iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem postulante; ut Callicratidas, qui cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaque fecisset egregie; vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusæ removendam, nec

cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classe illa amissâ aliam parare posse; se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse." Notwithstanding the respectable authority of Cicero, whoever attentively considers the laws of Lycurgus and the character of Callicratidas, will be disposed to believe, that an undeviating principle of duty, not the fear of losing his glory, formed the sublime motive of that accomplished Spartan.

his ships to advance. The fight was long and bloody; passing, successively, through all the different gradations, from disciplined order and regularity to the most tumultuous confusion. The Spartan commander was slain charging in the centre of the bravest enemies. The hostile squadrons fought with various fortune in different parts of the battle, and promiscuously conquered, pursued, surrendered, or fled. Thirteen Athenian vessels were taken by the Peloponnesians; but, at length, the latter gave way on all sides: seventy of their ships were captured, the rest escaped to Chios and Phocæa²³.

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Stratagem of
Eteonicus,

The Athenian admirals, though justly elated with their good fortune, cautiously deliberated concerning the best means of improving their victory. Several advised that the fleet should steer its course to Mitylené, to surprise the Peloponnesian squadron which blocked up the harbour of that city. Diomedon recommended it as a more immediate and essential object of their care to recover the bodies of the slain, and to save the wreck of twelve vessels which had been disabled in the engagement. Thrasylulus observed that, by dividing their strength, both purposes might be effected. His opinion was approved. The charge of preserving the dying, and collecting the bodies of the dead, was committed to Theramenes and Thrasylulus. Fifty vessels were destined to that important service, doubly recommended by humanity and superstition. The remainder sailed to the isle of Lesbos, in quest of the Peloponnesians on that coast, who narrowly escaped destruction through the well conducted stratagem of Eteonicus, the Spartan vice-admiral. Soon after the engagement a brigantine arrived at Mitylené, acquainting him with the death of Callicratidas, as well as with the defeat and flight of the Peloponnesian fleet. The sagacity of Eteonicus immediately foresaw the probable consequences of those events. The Athenians would naturally sail from Arginussæ to pursue their

²³ Xenoph. p. 446. & Diodor. p. 384.

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good fortune, and Conon, who was shut up at Mitylené, would be encouraged to break through the harbour, that he might join his victorious countrymen.

which saves
the Pelopon-
nesian squa-
dron at Mi-
tylené.

In order to anticipate those measures, and to facilitate his own retreat, the Spartan commander ordered the brigantine privately to leave the harbour, and to return, at the distance of a short time, with joyous acclamations and music, the rowers crowned with garlands, and calling out that Callicratidas had destroyed the last hope of Athens, and obtained a glorious and decisive victory. The contrivance succeeded; the Spartans thanked heaven for the good news by hymns and sacrifices; the sailors were enjoined to refresh themselves by a copious repast, and to profit of a favourable gale to sail to the isle of Chios; while the soldiers burned their camp, and marched northward to Methymna, to reinforce the garrison there, which was threatened by a speedy visit of the enemy²⁴.

Disappoint-
ment of the
Athenian
admirals.

While the prudent foresight of Eteonicus saved the Peloponnesian squadron at Mitylené, the violence of a storm prevented Theramenes and Thraſybulus from saving their unfortunate companions, all of whom, excepting one of the admirals and a few others who escaped by their extraordinary dexterity in swimming, were overwhelmed by the waves of a tempestuous sea; nor could their dead bodies ever be recovered. The Athenians were likewise disappointed of the immediate advantages which ought to have resulted from the engagement. Methymna was too strongly fortified to be taken by a sudden assault; they could not spare time for a regular siege; and when they proceeded to Chios in quest of the Peloponnesian fleet, they found it carefully secured in the principal harbour of that island, which had been put in a vigorous posture of defence. These unforeseen circumstances were the more disagreeable and mortifying to the commanders, because, immediately after the battle, they had sent

²⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. & Diodor. *ibid*.

an advice-boat to Athens, acquainting the magistrates with the capture of seventy vessels²⁵; mentioning their intended expeditions to Mitylené, Methymna, and Chios, from which they had reason to hope the most distinguished success; and particularly taking notice that the important charge of recovering the bodies of the drowned or slain had been committed to Theramenes and Thrasylulus, two captains of approved conduct and fidelity.

The joy which the Athenians received from this flattering intelligence was converted into disappointment and sorrow, when they understood that their fleet had returned to Samos, without reaping the expected fruits of victory. They were afflicted beyond measure with the total loss of the wreck, by which their brave and victorious countrymen had been deprived of the sacred rites of funeral; a circumstance viewed with peculiar horror, because it was supposed, according to a superstition consecrated by the belief of ages, to subject their melancholy shades to wander an hundred years on the gloomy banks of the Styx, before they could be transported to the regions of light and felicity. The relations of the dead lamented their private misfortunes; the enemies of the admirals exaggerated the public calamity; both demanded an immediate and serious examination into the cause of this distressful event, that the guilty might be discovered and punished.

Discontents
in Athens.

Amidst the ferment of popular discontents Theramenes failed to Athens, with a view to exculpate himself and his colleague Thrasylulus. The letter sent thither before them had excited their fear and their resentment; since it rendered them responsible for a duty which they found it impossible to perform. Theramenes accused the admirals of having neglected the favourable moment to save the perishing, and to recover the bodies of the dead; and, after the opportunity of this important service was irrecoverably lost, of having

²⁵ Xenoph. says sixty-nine; Diodorus, seventy-seven.

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devolved the charge on others, in order to screen their own misconduct. The Athenians greedily listened to the accusation, and cashiered the absent commanders. Conon, who during the action remained blocked up at Mitylené, was intrusted with the fleet. Protomachus and Aristogenes chose a voluntary banishment. The rest returned home to justify measures which appeared so criminal²⁶.

Trials of the
admirals.

Among the inestimable rules of jurisprudence, invented by the wisdom of Athens, we may remark that beneficial institution which subjects the life, the character, and the fortune of individuals, not to the capricious will of an arbitrary judge, but to the equitable decision of the public. In every case, civil and criminal, the rights of an Athenian citizen were entrusted to the judgment of his peers; who, according as the question was more or less important, consisted of a committee, more or less numerous, of the popular assembly. But, in order to unite the double advantages of law and liberty, the nine archons, or chief magistrates, men of approved wisdom and fidelity, respectively presided in the several courts of justice, received complaints, examined the parties, directed process, and regularly conducted the suit through its various steps and stages. In matters of general concernment, such as the treason, perfidy, or malversation of men in power, the senate of the five hundred, or rather the Prytanes, who presided in the senate, performed the functions of the magistrate, and the whole body of the people, convened in full assembly, executed the office of judge and jury. It belonged to the Prytanes to prescribe the form of action or trial, and to admit the accuser to implead or impeach his antagonist. The cause was then referred to the people, who, as judges of the fact, gave their verdict, and, as judges of the law, passed their sentence or decree. Such were the regulations which reason had established, but which passion and interest commonly rendered ineffectual.

²⁶ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. vii. & seqq. Diodor. xiii. 76—97.

Archedemus, an opulent and powerful citizen, and Callixenus, a seditious demagogue, partly moved by the intreaties of Theramenes, and partly excited by personal envy and resentment, denounced the admirals to the senate. The accusation was supported by the relations of the deceased, who appeared in mourning robes, their heads shaved, their arms folded, their eyes bathed in tears, piteously lamenting the loss and disgrace of their families, deprived of their protectors, who had been themselves deprived of those last and solemn duties to which all mankind are entitled. A false witness swore in court, that he had been saved, almost by miracle, from the wreck, and that his companions, as they were ready to be drowned, charged him to acquaint his country how they had fallen victims to the cruel neglect of their commanders. During these proceedings it happened that the people had met to celebrate the Apatouria, or festival in January so named, because the Athenians then presented their sons, who had reached their seventh year, to be inscribed in the register of their respective tribes. Callixenus presuming on the evidence given in the senate, and on the actual disposition of the assembly, proposed the following resolution: "That the cause of the admirals should be immediately referred to the people; that the suffrages should be given by tribes, in each of which the criers should make proclamation, having prepared two urns to receive the white and black beans; if the latter were more numerous, the admirals should be delivered to the eleven men, the executioners of public justice, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to Minerva."

This unjust decree, which deprived the commanders of the benefits of a separate trial, of an impartial hearing, and of the time as well as the means necessary to prepare a legal defence, was approved by a majority of the senate, and received with loud acclamations by the people, whose levity, insolence, pride, and cruelty, all eagerly demanded the destruction of the admirals. In such a nume-

Informality
of the trial.

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rous assembly, two men alone, Euryptolemus and Axiochus, defended the cause of law and justice. The former impeached Callixenus for proposing a resolution inconsistent with all the forms of legal procedure. But the rabble made a violent uproar, calling out that none should attempt, with impunity, to abridge their sovereign power. The Prytanes, who attended, as usual, to direct and controul the proceedings of the multitude, endeavoured to moderate the ferment: but they were licentiously told, that if they did not concur with the opinion of the majority, they should be involved in the same accusation with the admirals. This absurd menace (such was the popular frenzy) might be carried into immediate execution. The senators were intimidated into a reluctant compliance with measures which they disapproved, and by which they were for ever to be disgraced. Yet the philosophic firmness of Socrates disdained to submit. He protested against the tameness of his colleagues, and declared that neither threats, nor danger, nor violence, could compel him to conspire with injustice for the destruction of the innocent.

They are
condemned
and execu-
ted.

But what could avail the voice of one virtuous man amidst the licentious madness of thousands! The commanders were accused, tried, condemned; and, with the most irregular precipitancy, delivered to the executioner. Before they were led to death, Diomedon addressed the assembly in a short but ever-memorable speech. "I am afraid, Athenians! lest the sentence which you have passed on us, prove hurtful to the republic. Yet I would exhort you to employ the most proper means to avert the vengeance of heaven. You must carefully perform the sacrifices which, before giving battle at Arginussæ, we promised to the gods in behalf of ourselves and of you. Our misfortunes deprive us of an opportunity to acquit this just debt, and to pay the sincere tribute of our gratitude. But we are deeply sensible that the assistance of the gods enabled us to obtain that glorious and signal victory." The disinterestedness, the pa-
triotism,

triotism, and the magnanimity of this discourse, must have appeased (if any thing had been able to appease) the tumultuous passions of the vulgar. But their headstrong fury defied every restraint of reason or of sentiment. They persisted in their bloody purpose, which was executed without pity: yet their cruelty was followed by a speedy repentance, and punished by the sharp pangs of remorse, the intolerable pain of which they vainly attempted to mitigate by inflicting a well-merited vengeance on the worthless and detestable Callixenus²⁷.

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The removal of the Athenian admirals, and the defeat and death of the Spartan Callicratidas, suspended for several months the military and naval operations on both sides. The behaviour of Philocles and Adimantus, who had been joined in authority with Conon, were better fitted to obstruct than promote the measures of that brave and prudent commander. The former was a man of a violent and impetuous temper, unaccustomed to reflection, destitute of experience, and incapable of governing others, or himself. The latter possessed perhaps the virtue of humanity, but was destitute of spirit and activity, qualities so usual in his age and country. Though ready with his tongue, he was slow with his hand, careless of discipline, negligent of duty, and suspected of a treasonable correspondence with the public enemy.

Character of
their succeſ-
ſors.

Eteonicus, who commanded the Spartans and their confederates, was a man of a very different character. But the distressful situation of affairs prevented him from displaying his abilities in any important enterprise. His armament was inferior in strength; his sailors were disheartened by defeat; he had not money to pay them; even their subsistence at Chios was very sparing and precarious. These vexatious circumstances increased the mutinous spirit by which the confederates were too naturally animated. They reproached the unge-

Eteonicus
checks a
mutiny
among the
Peloponne-
ſian troops.

²⁷ Xeroph. & Diodor. *ibid*.

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nerous parsimony of the Chians, whom they had taken arms to defend; they spurned the authority of their commander; and, in order to obtain those advantages which their services deserved, and which had been unjustly denied them, they determined to become rich at once by seizing and plundering the large and wealthy capital of that flourishing island. The design, though secretly formed, was avowed with open boldness. The conspirators, whose numbers seemed to promise success, or at least to secure impunity, assumed a badge of distinction, that they might encourage each other, and intimidate their opponents. Eteonicus was justly alarmed with the progress of sedition. It was dangerous to attack the insurgents by force: if he destroyed them by fraud, he might be exposed to the reproach and obloquy of Greece. The conduct which he pursued was conceived with an enterprising courage, and executed with a resolute firmness. With only fifteen faithful and intrepid followers, armed with concealed daggers, he patrolled the streets of Chios. The first man whom they met distinguished by a reed (for that was the badge of conspiracy) was put to death, and a crowd collecting to know why the man had been slain, they were told it was for wearing a reed on his casque. The report was immediately spread through every quarter of the city. The reed-men (as they were called) were confounded at discovering a conspiracy more secret and more formidable than their own. They dreaded that every man whom they met might know and kill them; and, as they had not time to assemble for their mutual defence, they hastily threw away the reeds, which exposed them to the dangerous assault of their unknown enemies.

Lyfander resumes the command, and takes Lampfacus. Olymp. xciii. 3. A. C. 406.

The character of Eteonicus, as far as we can judge from his actions, justly entitled him to the command; but the partiality both of Cyrus and of the confederates eagerly solicited the return of Lyfander. The Spartans, though inclined to gratify them, were perplexed by an ancient law enacted in the jealousy of freedom, to prohibit

prohibit the same person from being twice entrusted with the fleet. That they might not violate the respect due to the laws, while at the same time they complied with the request of their powerful allies, they invested Aracus, a weak and obscure man, with the name of admiral, and sent out Lyfander as second in command. The latter was received at Sardis by the Persian prince, with the warmest demonstrations of joy. He was supplied with money to satisfy the immediate wants of the troops; and, as Cyrus at that time happened to make a journey into Upper Asia, the revenues of his wealthy province were consigned, in his absence, to the management of his Spartan friend. Such powerful resources could not long remain unemployed in the active hands of Lyfander. His emissaries assiduously engaged or pressed the Ionian and Carian seamen. The harbours of Asia Minor, particularly the port of Ephesus, glowed with the ardour of naval preparation, and in a few months Lyfander sailed to the Hellespont with an hundred and fifty gallies, and attacked the important town of Lampacus. The place, though vigorously defended by the natives as well as by the Athenian garrison, was at length taken by storm; and, according to the barbarous practice of the age, abandoned to the licentious rapacity, the avarice, the lust, and the fury, of the conquerors²⁸.

The languid and imprudent measures of the Athenians at Samos accuse the abilities of Tydeus, Menander, and Cephisodotus, who had been lately joined in command with Conon and his unworthy colleagues. They sailed too late to save Lampacus, but as they possessed an hundred and eighty gallies, a force superior to Lyfander's, they anchored on the opposite, or European, side of the Hellespont, at the distance of fifteen furlongs, in order to provoke the enemy to an engagement. Their unfortunate station was the mouth of the Ægos Potamos, or river of the goat, distinguished by that name on

The Athenian commanders prepare to give him battle.

²⁸ Plut. in Lyfand.

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Their imprudence and insolence.

account of some small islands, which rising high above the surface of the waters, exhibit to a lively imagination the appearance of that animal. This place was injudiciously chosen, since it afforded very insecure riding; and was distant two miles from Sestos, the nearest town from which the fleet could be provided with necessaries. Alcibiades, who in his Thracian retirement was unable to withdraw his attention from the war in which he had long acted such a distinguished part, modestly admonished his countrymen of their imprudence; but he was arrogantly reproached for presuming, while an exile and an outlaw, to give advice to the admirals of Athens. Their subsequent conduct too faithfully corresponded with this insolence and folly. Despising the inferiority of the Peloponnesian fleet, they advanced in order of battle to the harbour of Lampacus; and when the enemy moved not from their station, they returned in triumph as acknowledged masters of the sea. The prudence of Lyfander perceived and indulged their presumption. During four days he bore, with extraordinary patience, their repeated insults, affecting the utmost disinclination to an engagement, carefully retaining his fleet in a place of security, and regularly dispatching a few swift-sailing vessels to observe the motions and behaviour of the Athenians when they returned from their daily cruise to the road of Ægos Potamos.

Deceitful
battle of
Ægos Potamos, in
which the
Athenians
lose their
fleet.
Olymp.
xciii. 4.
A. C. 405.
December.

The fifth day they again bore up with the Peloponnesians, and provoked them to battle by more daring menaces than on any former occasion. As they flattered themselves with an undoubted prospect of success, they yielded without reserve to all the petulance of prosperity, and debated in what manner they should treat the Lacedæmonian prisoners who had the misfortune to fall into their power. The cruel Philocles proposed to cut off their right hands, that those enemies of Athens might be equally incapable to manage the oar and to brandish the spear; and this bloody resolution, though opposed by Adimantus, was approved by the majority of his colleagues. After insulting the enemy in a manner the most mortifying and disgraceful,

graceful, they retired with an air of exultation mingled with contempt. The Peloponnesian spy-boats followed them as usual at a convenient distance, and observed that they had no sooner reached their station than the seamen landed, straggled about the shore, advanced into the inland country in quest of provisions or amusement, indulged in indolence, or revelled in disorder. The advice-boats returned with uncommon celerity to convey the welcome intelligence to Lyfander, who had embarked the troops, cleared his ships, and made every necessary preparation to avail himself of the favourable opportunity to effect by stratagem what it might have been dangerous to attempt by force. When his scouts approached the middle of the channel, they hoisted their shields (for that was the appointed signal) and at the same moment the Peloponnesian squadrons were commanded to set sail that they might surprise the hostile fleet, and indulge that resentment and animosity which had been rendered more violent and furious by the long and prudent restraint of their commander. The victory was complete, if that can be called a victory where there was scarcely any resistance. The vigilant activity of Conon endeavoured seasonably to assemble the strength of the Athenians; but his advice was disdained by officers incapable and unworthy to command, and his orders were despised by seamen unaccustomed and unwilling to obey. At length they became sensible of the danger when it was too late to avoid it. Their ships were taken, either altogether empty, or manned with such feeble crews as were incapable to work, much less to defend them. The troops and sailors who flocked to the shore from different quarters, and with disordered precipitation, were attacked by the regular onset and disciplined valour of the Peloponnesians. Those who fought were slain; the remainder fled into the inmost recesses of the Chersonesus, or took refuge in the Athenian fortresses which were scattered over that peninsula. When Lyfander reviewed the extent of his well-merited success, he found that of a fleet of an
hundred

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hundred and eighty sail, only nine vessels had escaped, eight of which were conducted by Conon to the friendly island of Cyprus, while the ninth carried to Athens the melancholy news of a disaster equally unexpected and fatal. An hundred and seventy-one galleys, and three thousand prisoners (among whom were Philocles and Adimantus) rewarded the patience and fortitude of Lyfander, who returned with his invaluable spoil to Lampfacus, amidst the joyous acclamations of naval triumph²⁹.

The Athenian prisoners executed.

Before pursuing the natural consequences of an event, the most important that had hitherto happened in all the Grecian wars, it was necessary for Lyfander to decide the fate of the Athenian prisoners, against whom the confederates were animated by all that unrelenting hatred which is congenial to the stern character of republicans, exasperated by recent provocation and insult. The injustice and cruelty of that ambitious people were carefully described and maliciously exaggerated in the dreadful tribunal of their enemies. "It would be tedious to enumerate, though it was impossible ever to forget, their multiplied and abominable crimes, of which so many individuals, and so many communities, had been the innocent and unhappy victims. Even of late they had destroyed, without remorse, and without the shadow of necessity, the helpless crews of a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel. The gods had averted the atrocious resolution proposed by the bloody Philocles, of which the author and

²⁹ Xenoph. p. 456, & seqq. & Plut. in Lyfand. By the battle of Ægos Potamos the Athenians lost the empire of the sea, which they had acquired by the consent of their maritime allies in the fourth year of the seventy-fifth Olympiad. They enjoyed, therefore, that sovereignty, or empire as they styled it, from the year 477 till the year 405 before Christ; that is a period of seventy-two years. This important computation is not to be found in any ancient writer; and no two authors agree in calculating the duration of the Athenian empire. Lyfias in

his Funeral Oration, p. 93, says, "During seventy years in which the Athenians commanded the sea." Diodorus Siculus (ad Olymp. 95. 1.) says, the Athenians commanded the sea sixty-five years. Isocrates in one place (i. p. 174) agrees with Lyfias; in another (ii. p. 209) with Diodorus. Andocides (Orat. iii. p. 286) states it at eighty-five years. Lycurgus (Adv. Leoc. p. 145) at ninety. Dionysius Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. sub init.) at sixty-eight. Demosthenes, as we shall see below, states it variously at forty-five, sixty-five, and seventy-three years.

the approvers were equally criminal ; nor could those deserve pardon who were incapable of pity." Such discourse, which resounded from every quarter of the assembly, declared, without the necessity of a formal vote, the unanimous decree of the confederates. As the prisoners had been stripped of their arms, there was nothing to be feared from their numbers and despair. They were conducted into the presence of their armed judges ; and, as a prelude to the inhuman massacre, Lyfander sternly demanded of Philocles what he deserved to suffer for his intended cruelty. The Athenian replied with firmness, " Accuse not those whom you are entitled to judge, but inflict on us the same punishment which we, in a different fortune, would have inflicted on our enemies." The words were scarcely ended when Lyfander hacked him in pieces. The Peloponnesian soldiers followed the bloody example of their commander. Of three thousand Athenians, Adimantus alone was spared, either because he had opposed the detestable resolution of Philocles, or because he had engaged in a treacherous correspondence with the Spartans³⁰.

It might be expected that immediately after an event which gave him the command of the sea, Lyfander should sail to the Piræus, and assault the unfortunate city, which was already grievously oppressed by the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the sagacious Spartan foresaw the numerous obstacles that opposed his conquest of Athens, and prudently restrained the eagerness of the troops and his own. The strongly fortified harbours of that capital, the long and lofty walls which surrounded the city on every side, the ancient renown and actual despair of the Athenians, must render the siege, if not altogether fruitless, at least difficult and tedious ; and the precious moments wasted in this doubtful enterprise might be employed in attaining certain, immediate, and most important advantages.

Views of
Lyfander.

³⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. Plutarch. in Lyfand.

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He establishes
the Spartan
empire over
the coasts and
islands of
Asia and
Europe.
Olymp.
xciii. 4.
A. C. 405.

On the coast neither of Greece nor of Asia, nor of any of the intermediate islands, was there a naval force capable of contending with the fleet of Lysander, nor any fortified place in all those countries (except the city of Athens alone) sufficient to resist the impression of his army. It was a design, therefore, which might well deserve his ambition, and which was not condemned by his prudence, to establish or confirm the Lacedæmonian empire over these valuable and extensive coasts. The populous cities of Byzantium and Chalcedon were attacked and taken during the astonishment and terror occasioned by the dreadful and irreparable misfortune of their Athenian allies. After these important acquisitions, Lysander sailed to the island of Lesbos, reduced Mitylené, and confirmed the allegiance of Methymna. While he extended his arms over the neighbouring islands, as well as the maritime towns of Lydia and Caria, a powerful squadron, commanded by the enterprising valour of Eteonicus, ravaged the shores of Macedon, subdued the sea-ports of Thrace, and rode victorious in the Hellespont and Propontis, the Ægean and Euxine seas. In six or eight months after the Athenian disaster at Ægos Potamos, the fairest portion of the ancient world, the most favoured by nature, and the most adorned by art, reluctantly submitted to the power, or voluntarily accepted the alliance, of Sparta.

His measures
for the re-
duction of
Athens.

During this long series of triumphs, Lysander never lost sight of the reduction of Athens; an object not only useful but necessary to the completion of his designs. The vigilance of the Peloponnesian squadrons prevented the usual supplies of foreign grain from reaching the distressed city. In all the towns which surrendered, or which were taken by storm, the Athenian garrisons were saved from immediate death, only on condition that they returned to their native country. By such contrivances the crafty Spartan expected that the scarcity of provisions would soon compel the growing multitude of inhabitants to submit to the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the Athenians, who
despised

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despised the assaults of the enemy, braved the hardships of famine. Even after Lyfander had blocked up their harbours with an hundred and fifty sail, they still defended, with vigour, their walls and ramparts; patiently endured fatigue and hunger; and beheld, with obstinate unconcern, the affliction of their wives and children. Amidst the ravages of death and disease, which advanced with increasing horror, they punished, with the utmost severity, the ignoble cowardice of Archestratus, who first mentioned capitulation, and declared that the same moment should put an end to their independence and their lives.

Siege of
Athens.
Olymp.
xciv. 1.
A. C. 404.

But notwithstanding the melancholy firmness of the popular assembly, a numerous and powerful party in the state was governed rather by interest than by honour; and the greatest enemies of Athenian liberty flourished in the bosom of the republic. The aristocratical leaven of the Four Hundred had infected the whole body of the senate; and not only the inconstant Theramenes, but several other men of abilities and influence, who had been most active in subverting that cruel tyranny, regretted the restoration of democracy to a people, who (as they had recently proved in many parts of their conduct) were unable to enjoy, without abusing, the invaluable gift of freedom. In republican governments, the misfortunes, which ought to bind all ranks of men in the firmest and most indissoluble union, have often little other tendency than to increase the political factions which tear and distract the community. Amidst every form of public distress, the Athenians caballed, clamoured, accused, and persecuted each other; and the faction of the nobles, who acted with superior concert, vigour, and address, destroyed, by dark insinuations, false witnesses, perjury, and every other species of legal fraud and cruelty, the seditious Cleophon, and other turbulent demagogues, who might most effectually have opposed their measures³¹.

³¹ Lyfias, p. 272.

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Negotiation
of Therame-
nes with the
Spartans;

When these obstacles were removed, Theramenes (whose recent merit prevented the suspicion of the assembly) proposed an embassy to Lacedæmon, which should request a suspension of hostilities, and obtain, if possible, some moderate terms of accommodation. He named himself, with nine colleagues, as the persons best qualified to undertake this important commission; flattering the people in the clearest and least ambiguous terms, with an undoubted prospect of success. A decree was immediately passed, investing the ambassadors with full powers. They assumed the sacred badge of their inviolable character, reached in safety the Spartan camp, held a conference with king Agis, and afterwards repaired to the Lacedæmonian capital. During four months they carried on their pretended negotiation with the senate, the kings, the ephori, and especially with Lyfander, whose authority, being unknown to the ancient constitution of Sparta, was far more extensive than that of all the other magistrates together. With him, principally, the plan was concerted for compelling the Athenians to submit to terms of peace, which they must have regarded as worse, not only than war, but death³¹. The fortifications of their harbours were to be demolished, as well as the long walls which joined them with the city: they were to surrender all their ships but twelve; to resign every pretension to their ancient possessions in foreign parts; to recall from banishment the surviving members of the late tyrannical aristocracy; to follow the standard of Sparta in war; and, in peace, to mould their political constitution after the model which that victorious republic might think fit to prescribe.

which is confirmed by the Athenians.

When Theramenes produced these unexpected fruits of his boasted negotiation, the Athenians had no longer either strength or spirit to resist, or even courage to die. During the long absence of their ambassadors, the siege had been carried on with redoubled vigour. The Lacedæmonians, reinforced by the Thebans as well as by their

³¹ *Lyfias against Eratosthenes*, p. 273.

numerous allies of Peloponnesus, had invested the city on every side, the harbours were closely blocked up by Lysander, who had become master of Melos, Ceos, Ægina, and Salamis; islands so near to Athens that they were almost regarded as a part of the Attic territory. The greatest misery prevailed within the walls; the famine was intolerable, and the diseases more intolerable than the famine. The full period of thrice nine years had elapsed, which, if we may credit a most accurate and faithful historian³², had been assigned by repeated oracles and predictions, as the destined term of the Peloponnesian war, and of the Athenian greatness. The principal leaders of the democracy had been cut off by the perfidious snares of their opponents, who were prepared to bear a foreign yoke, provided they might usurp domestic tyranny. That odious faction was ready to approve the measures of Theramenes, who might intimidate the dejected assembly by declaring (a most melancholy truth) that the severity of the Lacedæmonians, excessive as it seemed, was yet moderation and lenity when compared with the furious and unextinguishable rage of the Thebans and Corinthians, who maintained that the Athenians deserved not any terms of accommodation; that their crimes ought to be persecuted with unrelenting vengeance; their proud city demolished with such perfect destruction, that not even its vestige should remain; and the insolent inhabitants utterly extirpated from Greece, which they had so long disturbed by their ambition, and provoked by their tyranny and cruelty. Such an argument Theramenes might have employed, if it had been necessary to employ any argument, to justify his negotiation with the Spartans, which was confirmed and ratified by the voice of the aristocratical

³² The words of Thucydides, l. v. p. 362, are very remarkable. "He remembers that from the first commencement of hostilities, it had been constantly prophesied that the war

would last thrice nine years; which, of all predictions, was *alone* firm and stable;" or as the idiom of the Greek language will bear, "the most firm and stable."

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Athens surrenders—its humiliation excites the compassion of its enemies. Olymp. xciv. 1. A. C. 404.

cabal, and submitted to, rather than accepted, by the majority of the assembly, with the gloomy silence of despair.

On the sixteenth of May, the day on which the Athenians had been accustomed to celebrate the anniversary of the immortal victory of Salamis, the hostile armament took possession of their harbours; the combined army entered their gates. The walls and fortresses of the city of Minerva, which the generous magnanimity of its inhabitants, preferring the public safety to their own, had abandoned in defence of Greece to the fury of a barbarian invader, were ungratefully levelled to the ground by the implacable resentment of the Greeks; who executed their destructive purpose with all the eagerness of emulation, boasting, amidst the triumphs of martial music, that the demolition of Athens would be regarded, in succeeding ages, as the true æra of Grecian freedom. Yet after they had satisfied their vengeance, they seemed to regret its effects. The day was concluded with a magnificent festival, in which the recitation of the poets formed, as usual, the principal ornament of the entertainment. Among other pieces was rehearsed the *Electra* of Euripides, and particularly that affecting chorus, “We come, O daughter of Agamemnon! to thy rustic and humble roof.” The words were scarcely uttered, when the whole assembly melted into tears, the forlorn condition of that young and virtuous princess, expelled the royal palace of her father, and inhabiting a miserable cottage, in want and wretchedness, recalling the dreadful vicissitude of fortune which had befallen Athens, once mistress of the sea, and sovereign of Greece, but deprived, in one fatal hour, of her ships, her walls, and her strength, and reduced from the pride of power and prosperity to misery, dependence, and servitude, without exerting one memorable effort to brighten the last moment of her destiny, and to render her fall illustrious³³.

³³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. ii. c. i. & seqq. Diodor. l. xiii. 104—107. Plut. in *Lyfand.* p. 438. *Lyfias* in *Eratoſth.* & *Agorat.*

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Rapacity and Cruelty of the Spartan Government.—The Thirty Tyrants in Athens.—Persecution of Lyfias and his Family.—Theramenes opposes the Tyrants.—Sanguinary Speech of Critias.—Death of Theramenes.—Persecution and Death of Alcibiades.—Thraſybulus ſeizes Phylé.—Defeats the Tyrants.—Memorable Speech of Thraſybulus.—Oath of Amneſty—not faithfully obſerved.

THE conquest of Athens, and the acknowledged dominion of Sparta, terminated the memorable war of twenty-seven years. It ſtill remained for Lyſander to reduce the iſland of Samos¹, which enjoys the honourable diſtinction of being the laſt ſettlement in the Eaſt that defied the ambition of Pericles, and the laſt which ſubmitted to the arms of Lyſander. The conquered iſlands and cities ſuffered ſtill greater vexations under the Spartan, than they had done under the Athenian, empire. Among the hoſtile factions² which ambition or danger had formed in thoſe turbulent republics, Lyſander always preferred that party which poſſeſſed moſt

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and cruelty
of the Spar-
tan govern-
ment.

¹ Comp. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 461. & Plut. iii. p. 31. in Lyſand. Lyſias adv. Eratoſth. p. 274. & Diodor. p. 396. It is remarkable, that Xenophon and Lyſias, both contemporaries, ſhould differ in a matter of chronology; the one placing the conquest of Samos before, and the other after, Lyſander's voyage to Athens.

² Theſe were the συνωμοτισμοὶ καὶ ἀρχαί, mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon; "associations, or rather conſpiracies, for mutual defence in courts of juſtice, and for mutual aſſiſtance in obtaining offices of power."

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to which
ascribed.

craft, and least patriotism. At the head of this cabal, he placed a Spartan Harmostes, or governor, on whose obsequious cruelty he could depend. The citadels were garrisoned by mercenaries; a tyrannical faction insulted as subjects, those whom they had envied as rivals, or dreaded as enemies; and every species of licence and disorder was exercised, with a presumption that could be equalled only by the tameness with which it was endured'. The Asiatic Greeks regretted the dishonourable yoke of Persia; they regretted the stern dominion of Athens; both which seemed tolerable evils, compared to the oppressive cruelty of Sparta and Lyfander. The contributions, of which they had formerly so much complained, no longer appeared exorbitant. Lyfander was the first and the last conqueror who imposed on those feeble communities the enormous tribute of a thousand talents*.

The unrelenting severity of Sparta has usually been ascribed to the personal character of her general, whose natural arrogance and cruelty were heightened and confirmed by the sudden exaltation of his fortune. From the simple citizen of a small, and then unfortunate republic, he became, in a few years, the arbiter of Greece. Athens acknowledged his authority; the smaller cities courted his protection; venal poets and orators extolled him with odes and panegyrics; he was honoured with crowns and statues, and worshipped by hymns and sacrifices'. Yet it is obvious to remark, that

* Instead of the sweet draught of Liberty, Sparta, according to Theopompus, gave Greece the bitter cup of Slavery. In the city of Miletus, he sacrificed at once eight hundred men, of the democratical faction, to the implacable rage of their adversaries. Plut. in Lyfand.

* Diodorus, p. 400. says, πλεον των χιλίων ταλαντων καθ' ημεραν, "more than a thousand talents yearly;" that is, above two hundred thousand pounds. It may be computed from Plut. in Lyfand. & Xenoph. p. 462. that Lyfander sent home a still larger sum

after the surrender of Samos. The law of Lycurgus respecting gold and silver, which had been long virtually, was now formally, abolished. The use of the precious metals was allowed to the state, but forbidden to individuals, under pain of death. The prohibition, however, was universally disregarded; many Spartans possessed abundance of gold and silver; none incurred the penalty of the law. Compar. Plat. & Xenoph. loc. citat. & Isocrat. in Archidam.

* Plut. in Lyfand.

whatever

whatever might be the temper and manners of Lyfander, his country is juſtly accountable for the wrongs which he was allowed to commit with impunity; and it is uncertain whether another general, placed in the ſame ſituation, would have acted on different principles; ſince the nature of the Spartan inſtitutions, and the ambitious views of the republic, ſeemed to demand and juſtify uncommon exertions of ſeverity. In the adminiſtration of their domeſtic government, five or ſix thouſand Spartans tyranniſed over thirty thouſand Lacedæmonians; theſe tyranniſed, with ſtill greater rigour, over thrice that number of ſlaves; and it was natural to expect, that when the ſlaves were aſſociated with the troops⁶, all theſe deſcriptions of men, Spartans, Lacedæmonians, and Helots, would tyranniſe, with the emulation of cruelty, over their conquered ſubjects.

The ſcanty materials of ancient hiſtory cannot enable us minutely to explain the humiliation and diſtreſs of the Aſiatic Greeks, oppreſſed by the double tyranny of the Spartans, and of their fellow-citizens. Contemporary writers, who beheld this ſcene of miſery and deſolation, ſeem at a loſs for words to impreſs its horror. Iſocrates endeavours to graſp the amplitude of the ſubject in the vague language of general deſcription; by ſtrokes of exaggeration and hyperbole, he ſupplies the place of clear and poſitive information; but all the copiouſneſs and energy of the Greek tongue ſink beneath the heavy afflictions of that unfortunate people; and the mind of the orator ſeems to labour with a thought which he is unable to expreſs⁷. It is not, however, from ſuch rhetorical deſcriptions that

The deep
impreſſion
which they
made on con-
temporaries.

⁶ The Helots then took the title of *ποδαμνίδες*, Libertini, *δυναται δὲ τοι ποδαμνίδες ἐλευθέρων ἢδὲ ἡμῶν*. Thucyd. I. v. p. 533. From ſome paſſages in Iſocrates (Panegy. & de Pace.), it ſhould ſeem that Lyfander often appointed theſe freed men to offices of great truſt and authority.

⁷ See the oration of Iſocrates on the peace, p. 171, &c. In the panegyric of Athens, Vol. II.

ſpeaking of the ariſtoeratical faſtions ſupported by Lyfander and the Lacedæmonians, Iſocrates ſays, they conſiſted of wretches, “ whoſe cruelty and juſtice are unexampled in the hiſtory of mankind. From what indignity did they abſtain? Into what exceſſes were they not tranſported? They, who regarded the moſt factious as the moſt faithful; the moſt treacherous as the moſt deſerving. Their crimes

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that we can attain an adequate and satisfactory knowledge of the Spartan administration: history delights in plain and authentic facts; and the rigorous treatment of the Athenians themselves, will best represent the hardships inflicted on their Asiatic colonies and dependencies.

The thirty
tyrants in
Athens.
Olymp.
xciv. 1.
A. C. 404.

The Athenians had surrendered their fleet; their walls and harbours were demolished; their citadel was occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, commanded by Callibius, the friend of Lyfander; and their government was usurped by thirty men, the dependants and creatures of Sparta. The furious and profligate Critias formed a proper head for this aristocratical council, whose members have been justly branded in history under the name of the Thirty Tyrants⁸. On pretence of delivering the state from the malice of informers, and the turbulence of seditious demagogues, they destroyed the most valuable portion of the community⁹. Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a son who inherited not only the opulence, but the virtues of his illustrious father, was condemned to death; Leon, the most public-spirited, and Antiphon, the most eloquent of his contemporaries, shared the same fate; Thrafsybulus and Anytus were banished. Whoever was known to be powerful, was regarded as dangerous; whoever was supposed to be rich, was accused as criminal. Strangers and citizens were involved in one promiscuous ruin¹⁰.

Illustrated
by the per-
secution of
Lyfias and
his family.

Amidst this general wreck of whatever was most worthy and respectable, I shall select the persecution of Lyfias and his family, the only transaction of that kind, recorded with such circumstances.

crimes proved infectious, and changed the mildness of human nature into savage ferocity," &c. See p. 52, &c.

⁸ Their names are preserved in Xenophon, *Hellen.* ii. 3.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 462. which Cæsar, *ap. Salust. de bello Catil.* c. 51. evidently had in view. "Lacedæmonii devictis Athenienfi-

bus, triginta viros imposuere. . . . Hi primocæpere pessimum quemque, & omnibus in-
visum, indemnatum necare. Eo populus læ-
tari, & merito dicere fieri. Post ubi paulla-
tim licentia crevit juxta bonos & malos libe-
dinosse interficere. . . . Ita civitas, servitute
oppressa, stultæ lætitiæ graves pœnas dedit."

¹⁰ Xenoph. l. ii. p. 463, & seqq.

as answer the ends of history. Cephalus, the father of that ingenious orator, was by birth a Syracusan. The friendship of Pericles persuaded him to settle in Athens, where, under the protection of that powerful statesman, he obtained wealth and honours. His inoffensive and generous character escaped the enmity and persecution to which the opulent Athenians were commonly exposed; and he enjoyed the rare felicity of living thirty years in the midst of continual trials and impeachments, without being obliged to appear as plaintiff or defendant in any litigation. His sons, Lyfias and Polemarchus, inherited his innocence, his generosity, and his good fortune. Though possessed of the most valuable accomplishments, natural and acquired, the brothers prudently kept aloof from the dangerous paths of public life; contented with their domestic felicity, they aspired not to the rank of Athenian citizens; but liberally contributed to supply the exigencies of the state, from the profits of a flourishing manufacture of shields, which they carried on by the labour of an hundred and twenty slaves. The cruelty of the thirty tyrants, from whose rapacious eye neither obscurity could conceal, nor merit defend, occasioned the death of Polemarchus, and the immediate misfortunes, as well as the future glory of Lyfias, who acted a distinguished part in overturning that detestable tyranny, and in bringing its authors and abettors to condign punishment¹¹.

The history is related by himself with perspicuous precision, and graceful simplicity: "The tyrants Theognis and Piso acquainted their associates, that many strangers established at Athens were disaffected to the government: This was a plausible pretence for rising the effects of these unhappy men; a measure to which the thirty were not only excited by avarice, but prompted by fear. Money was become necessary for the preservation of their power, which, being founded on usurpation, and tyrannically administered, could

The orator's
account of
that matter.

¹¹ See the Life of Lyfias, and the Orations there referred to, p. 110, & seqq.

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only be maintained by the influence of corruption, and the mercenary aid of foreign troops. The life of man, therefore, they regarded as a matter of little moment; the amassing of wealth was the principal object of their desire; to gratify which, ten strangers were at once devoted to destruction. In this number, indeed, were two poor men; a base and cruel artifice to persuade you, Athenians! that the remaining eight had been condemned, not for the sake of their riches, but in order to preserve the public tranquillity; as if the interest of the public had ever been the concern of that tyrannical cabal! Their infamous design was executed with inhuman cruelty. Their victims were taken in their beds, at supper, in the privacy of domestic retirement. Me they seized exercising the rites of hospitality; my guests were rudely dismissed; I was delivered into the custody of the worthless Piso. While his accomplices continued in the workshop, taking a list of our slaves and effects, I asked him, "Whether money could save my life?" "Yes, a considerable sum." "I will give you a talent of silver." This he consented to accept, as the price of my safety; and to such a melancholy situation was I reduced, that it afforded me a momentary consolation to depend on the precarious faith of a man, who (as I well knew) despised every law, human and divine. But my comfort was of short duration; for I had no sooner opened my coffer to pay him the talent, than he ordered his attendant to seize the contents, consisting of three talents of silver, an hundred Daricks, three hundred Cyzicenes, and three silver cups. I intreated Piso to allow me a small sum to defray the expence of my journey. But he desired me to be thankful to escape with my life. Going out together, we met the tyrants Melobius and Mnesitheides, returning from the workshop. They enquired, where we were going? Piso answered, to examine the house of my brother Polemarchus. They desired him to proceed; but commanded me to follow them to the house of Damasippus. Piso whispered me to be silent, and to fear nothing, because he
would

would immediately come there. Upon our arrival, we found Theognis guarding several of my companions in calamity. I increased the number of his prisoners; but obtained an opportunity to represent my innocence and misfortunes to Damasippus, intreating him, by our past friendship, to employ his influence in my behalf. He assured me of his intention to intercede with Theognis, whose avarice would easily persuade him to betray his trust. While they conversed on this subject, I took advantage of my knowledge of the house to escape through three secret passages, which all happened to be open and unguarded; and fortunately reaching the country-house of my friend Archimaus, a ship-master, sent him to the city, that he might bring me intelligence of my brother. He discovered, that the tyrant Eratosthenes had dragged him from the road, and conducted him to prison, where he was ordered to drink hemlock. At this melancholy news, I fled to Megara, under cover of the night. Our effects became the property of the tyrants, whose mean avarice spared not the smallest trifle belonging to us. Even the gold earrings of Polemarchus's wife were forcibly torn away by the brutal Melobius¹²."

The Thirty justified these abominable acts of cruelty by the authority of a servile senate, which they still allowed to subsist as the instrument and accomplice of their tyranny. It could not be expected, however, that in a city accustomed to the utmost liberty of opinion and freedom of debate, a body of five hundred, or even of thirty men, should continue to agree in the same odious and oppressive measures. The first seeds of discord, or rather the first symptoms of repentance, appeared in the speeches and behaviour of the bold and active Theramenes; who, though the principal author of the usurpation, was already disposed by the humanity of his nature, or by the singular inconstancy of his temper¹³, to destroy the

Theramenes
opposes the
tyrants.

¹² See the discourses of Lyfias against Agoratus and Eratosthenes, p. 258, & seqq. more favourably; and Aristot. apud Plut. iii. 337. & Diodor. p. 350. & seqq. still more

¹³ Thucydid. viii. 68. & seqq. Lyfias favourably than Xenophon. advers. Eratosth. Xenophon paints him

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work of his own hands. His strenuous endeavours were used to save the innocent and unhappy victims whom his furious colleagues daily devoted to destruction; under his protection the citizens assembled, and expressed their resentment or despair; and it was justly apprehended that the government of the Thirty might be dissolved by the same means, and by the same man, who had set on foot and subverted the short-lived tyranny of the four hundred. The present usurpation, indeed, was defended by a Lacedæmonian garrison; but the Thirty dreaded the influence of Theramenes over the foreign troops; they dreaded still more his influence over the Athenian citizens. When they considered the precarious tenure of their authority, and the unjust violence of their administration, they reflected on the past with pain, and viewed the future with terror. But they had gone too far to retreat, and nothing remained but to prop the tottering fabric of their power by enlarging its base. Three thousand citizens were invited to participate in the advantages and dangers of their government. The rest were disarmed and treated with an increase of severity.

He is accused
by Critias.

Theramenes vainly opposed the criminal designs of his colleagues, who implicitly submitted their opinions to the implacable fury of Critias. He it was who chiefly encouraged them boldly to persevere, and to remove every obstacle to the unlimited gratification of their passions. The safety of Theramenes, he assured them, was no longer compatible with their own. His delicacy, real or affected, was totally inconsistent with the spirit of the present administration; nor could the government of Thirty, any more than that of *one* tyrant, admit of being curiously canvassed, or fastidiously opposed. These sentiments being received with approbation, we might expect that Theramenes should have been destroyed by that sudden and open violence which had proved fatal to so many others. But as the most daring violators of the laws of society are obliged to establish and observe some rules of justice, in their conduct towards each other, it had been

been resolved by the Thirty, that, amidst the violent and capricious outrages which they committed against their subjects, none of their own number should be put to death without the benefit of a trial before the senate; a privilege extending to the three thousand intrusted with the use of arms, and sufficiently denoting the miserable condition of the other citizens. The senate was assembled to try Theramenes; but this tribunal was surrounded by armed men. When the pretended criminal appeared, Critias addressed the court in a speech too remarkable ever to be forgotten.

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“ Should you imagine, O senators! considering the great numbers who have suffered death, that we have been guilty of unnecessary cruelty, you will alter that opinion on reflecting that revolutions of government must always be attended with bloodshed; but particularly when a populous city like Athens, which has been long pampered with liberty, is reduced under the dominion of a few. The actual form of administration was imposed by the Lacedæmonians as the condition of the public safety. In order to maintain its authority we have removed those seditious demagogues, whose democratical madness hath occasioned all our past calamities. It is our duty to proceed in this useful work, and to destroy, without fear or compassion, all who would disturb the public tranquillity. Should a man of this dangerous disposition be found in our own order, he ought to be punished with double rigour, and treated not only as an enemy but as a traitor. That Theramenes is liable to this accusation appears from the whole tenour of his conduct. He concluded the treaty with the Lacedæmonians; he dissolved the popular government; he directed and approved the first and boldest measures of our administration: but no sooner did difficulties arise than he deserted his associates, declared his opposition to their designs, and undertook the protection of the populace. When the weather was fair and favourable, he pursued the same course with his companions, but, on the first change of wind, he thought proper to alter

Sanguinary
Speech of
Critias.

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alter his navigation. With such an irresolute seersman it is impossible to govern the helm of the republic, and to guide the vessel to her destined harbour. This dangerous inconsistency ought, indeed, to have been expected from a man to whose character perfidy is congenial. He began his political career under the direction of his father Hagnon, a violent partisan of democracy. He afterwards changed his system, in order to obtain the favour of the nobles. He both established and dissolved the government of the four hundred; and the whole strain of his behaviour proves him unfit to govern, and unworthy to live²⁴.”

Therame-
nes's defence.

Theramenes made a copious and persuasive defence, acknowledging, “ That he had often changed his conduct, but denying that he had ever varied his principles. When the democracy flourished he had maintained the just rights, but repressed the insolence, of the people. When it became necessary to alter the form of the republic, in compliance with the command of the Spartans, he had supported the legal power, but opposed the tyranny, of the magistrates. Under every administration of government he had approved himself the friend of moderation and justice, which he still continued, and ever would continue, to recommend and enforce, convinced that those virtues alone could give stability and permanence to any system of government, whether aristocratical or popular.”

Theramenes
dragged to
execution.

The senators murmured applause, unawed by the presence of Critias and his associates. But this furious tyrant made a signal to the armed men, who surrounded the senate-house, to shew the points of their daggers; and then stepping forward, said, “ It is the duty, O senators! of a prudent magistrate, to prevent the deception and danger of his friends. The countenance of those brave youths (pointing to his armed partisans) sufficiently discovers that they will not permit you to save a man who is manifestly subverting the go-

²⁴ Xenoph. p. 464—466.

vernment: I, therefore, with the general consent, strike the name of Theramenes from the list of those who have a right to be tried before the senate; and, with the approbation of my colleagues, I condemn him to immediate death." Roused by this unexpected and bloody sentence, Theramenes started from his seat, and sprang to the altar of the senate-house, at once imploring the compassion, and urging the interest of the spectators, whose names, he observed, might be struck out, and whose lives might be sacrificed, as unjustly and cruelly as his own. But the terror of armed violence prevented any assistance or intercession; and the eleven men (for thus the Athenian delicacy styled the executioners of public justice) dragged him from the altar, and hurried him to execution.

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In proceeding through the market-place the unhappy victim of tyranny invoked the favour and gratitude of his fellow-citizens, who had often been protected by his eloquence, and defended by his valour. But the impudent Satyrus, the chief minister of vengeance both in authority and cruelty, sternly told him, that if he continued his lamentations and uproar he should soon cry in good earnest¹⁵: "And shall I not," said Theramenes, "though I remain silent?" When he drank the fatal hemlock, he poured a libation on the ground with a health to the honest Critias; circumstances unworthy to relate, if they proved not, that even in his last moments, he was forsaken neither by his facetiousness nor by his fortitude¹⁶.

His death.

The death of Theramenes delivered the tyrants from the only restraint which tended to controul their insolence, and to moderate

Excessive
cruelty of the
tyrants.

¹⁵ Ὅτι οὐκ ἔμελλε, ἢ μὴ σιωπῆσαι. Literally, that he would cry out unless he were silent. The inaccurate language of the executioner furnished occasion to the smart reply of Theramenes.

¹⁶ Xenoph. p. 470. The glorious death of Theramenes cancelled the imperfections of his life. That his character was incon-

stant, most writers allow. Lyfias adversus Eratosthen. accuses him of many deliberate crimes; but he died in a virtuous cause, and, however he acted, left the scene gracefully.

"Quam me delectat Theramenes! quam elato animo est! Etsi enim stemus, cum legimus, tamen non miserabiliter vir clarus moritur." Cic. Tusc. Quæst.

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their cruelty. They might now indulge in all the licentiousness of outrage, without the fear of reproach or the danger of resistance. Their miserable subjects were driven from the city, from the Piræus, from their houses, their farms, and their villages, which were divided among the detestable instruments of an odious usurpation. Nor did the tyrants stop here. A mandate was published, enforced by the authority of the Spartan senate, prohibiting any Grecian city to receive the unfortunate fugitives. But this inhuman order was almost universally disobeyed; the sacred laws of hospitality prevailed over the terror of an unjust decree; Thebes, Argos, and Megara were crowded with Athenian exiles¹⁷.

They dread
the machina-
tions of Al-
cibiades.

In exercising those abominable acts of cruelty, the Thirty probably consulted the immediate safety of their persons, but they precipitated the downfall of their power. The oppressed Athenians, whose sufferings seemed no longer tolerable, required only a leader to rouse them to arms, and to conduct them to victory and to vengeance. This danger the tyrants had greater reason to apprehend, since they could not expect a reinforcement to the garrison, while the efforts of Lyfander and the Spartans were principally directed towards the extension of their Asiatic conquests. The abilities and resentment of Alcibiades pointed him out as the person best qualified to undertake the arduous and honourable design of re-assembling the fugitives, and of animating them with courage to recover their lost country. That illustrious exile had been driven from his Thracian fortress by the terror of the Lacedæmonians, then masters of the Hellespont, and had acquired a settlement under the protection of Pharnabazus, in the little village of Grynium in Phrygia, where, undisturbed by the dangerous contentions of war and politics, he enjoyed an obscure happiness in the bosom of love and friendship. But the cruel fears of the tyrants pursued him to this last retreat.

¹⁷ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 236.

Lyfander told Pharnabazus that the facifice of Alcibiades was neceffary for the fafety of that form of government which had been recently eftablifhed in Athens, and which it was the intereft both of Sparta and of Perfia to maintain. A private reafon (which will afterwards appear) prevailed with the fatrap to pay immediate attention to this bloody advice. A band of armed Phrygians was fent to furprife and deftroy Alcibiades. Such was the fame of his prowess, that thefe timid affaffins durft not attack him in broad day, or by open force. They chofe the obfcurity of night to furround and fet fire to his houfe, which, according to the fafhion of the country, was chiefly compofed of light and combuftible materials. The crackling noife of the flames alarmed Alcibiades, whofe own treacherous character rendered him always fufpicious of treachery. He fnatched his fword, and, twifting his mantle round his left arm, rufhed through the flaming edifice, followed by his faithful Arcadian friend, and by his affectionate miftrefs Timandra¹⁸. The cowardice of the Phrygians, declining to meet the fury of his affault, covered him with a fhower of javelins. But even thefe Barbarians fpared the weaknefs and the fex of Timandra, whofe tears and entreaties obtained the melancholy confolation of burying her unfortunate lover; a man whofe various character can only be reprefented in the wonderful viciffitudes of his life and fortune; and who, though eminently adorned with the advantages of birth, wealth, valour, and eloquence, and endowed with uncommon gifts of nature, and acquirements of art, yet deficient in difcretion and probity, involved his country and himfelf in inextricable calamities.

Although the life of Alcibiades had been highly pernicious to his country, his death at this particular juncture, might be regarded as a miffortune, if the Athenian exiles at Thebes had not been headed by a man who poffeffed his excellencies, purified from his defects

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His death.

Thrafybulus,
with a hand-
ful of fugi-
tives, feizes
Phyla.

¹⁸ Corn. Nepos, & Plut. in Alcibiad.

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The tyrants
baffled in
their at-
tempts to dis-
lodge them.

Thraſybulus
ſurprizes and
deſeats the
enemy.

and vices. The enterpriſing courage of Thraſybulus was animated by the love of liberty; and while he generally followed¹⁹ the rules of juſtice and humanity, he had magnanimity to conceive, abilities to conduct, and perseverance to accompliſh, the boldeſt and moſt arduous deſigns. Having communicated his intentions to the unhappy fugitives in Thebes and Megara, he encouraged a body of ſeventy intrepid followers to ſeize the important fortrefs of Phyla, ſituate on the Bœotian and Athenian frontier. This daring enterpriſe alarmed the tyrants, who marched forth with the flower of their troops to diſlodge the new gariſon. But the natural ſtrength of the place baffled their aſſault; and, when they determined to inveſt it, the unexpected violence of a tempeſt, accompanied with an extraordinary fall of ſnow²⁰, obliged them to deſiſt from their undertaking. They returned with precipitation to Athens, leaving behind part of their attendants and baggage, which fell a prey to the gariſon of Phyla; the ſtrength of which continually augmented by the confluence of Athenian exiles, and ſoon increaſed from ſeventy, to ſeven hundred, men.

The tyrants had juſt reaſon to apprehend that theſe daring invaders might ravage the ſurrounding country, and even attack the capital. Alarmed by this danger they diſpatched ſeveral troops of horſe, with the greater part of their Lacedæmonian mercenaries, who encamped in a woody country, at the diſtance of fifteen furlongs from Phyla, in order to watch the motions and repreſs the incuſions of the enemy. But theſe forces, which had been ſent to guard the territory and city from ſurpriſe, were themſelves ſurprized by Thraſybulus, who ſilently marched forth in the night, poſted his men amidſt the concealed intricacies of the foreſt, and ſuddenly attacked the Lacedæmonians before they had time to recolleſt themſelves, or even to ſtand to their arms. The dread of an ambuſh

¹⁹ His conduct, as will appear hereafter, was not uniform.

²⁰ Επιχεινιτται της νυκτος χιον παμπληθης.
Xenoph. p. 471.

probably

probably prevented the wary general from following them to any great distance from the garrison. An hundred and twenty men were slain in the pursuit; a trophy was erected; the baggage and arms were conveyed in triumph to Phyla²¹.

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The news of this disaster inspired the Thirty with such terror that they no longer regarded a demolished city like Athens as proper for their residence. They determined to remove to the neighbouring town of Eleufis, which, in case of extremity, seemed more capable of defence. The three thousand, who were entrusted with the use of arms, accompanied them thither, and assisted them in treacherously putting to death all such of the Eleufinians as were thought disaffected to the usurpation. Under pretence of mustering the inhabitants, those unhappy men were singly conducted through a narrow gate leading to the shore, where they were successively disarmed, bound, and executed, by the cruel instruments of tyranny²².

The tyrants
remove to
Eleufis.

Meanwhile the garrison of Phyla continually received new reinforcements. The orator Lysias, whose domestic sufferings have been recently described, collected three hundred men to take vengeance on the murderers of his brother, and the authors of his own banishment²³. These useful supplies encouraged Thrafsybulus to attempt surprizing the Piræus, the inhabitants of which, consisting chiefly of tradesmen, merchants, and mariners, bore with great impatience and indignation, the injuries of a subordinate council of Ten, the obsequious imitators of the Thirty. This enterprize was crowned with success, although the tyrants brought forth their whole force to oppose it. Having intercepted their march to the place, Thrafsybulus occupied a rising ground, which gave him a decisive advantage in the engagement.

Thrafsybulus
marches to
the Piræus.

²¹ Xenoph. p. 471. ²² Id. *ibid.*

his usual inaccuracy, says *Lysias Syracusanus*

²³ Justin. l. v. c. ix. The compiler, with orator.

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Addresses his
followers in
fight of the
enemy.

Before leading his men to action, he animated their valour and repentment, by reminding them, that the enemy on the right consisted of those Lacedæmonians whom only five days before they had shamefully routed and put to flight; that the troops on the left were commanded by the Thirty tyrants, who had unjustly driven them into banishment, confiscated their property, and murdered their dearest friends. "But the gods have finally given us the opportunity (long ardently desired) to face our oppressors with arms in our hands, and to take vengeance on their multiplied wickedness and cruelty. When they invested us at Phyla, the gods, consulting our safety, ruffled the serenity of the sky with an unexpected tempest. The assistance of Heaven enabled us, with a handful of men, to raise a trophy over our numerous foes; and the same divine Providence still favours us with the most manifest marks of partiality. The enemy are drawn up in a deep and close array; they must be obliged to ascend the eminence; the javelins of their rear cannot reach beyond their van; while, from the reverse of these circumstances, no weapon of ours needs be discharged in vain. Let us avail ourselves, therefore, of an arrangement evidently produced by the favour of Heaven; each soldier remembering, that he never can achieve a more honourable victory, or obtain a more glorious tomb²⁴."

The tyrants
defeated.

The revered authority of the priest enforced the exhortation of the general. He promised them complete success, provided they forbore to charge, till one of their men were killed or wounded: "Then," added he, "I will conduct you on to victory, though I myself shall fall." He had scarcely ended, when the enemy threw their javelins; upon which, as if guided by a divine impulse, he rushed forward to the attack. Both parts of his prediction were accomplished. The battle was neither long nor bloody; but Critias and Hippomachus, the two most violent of the tyrants, were left among

²⁴ Xenoph. p. 473. & Diodor. l. xiv. p. 414.

the slain. Thraſybulus judiciously avoided to purſue the ſcattered fugitives, who being ſuperior in number, might ſtill rally and renew the battle, if he quitted the advantage of the ground. But having proceeded to the foot of the hill, he ſtopped the ardour of his troops, and commanded the herald Cleocritus to proclaim with a loud voice, “Wherefore, Athenians! would you fly from your countrymen? Wherefore have you driven them from the city? Why do you thirſt for their blood? We are all united by religious, civil, and domeſtic ties. Often, with combined arms, have we fought, by ſea and land, to defend our common country and common freedom. Even in this unnatural civil war, excited and fomented by the ambition of impious and abominable tyrants, who have ſhed more blood in eight months, than the Peloponneſians, our public enemies, in ten years. We have lamented your miſfortunes as much as our own; nor is there a man whom you have left on the field of battle, whoſe death does not excite our ſympathy, and increaſe our affliction.” The tyrants, dreading the effect of a proclamation well calculated to ſow the ſeeds of diſaffection, led off their troops with great precipitation; and Thraſybulus, without ſtripping the dead, marched to the Piræus²⁵.

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His proclamation to the vanquiſhed.

Next day the Thirty, ſhamefully diſcomfited in the engagement, and deprived of Critias, their furious, but intrepid leader, took their melancholy ſeats in council with ſtrong indications of expected ruin. Their unfortunate ſubjects accuſed their commanders, and each other; a new ſedition aroſe; nor was the ferment allayed, until the tyrants had been deprived of their dignity, and ten magiſtrates (one elected from each tribe) appointed in their room²⁶. The ſurviving tyrants, with thoſe who were too cloſely united with them in guilt, not to be united in intereſt, fled to Eleuſis.

Government of the Decemvirs;


It might be expected that the Decemvirs, who now aſſumed the government, ſhould have been deterred from injuſtice by the fatal ex-

as violent as that of the Thirty.

²⁵ Xenoph. p. 474.

²⁶ Idem, *ibid.* & *Iſocrat.* ii. p. 426.

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ample of their predecessors. But in the turbulent republics of Greece, however free in theory, men were little acquainted with the benefits of practical liberty. Whether the nobles, or people, or a prevailing faction of either; whatever party in the state obtained the chief administration, their authority was almost alike oppressive and tyrannical. Alternately masters and slaves, those fierce republicans were either unable or unwilling to draw that decisive and impervious line between the power of government, and the liberty of the subject; a line which forms the only solid barrier of an uniform, consistent, and rational freedom.

Lyfander
marches to
the Piræus.

The Ten had no sooner been invested with the ensigns of command, than they shewed an equal inclination with the Thirty to obey the Lacedæmonians, and to tyrannise over their fellow-citizens²⁷. After various skirmishes, which happened in the course of two weeks, and generally proved honourable to the bravery and conduct of Thraſybulus, the tyrants both in Eleusis and in Athens dispatched messengers to solicit farther assistance from Sparta and Lyfander. That active and enterprising leader employed his usual diligence to protect the government which he had established. At the head of a powerful body of mercenaries, he marched to the Piræus, which he invested by land; while his brother Libys, who commanded a considerable squadron, blocked up the harbour²⁸.

His measures
thwarted by
Pausanias.

These vigorous exertions restored the hopes and courage of the tyrants; nor can it be doubted that Thraſybulus and his followers must have speedily been compelled to surrender, had the Spartan commanders been allowed to act without controul. But the proud arrogance of Lyfander, and the rapacious avarice of his dependants, provoked the indignation and resentment of whatever was most respectable in his country. The kings, magistrates, and senate, conspired to humble his ambition; and, lest he should enjoy the glory

²⁷ Lyſias adverſ. Eratoſth. p. 212. & ſeqq.

²⁸ Xenoph. p. 476. & Diodor. ubi ſupra.

of conquering Athens a second time, Pausanias, the most popular and beloved of the Spartan princes, hastily levied the domestic troops, and a considerable body of Peloponnesian allies, and marching through the Isthmus of Corinth encamped in the neighbourhood of Athens; little solicitous to increase the dissensions in that city, provided he could anticipate and thwart the measures of Lyfander.

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While the two Lacedæmonian armies discovered, in the distance of their encampments, a disunion of their views and interests, an incident happened which determined Pausanias to undertake the protection of Thraſybulus and his adherents; a resolution to which he was naturally inclined from opposition to an envied and odious rival. Diognotus, an Athenian of an amiable and respectable character, brought him the children of Niceratus and Eucrates; the former the son, the latter the brother, of the great Nicias, with whom the Spartan king was connected by the hereditary ties of hospitality and friendship. Having placed the helpless infants on his knees, he conjured him, by his religious regard for the memory of their much-respected ancestor, to pity their innocence and weakness, and to defend them against the cruel tyranny of a worthless faction, ambitious to cut off and destroy whatever was distinguished by birth, wealth, or virtue²⁹. This affecting scene, had it failed to touch the heart of Pausanias, must at least have afforded him a plausible pretence for embracing the party of Thraſybulus, which numbered among its adherents the friends and family of Nicias, who had long been suspected of an undue attachment to the Spartan interest.

Pausanias
espouses the
interest of
Thraſybulus
and his ad-
herents.
Olymp.
xciv. 2.
A. C. 403.

Before he could fully persuade the enemy of his favourable intentions, several bloody skirmishes were fought, in which the partisans of democracy defended the Piræus with unequal force, but with uncommon resolution³⁰. At length Pausanias made them understand, that, instead of destroying their persons, he wished to protect their

Commis-
sioners ap-
pointed to
settle the
affairs of
Athens.

²⁹ Lyſias adv. Poliuchum, p. 323. and the translation of Lyſias, p. 231.

³⁰ Xenoph. Diodor. Lyſias, ubi ſupra.

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liberties. In Athens his emissaries made known this unexpected revolution, which excited a numerous party to throw off the yoke of the tyrants, and to desire a reconciliation with their fellow-citizens in the Piræus. The deputies were favourably received by the Spartan king, and sent, under his protection, to propose overtures of accommodation to the ephori and senate. The messengers of Lyfander and the tyrants endeavoured to traverse this negotiation; but notwithstanding *their* opposition, the Spartans appointed fifteen commissioners, who, in conjunction with Pausanias, were empowered to settle the affairs of Athens²¹.

This happily
effected.

With the approbation, or rather by the command of those ministers, the Athenian factions ceased from hostility; the tyrants were divested of their power; the foreign garrison was withdrawn; and the popular government re-established. This important revolution was remarkable for its singular mildness. The authors and instruments of the most oppressive usurpation recorded in the annals of any people were allowed to retire in safety to Eleusis. Thrafsybulus conducted a military procession to the temple of Minerva in the citadel, where the acknowledgments of thanks and sacrifice were offered to that protecting divinity, who had restored the virtuous exiles to their country, and healed the divisions of the state. The citizens who had been banished, and those who had driven them into banishment, joined in this solemn exercise of religious duty; after which, convening in full assembly, they were addressed by Thrafsybulus in these memorable words:

Memorable
speech of
Thrafsybulus.

“ The experience of your past transactions may enable you, men of Athens! to know each other, and to know yourselves. On what pretence could you, who drove us from the city, abet a tyrannical faction? Why would you have enslaved your fellow-citizens? On what superiority of merit could you found your claim of dominion?

²¹ Xenoph. p. 478.

Is it that you are more honest and virtuous? Yet the people whom you insulted never relieved their poverty by unjust gain; whereas the tyrants, whom you served, increased their wealth by the most oppressive rapacity. Is it that you are more brave and warlike? Yet this injured people, alone and unassisted, and almost unarmed, have overcome your superior numbers, reinforced by the Lacedæmonian garrison, the powerful succours of Pausanias, and the experienced mercenaries of Lyfander. As you must yield the prize both of probity and of prowess, so neither can you claim the honour of superior prudence and sagacity. You have been not only conquered in war, but overcome in negotiation, by the people whom you despised; to whom your Lacedæmonian masters have delivered you, like biting curs³², bound and muzzled, to be justly punished for your unprovoked insolence and audacity. But as to you, my fellow-sufferers and fellow-exiles! you, who shared the hardships of my banishment, and who now share the triumph of my victorious return, I exhort you to forgive and forget our common injuries. Let the dignity of your sentiments adorn the splendour of your actions. Prove yourselves superior to your enemies, not only in valour but in clemency, that moderation may produce concord, and concord strength."

The effect of this generous enthusiasm, excited and diffused by The amnesty Thrafsybulus, appeared in a very extraordinary resolution of the assembly. During the usurpation of the Thirty, an hundred talents had been borrowed from the Lacedæmonians, to support the rigorous cruelty of a government which had banished five thousand³³, and put to death, untried, fifteen hundred citizens. The repayment of this sum was not to be expected from the people at large,

³² Ὅσπερ τῆς δακνόντος κλωῆ δρῶντες παρὰ ἡδραίων. Xenoph. Hellen. ii. sub. fin. In their comparisons the ancients, it is well known, regarded justice more than dignity.

³³ Isocrat. in Areopag. p. 345, says upwards of five hundred. Diodorus says the one-half of the citizens.

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against whose interest and safety it had been so notoriously employed. Yet the Athenians unanimously resolved, on this occasion, that the money should be charged indiscriminately on them all³⁴. This unexampled generosity might have encouraged even the enfeebled party of the tyrants to return from Eleusis. But they were too sensible of their guilt to expect forgiveness or impunity. Having fortified their insecure residence, in the best manner that their circumstances could permit, they began to prepare arms; to collect mercenaries; and to try, anew, the fortune of war. But their unequal hostility, the effect of rage and despair, was easily defeated by the vigour of the new republic. The most obnoxious leaders sealed, with their blood, the safety of their adherents, who submitted to the clemency of Thrasybulus. That fortunate and magnanimous commander generously undertook their cause, and obtained a decree of the people for restoring them to the city, for reinstating them in their fortunes and privileges, and for burying, in oblivion, the memory of their past offences³⁵. The assembly even ratified, by oath, this act of amnesty, of which both the idea and the name have been adopted by most civilised nations, and extolled by all historians, ancient and modern; who, dazzled by the splendour of a transaction so honourable to Thrasybulus and to Athens, have universally for-

³⁴ Isocrates, *ibid.* & p. 495 of the translation.

³⁵ Among these offences were reckoned the arbitrary laws enacted during their usurpation. All these laws were annulled, and those of Solon, Clithenes, Pericles, &c. re-established. It appears that the Athenians embraced the same opportunity of examining their ancient laws, abolishing such as no longer suited the condition of the times, and enacting some new ones. Andocid. *Orat. i. de Mylter.* p. 212. & Demost. *adv. Timocrat.* p. 469. The year in which the democracy was restored, or, in other words, the archonship of Euclides was regarded, there-

fore, is an important era in Athenian jurisprudence. The only material alterations on record consist, 1. In the law, confining the right of voting in the assembly to those born of Athenian mothers. Formerly it sufficed that the father was a citizen, the condition of the mother not being regarded. *Athenæus*, xiii. p. 285. & *Mask. in Vit. Lysiaz.* p. 55. 2. In the law of Demophantus, requiring the citizens to take an oath that no personal danger should prevent them from doing their utmost to deliver their country from tyrants. *Vid. Lycurg. adv. Leocr.* p. 180. & *Andoc. de Myl.* p. 220.

got to mention, that the conditions of the amnesty were not faithfully observed. Yet there is the fullest evidence to prove³⁶, that, when the tyrants were no more, the abettors of their usurpation were accused, convicted, and punished, for crimes of which they had been promised indemnity by a solemn oath. So true it is, that the Athenians had wisdom to discern, but wanted constancy to practise, the lessons of sound policy, or even the rules of justice.

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not observed.

³⁶ See Lyfias's Orations against Agoratus and Eratosthenes, from p. 233 to p. 280.

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Accusation of Socrates.—Artifices of his Accusers.—His Defence.—Condemnation.—Address to the Judges.—His Conversation in Prison—and Death.—Transient Persecution of his Disciples.—Writings of Cebes—Æschines.—State of Philosophy.—Of the Fine Arts.—Of Literature.—Herodotus—Thucydides—Xenophon.—Transition to the public Transactions of Greece.—The Spartans invade Elis.—The Messenians driven from Greece.—History of Cyrene—Of Sicily.—War with Carthage.—Siege of Agrigentum.—Reign of Dionysius.—Sicily the first Province of Rome.

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Accusation of
Socrates.
Olymp.
xcv. i.
A. C. 400.

IT were well for the honour of Athens, if none but the cruel abettors of an aristocratical faction had experienced the unjust rigour of its tribunals. But among the first memorable transactions, after the re-establishment of democracy, happened the trial and condemnation of Socrates; a man guiltless of every offence but that of disgracing, by his illustrious merit, the vices and follies of his contemporaries. His death sealed the inimitable virtues of his useful and honourable life; it seemed to be bestowed as a favour, not inflicted as a punishment; since, had Socrates, who had already passed his seventieth year, yielded to the decays of nature, his fame would have descended less splendid, certainly more doubtful, to posterity.

The

The remote cause of his prosecution was the ludicrous farce of Aristophanes, entitled the Clouds; to which we had occasion formerly to allude. In this infamous performance Socrates is introduced denying the religion of his country, corrupting the morals of his disciples, and professing the odious arts of sophistry and chicane. The envy of a licentious populace, which ever attends virtue too independent to court, and too sincere to flatter them, gradually envenomed the shafts of the poet, and malignantly insinuated that the pretended sage was really such a person as the petulance of Aristophanes had described him. The calumny was greedily received, and its virulence embittered by the craft of designing priests and ambitious demagogues, as well as by the resentment of bad poets and vain sophists, whose pretended excellencies the discernment of Socrates had unmasked, and whose irritable temper his sincerity had grievously offended¹. From such a powerful combination it seems extraordinary that Socrates should have lived so long, especially since, during the democracy, he never disguised his contempt for the capricious levity, injustice, and cruelty of the multitude, and during the usurpation of the Thirty, openly arraigned the vices, and defied the authority of these odious tyrants. His long escape he himself ascribed to his total want of ambition. Had he intermeddled in public affairs, and endeavoured, by arming himself with authority, to withstand the corruptions of the times, his more formidable opposition would have exposed him to an earlier fate². Notwithstanding

¹ The causes of his persecution, which are hinted at in Xenophon's Apology for Socrates, are more fully explained in that written by Plato. Vid. Plat. Apolog. Socrat. sect. vi. From these two admirable treatises of practical morality, together with the first chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia, and Plato's Phædo, the narrative in the text is principally extracted.

² The memorable words of Socrates will for ever brand the stern unfeeling spirit of democracy. Εὐ γὰρ ἵτε ὡ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖαι, εἰ ἐγὼ παλαι ἐπιχειρήσω τὰ πολίτικα πράγματα, πολλοὶ αὖν ἀπολώλην, καὶ ὅτε αὖ ἕκας ὑφίληκταιν ἔδην ὅτε αὖ ἐμαυτοῖ. καὶ τοὶ μὴ ἀχθισθεὶς λέγουσι, τάδε· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτις σωθίσεται, ὅτε ὕμιν ὅτε ἄλλω ὅδῃ πολλοὶ γήσιως ἐναντιμαίεσθαι· καὶ διακώλυεν πολλὰ ἀδικα καὶ παρνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γήσθαι· ἀλλὰ ἀναγκάζει

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ing his private station it seems still to have appeared remarkable to his disciples, that, amidst the litigious turbulence of democracy, his invidious fame and merit should have escaped persecution during a long life of seventy years.

Artifices of
his accusers.

When his enemies finally determined to raise an accusation against him, it required uncommon address to give their malignant calumnies the appearance of probability. Socrates conversed in public with every description of men, in all places, and on all occasions. His opinions were as well known as his person, and ever uniform and consistent; he taught no secret doctrines; admitted no private auditors; his lessons were open to all; and, that they were gratuitous, his poverty, compared with the exorbitant wealth of the sophists who accused him, furnished abundant proof. To balance these stubborn circumstances, his enemies confided in the hatred of the jury and judges, composed of the meanest populace, and the perjury of false witnesses, which might be purchased at Athens for the small sum of a few drachmas. They trusted, however, not less in the artifices and eloquence of Miletus, Anytus³, and Lycon; the first of whom appeared on the part of the priests and poets; the second, on that of the politicians and artists; the third, on that of the rhetoricians and sophists⁴.

Informality
of the trial.

From the nature of an accusation, which principally respected religion, the cause ought to have been regularly tried in the less numerous but more enlightened tribunal of the Areopagus; yet it was

αναγκαίον ἐστὶ τῷ ὅτι μαχημένοι ὑπὲρ τοῦ δίκαιου, καὶ ἡ πολλὴ ὀλιγὴ χρεὶς συμβαίνειν, ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσίως. Plut. Apolog. Socrat. c. xiii. "You well know, Athenians! that had I formerly intermeddled in public affairs I should formerly have perished, without benefiting either you or myself. Be not offended; but it is impossible that *he* should live long who arraigns and manfully opposes the injustice and licentiousness of you, Athenians! or of any other multitude. A cham-

pion for virtue, if he would survive but a few years, must lead a private life, and not interfere in politics."

³ Some personal reasons are glanced at why Miletus and Anytus stepped forth as accusers. Vid. Andocid. Orat. i. & Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. Libanius has swelled it into a long story, and strangely disfigure the hint of Xenophon. Apol. Soc. p. 642. & seqq.

⁴ Plato Apol. Soc. c. x

immediately

immediately carried before the tumultuary assembly, or rather mob of the *Heliaæ*⁵, a court, for so it was called, consisting of five hundred persons, most of whom were liable, by their education and way of life, to be seduced by eloquence, intimidated by authority, and corrupted by every species of undue influence.

In a degenerate age and nation, few virtuous or able men ever acquired popularity merely by their virtues or abilities. In such a nation, should a person, otherwise estimable, be unfortunately cursed with ambition, he must endeavour to gratify it at the expence of his feelings and his principles, and can attain general favour only in proportion as he ceases to deserve it. Uncomplying integrity will meet with derision; and wisdom, disdaining artifice, will grovel in obscurity, while those alone will reach fame, or fortune, or honour, who, though endowed with talents just beyond mediocrity, condescend to flatter the prejudices, imitate the manners, gratify the pride, or adopt the resentments, of an insolent populace.

Uncomplying integrity of Socrates.

The superior mind of Socrates was incapable of such mean compliances. When called to make his defence, he honestly acknowledged that he himself was much affected by the persuasive eloquence of his adversaries; though, in truth, if he might use the expression, they had said nothing to the purpose⁶. He then observed, that the fond partiality of his friend Chærephon, having asked the Delphic oracle, whether any man was wiser than Socrates?—the oracle replied, that Socrates was the wisest of men. In order to justify the answer of that god, whose veracity they all acknowledged, he had conversed

His defence.

⁵ This appears from innumerable circumstances, some of which are mentioned below, though Meurius, in his Treatise on the Areopagus, (Vid. Gronov. Thesaur. vol. v.) maintains that Socrates was tried in that court; an opinion which has been generally followed, but which the slightest attention to the works of the Athenian orators is sufficient to disprove. Vid. Isoc. Orat. Areopag. Lyfias

adv. Andocid. p. 108, & Andocid. Orat. i. p. 215. The oath to which Socrates alludes in Xenophon's Apology, c. iv. can only apply to the *Heliaæ*. It is recited at length by Demosthenes, Orat. cont. Timocrat.

⁶ The simplicity of the original is inimitable—*Καὶ τοὶ ἀδελφεοὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐβόωντο*. Plut. Apol.

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Provokes the
anger of his
judges.

with every distinction of persons, most eminent in the republic; and finding that they universally pretended to know many things of which they were ignorant, he began to suspect, that in this circumstance he excelled them, since he pretended to no sort of knowledge of which he was not really possessed. What he did possess, he freely communicated, striving, to the utmost, to render his fellow-citizens more virtuous and more happy; an employment to which he believed himself called by the god, "whose authority I respect, Athenians! still more than yours."

The judges were seized with indignation at this firm language from a man capitally accused, from whom they expected that, according to the usual practice, he would have brought his wife and children to intercede for him by their tears⁷, or even have employed the elaborate discourse which his friend Lyfias, the orator, had composed for his defence; a discourse alike fitted to detect calumny, and to excite compassion. But Socrates, who considered it as a far greater misfortune to commit, than to suffer, an injustice, declared, that he thought it unbecoming his fame, and unworthy his character, to employ any other defence than that of an innocent and useful life. Whether to incur the penalties of the delinquency with which he was falsely charged ought to be regarded as an evil, the gods alone knew. For his part he imagined that he should have no reason for sorrow at being delivered from the inconveniencies of old age, which were ready to overtake him, and at being commanded to quit life⁸ while his mind, still active and vigorous, was likely to

⁷ These circumstances, which are mentioned both by Xenophon and Plato, prove that Socrates was tried before a popular tribunal. It is well known that the Areopagus rigorously proscribed all such undue methods of biasing the judgment, and seducing the passions. Vid. Demosth. in Near. & Aristocrat. Æschin. in Timarch. Lucian. Hermotim. & Isocrat. Areopag.

⁸ Xenophon says, that he writes Socrates's Defence, after so many others, who had already executed that task with sufficient skill and fidelity, in order to illustrate one point, much insisted on by Socrates, "That it was better for him to die than to live." Xenoph. Apol. sub init.

leave behind him the most agreeable impression in the remembrance of his friends.

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Socrates is
condemned.

The firm magnanimity of Socrates could not alter the resolution of his judges; yet such is the ascendant of virtue over the worst of minds, that he was found guilty by a majority of only three voices⁹. The court then commanded him, agreeably to a principle which betrays the true spirit of democratical tyranny, to pass sentence of condemnation on himself, and to name the punishment which ought to be inflicted on him. The punishment, said Socrates, which I deserve for having spent my whole life in endeavouring to render my fellow-citizens wiser and better, and particularly in striving to inspire the Athenian youth with the love of justice and temperance, is, "To be maintained, during the remainder of my life, in the Prytanæum; an honour due to *me*, rather than to the victors in the Olympic games, since, as far as depended on me, I have made my countrymen more happy *in reality*, they only in *appearance*." Provoked by this observation, by which they ought to have been confounded, the judges proceeded to pass sentence, and condemned Socrates to drink hemlock¹⁰.


This atrocious injustice excited the indignation of his numerous friends and disciples, most of whom had accompanied him to the court; but it awakened no other passion in the illustrious sage than that of pity for the blind prejudices of the Athenians. He then addressed that part of the court who had been favourable to him, or rather to themselves, since they had avoided the misfortune of passing an unjust sentence, which would have disgraced and embittered the latest moment of their lives. "He considered them as friends with whom he would willingly converse for a moment, upon the event which had happened to him, before he was summoned to death. From the commencement of the prosecution, an unusual circumstance, he ob-

His address
to the judges
who voted in
his favour.

⁹ Plato. Apol.

¹⁰ Idem, *ibid*.

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served, had attended all his words, and actions, and every step which he had taken in the whole course of his trial. The dæmon, who on ordinary occasions had ever been so watchful to restrain him, when he prepared to say or do any thing improper or hurtful, had never once withheld him, during the whole progress of this affair, from following the bent of his own inclination. For this reason he was apt to suspect that the fate which the court had decreed him, although they meant it for an evil, was to him a real good. If to die was only to change the scene, must it not be an advantage to remove from these pretended judges to Minos, Rhadamanthus, and other real judges, who, through their love of justice, had been exalted by the divinity to this important function of government! What delight to live and converse with the immortal heroes and poets of antiquity! It becomes you also, my friends! to be of good comfort with regard to death, since no evil, in life or death, can befall virtuous men, whose true interest is ever the concern of heaven. For my part, I am persuaded that it is better for me to die than to live, and therefore am not offended with my judges. I intreat you all to behave towards my sons, when they attain the years of reason, as I have done to you, not ceasing to blame and accuse them, when they prefer wealth or pleasure, or any other frivolous object, to the inestimable worth of virtue. If they think highly of their own merit, while in fact it is of little value, reproach them severely, Athenians! as I have done you. By so doing you will behave justly to me and to my sons. It is now time for us to part. I go to die, you to live; but which is best, none but the Divinity knows¹¹”.

The execution of the sentence deferred on account of the Delian festival.

It is not wonderful that the disciples of Socrates should have believed the events of his extraordinary life, and especially its concluding scene, to be regulated by the interposition of a particular

¹¹ Plato. Apol. sub fin.

providence.

providence¹². Every circumstance conspired to evince his unalterable firmness, and display his inimitable virtue. It happened, before the day of his trial, that the high-priest had crowned the stern of the vessel, which was annually sent to Delos, to commemorate, by grateful acknowledgments to Apollo, the triumphant return of Theseus from Crete, and the happy deliverance of Athens from a disgraceful tribute¹³. This ceremony announced the commencement of the festival, which ended with the return of the vessel; and, during the intervening time, which was consecrated to the honour of Apollo, it was not lawful to inflict any capital punishment. Contrary winds protracted the ceremony thirty days, during which Socrates lay in prison, and in fetters. His friends daily visited him, repairing, at the dawn, to the prison-gate, and impatiently waiting till it opened. Their conversation turned on the same subjects which had formerly occupied them; but afforded not that pure unmixed pleasure which they usually derived from the company of Socrates. It occasioned, however, nothing of that gloom which is naturally excited by the presence of a friend under sentence of death. They felt a certain pleasing melancholy, a mixed sensation of sorrow and delight, for which no language has assigned a name¹⁴.

¹² According to Plato nothing happened in this transaction *ανω θειας μηχανας*. Plat. Apoll. Yet in the Phædo. sub. init. he says, *τυχη τις αυτης, ω Ελκερατιε! συμβη*. But *τυχη* here refers not to the cause, but to the effect; not to blind chance, but to an unaccountable disposition of events produced by a particular interposition of the divinity. In this sense the word is used not only by philosophers but orators, particularly Demosthenes, as we shall see below.

¹³ See vol. i. p. 23.

¹⁴ This is admirably described by Plato:
Αλλα ατιχωις αποποι τι μοι παθος παρει, και τις

αυθις κραςι—απο το της ηδους συγκεκραμενη ομνη και της λυπης. The following circumstances are inimitable: *Και πασις η παρεις σκεδη τι ετω δικημεθα, ποτε μη γινωσκεις, ουτε δε δοκουντες εις δε ημων διαφειρας Απελλωδωρος: αισθη γαρ τον αυθα και το τροπον αυτην*. Phædo, viii. c. ii. Socrates alone felt none of these sensations; but as Montaigne, who had seized his true character, says, Et qui ne reconnoît en luy, non seulement de la fermeté & de la constance (c'étoit son assiette ordinaire que celle là) mais je ne sçay quel contentement nouveau & une allegresse enjouée en ses propos & façons dernières.

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He refuses to
escape from
prison.

When the fatal vessel arrived in the harbour of Sunium, and was hourly expected in the Piræus, Crito, the most confidential of the disciples of Socrates¹⁵, first brought the melancholy intelligence; and, moved by the near danger of his admired friend, ventured to propose a clandestine escape, shewing him at the same time that he had collected a sufficient sum of money to corrupt the fidelity of his keepers. This unmanly proposal, which nothing but the undistinguishing ardour of friendship could excuse, Socrates answered in a vein of pleasantry, which shewed the perfect freedom of his mind, "In what country, O Crito! can I escape death? where shall I fly to elude this irrevocable doom, passed on all human kind?" To Apollodorus, a man of no great depth of understanding, but his affectionate and zealous admirer, who said, "That what grieved him beyond measure was, that such a man should perish unjustly," he replied, stroking the head of his friend, "And would you be less grieved, O Apollodorus! were I deserving of death¹⁶?" When his friends, and Crito especially, insisted, "That it would be no less ungenerous than imprudent, in compliance with the hasty resolution of a malignant or misguided multitude, to render his wife a widow, his children orphans, his disciples for ever miserable and forlorn, and conjured him, by every thing sacred, to save a life so inestimably precious;" Socrates assumed a tone more serious, recalled the maxims which he professed, and the doctrines which he had ever inculcated, "That how unjustly soever we were treated, it could never be our interest to practise injustice, much less to retort the injuries of our parents or our country; and to teach, by our example, disobedience to the laws." The strength of his arguments, and still more, the unalterable firmness and cheerful serenity that appeared in his looks, words, and actions¹⁷, silenced the struggling emotions of his disciples. The dignity of virtue elevated their souls; they parted with

¹⁵ Finding Socrates in a profound sleep, he reposed himself by his side till he awoke. Plat. *ibid.*

¹⁶ Xenoph. & Plat. *ibid.*

¹⁷ Κρίναι ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἀδικοῦντος καὶ ἀδικοῦντος φαιδρῶς. Xenoph. Apol.

tears

tears of inexpressible admiration, and with a firm purpose to see their master earlier than usual on the fatal morning.

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His behaviour during the last day of his confinement.

Having arrived at the prison-gate, they were desired to wait without, because the Eleven (so the delicacy of Athens styled the executioners of public justice) unloosed the fetters of Socrates, and announced to him his death before the setting of the sun. They had not waited long, when they were desired to enter. They found Socrates just relieved from the weight of his bonds, attended by his wife Xantippé, who bore in her arms his infant son. At their appearance, she exclaimed, "Alas! Socrates, here come your friends, whom you for the last time behold, and who for the last time behold you!" Socrates, looking at Crito, desired some one to conduct her home. She departed beating her breast, and lamenting with that clamorous sorrow natural to her sex¹⁸ and her character.

His conversation with his disciples.

Socrates, meanwhile, reclining on the couch with his usual composure, drew his leg towards him, and gently rubbing the part which had been galled by the fetters, remarked the wonderful connection between what men call pleasure, and its opposite, pain. The one sensation, he observed (as just happened to his leg after being delivered from the smart of the irons), was generally followed by the other. Neither could long exist apart; they are seldom pure and unmixed; and whoever feels the one, may be sure that he will soon feel the other. "I think, that had Æsop the fabulist made this reflection, he would have said, that the Divinity, desirous to reconcile these opposite natures, but finding the design impracticable, had at least joined their summits; for which reason pleasure has ever since dragged pain after it, and pain pleasure."

The mention of Æsop recalled to Cebes, the Theban, a conversation which he had recently had with Euenus of Paros, a celebrated

Why he composed verses in prison, having never done it before.

¹⁸ Βοῤῃαν τι καὶ μετὰ μῆνιν; and a little above, "ὅσα δὲ συμβασι αἱ συναισθησεις." Phædo, sect. iii.

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elegiac poet, then resident in Athens". The poet asked Cebes, "Why his master, who had never before addicted himself to poetry, should, since his confinement, have written a hymn to Apollo, and turned into verse several of Æsop's fables?" The Theban seized the present opportunity to satisfy himself in this particular, and to acquire such information as might satisfy Euenus, who, he assured Socrates, would certainly repeat his question. The illustrious sage, whose inimitable virtues were all tinged, or rather brightened, by enthusiasm, desired Cebes to tell Eucnus, "That it was not with a view to rival him, or with a hope to excel his poetry (for *that*, he knew, would not be easy), that he had begun late in life this new pursuit. He had attempted it in compliance with a divine mandate, which frequently commanded him in dreams to cultivate music. He had, therefore, first applied to philosophy, thinking *that* the greatest music; but since he was under sentence of death, he judged it safest to try likewise the popular music, lest any thing should on his part be omitted, which the gods had enjoined him. For this reason, he had composed a hymn to Apollo, whose festival was now celebrating; and not being himself a mythologist, had versified such fables of Æsop as happened most readily to occur to his memory. Tell this to Euenus—bid him farewell; and farther, that if he is wise, he will follow me; for I depart, as it is likely, to-day; so the Athenians have ordered it."

His opinion concerning suicide, and the immortality of the soul.

The last words introduced an important conversation concerning suicide, and the immortality of the soul. Socrates maintained, that though it was better for a wise man to die than to live, because there was reason to believe that he would be happier in a future than in the present state of existence, yet it could never be allowable to perish by his own hand, or even to lay down life without a sufficient motive, such as that which influenced himself, a respectful submis-

"The following narrative, to the death of Socrates, is entirely borrowed from the Phædo, to which it is therefore unnecessary at every moment to refer.

tion

sion to the laws of his country. This interesting discussion consumed the greatest part of the day. Socrates encouraged his disciples not to spare his opinions, from delicacy to his present situation. Those who were of his mind he exhorted to persevere. Entwining his hand in the long hair of Phædo, "These beautiful locks, my dear Phædo, you will this day cut off²⁰; but were I in your place, I would not again allow them to grow, but make a vow (as the Argives did in a matter of infinitely less moment) never to resume the wonted ornament of my beauty, until I had confirmed the doctrine of the soul's immortality."

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The arguments of Socrates convinced and consoled his disciples, as they have often done the learned and virtuous in succeeding times. "Those who had adorned their minds with temperance, justice, and fortitude, and had despised the vain ornaments and vain pleasures of the body, could never regret their separation from this terrestrial companion. And now," continued he, in the language of tragedy, "the destined hour summons me to death; it is almost time to bathe, and surely it will be better that I myself, before I drink the poison, should perform this operation, than occasion unnecessary trouble to the women after I am dead." "So let it be," said Crito; "but first inform us, Socrates, in what we can do you pleasure, respecting your children, or any other concern." "Nothing new, O Crito! but what I have always told you. By consulting your own happiness, you will act the best part with regard to my children, to me, and to all mankind; although you bind not yourselves by any new promise. But if you forsake the rules of virtue, which we have just endeavoured to explain, you will benefit neither my children, nor any with whom you live, although you should now swear to the contrary." Crito then asked him, "How

Cene-
death, burial,
and the duties
of friends
to the de-
ceased.

²⁰ The ceremony of cutting off the hair c. vii. p. 238, where the transaction of the at funerals was mentioned above, Vol. I. Argives, alluded to in the text, is related.

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he chose to be buried?" "As you please, provided I don't escape you." Saying this, he smiled, adding, that as to his *body*, they might bury it as seemed most decent, and most suitable to the laws of his country.

He bathes;

is addressed
by the mes-
senger of
death.

He then retired into the adjoining chamber, accompanied only by Crito; the rest remained behind, like children mourning a father. When he had bathed and dressed, his sons (one grown up, and two children), together with his female relations", were admitted to him. He conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and then returned to his disciples near sun-set, for he tarried long within. Before he had time to begin any new subject, the keeper of the prison entered, and standing near Socrates, "I cannot," said he, "accuse you, O Socrates! of the rage and execrations too often vented against me by those here confined, to whom, by command of the magistrates, I announce that it is time to drink the poison. Your fortitude, mildness, and generosity, exceed all that I have ever witnessed; even now I know you pardon me, since I act by compulsion; and as you are acquainted with the purport of my message, farewell, and bear your fate with as much patience as possible." At these words the executioner, hardened as he was in scenes of death, dissolved in tears, and, turning from Socrates, went out. The latter following him with his eye, replied, "And you also farewell; as to me, I shall obey your instructions." Then looking at his disciples, "How truly polite," said he, "is *the man*²¹! During my confinement, he often visited and conversed with me; and now, how generously does he lament my death! But let the poison be brought, that we may obey his orders."

²¹ The *οικιστὴν γυναικὸς* of Plato. This expression seems to have given rise to the absurd fable, that Socrates had two wives, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, and others; and the absurd explication of that irregula-

rity, "that the Athenians, after the pestilence, had allowed polygamy, at least bigamy, to repair the ravages of that dreadful malady."

²² *Ὁ ἀνδραγωγὸς*, the term for the executioner.

His conver-
sation before
drinking the
poison.

Crito then said, "Still, O Socrates! there is time; the sun still brightens the tops of the mountains. Many have I known, who have drank the poison late in the night, after a luxuriant supper and generous wines, and lastly, after enjoying the embraces of those with whom they were enamoured²³. But hasten not; it is yet time." "With good reason," said Socrates, "these persons did what you say, because they believed thereby to be gainers; and with good reason I shall act otherwise, because I am convinced that I should gain nothing but ridicule by an over-anxious solicitude for life, when it is just ready to leave me." Crito then made a sign to the boy who waited; he went, ground the hemlock, and returned with him who was to administer it. Socrates perceiving his arrival, "Tell me," said he, "for you are experienced in such matters, what have I to do?" "Nothing farther than to walk in the apartment till your limbs feel heavy; then repose yourself on the couch." Socrates then taking the cup in his hand, and looking at him with ineffable serenity, "Say, as to this beverage, is it lawful to employ any part of it in libation?" The other replied, "There is no more than what is proper to drink." "But it is *proper*," rejoined Socrates, "and necessary, if we would perform our duty, to pray the gods, that our passage hence may be fortunate." So saying, he was silent for a moment, and then drank the poison with an unaltered countenance. With a mixture of gentleness and authority, he filled the noisy lamentations of his friends, saying, that in order to avoid such unmanly complaints, he had before dismissed the women. As the poison began to gain his vitals, he uncovered his face, and said to Crito, "We owe a cock to Æsculapius; sacrifice it, and neglect it not." Crito asked, if he had any thing further to command? But he made no reply. A little after, he was in agony; Crito shut his eyes. Thus died Socrates; whom, his disciples declared, they could

His prayer,
and death.

²³ Συγχορηματικὸς γίνεσθαι ὡς αὐτὸς τυχόντι ἐπιθυμῶντες. Phæd. c. xlviii. What an extraordinary picture of Athenian manners!

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Transient
persecution
of his dis-
ciples.

The Athe-
nians repent,
and honour
the memory
of Socrates.

never cease to remember, nor remembering, cease to admire. "If any man," says Xenophon inimitably, "if any man, a lover of virtue, ever found a more profitable companion than Socrates, I deem that man the happiest of human kind²⁴."

The current of popular passions is nowhere more uniform than in the history of Athens. The factitious resentment excited against Socrates by such improbable calumnies, as even those who were the readiest to receive and to disseminate, could never seriously believe, extended itself with rapidity to his numerous friends and adherents. But fortunately for the interest of letters and humanity, the rage of popular frenzy was confined within the Athenian frontiers. Plato, Antisthenes, Æschines, Critobulus, and other Athenians, wisely eluded a storm which they had not strength to resist. Some took refuge in Thebes with their fellow-disciples, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædonas; others found protection in Megara from Euclid and Terpsion. This persecution of philosophy, however, was accidental and transient. Mingled sentiments of pity, shame, and resentment, soon gave a new direction to the popular fury, which raged with more destructive, yet far juster cruelty, against the accusers and judges of Socrates²⁵. Many were driven into exile; many were put to death; several perished in despair, by their own hands. The illustrious sage was honoured by signal monuments of public admiration²⁶; his fame, like the hardy oak, derived vigour from years²⁷; and increased from age to age, till the superstition of the Athenians at length worshipped, as a god²⁸, him whom their injustice had condemned as a criminal.

²⁴ Plato speaks with equal feeling, or rather enthusiasm. Καὶ γὰρ το μνησθῆναι, καὶ αὐτὸν λεγόντα, καὶ ἄλλα ἀκρόατα, ἐμνήσθην αὐτοῦ πάντων ἡδίστον. Phæd. c. ii.

²⁵ Plutarch. de Invid. p. 538.

²⁶ Statues, altars, even a chapel, called Socrateion. Vide Diogen. in Socrat.

²⁷ Crescit occulto, velut arbor, ævo
Fama Marcelli — HORACE.

²⁸ Or rather as a demi-god; but the boundaries were not very accurately ascertained, though *that* is attempted by Arrian, in Exped. Alexand. l. iv. p. 86.

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The writings
of his dis-
ciples.

The persecution, the death, and the honours of Socrates, all conspired to animate the affection, and to increase the zeal, of his disciples. Their number had been great in his life-time: it became greater after his death; since those who followed, and those who rejected his doctrines, alike styled themselves Socratic philosophers. His name was thus adopted and profaned by many sects, who, while they differed widely from each other, universally changed, exaggerated, or perverted the tenets of their common master. Among the genuine followers of Socrates, Xenophon, as will appear hereafter, unquestionably merits the first place. Plato comes next, yet separated by a long interval. In the same class may be ranked Cebes the Theban, Æschines, Crito, and Simon, the Athenians. The table of Cebes, which has been transmitted to modern times, contains a beautiful and affecting picture of human life, delineated with accuracy of judgment, and illuminated by the splendor of sentiment. Three remaining dialogues of Æschines breathe the same sublime spirit, and abound in irresistible persuasions to virtue: "That happiness is attained, not by gratifying, but by moderating the passions; that he alone is rich and powerful, whose faculties exceed his desires; that virtue is true wisdom, and being attended with the only secure happiness that can be enjoyed in the present life, must, according to the unalterable laws of Providence, be crowned with immortal felicity hereafter."

Cebes.

Æschines.

The remains of Cebes and Æschines, and far more, as will appear in the sequel, the copious writings of Plato and Xenophon, may enable us to discriminate the philosophy of Socrates, from that of the various sects who misrepresented or adulterated his opinions. The establishment of these sects belongs not to the period of history now under our review. But the foundation of their respective tenets, which had been laid in a former age, was confirmed by the philosophers who flourished in the time of Socrates. Of these, the most distinguished

The philosophers who misrepresented his opinions.

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Euclid and
Phædo,
Aristippus
and Antis-
thenes.

distinguished were Euclid of Megara, Phædo of Elis, Aristippus of Cyrené, Antisthenes of Athens. The two first restored the captious logic of the sophists; Aristippus embraced their licentious morality. While the schools of Elis and Megara laboured to confound the understanding, that of Cyrené tended to corrupt the heart. Antisthenes set himself to oppose these pernicious sects, deriding the refined subtleties of the sceptics, and disdaining the mean pleasures of the Epicureans²⁹. To prefer the mind to the body, duty to interest, and virtue to pleasure, were the great lessons of Antisthenes. Yet this sublime philosophy he carried to extravagance³⁰, affecting not only to moderate and govern, but to silence and extirpate the passions, and declaring bodily pleasure not only unworthy of pursuit, but a thing carefully to be avoided, as the greatest and most dangerous of evils. His rigid severity of life deceived not the penetration of Socrates. The sage could discern, that no small share of spiritual pride lurked under the tattered cloak of Antisthenes.

State of the
fine arts
during the
period under
review.

A. C. 431—
404.

While philosophy, true or false, thus flourished in Greece, a propitious destiny watched over the imitative arts, which continued, during half a century of perpetual wars and revolutions, to be cultivated with equal assiduity and success. The most distinguished scholars of Phidias were Alcamenes of Athens, and Agoracritus of the isle of Paros. They contended for the prize of sculpture in their respective statues of Venus; and the Athenians, it is said, too partially decided in favour of their countryman. Agoracritus, unwilling that his work should remain in a city where it had met with

²⁹ I anticipate these names. The *scepticism* of Pyrrho, as will be explained hereafter, arose from the quibbling sophisms of the schools of Elis and Megara. *Epicurus*, having adopted and refined the selfish philosophy of Aristippus, had the honour of distinguishing, by his name, the *Epicurean* sect.

³⁰ His follower, Diogenes, as will appear in the sequel, pushed this extravagance still

farther. They both taught in the suburb of Athens called the *Cynosarges*, from which they and their disciples were called *Cynics*. In a subsequent part of this work, it will be explained, how the *Cynical philosophy* gave rise to *Stoicism*, so called, because Zeno and his followers taught at Athens in the "*Stoa pæcile*," the painted portico.

so little justice, sold it to the borough of Rhamnus. There it was beheld with admiration, and soon passed for a production of Phidias³¹ himself. The sculptor Cteselaus excelled in heroes. He chose noble subjects, and still farther ennobled them by his art³². His contemporary Patrocles distinguished himself by his statues of Olympic victors, and particularly of celebrated wrestlers. Assisted by Canachus, he made the greatest work mentioned during the period now under our review, thirty-one figures of bronze, representing the respective commanders of the several cities or republics, who, under the conduct of Lyfander, obtained the memorable victory of Ægos Potamos. They were erected in the temple of Delphian Apollo, together with the statue of Lyfander himself, crowned by Neptune. Inferior artists³³ were employed to copy the statues of various divinities, dedicated at the same time, and in the same place, by the Lacedæmonian conqueror.

It appears not however that, during the Peloponnesian war, any new style was attempted either in sculpture or painting. The artists of that period contented themselves with walking in the footsteps of their great predecessors. The same observation applies to music and poetry; but eloquence, on the contrary, received a new form, and flourishing amidst the tumults of war, and the contentions of active life, produced that concise, rapid, and manly character of composition which thenceforth distinguished the Attic writers. The works of Homer, Sophocles, and Pindar, left few laurels to be gained by their successors. It was impossible to excel, it was dangerous to rival them. Great genius was required to start, without disgrace, in a career where such candidates had run. But great genius is rare, and commonly disdains imitation; and the first poetical prizes being already carried off, men who felt the animation

Of literature.

³¹ Vid. Suid & Hesych. voc. Ραμμας.³² Plin. l. xxxv.³³ See their names in Pausan. l. x. p. 625, & seqq.

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Principal au-
thors in prose
preceding
this period.
Character of
Herodotus as
an historian.

and vigour of their own powers, naturally directed them to objects which possessed the charms of novelty, and promised the hope of excellence.

Even in prose composition the merit and fame of Herodotus and Democritus³⁴ (not to mention authors more ancient) opposed very formidable obstacles to the ambition of their successors. In a work no less splendid than important, the father of prophane history had deduced the transactions between the Greeks and Barbarians, from the earliest accounts till the conclusion of the Persian war; a work including the history of many centuries, and comprehending the greatest kingdoms and empires of the ancient world. This extensive subject was handled with order and dignity. The episodes were ingeniously interwoven with the principal action. The various parts of the narrative were so skilfully combined, that they mutually reflected light on each other. Geography, manners, religion, laws, and arts, entered into the plan of his work; and it is remarkable that the earliest of historians agrees more nearly, as to the design and form of his undertaking, with the enlightened writers of the present century, than any historical author in the long series of intervening ages.

His language was the picture of his mind; natural, flowing, persuasive; lofty on great occasions³⁵, affecting in scenes of distress³⁶, perspicuous in narration, animated in description. Yet this admired writer has sometimes inserted reports romantic and incredible. Of many, indeed, of the fables of Herodotus, as ignorance conceited

³⁴ Itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis & Democriti locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen quod incitatus feratur, & clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum, quam comicorum poetarum. Cicero ad M. Brutum Orator. c. xx. See also de Orator. l. i. c. xi. It is impossible to read Lucretius, without fancying, if we recollect Cicero's criticisms on Democri-

tus, that we are perusing the long lost works of that great philosopher.

³⁵ Longinus cites as an example of the sublime, Herodot. l. vii. c. lx. The whole expedition of Xerxes is written with an elevation becoming the subject.

³⁶ See the affecting story of Adrastus, l. i. c. xxxv.

of its knowledge-long affected to call them, subsequent experience has proved the reality; modern discoveries and voyages seem purposely directed to vindicate the fame of a writer, whom Cicero²⁷ dignifies with the appellation of Prince of Historians. Of other wondrous tales which he relates, his own discernment shewed him the futility. Whatever is contrary to the analogy of nature he rejects with scorn. He speaks with contempt of the Ægepodes, and of the one-eyed Arimaspi, and of other ridiculous and absurd fictions which have been adopted, however, by some credulous writers even in the eighteenth century. But Herodotus thought himself bound in duty to relate what he had heard, not always to believe what he related²⁸. Having travelled into Egypt and the East, he recounts, with fidelity, the reports current in those remote countries. And his mind being opened and enlarged by an extensive view of men and manners, he had learned to set bounds to his disbelief, as well as to his credulity. Yet it must not be dissembled that the fabulous traditions, in which he too much abounds, give the air of romance to his history. Though forming, comparatively, but a small part of the work, they assume magnitude and importance, when invidiously detached from it²⁹. It thus seems as if this most instructive author had written with a view rather to amuse the fancy than to inform the understanding. The lively graces of his diction tend to confirm this supposition. His mode of composition may be regarded as the intermediate shade between Epic poetry and history. Neither concise, nor vehement, the general character of his style

C. 1. A. P.
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²⁷ L. ii. de Orator.

²⁸ Εγὼ δὲ φιλοῦν λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πιστεύειν γὰρ μὴ ἢ πάντα καὶ φιλοῦν. Herodot. l. vii. c. clii. p. 433.

²⁹ The reproaches which Juvenal (Satyr. 10) and Plutarch (in his treatise entitled the Malignity of Herodotus) make to this great historian, are fully answered by Aldus

Manutius, Camerarius, and Stephanus. Plutarch, forsooth, was offended that his countrymen made so bad a figure in the history of Herodotus. The criticism of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a writer of more taste and discernment than Plutarch, does ample justice to the father of history.

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is natural, copious, and flowing⁴⁰; and his manner throughout breathes the softness of Ionia, rather than the active contention of Athens.

Of Thucydides.

In this light Herodotus appeared to the Athenians in the age immediately succeeding his own. At the Olympic games he had read his work with universal applause. Thucydides, then a youth, wept mixed tears of wonder and emulation⁴¹. His father was complimented on the generous ardour of a son, whose early inquietude at another's fame marked a character formed for exertions that lead to immortality. But Herodotus had preoccupied the subjects best adapted to historical composition; and it was not till the commencement of the memorable war of twenty-seven years, that Thucydides, amidst the dangers which threatened his country, rejoiced in a theme worthy to exercise the genius, and call forth the whole vigour of an historian. From the breaking out of this war, in which he proved an unfortunate actor, he judged that it would be the greatest, the most obstinate, and important that had ever been carried on. He began therefore to collect, and treasure up, such materials as were necessary for describing it: in the selection, as well as in the distribution of which, he afterwards discovered an evident purpose to rival and surpass Herodotus. Too much indulgence for fiction had disgraced the narrative of the latter: Thucydides professed to be animated purely by the love of truth. "His relation was not in-

⁴⁰ Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, l. iii. c. ix. distinguishes two kinds of style; the continuous and the periodic. The former flows on without interruption, until the sense is complete. The latter is divided, by stops, into due proportions of duration, which are easily felt by the ear, and measured by the mind. The former style is tiresome, because in every thing men delight to see the end; even racers, when they pass the goal, are quickly out of breath. Herodotus is the

most remarkable instance of the continuous style. In his time scarcely any other was in use; but it is now entirely laid aside. So far Aristotle, who seems rather unjust to Herodotus, since many parts of his work are sufficiently adorned by periods, although the loose style in general prevails. But the partiality of his countryman Dionysius, completely avenges the wrongs of Herodotus.

⁴¹ Suidas, Photius, Marcellinus.

tended to delight the ears of an Olympic audience. By a faithful account of the past, he hoped to assist his readers in conjecturing about the future. While human nature remained the same, his work would have its use, being built on such principles as rendered it an everlasting possession, not a contentious instrument of temporary applause." The execution corresponded with this noble design. In his introductory discourse he runs over the fabulous ages of Greece, carefully separating the ore from the dross. In speaking of Thrace, he touches, with proper brevity, on the fable of Tereus and Progne⁴²; and in describing Sicily, glances at the Cyclops and Leftrigons. But he recedes, as it were, with disgust, from such monstrous phantoms, and immediately returns to the main purpose of his history. In order to render it a faithful picture of the times, he professes to relate not only what was done, but what was said, by inserting such speeches of statesmen and generals as he had himself heard, or as had been reported to him by others. This valuable part of his work has been imitated by all future historians, till the improvement of military discipline on the one hand, and the corruption of manners on the other, rendered such speeches superfluous. Eloquence was once an incentive to courage, and an instrument of government. But the time was to arrive, when the dead principles of fear and interest should alone predominate. In most countries of Europe, despotism has rendered public assemblies a dramatic representation; and in the few, where men are not enslaved by a master, they are the slaves of pride, of avarice, and of faction.

Thucydides, doubtless, had his model in the short and oblique speeches of Herodotus; but in this particular he must be acknowledged far to surpass his pattern. In the distribution of his subject, however, he fell short of that writer. Thucydides, aspiring at extraordinary accuracy, divides his work by summers and winters,

Comparison
between
them.

⁴² Ovid. *Metam.* l. vi. f. 8.

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relating apart the events comprehended in each period of six months. But this space of time is commonly too short for events deserving the notice of history, to be begun, carried on, and completed. His narrative, therefore, is continually broken and interrupted: curiosity is raised without being satisfied, and the reader is transported, as by magic, from Athens to Corcyra, from Lesbos to Peloponnesus, from the coast of Asia to Sicily. Thucydides follows the order of time; Herodotus the connection of events: in the language of a great critic, the skill and taste of Herodotus have reduced a very complicated argument into one regular harmonious whole; the preposterous industry of Thucydides has divided a very simple subject into many detached parts and scattered limbs, which it is difficult again to reduce into one body⁴³. The same critic observes, that Herodotus's history has not only more art and variety, but more gaiety and splendour. A settled gloom, doubtless, hangs over the events of the Peloponnesian war: but what is the history of all wars, but a description of crimes and calamities! The austere gravity of Thucydides admirably corresponds with his subject. His majesty is worthy of Athens, when she commanded a thousand tributary republics. His concise, nervous, and energetic style, his abrupt brevity, and elaborate plainness, admirably represent the contentions of active life, and the tumult of democratical assemblies. Demosthenes, whom Dionysius himself extols above all orators, transcribed eight times, not the elegant flowing smoothness of Herodotus, but the sententious, harsh, and often obscure annals of Thucydides⁴⁴.

Transition to
the military
transactions
of Greece.

Thucydides left his work unfinished in the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian war. It was continued by Xenophon, who deduced the revolutions of Greece through a series of forty-eight years to the battle of Mantinæa; a work which enables us to pursue the important series of Grecian history.

⁴³ Dionys. Halicarn. de Herodot. & Thucydid.

⁴⁴ Idem, ibid.


To a reader accustomed to contemplate the uniform and consistent operations of modern policy, it must appear extraordinary that, at the distance of less than two years from the subversion of the Athenian democracy by a Spartan general, the same turbulent form of government should have been re-established with new splendour, by the approbation, and even the assistance, of a Spartan king. The reasons explained in the preceding Chapter may lessen, but cannot altogether remove, his surprise; and, in order fully to comprehend the causes of this event, it is necessary to consider not only the internal factions which distracted the councils of Sparta, but the external objects of ambition or revenge which solicited and employed her arms.

While the fortune of the Peloponnesian war still hung in doubtful suspense, the peaceful inhabitants of Elis often testified an inclination to preserve an inoffensive neutrality, that they might apply, with undivided attention, to their happy rural labours, to the administration of the Olympian festival, and to the indispensable worship of those gods and heroes to whom their territory was peculiarly consecrated. The continual solicitation of Sparta, and the unprovoked violence of Athens, determined the Eleans to declare for the former republic; but of all the Spartan allies they were the most lukewarm and indifferent. In time of action their assistance was languid and ineffectual, and when the regular return of the Olympic solemnity suspended the course of hostilities, they shewed little partiality or respect for their powerful confederates, whose warlike and ambitious spirit seemed incompatible with the enjoyment of their own contemplative tranquillity. This omission of duty was followed by the actual transgression of the Eleans. In conjunction with the Mantinæans and Argives they deserted the alliance of Sparta; defended themselves by arms against the usurpations of that republic; and excluded its members from consulting the oracle, and from

partaking

The Eleans
incur the dis-
pleasure of
Sparta.

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The Spartans
invade Elis.
Olymp.
xciv. 2.
A. C. 403.

partaking of the games and sacrifices celebrated at Olympia⁴⁵. These injuries passed with impunity until the successful issue of the war of Peloponnesus disposed the Spartans to feel with sensibility, and enabled them severely to chastise every insult that had been offered them during the less prosperous current of their fortune.

While Pausanias and Lyfander settled the affairs of Athens and of Asia, Agis, the most warlike of their princes, levied a powerful army, to inflict a late, but terrible vengeance, on the Elians. That he might attack the enemy unprepared, he led his forces through the countries of Argolis and Achaia, entering the Elian territory by the way of Larissa, and intending to march by the shortest road to the devoted capital. But he had scarcely passed the river Larissus, which gives name to the town, and separates the adjoining provinces of Elis and Achaia, when the invaders were admonished, by repeated shocks of an earthquake, to abstain from ravaging a country which enjoyed the immediate protection of Heaven. Into such a menace, at least, this terrible phenomenon was interpreted by the superstition of the Spartan king, who immediately repassed the river, and, returning home, disbanded his army. But the hostility of the Spartans was restrained, not extinguished. Having offered due supplications and sacrifices to sanctify their impious invasion, the ephori, next year, commanded Agis again to levy troops, and to enter the Elian territory. No unfavourable sign checked the progress of his arms. During two summers and autumns, the country was desolated; the villages burned or demolished; their inhabitants dragged into captivity; the sacred edifices were despoiled of their most valued ornaments; the porticos, gymnasia, and temples, which adorned the city of Jupiter, were many of them reduced to ruins.

The Spartans neither alone incurred the guilt, nor exclusively enjoyed the profits of this cruel devastation. The Elian invasion fur-

⁴⁵ Thucyd. l. v.

nished a rich harvest of plunder to the Arcadians and other communities of Peloponnesus, whose rapacious lust was enflamed by the virgin bloom of a country which had long been protected by religion against the ravages of war. When the principal property of the Elians was destroyed or plundered, the Spartans at length granted them a peace, on condition that they surrendered their fleet, acknowledged the independence of the inferior towns and villages, which were scattered along the delightful banks of the Peneus and the Alpheus, and modelled their internal government according to the plan prescribed by their conquerors⁴⁶.

The war of Elis occupied, but did not engross, the attention of the Spartans; nor did the punishment of that unfortunate republic divert them from other projects of revenge. The Messenians were not their accidental and temporary, but their natural and inveterate, foes; and might justly expect to feel the unhappy consequences of their triumph. After the destruction of Messenê, and the long wanderings and misery of its persecuted citizens, the town of Naupactus, situate on the northern shore of the Corinthian gulph, furnished a safe retreat to a feeble remnant of that ancient community; which, flourishing under the protection of Athens, spread along the western coast, and planted a considerable colony in the neighbouring island of Cephallenia. We have already described the memorable gratitude of the Messenians, who were the most active, zealous, and, according to their ability, the most useful, allies of Athens in the Peloponnesian war. But *their* assistance (and assistance far more powerful than theirs) proved ineffectual; and the time was now arrived when they were to suffer a severe punishment for their recent as well as ancient injuries. The resentment of Sparta drove them from Naupactus and Cephallenia. The greater part escaped to Sicily; above three thousand failed to Cyrenaica, the only countries

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The Spartans drive the Messenians from Greece.
Olymp. xcv. 4.
A. C. 401.

⁴⁶ Xenophon Hellen. l. iii. c. 2: Diodor. l. xiv. p. 404.

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inhabited by the Hellenic race, which lay beyond the reach of the Lacedæmonian power⁴⁷.

Causes which
withdrew
Cyrenaica
and Sicily
from the
sphere of
Grecian
politics.

From the æra of this important migration, the names of Sicily and Cyrenaica will seldom occur in the present history; on which account it may not be improper briefly to explain the causes which withdrew from the general sphere of Grecian politics a fruitful and extensive coast, and an island not less fruitful and extensive, and far more populous and powerful. The insulated situation of those remote provinces, while it rendered it extremely inconvenient for Greece to interfere in their affairs, peculiarly exposed them to two evils, which rendered it still more inconvenient for them to interfere in the affairs of Greece. Removed from the protection of their Peloponnesian ancestors, both the Cyreneans and Sicilians often endured the oppression of domestic tyrants, and often suffered the ravages of foreign barbarians.

Subsequent
history of
Cyrenaica.

The inhabitants of Cyrenaica alternately carried on war against the Libyans and Carthaginians⁴⁸. They were actually oppressed by the tyrant Ariston. Soon afterwards they recovered their civil liberty⁴⁹; but were compelled frequently to struggle for their national independence. Though often invaded, their country was never subdued by any barbarian enemy; and their liberties survived the republics of their European brethren, since they reluctantly submitted, for the first time, to the fortunate general of Alexander, who, in the division of his master's conquests, obtained the fertile and wealthy kingdom of Egypt⁵⁰.

Of Sicily.

The revolutions of Sicily are far better known than those of Cyrené, and still more worthy to be remembered. During the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, the assistance given by Syracuse to

⁴⁷ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

⁵⁰ Diodor. l. xix. p. 715. & Strabo, l. xvii.

⁴⁸ Aristot. Polit. Sallust. de bell Jugurth. p. 856.

⁴⁹ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

the Lacedæmonians became gradually more faint and imperceptible, and at length totally disappeared. This was occasioned by the necessity of defending the safety of the whole island, in which that of the capital was involved, against the formidable descents of the Carthaginians, whom the invitation of Segesta and several inferior cities at variance with their powerful neighbours, the hopes of acquiring at once those valuable commodities, the annual purchase of which drained Africa of such immense treasures, and, above all, the desire of revenging the death of Hamilcar, and the dishonour of the Carthaginian name in the unfortunate siege of Himera, encouraged to undertake and carry on various expeditions for the entire subjugation of Sicily.

Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar, was entrusted with the conduct of the war, which commenced the four hundred and tenth, and continued, with little intermission, till the four hundred and fourth year before the Christian æra. The domestic troops of Carthage were reinforced by their African allies. Considerable levies were made among the native Spaniards and Italians, who naturally envied the splendour, and dreaded the power of the Greeks, to whose conquests and colonies they saw no bounds. The united army exceeded an hundred thousand men, and was conveyed to the southern shore of Sicily in a proportionable number of transports and galleys¹.

The design of Hannibal, as far as it appears from his measures, was to conquer successively the smaller and more defenceless towns, before he laid siege to Syracuse, whose natural strength, recently improved by art, bidding defiance to assault, could only be taken by blockade. The first campaign was rendered memorable by the conquest of Selinus and Himera; the second by the demolition of Agrigentum; the third by the taking of Gela. The inferior cities

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which is long
harassed by
the Cartha-
ginians;
Olymp.
xcii. 3.
Olymp.
xciv. 1.
A. C. 410—
404.

whose con-
quests are in-
terrupted by
pestilence.

A. C. 409.

A. C. 406.

A. C. 405.

¹ Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. 43. & seqq.

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of Solas, Egesta, Motya, Ancyra, Entelta, and Panormus, either invited the Carthaginian arms, or surrendered without resistance. The invaders might have proceeded to the siege of Syracuse, the main object of their expedition; but pestilence followed the bloody havoc of war, and swept off, in undistinguished ruin, the victors and the vanquished. Not only the general, but the most numerous portion of his troops, had fallen a prey to this calamity; and Hamilcar, who succeeded to the command, contented himself with leaving garrisons in the towns which had been conquered, and returned to Africa with the enfeebled remains of his armament, which communicated the pestilential infection to Carthage, where it long raged with destructive fury⁵².

Excessive
cruelty of
the Cartha-
ginians.

According to the genius of Grecian superstition, it was natural to ascribe the sufferings of the Carthaginians to the unexampled cruelty and impiety with which, in their successive ravages, they had deformed the fair face of Sicily. It would be useless and disgusting to describe the horrid scenes of bloodshed and slaughter transacted in the several places which presumed to resist their power. Whatever atrocities could be invented by the unprincipled licence of the Italians, approved by the stern insensibility of the Spaniards, and inflicted by the implacable revenge of the Africans, were committed in the miserable cities of Selinus, Himera, Gela, and Agrigentum. After the taking of Himera, Hannibal sacrificed, in one day, three thousand of its inhabitants to the manes of his grandfather, who, in the first Carthaginian invasion, had perished before its walls; and the lot of these unhappy victims, dreadful as it was, might justly be an object of envy to the long-tormented natives of Gela and Selinus.

Ancient
magnifi-
cence of
Agrigentum.

Yet of all Sicilian cities, the fate of Agrigentum seemed the most worthy to be deplored, from the striking contrast of its fallen state

⁵² Diodor. l. xiii. c. 70. & seqq.

with its recent splendour and prosperity. The natural beauties⁵³ of Agrigentum were secured by strength, and adorned with elegance; and whoever considered, either the innumerable advantages of the city itself, or the gay cultivation of the surrounding territory, which abounded in every luxury of the sea and land, was ready to pronounce the Agrigentines the most favoured inhabitants of the earth. The exuberant fertility of the soil, particularly the rich luxuriance of the vines and olives⁵⁴, exceeded every thing that is related of the happiest climates, and furnished the materials of a lucrative commerce with the populous coast of Africa, which was very sparingly provided in those valuable plants. The extraordinary wealth of the Agrigentines was displayed in the magnificence of public edifices, and in the splendid enjoyment of private fortunes. They had begun, and almost completed, the celebrated temple of Jupiter, built in the grandest style of architecture employed by the Greeks on the greatest and most solemn occasions. Its walls were encompassed by pillars without, and adorned by pilasters within; and its magnitude far exceeded the ordinary dimensions of ancient temples, as it extended three hundred and forty feet in length, sixty in breadth, and an hundred and twenty in height, without including the lofty and spacious dome. The grandeur of the doors and vestibule corresponded with the simple majesty of the whole edifice, whose sculptured ornaments represented, with finished elegance, and with a laborious accuracy that distinguished each particular figure, the defeat of the Giants, and the taking of Troy; respectively the most illustrious exploits of Grecian gods, and Grecian heroes.

The temple
of Jupiter.

This noble monument, consecrated to piety and patriotism, might be contrasted, by a philosophic mind, with others destined to a very different purpose. Without the walls of Agrigentum an artificial

Their
luxury.

⁵³ The following particulars in the text concerning Agrigentum, we learn from Diodorus Siculus, p. 374—379. Valer. Maxim. l. iv. 8. Athenæus, l. i. c. 3.

⁵⁴ Diodorus celebrates the height of the vines, which we are not used to consider as a proper subject of panegyric.

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Excessive
wealth of in-
dividuals.

Siege of
Agrigentum.

pond, or rather lake, thirty feet deep and near a mile in circumference, was continually replenished with a rare variety of the most delicate fishes, to furnish a sure supply to the sumptuous extravagance of public entertainments. But nothing could rival the elegance and beauty of the tombs and sepulchres erected by the Agrigentines, to perpetuate the fame of their couriers which had obtained the Olympic prize; and, if we believe the testimony of an eye-witness⁵⁵, to commemorate the quails and other delicate birds, which were cherished with an affectionate and partial fondness by the effeminate youth of both sexes. Such capricious and absurd abuses of opulence and the arts might be expected amidst the mortifying discrimination of ranks, and the enormous superabundance of private riches, which distinguished the Agrigentines. The labour of numerous and active slaves cultivated agriculture and manufactures with extraordinary success. From the profit of these servile hands many citizens attained, and exceeded, the measure not only of Grecian, but of modern, wealth. A short time before the siege of the town, Hexenitus returned, in triumph, from Olympia, with three hundred chariots, each drawn by two milk-white horses of Sicilian blood. Antisthenes had eclipsed this magnificence in celebrating the marriage of his daughter. But every native of Agrigentum yielded the fame of splendour to the hospitable Gellias, whose palace could entertain and lodge five hundred guests, who had been clothed from his wardrobe, and whose cellars, consisting of three hundred spacious reservoirs, cut in the solid rock, daily invited the joyous festivity of strangers and citizens.

Before the second Carthaginian invasion the Agrigentines, warned by the fate of Selinus and Himera, had prepared every thing most necessary for their own defence. Their magazines were stored with provisions, their arsenals with arms. Elevated by the confidence of prosperity, they had courage to resist the first impressions of their

⁵⁵ Timæus apud Diodor. l. xiii.

enemies;

enemies; but, corrupted by the vices of wealth and luxury, they wanted fortitude to persevere. Their allies in Sicily and Italy shewed not that degree of ardour which might have been expected in a war which so deeply concerned them all: yet, by the partial assistance of Syracuse, Gela, and Camerina, as well as several Grecian allies in Italy, the Agrigentines stood the siege eight months, during which, the Carthaginians employed every resource of strength and ingenuity. At length the place was reduced to great difficulties by means of immense wooden machines, drawn on wheels, which enabled the besiegers to fight on equal ground with those who defended the walls. But before any breach was effected, the greater part of the inhabitants determined to abandon the city.

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In the obscurity of night they departed, with their wives and families, and many of them fortunately escaped to Gela, Syracuse, and Leontium. Others, wanting courage for this dangerous resolution, or unwilling to survive the fate of their country, perished by their own hands. A third class, more timid, or more superstitious, shut themselves up in the temples, expecting to be saved by the protection of the gods, or by the religious awe of the enemy. But the Barbarians no more respected what was sacred, than what was profane. The consecrated statues, and altars, and offerings, were confounded with things the most vile, and plundered or destroyed in the promiscuous ruin. One memorable act of despair may represent the general horror of this dreadful scene. With his numerous friends, and most valued treasure, the humane and hospitable Gellias had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva; but when he understood the universal desolation of his country, he set fire to that sacred edifice, choosing to perish by the flames rather than by the rage of the Carthaginians⁵⁶.

Unhappy
fate of its
inhabitants.

Near fourscore years before the demolition of Agrigentum, Sicily had acquired immortal glory, by defeating more numerous invaders;

Amidst the
tumults of
war and fac-
tion Diony-
sius rises to
eminence.
Olymp.
xciii. 1.
but, A. C. 408.

⁵⁶ Diodorus, p. 379.

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but, at that time, the efforts of the whole island were united and animated by the virtues and abilities of Gelon ; whereas, amidst the actual dangers and trepidation of the Carthaginian war, the Sicilians were distracted by domestic factions. Syracuse had banished the only man whose consummate wisdom, and approved valour and fidelity, seemed worthy to direct the helm in the present tempestuous juncture. In the interval between the siege of Himera and that of Agrigentum, the patriotic Hermocrates had returned to Sicily ; and, at the head of his numerous adherents, had attempted to gain admission into the capital. But the attempt was immediately fatal to himself ; and, in its consequences, destructive of the public freedom. His partisans, though discomfited and banished, soon found a leader qualified to avenge their cause, and to punish the ingratitude of Syracuse.

His character.

This was the celebrated Dionysius, a youth of twenty-two years ; of mean parentage, but unbounded ambition ; destitute (if we believe historians) of almost every virtue, and possessed of every talent ; and whose fortune it was to live and flourish amidst those perturbed circumstances of foreign war and civil dissention, which are favourable to the elevation of superior minds. Though esteemed and entrusted by Hermocrates, who could more easily discern the merit of his abilities, than discover the danger of his ambition, Dionysius had gained friends in the opposite faction, by whose interest he was recalled from exile. His services in the Carthaginian war raised him to eminence. He excelled in valour ; he was unrivalled in eloquence ; his ends were pursued with steady perseverance ; his means were varied with convenient flexibility : the appearance of patriotism rendered him popular, and he employed his popularity to restore his banished friends.

Means by which he usurped the government of Syracuse. Olymp. xciii. 4. A. C. 405.

The gratitude of one party, and the admiration of both, enabled him to attain the command of the mercenaries, and the conduct of the war. But he was less solicitous to conquer the Carthaginians than

than to enslave his fellow-citizens, whose factious turbulence rendered them unworthy of liberty. By the affected dread of violence from his enemies, he obtained a guard for his person, which his artful generosity easily attached to his interest; and the arms of his troops, the influence and wealth of Philistus, the historian of Sicily, who was honoured with the appellation of the second Thucydides⁵⁷, above all, his own crafty and daring ambition enabled him, at the age of twenty-five, to usurp the government of Syracuse, which he held for thirty-eight years.

During his long and active reign he was generally engaged in war; sometimes with the Carthaginians, sometimes with his revolted subjects. Yet in both contests he finally prevailed, having reduced the Carthaginian power in Sicily, and appeased, or intimidated, domestic rebellion. His actual condition, however splendid, he regarded only as a preparation for higher grandeur. He besieged and took Rhegium, the key of Italy: nor could the feeble confederacy of the Italian Greeks have prevented the conquest of that country, had not the renewed hostilities of the Carthaginians, and fresh discontents at home, interrupted the progress of his arms. This growing storm he resisted as successfully as before, and transmitted, to a degenerate son, the peaceful inheritance of the greatest part of Sicily; after having strengthened, with wonderful art, the fortifications of the capital; enlarged the size, and improved the form of the Syracusan galleys; invented the military catapults, an engine of war which he employed, with great advantage, in the siege of Motya and Rhegium; and not only defended his native island against foreign invasion, but rendered its power formidable to the neighbouring countries.

His poetical labours were the least uniformly successful of all his undertakings. His verses, though rehearsed by the most skilful

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His successful reign.
Olymp.
xciii. 4.
A. C. 405.
Olymp.
ciii. 2.
A. C. 367.

His literary ambition.

⁵⁷ Cicero de Orator. l. xi.

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ambassadors of the age, were treated with signal contempt at the Olympic games. A second time he renewed his pretension to literary fame in that illustrious assembly; but his ambassador was insulted with the most humiliating indignities; and the orator Lyfias pronounced a discourse, in which he maintained the impropriety of admitting the representative of an impious tyrant to assist at a solemnity consecrated to religion, virtue, and liberty⁵⁸. The oration of Lyfias gives ground to suspect that the plenitude of Dionysius's power, rather than the defect of his poetry, exposed him to the censure and derision of the Olympic spectators; and this suspicion receives strong confirmation by considering, that, in the last year of his reign, he deserved and obtained the poetic crown at Athens; a city renowned for the impartiality of its literary decisions⁵⁹.

Reasons why
the character
of Dionysius
appeared so
odious to an-
cient histo-
rians.

It is remarkable, that, with such an active, vigorous, and comprehensive mind; with such a variety of talents, and such an accumulation of glory, Dionysius should be universally held out and branded, as the most conspicuous example of an odious and miserable tyrant, the object of terror in his own, and of detestation in succeeding ages. Yet the uncorrupted evidence of history will prove, that the character of Dionysius was not decisively flagitious. His situation rendered it artificial; and he is acknowledged often to have assumed the semblance of virtue. Always crafty and cautious; but, by turns, and as it suited his interest, mild, affable, and condescending; or cruel, arrogant, and imperious: nor did the Syracusans feel the rigour of his tyranny, until they had justly provoked it by an insurrection, during which they treated his wife and children with the most barbarous and brutal fury. But there are two circumstances in the character of Dionysius which peculiarly excited the indignation of the moralists of Greece and Rome, and which the moderation or the softness of modern times will be disposed to consider with

⁵⁸ Life of Lyfias, p. 117. Dionys. Halicar. de Demosth.

⁵⁹ Isocrat. Panegyri.

less severity. He had usurped the government of a free republic; a crime necessarily heinous in the sight of those who held the assassination of a tyrant to be the most meritorious exertion of human virtue; and he professed an open contempt for the religion of his country; a crime of which the bare suspicion had brought to death the most amiable and respected of men. Yet the impiety of Dionysius was only the child of his interest, and sometimes the parent of his wit. He stripped a celebrated statue of Jupiter of a golden robe, observing, that it was too heavy in summer, and too cold in winter. For a reason equally ingenious he deprived Æsculapius of his golden beard; asserting, that such a venerable ornament ill became the son of the beardless Apollo. But if he despoiled the altars and statues, he increased and improved the fleets and armies, of Syracuse, which were successfully employed against the public enemy. And to the general current of satire and declamation against this extraordinary man⁶⁰, may be opposed the opinion of Polybius and Scipio Africanus, the most illustrious characters of the most illustrious age of Rome: "That none ever concerted his schemes with more prudence, or executed them with more boldness, than Dionysius the Elder."

His son, Dionysius the Younger, exceeded his vices without possessing his abilities. The reign of this second tyrant was distracted and inglorious. His kinsman Dion, the amiable disciple of Plato, endeavoured to correct the disorders of his ungoverned mind. But the task was too heavy for Dion, and even for Plato himself. The former, unable to restrain the excesses of the prince, undertook the defence of the people. His patriotism interrupted, but did not destroy, the tyranny of Dionysius, which was finally abolished, twenty-

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Inglorious
reign of Di-
onysius the
Younger.
Olymp.
civ. 3.
A. C. 362—
Olymp.
cx. 1.
A. C. 340.

⁶⁰ The authentic history of the reign of Dionysius is copiously recorded by Diodorus Siculus, l. xiv. & xv. To relate the numerous and improbable stories told of him by Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and other moralists, would be to transcribe what it is not

easy to believe. The reader may consult, particularly, Plut. ex edit. Paris, in Moral. pp. 78 & 83. De Garrul. p. 508. In Dion. p. 961; and various passages of Cicero de Officiis, & Tusculan. Quæst.

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two years after he first mounted the throne, by the magnanimity of Timoleon⁶¹. This revolution happened only two years before Corinth, the country of Timoleon, as well as the other republics of Greece, submitted to the arms of Philip of Macedon; and, having lost their own independence, became incapable of asserting the freedom of their colonies.

Sicily becomes a province of Rome.
Olymp. cxliii. 1.
A. C. 212.

New tyrants started up in Syracuse, and almost in every city of Sicily, and held a precarious sway under the alternate protection of the Carthaginians and Romans. The citizens of Syracuse, mindful of their ancient fame, dethroned their usurpers, and enjoyed considerable intervals of liberty. But at length the Romans gained possession of the place; the persevering valour of Marcellus, assisted by the treachery of the garrison, prevailing, after a siege of three years, over the bold efforts of mechanical power, directed by the inventive genius of Archimedes⁶². The reduction of the capital was immediately followed by the conquest of the adjoining territory; and Sicily came thus to be regarded as the eldest province of Rome, and the first country, without the limits of Italy, which had taught that victorious republic to taste and enjoy the sweets of foreign dominion⁶³.

⁶¹ Corn. Nepos. Diodorus Sicul. Plut. Dion.

⁶² Polyb. Excerpt. l. viii. Plut. in Marcell.

⁶³ Livy, l. xxiiv. & Cicero in Verrem in few words—Omnium exterarum gentium

princeps Sicilia ad amicitiam fidemque, P. R. applicuit; primaque omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii est, provincia est appellata: prima docuit majores nostros, quam præclarum esset exteris gentibus imperitare.

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Death of Darius Nothus.—Cyrus disputes the Succession with his elder Brother Artaxerxes.—Character of Cyrus.—State of Lower Asia under his Administration.—His Strength and Resources.—His Expedition into Upper Asia.—Describes the vast Army of his Brother.—Battle of Canaxa.—Death of Cyrus.—His Grecian Auxiliaries victorious.—Their Treaty with Tissaphernes.—Perfidious Assassination of the Grecian Generals.—Artaxerxes sends to the Greeks to demand their Arms.—Conference on that Subject.

WHILE the operations of war conspired with the revolutions of government, to detach the Grecian colonies in Italy, Sicily, and Cyrené, from the general interests and politics of the mother country, a series of events, not less curious than important, connected, in the closest intimacy, the history of Greece with the annals of the Persian empire. The same memorable year which terminated the destructive war of Peloponnesus brought to a conclusion the active and prosperous reign of Darius Nothus. He named as his successor Artaxerxes, styled Mnemon, from the strength of his memory; and persisted in this choice, notwithstanding the opposition of the artful and ambitious Parysatis, who employed her extensive influence over the mind of an old and uxorious husband, to obtain the kingdom for Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes, and the peculiar favourite of his mother. The rivalry

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Death of
Darius
Nothus.
Olymp.
xciv. 1.
A. C. 404.

The succession of Artaxerxes is disputed by his younger brother Cyrus.

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—

of the young princes, both of whom were at court during the last illness of Darius, unhappily degenerated into enmity; and a circumstance, which would be thought immaterial in the present age, increased the indignation of Cyrus. The birth of Artaxerxes had happened before the accession of his father to the throne, but Cyrus was born the son of a king; a distinction which, however frivolous it may appear in modern times, had engaged Darius Hystaspes to prefer Xerxes, the younger of his sons, to his elder brother Artabazanes¹.

Cause of his
resentment
against Ar-
taxerxes.

The precedent established by such an illustrious monarch might have enforced the partial arguments of Parysatis, and both might have been confirmed by the strong claim of merit, since Cyrus early discovered such talents and virtues, as fitted him to fill the most difficult, and to adorn the most exalted, station. At the age of seventeen, he had obtained the government of Lydia, Phrygia, and Capadocia; and the same mandate of Darius, which destroyed his hopes of succession to the Persian throne, rendered him hereditary satrap of those valuable provinces. On the demise of that monarch, Cyrus prepared to return to Asia Minor, attended by the same escort with which he had come to Susa; a faithful body of three hundred heavily-armed Greeks, commanded by Xenias, an Arcadian. But when he prepared to leave court, a very criminal and unfortunate measure retarded his departure. The selfish and perfidious Tissaphernes, who expected to divide the spoils of the young prince, accused him of treason. He was apprehended by order of Artaxerxes; but the powerful protection of Parysatis, who, though she loved only one, was beloved, or at least feared, by both of her sons, defended his life, vindicated his honour, and restored him in safety to his government.

Circum-
stances fa-
vourable to
his ambition.

The danger that had threatened his person could not much affect the heroic fortitude of Cyrus; but the affront offered to his dignity

¹ Herodot. l. vii. c. ii.

sunk deep into his heart; and from the moment that he recovered his freedom, he determined to revenge his injuries², or to perish in the attempt. In the despotic countries of the East, as there is scarcely any intermediate gradation between the prince and people, and scarcely any alternative but that of dominion or servitude, a discontented or rebellious subject must either stifle his animosity, submit to die, or aspire to reign³. The magnanimity of Cyrus naturally preferred the road of danger and glory; he prepared not only to punish the injustice, but to usurp the throne of Artaxerxes, defended as it was by a million of armed men, and protected both by the power of superstition, and by the splendour of hereditary renown. This design would have been great, but romantic, if the young prince had not enjoyed very extraordinary resources in the powers of his own mind, in the affectionate attachment of his Barbarian subjects, and, above all, in the fidelity and valour of his Lacedæmonian allies.

Whether we consider what he said, or what he did, the testimony of his contemporaries, or the more unerring testimony of his life and actions, Cyrus appears to have been born for the honour of human nature, and particularly for the honour of Asia, which, though the richest and most populous quarter of the globe, has never, in any age, abounded in great characters. From the age of seven years, he had been trained, at the gate of the palace, to shoot with the bow, to manage the horse, and to speak truth; according to the discipline instituted by the great founder of the monarchy, and well adapted, in an age of simplicity, to form the princes and nobles of Persia. But in the course of two centuries, the progress of refinement and luxury, the infectious example of a corrupt court, and the perfidious

Character of
Cyrus;

contrasted
with that of
the Persian
nobles.

² Xenoph. Anab. l. i. c. i. This was the origin of his resentment, which Xenophon expresses with great delicacy; ἡ δὲ χυδνύουσις καὶ ἀτιμωσίς, ἐκδίδεται ὅτις μάλιστα ἐστὶ βλάπτειν τὴν ἀδίκου, &c. He asserted independence, the first wish of every great mind.

³ "Cyrus determined no longer," says Xenophon, "to depend on his brother: ἀλλὰ πεινυται βασιλευσθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ," "but, if possible, to reign in his stead."

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lessons of the world, had perverted, or rendered ineffectual, a very salutary system of education; and the grandees of Persia, whatever proficiency they made in their exercises, felt so little regard for veracity, that (as will abundantly appear in the sequel) they seldom spoke but with a view to deceive, and rarely made a promise which they did not break, or took an oath which they did not violate. The behaviour of Cyrus was totally the reverse. He equalled, and surpassed his companions in all exterior accomplishments. But while his manly beauty, his bodily activity and address, and the superior courage, as well as skill, which he displayed in hunting, horsemanship, and every military exercise, commanded the admiration of the multitude; he himself seems not to have estimated such superficial advantages beyond their real worth. He regarded integrity of heart as the only solid basis of a great character. His probity was uniform, his word sacred, his friendship inviolable. In the giddy season of youth, he yielded, with uncommon docility, to the admonitions of experience. Neither wealth, nor birth, nor rank, but age and virtue, were the objects of his respect: and his behaviour, equally meritorious and singular, was justly and universally admired.

State of
Lower Asia
during his
administra-
tion.

His subjects in Lesser Asia, in particular, were seized with the most pleasing astonishment, when, instead of a greedy and voluptuous satrap, eager only to squeeze, to amass, and to enjoy, they beheld a prince who preferred the public interest to his own; who alleviated the weight of taxes, that he might encourage the operations of industry; whose own hands gave the useful example of rural labour*; whose decisions united justice and mercy; and whose active vigilance introduced (what neither before nor since the government of Cyrus has been known in the Asiatic peninsula) such regularity of police, as rendered intercourse safe, and property secure.

* Xenoph. *ibid.* Cic. in Senect. Plut. in Lyfand. have all celebrated this part of his character.

The virtues of justice and integrity, when accompanied with diligence and abilities, must procure such a degree of respect for the administration, as will naturally be extended to the person, of a prince. But something farther is required, not to obtain the public gratitude and esteem, but to excite the affectionate ardour of select and devoted friends; without the assistance of whom, it is impossible to accomplish any great and memorable design. Cyrus excelled all his contemporaries in the art both of acquiring and of preserving the most valuable friendships. His gratitude overpaid every favour; his liberality was large, yet discerning; and his donatives were always enhanced by the handsome and affectionate manner in which they were bestowed. When he discovered a man really worthy of his confidence and esteem, he was not satisfied with giving him a partial share of his affections; he gave his heart entire: and it was his constant prayer to the gods, that he might live to requite and surpass the good offices of his friends, and the injuries of his enemies.

With such sentiments and character, Cyrus acquired the firm attachment of a few, and the willing obedience of all his Barbarian subjects, in the populous provinces which he commanded, whose united strength exceeded an hundred thousand fighting men; who, unwarlike as they were, yet excelled, both in bravery and in skill, the effeminate troops of Upper Asia.

They were probably indebted for this advantage to their intercourse with the Greeks, whose disciplined valour, far more than the numbers of his Barbarians, encouraged Cyrus to undertake an expedition for acquiring the empire of the East. By the most important services he had deserved the gratitude of the Lacedæmonian republic; which had been raised, chiefly by his assistance, to the head of Greece, and to the command of the sea. In return for that favour, so inestimable in the sight of an ambitious people, the Spartans readily complied with his request, by sending into Asia eight hundred heavy-

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His popular
acts.

Amount of
his Barbarian
troops.

His chief
confidence
in the grati-
tude and va-
lour of the
Greeks.

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Amount of
his Grecian
troops.

Secrecy of
his prepara-
tions.

heavy-armed men, under the command of the intrepid Cheirifophus; and they charged their admiral, Samius, who had succeeded Lyfander in the government of the Ionian coast, faithfully to co-operate with Cyrus, by employing his powerful fleet in whatever service the Persian prince might think proper to recommend⁵. Had they done nothing more than this, Cyrus might well have approved their useful gratitude; especially as their alliance, securing him on the side of Europe, enabled him, without danger, to drain his western garrisons, and to augment the strength of his army. But the friendship of the Spartans carried them still farther. They allowed him to recruit his forces in every part of their dominions; and the generous munificence of Cyrus had acquired numerous partisans well qualified to raise, and to command those valuable levies. Clearchus the Spartan, Menon the Theſſalian, Proxenus the Boeotian, Agias the Arcadian, and Socrates the Achæan, all alike devoted to the interest and glory of the Persian prince, collected, chiefly from their reſpective republics, above ten thousand heavy-armed men, and near three thousand archers and targeteers.

These preparations, which were carried on with silence and celerity, deceived the haughty indolence of the Persians; but they could not escape the vigilance of Alcibiades, who then resided at Gryniûm, a town of Phrygia, under the protection of Pharnabazus. Moved by resentment against the Lacædæmonians, or ambitious of gaining merit with the great king, he desired an escort from the satrap, that he might undertake with safety a journey to Susa, in order to acquaint Artaxerxes with the hostile designs of his brother. Pharnabazus, who possessed not the merit, desired the reward of the discovery; and therefore (as we formerly had occasion to relate⁶) readily gratified the request of Lyfander, by the destruction of Alcibiades.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii.

⁶ See above, p. 83.

But neither the intelligence conveyed by the Persian governor, nor the repeated solicitations of Tisaphernes, nor the consciousness of his own injustice and cruelty, could rouse Artaxerxes from the profound security of his repose. Cyrus completed his levies without molestation, and almost without suspicion; and prepared, in the beginning of the year four hundred before Christ, to march from the Ionian coast into Upper Asia, at the head of an hundred thousand Barbarians, and above thirteen thousand Greeks. His journey towards Babylon, his defeat and death in the plain of Cynaxa, the retreat and dispersion of his followers, and the memorable return of the Greeks to their native country, have been related by the admired disciple of Socrates, (whom the friendship of Proxenus, the Bœotian, recommended to the service and esteem of Cyrus) with such descriptive beauty, with such profound knowledge of war and of human nature, and with such inimitable eloquence, as never were re-united in the work of any one man but that of Xenophon the Athenian. The retreat was principally conducted by Xenophon himself; which has enabled him to adorn his narrative with such an affecting variety of incidents and characters, as will always serve to prove that the force of truth and nature is far superior to the powers of the most fertile fancy. It would be an undertaking not only hardy, but presumptuous, to invade the province of such an accomplished writer, if the design of the present work did not oblige us to select the principal circumstances which illustrate the condition of the times, and connect the expedition of Cyrus with the subsequent history of Greece.

Having assembled his forces at Sardis, the Persian prince was carried, by the activity of his resentment or ambition, with the utmost celerity, towards Upper Asia. In ninety-three marches he travelled through the central provinces of Lydia, Phrygia, Cappadocia; traversed the mountains of Cilicia; passed unresisted through Syria; crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus; and, after penetrating the


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Cyrus undertakes his expedition into Upper Asia. Olymp. xcvi. 1. A. C. 400.

Xenophon's account of the expedition.

Rapidity of his march.

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desert, entered the confines of Babylonia. In a journey of above twelve hundred miles, his numerous army experienced fewer difficulties than might naturally be expected. The fertile territory of Asia Minor supplying them abundantly with provisions, enabled them to proceed commonly at the rate of fifteen or sixteen miles a-day; and almost every second day brought them to a large and populous city. The dependent satraps or viceroys of Lycaonia and Cilicia were less solicitous to defend the throne of Artaxerxes, than anxious to protect their respective provinces from plunder and devastation. But the former experienced the severity of an invader whom he had the weakness to oppose, without the strength or courage to resist⁷.

Cilicia defended by the beauty of Epyaxa.

Syennesis, governor of Cilicia, had reason to fear that his country might be plundered with equal rapacity. He endeavoured, therefore, to avail himself of the natural strength of a province whose southern boundaries are washed by the sea, and which is defended on other sides by the winding branches of Mount Taurus⁸. Towards the west is but one pass, called by Arrian the Gates of Cilicia⁹; sufficient to admit only one chariot at a time, and rendered dark and difficult by steep and almost inaccessible mountains. These were occupied by the troops of Syennesis, who, had he maintained his post, might have easily prevented the passage of an army. But the timid Cilician had not trusted in arms alone for the defence of his country. By the order, or at least with the permission of her husband, his queen, the beautiful Epyaxa, had met Cyrus at Cylenæ, on the frontiers of Phrygia; and, according to the custom of the East, presented her acknowledged liege-lord and superior with gold, silver, and other costly gifts. But the greatest gift was her youth and beauty, which she submitted, it is said, to the enamoured prince, who, after enter-

⁷ Xenoph. Anabaf. l. i. p. 248.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 248.

⁹ Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. ii. p. 31.

taining her with the utmost magnificence and distinction¹⁰, restored her to Cilicia by a near, but difficult road, which led across the mountains.

To the escort which accompanied her, Cyrus added a considerable body of Greeks, commanded by Menon the Thessalian. The greater part arrived at Tarsus, the capital, before the army of Cyrus reached the gates of Cilicia; but two companies, amounting together to an hundred men, were missing, and supposed to have been destroyed by the mountaineers, while they wandered in quest of booty. Syennesis was mortified at hearing that the enemy had already entered his province. But when he likewise received intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed round from Ionia, in order to co-operate with the army, the disagreeable news totally disconcerted the measures of his defence. He fled in precipitation, abandoning his tents and baggage to the invaders. Cyrus crossed the mountains without opposition, and traversed the beautiful irriguous plains of Cilicia, which were adorned with trees and vines, and abounded in sesame, panic, millet, wheat and barley. In four days he arrived at the large and rich city of Tarsus, which was plundered by the resentment of the Greeks, for the loss of their companions.

Cyrus immediately sent for the governor, who had removed from his palace, and, attended by the greater part of the inhabitants, had taken refuge among the fastnesses in the neighbouring mountains. By the assurances of Epyaxa, her timorous¹¹ husband was

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The Greeks
plunder
Tarsus.

Cyrus ex-
changes pre-
sents with
Syennesis of
Cilicia.

¹⁰ She requested Cyrus to shew her his troops. He complied; and attended her coach, in an open car. But the curiosity of Epyaxa had almost cost her dear. "When the Barbarians were reviewed, the Greeks were ordered to their arms, and commanded to advance, as to a charge; after which, the soldiers, of their own accord, ran with shouts to their tents. The Barbarians were thrown into consternation; Epyaxa quitted her coach; the Greeks returned laughing to their tents; and Cyrus rejoiced at seeing the terror with

which the Greeks had inspired the Barbarians." Xenoph. Anabaf. l. i. p. 247.

¹¹ Pride, as well as fear, seems to have actuated Syennesis; ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔμελλεν οὐδὲν πρὸς κριτὴν ἑατὸν εἶναι, χαλεπὰ δὲ οὖν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τότε αὐτῷ ἰσχυρὰ εὐδοκίαν, πρὸς ἣν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἴσχυται; "Syennesis declared, that he had never formerly put himself in the power of a man in any respect superior to himself; nor would he then go to Cyrus, till his wife persuaded him," &c. A true picture of oriental manners, meanness varnished with pride!

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with much difficulty persuaded, to put himself in the power of a superior, to whom, as the price of his safety, he carried large sums of money. Cyrus courteously accepted the welcome supply, which the demands of his troops rendered peculiarly seasonable; and, in return, honoured Syennesis with such presents as were deemed of great value by the kings of the East. They consisted in a Persian robe, a horse with a golden bit, a chain, bracelets, and scimitar of gold, the restoration of prisoners, and the exemption of Cicilia from farther plunder¹¹.

Mutiny in
the Grecian
camp.

During their luxurious residence at Tarsus, the Greeks were corrupted by prosperity. They disdained to obey their commanders, and refused to continue their journey. The design of marching to Babylon, though it was not unknown to Clearchus, or to the Spartan senate, had been concealed from the soldiers, lest their impatience or their fears might be alarmed by the prospect of such a long and dangerous undertaking. At Tarsus they first discovered their suspicions of the deceit, which immediately broke out into licentious clamours. They insulted the majesty of Cyrus; they reproached the perfidy of their generals; and their anger was ready to vent itself in open sedition, when the ferment was appeased by the address and prudence of Clearchus. While he privately assured Cyrus of his best endeavours to make the affair take a favourable turn, he openly embraced the cause of the soldiers, affected deeply to feel their grievances, and eagerly concurred with every measure that seemed proper to remove them. His eloquence and his tears diverted the design of immediate hostility. An assembly was summoned to deliberate on the actual posture of affairs. Several, of their own accord, offered their opinion; others spoke as they had been directed by Clearchus. One counsellor, who was heard with applause, advised them to pack up their baggage, and to demand guides or ships from Cyrus, to facili-

Appeased by
the address of
Clearchus.

¹¹ Xenophon. Anabaf. p. 249.

tate their return. Another shewed the folly of this request from a man whose measures they had traversed, and whose purpose they had endeavoured to defeat¹³. They surely could not trust in guides given them by an enemy; nor could it be expected that Cyrus should part with his ships, which were evidently so necessary to the success of his expedition. At length it was determined to send commissioners to treat with Cyrus, that he might either, by granting the demands of the Greeks, prevail on them to follow him, or be himself prevailed on to allow them to return home; and the difference was thus finally adjusted, by promising each soldier a darick and a half, instead of a darick, of monthly pay¹⁴.

When this storm was happily appeased, the enemy left Tarsus, and marched five days through the fertile plains of Cilicia, till they arrived at Issus, the last town of the province; large, rich, and populous; and only fifteen miles distant from the frontier of Syria. This wealthy province was defended by two fortresses, called the Gates of Syria and Cilicia. They extended from the mountains to the sea. The interval of three furlongs between them contained several passes, narrow and intricate, besides the rapid Kerfas, which flowed in the middle, one hundred feet in breadth. It was on this occasion that Cyrus experienced the full advantage of the Lacedæmonian assistance. A fleet of sixty sail, conducted by Pythagoras the Spartan, who had succeeded Samius in the naval command, pre-

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
Cyrus passes
the Syrian
gates.

¹³ This passage is translated as follows by Mr. Spelman: "After him another got up, shewing the folly of the man who advised to demand the ships, as if Cyrus would not resume his expedition. He shewed also how weak a thing it was to apply for a guide to that person whose undertaking we had defeated." If Cyrus resumed his expedition, it could not be said that his undertaking was defeated; nor is this the proper meaning of the word *ἀσθενέσθαι*, which signifies to hurt or weaken. I am sensible that by an easy translation, it sometimes signifies to corrupt,

to destroy, to defeat; but in the passage before us, if a translator should choose to explain it by any of those words, he must say, "whose undertaking we had begun, endeavoured, or purposed, to defeat; an explanation of *ἀσθενέσθαι*, which is justified by the analogy of the Greek language, and which the sense absolutely requires." This is one of the few minute mistakes which I have discovered in Mr. Spelman's most accurate translation.

¹⁴ Xenoph. *ibid.* p. 250, & seqq.

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pared to land the Greeks on the eastern side of the Gates, which must have exposed the Syrian works to a double assault; but the cowardice of Abrocomas, who commanded the numerous forces of Syria and Phœnicia, rendered the execution of this measure unnecessary. The design, alone, was sufficient to terrify him. He abandoned his forts, and fled with precipitation before the approach of an enemy¹⁵.

The army
wade the
Euphrates.

Cyrus thenceforth proceeded without meeting with any appearance of opposition, and, in fifteen days march, reached the banks of the Euphrates. At Thapfacus, which in some eastern languages signifies the ford¹⁶, this noble river is above half a mile in breadth, but so shoaly that the navigation is reckoned dangerous even for boats which draw very little water. The shallowness increases in the autumnal season, which happened to be the time that the army passed the Euphrates, which no where reached above the breast. This favourable circumstance furnished an opportunity to the inhabitants of Thapfacus to flatter Cyrus, that the great river had visibly submitted to him as its future king¹⁷. Elevated by this auspicious prediction, he pursued his journey through Mesopotamia, part of which was anciently comprehended under the name of Syria¹⁸. While he proceeded through this fertile country he did not forget that a laborious march of seventeen days, through a barren desert, must conduct him to the cultivated plains of Babylon.

Traverse the
desert, and
enter Baby-
lonia.

Having amply provided for this dangerous undertaking, he performed it with uncommon celerity, both in order to avoid risking the want of provisions, and, if possible, to take his enemy unprepared. For several days the army marched, without interruption, through the province of Babylonia; and, on the fifth, came to a deep and broad ditch, which had been recently dug to intercept, or

¹⁵ Xenoph. p. 2:3.

¹⁶ Foster's Geographical Dissertation on
Xenophon's Retreat.

¹⁷ Xenoph. p. 255.

¹⁸ So it is called by Xenoph. *ibid*.

retard,

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retard, their passage. But as this defence was left altogether unguarded, and the great king had taken no measures to protect the most valuable portion of his dominions, it was generally believed that he had laid aside the design of venturing an engagement. The troops of Cyrus, therefore, who had hitherto maintained their ranks with circumspection, no longer observed any order of march; their arms were carried in waggons, or on sumpter horses; and their general, in his car, rode in the van with few armed attendants. While they proceeded in this fearless contempt of the enemy, and approached the plain of Cynaxa, which is within a day's journey of Babylon¹⁹, Patagyas, a Persian, and confidential friend of Cyrus, came riding towards them, in full speed, his horse all in a foam, calling aloud successively in his own language, and in Greek, that the king was at hand with a vast army²⁰.

The experienced Greeks, who best knew the danger of being attacked in disorder, were most sensibly alarmed by this sudden surprise. Cyrus, leaping from his car, put on his corslet, mounted his horse, seized his javelin, commanded the troops to arm, and ordered every man to his post. His orders were readily obeyed; and the army advanced, several hours, in order of battle. It was now mid-day; yet no enemy appeared: but in the afternoon they perceived a dust like a white cloud, which gradually thickened into darkness, and overspread the plain. At length the brazen armour flashed; the motion, the ranks, and spears, were distinctly seen. In the front were innumerable chariots, armed with scythes in a downward, and in an oblique, direction. The cavalry, commanded by Tissaphernes, were distinguished by white corslets; the Persians by wicker bucklers; the Egyptians by wooden shields reaching down to their feet.

Cyrus describes the immense army of his brother.

¹⁹ I have used an indeterminate expression to denote the uncertain situation of those places as described by Strabo, l. iii. & Plut. in Artaxerx. Mr. Spelman justly observes, that the error of Xenophon (unnoticed by any

former translator) who makes the distance between Babylon three thousand and sixty stadia, is so enormous, that it can only be owing to a mistake of the transcriber.

²⁰ Xenoph. p. 263.

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Its number
and disposition.

These formed the chief strength of Artaxerxes; but the various multitude of nations, marching in separate columns according to their respective countries, had scarcely any armour of defence, and could annoy the enemy only at a distance, with their slings, darts, and arrows²¹.

While the hostile battalions approached, Cyrus, accompanied by Pigres the interpreter, and a few chosen attendants, all mounted on horses of extraordinary swiftness, rode through the intermediate space, observing the numbers and disposition of the enemy. He had learned from deserters, that the troops of the great king amounted to twelve hundred thousand, divided into four equal bodies of men, respectively commanded by the four generals Tissaphernes, Gobrias, Arbaces, and Abracomus. The last, however, had not yet joined; nor did he reach Babylonia till five days after the battle. But, notwithstanding this defect, the numbers of Artaxerxes were still sufficient to perform whatever numbers can accomplish. According to the custom of the East, the king, surrounded by a chosen body of cavalry, occupied the centre of the army, as the place of greatest security, and most convenient for issuing his orders with promptitude and effect. But such was the extent of ground covered by the various nations whom he commanded, that even his centre reached beyond the left wing of the army of Cyrus; who, therefore, called aloud to Clearchus to advance opposite to the king's guard, because, if that should be broken, the work would be done. But Clearchus was unwilling to withdraw the Greeks from the Euphrates, lest they should be surrounded by the enemy; he therefore kept his post, assuring Cyrus of his utmost care to make all go well.

The battle
of Cynaxa.
Olymp.
xcv. 1.
A. C. 400.

The disobedience of Clearchus, and the distrust of Cyrus, threw away the fortune of the day, which involved the fate of Persia, and

²¹ Xenoph. p. 263, & seqq.

the renown of Greece. For although, by skilful evolutions, Clearchus eluded the armed chariots and cavalry of the enemy; though the Greeks, by their countenance and shouts alone, put to flight the opposing crowd, who could not endure the sight of their regular array, their burnished arms, or hear, without terror, the martial sounds of their harmonious Pœans, intermixed with the clanging of their spears against their brazen bucklers; yet the great king, perceiving the rapid pursuit of the Greeks, and that nothing opposed him in front, commanded his men to wheel to the left, and advanced with celerity in order to attack the rear of the enemy. If this design had been carried into execution, it is probable that the Greeks, having prevailed on the first onset, would immediately have faced about, and, animated by the joy of victory, and their native ardour, have repelled and routed the troops of Artaxerxes.

But the impatience of Cyrus defeated this favourable prospect. He observed the movement of his brother, and eagerly rode to meet him, at the head of only six hundred horse. Such was the rapid violence of his assault, that the advanced guards of the king were thrown into disorder, and their leader Artagerfes fell by the hand of Cyrus, who, with all his great qualities, had not learned to distinguish between the duties of a foldier and a general. By a seasonable retreat he might still, perhaps, have saved his life, and gained a crown. But his eye darting along the ranks, met that of his brother. He rushed forward, with a blind instinctive fury, crying out, "I see the man!" and, penetrating the thick globe of attendants, aimed his javelin at the king, pierced his corslet, and wounded his breast. His eagerness to destroy the enemy prevented proper attention to save himself. From an uncertain hand he received a severe wound in the face, which, however, only increased the fury with which he assaulted his brother. Various and inconsistent accounts were given of the death of Cyrus, even by those who assisted in this memorable engagement. The crowd of historians thought it incum-

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Rash impetuosity of
Cyrus.

His death.

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bent on them to make him die like the hero of a tragedy, after many vicissitudes of fortune, and many variations of misery. Dinon and Ctesias²², the longer to suspend the curiosity of their readers, kill him as with a blunted weapon; but Xenophon is contented with saying, that he fell in the tumultuary contest of his attendants with the guards of Artaxerxes, who zealously defended their respective masters; and that eight of his most confidential friends lay dead upon him, thus sealing with their blood their inviolable affection and fidelity²³.

The Persian troops plunder the camp of Cyrus.

Such was the catastrophe of this audacious and fatal enterprise; after which the troops of Artaxerxes advanced, in the ardor of success, and proceeded, without encountering any resistance, to the hostile camp; Ariæus leading off the forces of Lesser Asia, dejected and dismayed by the loss of their prince and general. Among the valuable plunder in the tents of Cyrus, the Barbarians found two Grecian women, his favourite mistresses, the elder of Phocæa, the younger of Miletus. The former, whose wit and accomplishments heightened the charms of her beauty, received and deserved the name of Aspasia, from the celebrated mistress of Pericles, whose talents she rivalled, and whose character she too faithfully resembled. The young Milesian likewise fell into the hands of the enemy; but while carelessly guarded by the Barbarians, intent on more useful plunder, escaped unobserved, and arrived naked in the quarter of the Greeks, where a small guard had been left to defend the baggage.

The Greeks, victorious in their quarter of the field, pursue the enemy.

Meanwhile Clearchus, at the head of the Grecian phalanx, pursuing the fugitives, had been carried above the distance of three miles from Artaxerxes. But when he heard that the Barbarians were in his tent; and perceived, that, tired with plunder, they advanced to attack his rear, he faced about in order to receive them.

²² Apud Plutarch. in Artaxerx.

²³ Xenoph. p. 266.

The time was spent, till sun-set, in various dispositions made by the cavalry of Artaxerxes; but neither the foldiers, nor their commanders, had courage to come within the reach of the Grecian spear. They fled in scattered disorder, wherever the Grecians advanced; who, wearied with marching against an enemy that seemed incapable to fight, at length determined to return to their camp; wondering that neither Cyrus himself appeared, nor any of his messengers²⁴. They arrived in the beginning of the night; but found their tents in disorder, their baggage plundered, their provisions destroyed or spent. They chiefly regretted the loss of four hundred carriages filled with wine and flour, which had been provided by the foresight of Cyrus, as a resource in time of want. Even these were rifled by the king's troops; and the Greeks, whom the sudden appearance of the enemy had not allowed to dine, were obliged to pass the night without supper; their bodies exhausted by the fatigue of a laborious day, and their minds perplexed by the uncertain fate of their allies²⁵.

At the approach of light, they prepared to move their camp, when the messengers of Ariæus arrived, acquainting them with the death of Cyrus. The new commander, they said, had assembled the troops of Lesser Asia in their former encampment, about twelve miles from the field of battle; where he intended to continue that day, that the Greeks might have time to join him; but if they delayed, he would next day proceed, without them, towards Ionia, with the utmost expedition. When the Greeks recovered from the consternation into which they were thrown by these unexpected and melancholy tidings, Clearchus replied, "Would to God Cyrus were alive! but

Behaviour of
the Greeks
when in-
formed of
Cyrus's
death.

²⁴ In relating this battle, I have followed the advice of Plutarch in Artaxerxes, who says, "that Xenophon has described it with such perspicuity, elegance, and force, as sets the action before the eyes of his reader, and makes him assist with emotion at every incident, not as past, but as

present. A man of sense, therefore, will despair to rival Xenophon; and, instead of relating the action in detail, will select such circumstances only as are most worthy of notice."

²⁵ Xenoph. p. 270. & seqq.

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since he is dead, let Ariæus know, that we have conquered the king; that his troops have every-where fled before us; and that, now, no enemy appears to resist our arms. You may, therefore, assure Ariæus, that if he will come hither, we will place him on the Persian throne, which is the just reward of our victory." With this proposal the messengers departed, and Clearchus led his troops to the field of battle, to collect provisions, which were prepared by using for fuel the wooden bucklers, shields, and arrows, of the Barbarians²⁶.

Their answer
to the heralds
of Artaxerxes, who
demanded
their armour.

Next morning heralds arrived from Artaxerxes, who entertained a very different opinion from that expressed by Clearchus, concerning the issue of the battle. Among these respected ministers was Philinus, a fugitive Greek, a man esteemed by Tissaphernes, both as a skilful captain, and as an able negociator. When the chiefs were assembled, Philinus, speaking for his colleagues, declared it to be the will of the great king, who had defeated and killed Cyrus, "That the Greeks, who had now become the slaves of the conqueror, should surrender their arms." The demand was heard with universal indignation. One desired him to tell the king "to come and take them;" another, "that it was better to die, than to deliver up their arms." Xenophon spoke to the following purpose: "We have nothing, as you see, O Philinus! but our arms, and our valour. While we keep possession of the one, we can avail ourselves of the other; but, if we deliver up our arms, we also surrender our persons. Do not, therefore, expect that we shall throw away the only advantages which we still enjoy; on the contrary, be assured, that, relying on our arms and our valour, we will dispute with you those advantages which you possess." Clearchus enforced the sentiments of Xenophon, which were confirmed by the army; and Philinus, after a fruitless attempt to discover the immediate designs of the Greeks, returned with his colleagues, to the Persian camp²⁷.

²⁶ Xenoph. p. 272.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 273.

Meanwhile,

Meanwhile, Ariæus replied to the honourable embassy which had been sent him, "That there were many Persians of greater consideration than himself, who would never permit him to be their king; he repeated his desire that the Greeks should join him; but, if they declined to come, persisted in his resolution of returning with all haste to Ionia." This proposal was approved by the propitious indications of the victims: the army marched in order of battle to the encampment of Ariæus; who, with the most distinguished of his captains, entered into treaty with the Grecian commanders, binding themselves by mutual oaths to perform to each other the duties of faithful and affectionate allies. Having ratified this engagement by a solemn sacrifice, they proceeded to deliberate concerning their intended journey. It was determined, that instead of traversing the desolated country by which they had arrived at the field of battle, they should direct their course towards the north, by which means they would avoid the desert, acquire provisions in greater plenty, and cross the great rivers, which commonly diminish near their source, with less difficulty and danger. They resolved also to perform their first marches with all possible expedition, in order to anticipate the king's approach; since with a small force he would not dare to follow, and with a great army he would not be able to overtake, them²⁸.

This plan of retreat proposed by Ariæus, had the dishonourable appearance of flight; but fortune proved a more glorious conductor. Such was the effect of the Grecian courage and firmness on the counsels of Artaxerxes, that he, who had so lately commanded the soldiers to surrender their arms, sent heralds to them the day following to treat of a truce. This memorable agreement, the consequences of which were so calamitous, yet so honourable to the Greeks, was concluded by the intervention of Tissaphernes; who engaged, on the part of his master, to furnish them with a

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Their plan
of retreat
concerted
with Ariæus.

They accept
a truce from
Artaxerxes.

²⁸ Xenoph. p. 276.

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market, to cause them to be treated as friends in the countries through which they marched, and to conduct them without guile into Greece. For the Greeks, on the other hand, Clearchus and the generals swore, that they should abstain from ravaging the king's territories; that they should supply themselves with meat and drink only, when, by any accident, the market was not provided; but when it was, that they should purchase whatever they wanted for a reasonable price²⁹.

Treachery of
Tissaphernes
and Ariæus.

When this business was transacted, Tissaphernes returned to the king, promising to come back as soon as possible. But, on various pretences, he delayed twenty days; during which the Persians had an opportunity to practise with Ariæus. By the dread of punishment, if he persisted in rebellion; by the promise of pardon, if he returned to his allegiance; and, above all, by the warm solicitation of his kinsmen and friends, that unsteady Barbarian was totally detached from the interest of his Grecian allies. His conduct gave just ground to suspect this disposition, which became fully evident after the return of Tissaphernes. From that moment Ariæus no longer encamped with the Greeks, but preferred the neighbourhood of that perfidious satrap. Yet, for three weeks, no open hostility was committed; the armies, fearing, and feared by each other, pursued the same line of march; Tissaphernes led the way; and, according to agreement, furnished the Greeks with a market; but treacherously increased the difficulty of their journey, by conducting them by many windings through the canals and marshes between the Tigris and Euphrates. When they had crossed the former river, they continued to march northward along its eastern banks, always encamping at the distance of two or three miles from the Barbarians. Yet this precaution was unable to prevent the parties sent out to provide wood or forage from quarrelling with each other.

²⁹ Xenoph. p. 281. & seqq.

Sometimes they came to blows; and these partial encounters were likely to produce the worst consequences, by inflaming the latent, but general animosity, which it had been so difficult to stifle or conceal³⁰.

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At length they arrived at the fatal scene, where the river Zabatus, flowing westward from the mountains of Media, pours its tributary waters into the broad stream of the Tigris. The Grecian generals, and particularly Clearchus, who had long seen and lamented the unfortunate jealousies prevailing among those who had sworn mutual fidelity, proposed a mutual conference between the commanders, in order amicably to explain and remove every ground of hatred and complaint. Tissaphernes and Ariæus, as well as their colleague Orontes, eagerly desired a conference, though their motives were very different from those which actuated Clearchus. A measure so agreeable to both parties was, without difficulty, carried into execution; and the Greeks, on this occasion alone, forsook that prudence and caution, which, both before and after, uniformly governed their conduct. Five generals, and twenty captains, repaired to the tent of Tissaphernes; only two hundred soldiers followed them, under pretence of going to market. Clearchus, with his colleagues, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were conducted into the satrap's apartment; the rest, whether captains or soldiers, were not allowed to enter. This separation occasioned fear and distrust. The appearance of armed Barbarians increased the terror. A gloomy silence prevailed; when, on a given signal, those within the tent were apprehended, and those without cut to pieces. At the same time the Persian cavalry scoured the plain, destroying whomever they encountered. The Greeks were astonished at this mad excursion, which they beheld from their camp; until Nicarchus, an Arcadian, came, miserably mangled, and informed them of the dreadful tragedy that had been acted³¹.

Perfidious
seizure
of the Gre-
cian gene-
rals.

³⁰ Xenoph. p. 282.

³¹ Ibid. p. 286. & seqq.

Upon

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Artaxerxes
sends to the
Greeks to
demand their
arms.

Conference
on that sub-
ject.

Upon this intelligence they ran to their arms, expecting an immediate assault. But the cowardly Barbarians, not daring to engage in open and honourable war, endeavoured to accomplish their designs by the same impious treachery with which they had begun them. Instead of advancing in a body to attack the Grecian camp, they sent Ariæus, Arteazus, and Mithridates, persons whose great credit with Cyrus might prevent their intentions from being suspected by the enemy. They were attended by three hundred Persians, clad in complete armour. When they drew near to the Greeks, a herald called out, "That, if any of the generals or captains were present, they should advance, in order to be made acquainted with the king's pleasure." Cheirisophus the Lacedæmonian, who, next to Clearchus, had hitherto maintained the greatest influence over the army, happened to be absent with a party of foragers. But the remaining generals, Cleanor the Orchomenian, and Sophonetus the Stymphalian, proceeded with caution from the camp, accompanied by Xenophon the Athenian, who (though only a volunteer) followed the commanders, that he might learn what was become of his friend Proxenus²². When they came within hearing of the Barbarians, Ariæus said, "Clearchus, O Greeks! having violated his oath, and the articles of peace, is punished with just death; but Proxenus and Menon, who gave information of his crimes, are rewarded with the king's favour. Of you the king demands your arms, which, he says, are now his property, because they belonged to Cyrus, who was his slave." Cleanor the Orchomenian, speaking in the name of the rest, replied to this demand with the utmost indignation, reproaching the perfidy of Ariæus, who had betrayed the friends and benefactors of his master Cyrus; and who co-operated with the enemy of that master, the deceitful and impious Tissaphernes. The Persian endeavoured to justify himself, by repeating his accusation of Clearchus. Upon which Xenophon observed, "That

²² Xenoph. p. 288. & seqq.

Clearchus,

Clearchus, if guilty of perjury, had been justly punished; but where are Proxenus and Menon, who are *your* benefactors, and *our* commanders? Let them, at least, be sent to us, since it is evident that their friendship for both parties will make them advise which is best for both." This reasonable request it was impossible to elude; and the Barbarians, after long conferring together, departed without attempting an answer³³. Their mean duplicity in this interview sufficiently indicated the unhappy treatment of the Grecian commanders, who were kept in close captivity, and afterwards sent to Artaxerxes, by whose order they were put to death.

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XXV.³³ Xenoph. p. 289.

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Consternation of the Greeks.—Manly Advice of Xenophon.—Their Retreat.—Difficulties attending it.—Surmounted by their Skill and Perseverance.—Their Sufferings among the Carduchian Mountains.—They traverse Armenia.—First behold the Sea from Mount Theches.—Defeat the Colchians.—Description of the southern Shore of the Euxine.—Transactions with the Greek Colonies there.—The Greeks arrive at Byzantium.—Enter into the Service of Seuthes.—His History.—Conjunct Expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians.—The Greeks return to the Service of their Country.

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Consternation of the Greeks.

THE perfidious assassination of their commanders converted the alarm and terror, that had hitherto reigned in the Grecian camp, into consternation and despair. This dreadful catastrophe completed the afflictions of men distant above twelve hundred miles from their native land; surrounded by craggy mountains, deep and rapid rivers; by famine, war, and the treachery of their allies, still more formidable than the resentment of their enemies. The soldiers reflected, that it was dangerous to depart, yet more dangerous to remain; provisions could be acquired only by the point of the sword; every country was hostile; although they conquered one enemy, another would be still ready to receive them; they

they wanted cavalry to pursue the Barbarians, or to elude their pursuit; victory itself would be fruitless; defeat, certain ruin.

Amidst these melancholy reflections they had spent the greater part of the night; when Xenophon, the Athenian, inspired, as he acknowledges, by a favourable dream, and animated, as his conduct proves, by the native vigour of a virtuous mind, roused and emboldened by adversity, undertook, amidst the general dejection and dismay, the care of his own and of the public safety. Having assembled the captains belonging to the division of his beloved Proxenus, he faithfully represented to them their situation, which, dangerous as it was, ought not to sink brave men to despair. Even in the worst circumstances, fortitude, and fortitude alone, could afford relief. They had been deceived, but not conquered, by the Barbarians; whose perfidious violation of faith, friendship, and hospitality, rendered them odious and contemptible to men and gods; the gods, who were the umpires of the contest, and whose assistance could make the cause of justice and valour prevail, over every superiority of strength and numbers*.

The manly piety of Xenophon was communicated, by a generous sympathy, to the breasts of his hearers; who, dispersing through the various quarters of the camp, summoned together the principal officers in the army. To them Xenophon addressed a similar discourse, encouraging them by every argument that religion, philosophy, experience, and particularly their own experience, and that of the Grecian history, could afford, to expect success from their own bravery, and the favour of Heaven, and to disdain the offers of accommodation (if such should be made) from their impious foes, whose insidious friendship had always proved more hurtful than their open enmity. The hearty approbation of the Spartan Cheirisophus added weight and authority to the persuasive eloquence of the Athenian; who farther exhorted them to substitute commanders

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Manly advice of Xenophon;

who, together with Cheirisophus, the Spartan, is named to the chief command.

* Xenoph. p. 295.

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in the room of those whom they had lost; to disentangle themselves from every superfluous incumbrance that might obstruct the progress of their march, and to advance with all expedition towards the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates, in the form of a hollow square, having the baggage and those who attended it in the middle, and presenting the valour of their battalions on every side to the enemy. These resolutions were unanimously approved by the council, after which they were referred to the assembled troops, by whom they were readily confirmed, and carried into immediate execution². Timasion, Xanthicles, Cleanor, Philysias, succeeded to the late commanders; Xenophon supplied the place of Proxenus; and so ably was the ascendant of Spartan and Athenian virtue maintained by him and Cheirisophus, that the names of their unequal colleagues will seldom occur in the following narrative of their retreat.

The Greeks
harassed in
their retreat
by the Per-
sian archers
and cavalry.

The greater part of the day had been employed in these necessary measures; and in the afternoon, the troops having passed the Zabatus, pursued their march in the disposition recommended by Xenophon. But they had not proceeded far, before their rear was harassed by the Persian archers and cavalry, which afforded them a very inauspicious presage of the hardships to which they must be continually exposed in eighteen days journey along the level frontiers of Media. It was difficult to repel these light skirmishers, and impossible to attack them without being exposed to considerable loss; because a detachment of heavy-armed men, or even of targeteers, could not overtake them in a short space, nor could they continue the pursuit without being cut off from the rest of the army. Xenophon, with more valour than prudence, tried the unfortunate experiment; but was obliged to retreat fighting, and brought back his men wounded, disheartened, and disgraced³.

² Xenoph. p. 299,

³ Id. p. 305. & seqq.

But

But this unfortunate event neither disheartened nor disgraced the commander. He ingenuously acknowledged his error, which, pernicious as it was, had taught the Greeks their wants. They wanted cavalry and light-armed troops; the former of which might be obtained by equipping for war the baggage-horses which had been taken from the enemy; and the latter might be supplied by the Rhodians (well skilled in the sling), of whom there were great numbers in the army. This advice was approved; a company of fifty horsemen was soon raised, the men vying with each other to obtain the honour of this distinguished service; and two hundred Rhodians were drawn from the ranks, who furnished themselves with slings and leaden balls, which they threw twice as far as the stones employed by the Barbarians. The horsemen wore buff coats and corslets; they were commanded by Lycius the Athenian⁴.

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They equip
their sumpter
horses for
war, and
furnish the
Rhodians
with slings.

The utility of these preparations was discovered as soon as the enemy renewed their assaults, with a thousand horse, and four thousand slingers and archers. The newly raised troops advanced with boldness and celerity, being assured that their unequal attack would be sustained by the targeteers and heavy-armed men. But the Persians, not waiting to receive them, fled in scattered disorder; the Greeks pursued, took many prisoners, made great slaughter, and mangled the bodies of the slain, in order to terrify, by such a dreadful spectacle of revenge, their cowardly and perfidious enemies⁵.

Their success
in conse-
quence of
these mea-
sures.

After this advantage, the army continued to march along the banks of the Tigris, and the western boundaries of Media, meeting with many rich and populous villages, from which they were supplied with provisions; and admiring, as they passed along, the immense walls, the lofty and durable pyramids, the spacious but deserted cities, which testified the ancient greatness of that flourish-

New difficul-
ties with
which they
had to
struggle.

⁴ Xenoph. p. 307.

⁵ Ibid. p. 308.

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Surmounted
by their mi-
litary skill.

ing kingdom, before the Medes reluctantly submitted to the oppressive government of Persia. The Barbarians still endeavoured to annoy them, but with very little success, unless when they passed a bridge, or any narrow defile. On such occasions, the square form, in which they had hitherto marched, was found doubly inconvenient⁶. In order to traverse such a passage, the foldiers were obliged to close the wings, and to crowd into a narrow space, which disordered the ranks, and made them obstruct each other. When they had crossed the bridge or defile, they were again obliged to run with all haste, in order to extend the wings, and resume their ranks, which occasioned a void in the centre, and much disheartened the men, thus exposed to the sudden attack of the pursuers.

To obviate both inconveniencies, the Greeks separated from the army six companies, each consisting of an hundred men. These were subdivided into smaller bodies, of fifty and twenty-five, each division of the company, as well as the whole, commanded by proper officers. When it became necessary to close the wings, in order to pass a defile, these troops staid behind, thus disburdening the army of a superfluous mass, and thereby enabling them to proceed without confusion in their ranks. After the passage was effected, the army might again extend the wings, and assume the same loose arrangement as before, without exposing the centre to danger; because the vacuity left there was immediately supplied by the detached companies; the opening, if small, being filled up by the six divisions of an hundred men each; if larger, by the twelve divisions of fifty; and if very large, by the twenty-four divisions of twenty-five⁷; as the same number of men, in proportion to the number of columns into which they were divided, would occupy a wider extent of ground⁸.

With

⁶ Xenoph. p. 310.

⁷ Ibid. idem.

⁸ I have explained this matter minutely, because the words of Xenophon are

mistaken by great military writers. Major Mauvillon, a skilful engineer and excellent scholar, proposes a transposition of the words of Xenophon, that the greater gaps may be filled

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The Greeks approach the country of the Carduchians.

With this useful precaution the Greeks performed a successful march to the mountains of the Carduchians, where the enemy's cavalry could no longer annoy them. But here they found new difficulties, far more formidable than those with which they had hitherto been obliged to contend. The Tigris, on their left, was so deep and rapid, that the passage appeared absolutely impracticable. Before them rose the high and craggy mountains, which overshadowed the river, inhabited by a warlike race of men, whose barbarous independence had always defied the hostilities⁹ of Persia, as that of their successors, the modern Curdes, does the arms of the Turk, to whom they are but nominally subject¹⁰. While the Greeks doubted what course to pursue, a certain Rhodian undertook to deliver them from their perplexity, provided they gave him a talent, to reward his labour. I shall want, besides, continued he, two thousand leather bags, which may be obtained by slaying the sheep, goats, oxen, and asses, which the country affords in such numbers as we see around us. The skins may be blown, tied at the ends, and fastened together by the girths belonging to the sumpter horses, then covered with fascines, and lastly with earth. I shall use large stones instead of anchors; every bag will bear two men, whom the fascines and earth will prevent from slipping, and whom, with very little labour on their part, the rapidity of the current will waft across the river¹¹.

Ingenious contrivance of a Rhodian for passing the Tigris.

This ingenious contrivance was commended, but not carried into execution; the Grecians having learned from some prisoners recently taken, that the road through the country of the Carduchians would soon conduct them to the spacious and plentiful province of Ar-

The sufferings of the Greeks among the mountains of the Carduchians.

filled up by the greater divisions. He justly observes, that no translator or commentator has taken notice of the difficulty that naturally presents itself on reading the passage, which, however, I hope is sufficiently perspicuous in the text. See *l'Essai sur l'Influence de la Poudre à Canon, &c.* a work which, I

believe, no military man can read without receiving from it instruction and entertainment.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 315.

¹⁰ Rauwolf's Travels.

¹¹ Xenoph. p. 314.

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menia. Thither they fearlessly penetrated, regardless of the report, that under a former reign, a Persian army of an hundred and twenty thousand men had been cut off by those fierce barbarians, whose manners were more rude and inhospitable than the mountains which they inhabited. At the approach of the Greeks, the Carduchians retired to their fastnesses, leaving the villages in the plain at the mercy of the invaders. The troops were restrained from injury; but their inoffensive behaviour, and kind invitations to peace, were regarded with contempt by the common enemies of the Greeks, of the Persians, and of human kind. They seized every opportunity to obstruct the march of the army; and though unprepared for a close engagement, used with extraordinary effect their bows, three cubits long, which they bent by pressing the lower part with their left foot. The arrows were near as long as the bows; and their irresistible points pierced the firmest shields and corslets. The Greeks employed their skill in tactics, and their valour, to elude, or to repel, the assault of these dangerous foes, from whom they suffered more in seven days than they had done in as many weeks from the bravest troops of Artaxerxes¹². At length they arrived at the river Centrites, two hundred feet broad, which forms the southern boundary of Armenia, having just reason to rejoice that they had escaped the weapons of the Carduchians, whose posterity, the Parthians¹³, with the same arms and address, became formidable to Rome, when Rome was formidable to the world¹⁴.

They tra-
verse Arme-
nia.

The month of January was employed in traversing the fruitful plains of Armenia¹⁵, which are beautifully diversified by hills of easy ascent. Teribazus, the Persian governor of the province, entered into an agreement with the generals, that if they abstained from ho-

¹² Xenoph. p. 218—226.

¹³ Strabo, l. xvi. p. 515.

¹⁴ Plut. in Crasso & Marc. Anton:

¹⁵ There the Greeks found πάντα τα σιτη-
δια, ἴσα ἰσῶν ἀγαθὰ, ἡμεῖς, οἱ τοῖ, οὐκ παλαιός

ἐνδεδεικναι, ἀσπιδας, σκεπη παντοδαπα; "All kinds of necessaries, and even luxuries, victims, corn, old fragrant wines, dried grapes, and all sorts of pulse."

stilities,

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ilities, he would not obstruct their march, but furnish them plentifully with provisions. But this league was perfidiously violated. The Greeks had recourse to arms; pursued Teribazus; assaulted and plundered his camp¹⁶. Next day they were exposed to a more dangerous contest, in which neither skill nor valour could avail. The snow fell in such quantities during the night, as completely covered the men with their arms. Their bodies were benumbed and parched with the piercing coldness of the north wind. Many slaves and sumpter horses perished, with about thirty soldiers. The rest could scarcely be persuaded by Xenophon to put themselves in motion, which was known to be the only remedy for their distress; and as the severity of the weather still continued during the remainder of their march through Armenia, several soldiers lost their sight by the glare of the snow, and their toes and fingers by the intenseness of the cold¹⁷. The eyes were best defended by wearing something black before them; the feet were preserved by constant motion in the day, and by stripping bare in the night.

In danger of
perishing by
the intense
cold of that
country.

From Armenia they proceeded to the country of the Taochians, who, alarmed by the approach of an unknown enemy, had abandoned the vallies, and taken refuge on the mountains, with their wives, children, and cattle. Hither also they had conveyed all their provisions; so that the Greeks were obliged to attack these fastnesses, otherwise the army must have been starved. The Barbarians boldly defended them, by letting fly innumerable volleys of stones down the precipices. But this artillery was at length exhausted; the Greeks became masters of the heights; and a dreadful scene followed. The women first threw their children down the rocks, and then themselves. The men imitated this frantic example of despair; so that the assailants made few prisoners, but took a considerable quantity of sheep, oxen, and asses¹⁸.

Proceed
through the
territories of
the Tao-
chians.

¹⁶ Xenoph. p. 328.¹⁷ Ibid. p. 329, & seqq.¹⁸ Ibid. p. 338.

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The fierce
and fearless
character of
the Chaly-
beans.

From thence the army proceeded with uncommon celerity through the bleak and rocky country of the Chalybeans; marching, in seven days, about an hundred and fifty miles. The Chalybeans were the fiercest nation in all those parts. They wore, for their defence, linen corslets, greaves, and helmets; they carried a short falchion at their girdles; and attacked with pikes fifteen cubits long. Instead of discovering any symptoms of flight or fear, they sang, danced, and rejoiced, at the approach of an enemy. They boldly defended their villages, not declining even a close engagement with the Greeks; who could supply themselves with nothing from this inhospitable and warlike country, but, in their dangerous march through it, subsisted entirely on the cattle lately taken from the Taochians¹⁹.

The Greeks
arrive at
mount The-
ches, from
which they
behold the
sea.

The river Harpasus, four hundred feet broad, separated the territories of the Chalybeans and Scythinians. From the latter the Greeks met with little resistance, in a march of thirteen days, which brought them to the lofty mount Theches, a place held in particular devotion by the inhabitants of the neighbouring territory. The vanguard had no sooner ascended this sacred mountain, than the army were alarmed by loud shouts, which continued to redouble with increasing violence. It was imagined that some new form of danger had appeared, or that some new enemy was ready to assail them. The rear advanced with all possible expedition to the assistance of their companions; but having arrived within hearing, were seized with the most pleasing astonishment, when their ears were saluted from every quarter with the repetition, "The sea! the sea!" the sight of which, a sight so long wished in vain, at first filled them with transports of tumultuous joy, and afterwards recalled more distinctly the remembrance of their parents, their friends, their country, and every object of their most tender concern²⁰. The foldiers, with tears in their eyes, embraced each

¹⁹ Xenoph. p. 338.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 339.

other,

other, and embraced their commanders; and then, as by a hidden consent of sympathy (for it was never known by whose orders), heaped up a mount of stones, which they covered with barbaric arms, as a trophy of their memorable journey through so many fierce and hostile nations.

The distant prospect of the Euxine made them forget that they had not yet attained the end of their labours. A space, indeed, of less than sixty miles intervened; but it was covered by the trackless forests of the Macronians, and by the abrupt and intricate windings of the Colchian mountains. A fortunate circumstance enabled them without difficulty to surmount the first of those obstacles. Among the Grecian targeteers was a man who understood the language of the Barbarians. He had been carried to Athens in his youth, where he had served as a slave. At the sight of the Macronians, he recognised his long-forgotten countrymen; and having addressed them in terms of friendship and respect, engaged them to exchange presents, and to enter into alliance with the Greeks²¹, whom they plentifully supplied with provisions, and having cut down the trees that interrupted their passage, conducted them in three days to the western frontier of Colchos.

They pass
through the
country of
the Macro-
nians.

This country, so famous in the fables of antiquity²², was inhabited by an ancient colony of Egyptians, who long preserved pure from any foreign admixture, not only their original language, but the singular manners, and the more singular rites and ceremonies, of their mother-country²³. Though distinguished in other respects from the neighbouring nations, whom they detested, and to whom they seem detestable, they agreed with them in their jealousy of the Greeks, whose flourishing colonies along the southern shores of the Euxine threatened the safety of their dominions. They assembled therefore from all quarters, occupied the heights, and prepared to

Enter Col-
chos.

²¹ Xenoph. p. 340.

²² See Vol. I. p. 14, & seqq.

²³ Herodot. l. xi. c. civ.

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dispute the passage with obstinacy. Their numbers, their discipline, their arms, but, still more, their situation, rendered them formidable. If the Greeks advanced in a phalanx, or full line, their ranks would be broken by the inequalities of the ground, the centre would be disordered, and the superior numbers of the enemy would out-reach either wing²⁴. These inconveniencies might partly be remedied by making such parts of the line, as had an easy ascent, wait for the slow and difficult progress of their companions through more abrupt and inaccessible mountains; and, by extending the phalanx in length, and leaving very few men in file, their front might be rendered equal to that of the Colchians. But the first of these operations would have too long exposed the army to the darts and arrows of the Barbarians, and the second would have so much enfeebled the line, as must have rendered it liable to be penetrated. Amidst this choice of difficulties, Xenophon proposed, and the proposal was readily approved by his colleagues, that the heavy-armed men should be divided into companies of an hundred each, and that each division should be thrown into a separate column. The wide intervals between the columns might thus enable the smaller army to extend on the right and left beyond the enemy's line; each company or division might ascend the mountain wherever they found it most convenient; the bravest men might be led first to the charge; the depth of the columns²⁵ could not possibly be penetrated; nor could the enemy fall into the intervals between them, without being cut off by the divisions on either side, which might be arranged in such a manner as to relieve, encourage, and support each other.

²⁴ Idem, p. 341.

²⁵ The *λῦγες ὀφίαι*, is defined by Arrian to be a body of men, with the files longer than the ranks; that is, with more men in depth than in front. The *φάλαγξ*, without any epithet, means the contrary. But the *φάλαγξ*

ὀφία is an army, as the same author tells us, *ὅταν ἐπὶ κέρως πορεύεται*, that is, having more men in depth than in front, and employing, for some extraordinary reason, what is naturally the line of march as an order of battle.

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XXVI.Defeat the
Colchians.

This judicious disposition was attended with the expected success. The heavy-armed men formed eighty companies; the targeteers and archers, divided into three bodies, each of about six hundred men, flanked the army on the right and left. Their third division, consisting chiefly of Arcadians, occupied a distinguished place in the centre. Thus disposed for battle, the wings of the Grecian army, and particularly the targeteers and archers, who were most capable of expedition, advanced with celerity to the attack. The enemy, who saw them approach, and who perceived that on either hand, they outreached their line, fled to the right and left in order to receive them. By this movement they left a void in their centre, towards which the Arcadian targeteers, supported by the nearest columns, advanced with rapidity, and soon gained the summit. They could thus fight on equal terms with the Barbarians, who, thinking they had lost all when they lost the advantage of the ground, no longer offered resistance, but fled on every side with disordered trepidation, leaving the Greeks masters of the field of battle, as well as of the numerous villages in that neighbourhood²⁶, and within two days march of the Euxine sea, without any other enemy to oppose their long disputed passage thither.

The southern shore of the Euxine, which actually presents one uniform scene of effeminate indolence and sullen tyranny, anciently contained many barbarous but warlike tribes, totally independent on each other, and scarcely acknowledging any dependance on the king of Persia. That part which extends towards the east and the borders of Mount Caucasus, and which afterwards formed the kingdom of the great Mithridates, was inhabited by the Colchians, Drillians, Mysonæcians, and Tybarenians; the middle division was possessed by the Paphlagonians, who gloried in the irresistible prowess of their numerous cavalry; and the western parts, extending two hundred miles from Heraclea to the Thracian Bosphorus, were occupied by

Description
of the south-
ern shore of
the Euxine.²⁶ Xenophon, p. 342.

the

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The Greek
colony of
Sinopé.

the inhospitable Bithynians; a colony of Thrace, who excelled and delighted in war, which, like their ancestors in Europe, they carried on with a savage fury²⁷.

Amidst the formidable hostility of those numerous nations arose, at wide intervals, several Grecian cities, which enlivened the barbaric gloom, and displayed the peculiar glory of their arts and arms. Sinopé, the mother and the queen of those cities, was advantageously situated on a narrow isthmus which joined its territory, consisting in a small but fertile peninsula²⁸, to the province of Paphlagonia. The foundation of Sinopé, remounted to the highest antiquity, and was ascribed to Antolycus, one of the Argonauts²⁹. The city was afterwards increased by a powerful accession of Milesians. It possessed convenient harbours on either side of the isthmus. The peninsula was surrounded by sharp rocks, which rendered it inaccessible to an enemy; and the sea abounded with the Tunny fish, which flow in shoals from the Palus Mæotis, where they are supposed to be bred³⁰, to the Euxine and Propontis.

The Sinopians found new colonies on that coast.

Such multiplied advantages rendered the Sinopians populous and powerful. They diffused their colonies to the east and west. It is not improbable that they founded Heraclea³¹, on the frontier of Bithynia; and it is certain that they built Cotyora in the territory of the Tybarenians, Cerafus in that of the Mysonæcians, and Trapezus in that of the Drillians.

The Greeks are hospitably received at Trebizond, one of these colonies.

Trapezus, or Trebizond, was the first friendly city at which the Grecians arrived, after spending more than a twelvemonth in almost

²⁷ See Dionysius Periegetes, and Arrian's *Periplus*.

²⁸ Tournefort, v. iii. p. 46, says it is about six miles in circumference.

²⁹ See the account of the Argonautic expedition, vol. i. p. 14. & seqq. Strabo, l. xii. p. 546, who gives us this information, says farther, that Lucullus, when he took the town, carried away the statue of Antolycus.

³⁰ Tournefort, *Voyage au Levant*.

³¹ Strabo, l. xii. p. 542, calls Heraclea a colony of the Milesians, by whom we may understand the Sinopians, who were themselves a colony of that people. Xenophon, however, called Heraclea a colony of Megareans. Xenoph. *Anabaf.* p. 358.

continual travelling and war. The numerous inhabitants of this flourishing sea-port, which has now decayed into the much neglected harbour of Platana³², received them with open arms, generously supplied their wants, and treated them with all that endearing yet respectful hospitality of kinsmen, who commiserated their sufferings, and admired their virtue. The Grecians, on their part, displayed a very just and becoming sense of the evils which they had escaped, and of their actual security. In the fervour of religious gratitude they paid the solemn vows and sacrifices which they had promised to Jupiter the preserver, and the other gods and heroes, whose bountiful protection had hitherto conducted them through so many known, and so many concealed dangers. They afterwards celebrated, with much pomp and festivity, the gymnastic games and exercises; an entertainment equally agreeable to themselves, to the citizens of Trebizond, and to the divinities whom they both adored. When these essential duties, for such the Greeks deemed them, had been performed with universal satisfaction, the soldiers, who were unwilling to be burdensome to their Trebizontian friends, found sufficient employment in providing for their own subsistence, and that of their numerous attendants. For several days they ravaged the neighbouring villages of the Colchians and Drillians; and while they cruelly harassed the enemies, they carefully respected the allies, of Trebizond. Their repeated devastations at length desolated the country immediately around them, so that the foraging parties could no longer set out and return on the same day; nor could they penetrate deep into the territory, without being endangered by the nocturnal assaults of the Barbarians. These circumstances rendered it necessary for them to think of leaving Trebizond; on which account an assembly was convened to fix the day of their departure, and to regulate the mode and plan of their future journey³³.

³² Tournefort. l. xvii. This place, however, is still large but depopulated; containing more woods and gardens than houses, and those only of one story; yet the town retains the form of an oblong square, the

modern walls being built on the ruins of the ancient, the shape of which occasioned the name of Trapezus, from the Greek word signifying a table. Tournefort, *ibid*.

³³ Xenoph. 343. Sc. 699.

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Cheirifophus
sails to the
Hellespont to
demand trans-
ports from
the Spartan
admiral.

In this important deliberation the soldiers very generally embraced the opinion of Antileon of Thuria, who told them that, for his part, he was already tired with packing up his baggage, marching, running, mounting guard, and fighting, and now wished, after all his labours, to perform the remainder of the journey like Ulysses, and, stretched out at his ease, to be carried asleep ³⁴ into Greece. That this pleasing proposal might be put in execution, Cheirifophus sailed to the Hellespont, hoping to obtain ships from Anaxibius, who commanded the Spartan fleet in that sea. But in case such a request could not be conveniently granted, the soldiers determined to demand a few ships of war from the inhabitants of Trebizond, with which they intended to put to sea, and to capture whatever merchantmen they could meet with in the Euxine, in order to employ them as transports ³⁵.

Meanwhile
the Greeks
capture the
merchant-
men in the
Euxine;

Several weeks elapsed without bringing any news of Cheirifophus, or promising any hope of assistance from the Spartan admiral. Meanwhile the Grecian pirates, for they deserve no better name, infested the Euxine sea. Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, with a degree of perfidy worthy of his commission, betrayed his companions, and sailed off with the galley which he commanded ³⁶. But Polycrates, the Athenian, behaved with an ardour and fidelity which even robbers sometimes display in their transactions with each other; and his successful diligence soon collected such a number of vessels as served to transport to Cerasus the aged, the infirm, the women and baggage; while the strength of the army, consisting of men

in which they
transport
their sick, &c.
to Cerasus.

³⁴ Thus was Ulysses transported by the Phœnicians, who placed him sleeping on the shore of Ithaca:

Ὁ δὲ Λαερτιάδης ὅτε ἐπὶ πλοῦσι κλυτὰς

Κοιτῶσιν ἐβόηεν, Ἰσ. Odyss. xiii. 133.

The beautiful images which the poet, in the same book, gives of the pleasures of rest, after immoderate labour, played about the fancy of Antileon.

Καὶ τῶν ῥέχοντων ὅτε ἐπὶ θέρειον ἐπὶ τῶν

Νεγροῦν ἔσαν, βλ. αὐτὴν ἀρχαία ἱστορία, v. 80.

And again, "The ship cut the waves with a rapidity, which the flight of the swiftest hawk could not accompany, carrying a man

Ὁς πρὶν μὲν μετὰ πολλὰ παρ' ὄρκοις ἐκαστοῦ
ἄνθρωπον περιέμεναι, ἀδρόναι τὴν ῥοῇ ἐπὶ
Διὰ τὴν ἰσχυρίαν, ἡδὺν δὲ καὶ ἰσχυρίαν ἐπὶ ἰσχυρίαν.

³⁵ Xenoph. p. 345.

³⁶ Idem, *ibid.*

below forty years of age, reached the same place in three days march³⁷.

The colony of Cerasus, or Cerazunt, was delightfully situated near the sea, among hills of easy ascent, covered in every age³⁸ with whole woods of cherry-trees, from which, in all probability, the place derived its name³⁹. From thence the voluptuous Lucullus, in the six hundred and eightieth year of Rome, first brought into Italy this delicious fruit, which ancient naturalists scarcely believed capable of thriving in an Italian sky; but which actually adorns the bleakest and most northern regions of our own island. At Cerasus the Greeks remained ten days, disposing of their booty, supplying their wants, and reviewing the army, which still amounted to eight thousand six hundred men, the rest having perished by fatigue, war, cold, and sickness⁴⁰.

After this necessary delay, the less active portion again embarked, while the vigorous youth pursued their journey through the romantic country of the Mosynæcians; a barbarous, yet powerful tribe, who received their singular denomination from the wooden houses, or rather towers, which they inhabited⁴¹; and which, either by chance or design, were scattered in such a manner among the hills and vallies, that, at the distance of eight miles, the villages could hear and alarm each other⁴². The army next proceeded through the dark and narrow district of the Chalybians, who subsisted by the working of iron; and whose toilsome labours, rugged mountains, and more rugged manners⁴³, must have formed a striking contrast with the smiling plains, the pastoral life⁴⁴, the innocent and hospi-

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Transactions
of the Greeks
at that place.

They tra-
verse the ter-
ritories of the
Mosynæ-
cians;

Chalybians;

³⁷ Xenoph. p. 349.

³⁸ Tournefort.

³⁹ *Kigazo*, *cerasus*, *cerise*, *cherry*. For a similar reason *Tadmor*, in the desert, was called *Palmyra*, *à palmis*, the palm tree. Tournefort mentions it as the opinion of St. Jerom, that the place gave name to the fruit. The difference is not material.

⁴⁰ Xenoph. p. 349.

⁴¹ *Μόσυναι* & *οἰκίσαι*.

⁴² Xenoph. p. 351.

⁴³ Idem, p. 344.

⁴⁴ Dionysius Periegetes qualifies them by the epithet *παλιόχοι*, abounding in sheep.

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and Tyber-
nians.

Distinctions
in the camp,
soon after
their arrival
in Cotyora.

table character of their Tyberenian neighbours; who treated the Greeks with every mark of friendship and respect, and conducted them, with attentive civility, to the city of Cotyora.

It might be expected, that the army, having reached the country of their friends and kinsmen, should have been disposed peaceably to enjoy the fruits of their past labours and dangers. If they were unwilling to expose themselves to fresh hostilities from the warlike inhabitants of Paphlagonia and Bithynia, they might have waited the arrival of ships from Sinopé and Heraclea, or from the Spartan admiral in the Hellespont, who would either retain them in his own service, or transport them to the Chersonesus, to Byzantium, and to other cities and territories, which, being lately conquered by Sparta, required the vigilant protection of brave and numerous garrisons. But it is more easy for men to repel the assaults of external violence, than to elude the effects of their own ungovernable passions. The Greeks were involved in real danger, in proportion as they attained apparent security. During the long course of their laborious journey, the terror of unknown Barbarians hanging over them, preserved their discipline and their union. But the air of a Grecian colony at once dissolved both. They, who in the remote regions of the East had acted with one soul, and regarded each other as brethren, again felt the unhappy influence of their provincial distinctions. The army was divided by separate interests, as well as by partial attachments. Those who had acquired wealth, desired to return home to enjoy it. Those who were destitute of fortune, longed to plunder friends and foes, Greeks and Barbarians. The commanders despised and deceived the troops; the troops clamoured against, and insulted the commanders. Both were really in the wrong; and both suspected and accused each other of imaginary crimes, of which none were guilty.

Xenophon's
great views
defeated by

Xenophon, who, with wonderful address, has justified himself from every reproach⁴⁵ that can reflect either on his understanding or his

⁴⁵ Xenoph. p. 367.

heart, does not deny an imputation to which he was exposed by discovering (somewhat, perhaps, unseasonably) the just and extensive views of a philosopher. When he surveyed the southern shores of the Euxine, covered in ancient times, as well as they are at present, with tall and majestic forest trees, admirably adapted to ship-building; when he considered the convenience of the harbours, and the productions of the neighbouring territory, consisting in flax, iron, and every commodity most necessary in raising a naval power, he was ambitious of establishing a new settlement, which the numbers, the valour, and the activity of his followers, must soon render superior to the other Grecian colonies on the Euxine, or perhaps in any part of Asia. But this noble design, which might have proved so useful and honourable to the army, was blasted by the mean jealousy of his enemies. Xenophon was reproached with forming projects equally romantic and dangerous; and accused of an intention to keep the soldiers from home, that they might continue dependent on himself, and that he might increase his own fame and fortune at the risk of the public safety⁴⁶.

the mean
jealousy of
his enemies.

The mutinous and distracted spirit of the troops rendered all their future measures weak and wavering. The terror which they inspired, and their wants, which it was necessary to supply, made them very unwelcome guests at Cotyora, Sinopé, and Heraclea, at which places they continued several months, under pretence of waiting for transports, but meanwhile plundering the neighbouring country, laying the cities under contribution, and threatening them with burdens that exceeded their faculties. The inhabitants of Heraclea, while they affected to consider those unreasonable demands, removed their effects from the villages, shut the gates of their city, and placed armed men on the walls. Cheirisophus had by this time returned with vessels from Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, but not sufficiently

Sufferings of
the Greeks in
their march
through Bi-
thynia.

⁴⁶ Xenoph. p. 359 & seqq.

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After the
death of
Cheiriso-
phus, are
conducted by
Xenophon to
Byzantium.

The muti-
nous spirit of
the troops
breaks out
afresh at
Byzantium.

numerous to transport so great an army. The soldiers thus disappointed of their hopes, and discontented with their commanders, and with each other, rashly undertook, in separate bodies, the dangerous journey through Bithynia, a country extending two hundred miles from Heraclea to Byzantium, and totally inhabited, or rather wasted, by the Thynians, a Thracian tribe, the most cruel and inhospitable of the human race. In this expedition they lost above a thousand men; and the destruction must have been much greater, had not the generous activity of Xenophon seasonably led his own division to the assistance of those who had deserted his standard. Cheiriso-phus was soon afterwards killed by a medicine which he had taken in a fever. The sole command devolved on Xenophon; not by appointment, but by the voluntary submission of the troops to his superior mind. He at length taught them to defeat the irregular fury of the Thynians; and, after taking many slaves, and much useful booty, conducted them in safety to Chrysopolis⁴⁷, which is now known by the name of Scutari, and considered as the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople.

The neighbourhood of a Grecian colony seemed infectious to the temper of the troops. At Byzantium their mutinous spirits were again thrown into fermentation. Cleander, the governor of that city, who had come to meet them, narrowly escaped death during the fury of a military sedition. Their behaviour rendered them the objects of terror to all the inhabitants of those parts. The Lacedæmonians dreaded the assistance of such dangerous allies; and the satrap, Pharnabazus, alarmed for the safety of his province, practised with Anaxibius, who commanded in the Hellespont, to allure them, by fair promises, into Europe. Gained by the bribes of the Persian, not only Anaxibius, but his successor Aristarchus, made proposals of advantage to the army, which he had not any intention to fulfil.

⁴⁷ Xenoph. p. 277. & seqq.

The troops, enraged at this disappointment, and still more at the treachery of the Spartan commanders, would have attacked and plundered Byzantium, had they not been restrained by the wisdom and authority of Xenophon, who, struggling like a skilful pilot against the violence of a tempest, prevented the execution of a measure which must have exposed them to immediate danger, and covered them with eternal infamy⁴⁸.

With tears and prayers, he conjured them "not to tarnish, by the destruction of a Grecian city, the glory of a campaign signalised by so many illustrious victories over the Barbarians. What hopes of safety could they entertain, if, after unsuccessfully attempting to dethrone the king of Persia, they should provoke the resentment of Sparta? Destitute as they were of friends, of money, of subsistence; and reduced by their misconduct to a handful of men, could they expect to insult with impunity the two greatest powers in the world? The experience of late years ought to correct their folly. They had seen that even Athens, in the zenith of her greatness, possessed of four hundred galleys, an annual revenue of a thousand talents, and ten times that sum in her treasury; Athens, who commanded all the islands, and occupied many cities both in Asia and Europe, among which was Byzantium itself, the present object of their frantic ambition, had yielded to the arms of Sparta, whose authority was actually acknowledged in every part of Greece. What madness, then, for men in their friendless condition, a mixed assemblage of different nations, to attack the dominions of a people whose valour was irresistible, and from whose vengeance it was impossible for them to fly, without flying from their country, and taking refuge with those hostile Barbarians, from whom, for near two years past, they had met with nothing but cruelty, injustice, persecution, and treachery?"

Xenophon
dissuades
them from
plundering
that place.

⁴⁸ Xenoph. p. 392. & seqq.

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The Greeks
invited into
the service
of Seuthes;

his history.

The judicious representations of Xenophon saved Byzantium; but it is probable that neither the weight of argument, nor the power of eloquence, would have long restrained the discontented and needy troops from attempting other enterprises of a similar nature, if an opportunity had not fortunately presented itself of employing their dangerous activity in the service of Seuthes, a bold and successful adventurer of Lower Thrace. Mæfades, the father of Seuthes, reigned over the Melandeptans, the Thynians, and the Thranipfans, who inhabited the European shores of the Propontis and Euxine sea. The licentious turbulence of his subjects compelled him to fly from his dominions. He took refuge with Medocus, king of the Odryans, the most powerful tribe in Upper Thrace, with whose family his own had long been connected by the sacred ties of hospitality. Medocus kindly received, and generously entertained, the father; and, after his decease, continued the same protection and bounty to his son, Seuthes. But the independent spirit of the young prince disdained, as he expresses it, to live like a dog at another man's table. He desired horses and soldiers from Medocus, that he might acquire subsistence for himself. His request was granted; his incursions were successful; the terror of his name filled all the maritime parts of Thrace; and there was reason to believe that if he could join the Grecian forces to his own, he might easily regain possession of his hereditary dominions⁴⁰.

Their agree-
ment with
that prince.

For this purpose he sent to Xenophon Medofades, a Thracian, who, understanding the Greek language, usually served him as ambassador. The terms of the treaty were soon agreed on. Seuthes promised each soldier a Cyzicene (about eighteen shillings sterling), the captains two Cyzicenes, and the generals four, of monthly pay. The money, it was observed, would be clear gain, as they might subsist by plundering the country; yet such of the booty as was not

⁴⁰ Xenoph. p. 393. & seqq.

of a perishable nature, Seuthes reserved for himself, that by selling it in the maritime towns, he might provide for the pay of his new auxiliaries⁵⁰.

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Having communicated their designs to the army, the Grecian commanders followed Medofades to the camp of Seuthes, which was distant about six miles from the coast of Perinthus, a city of considerable note in the neighbourhood of Byzantium. They arrived after sun-set, but found the Barbarians awake and watchful. Seuthes himself was posted in a strong tower; horses ready bridled stood at the gate; large fires blazed at a distance, while the camp itself was concealed in darkness; precautions, however singular, yet necessary against the Thynians, who were deemed, of all men, the most dangerous enemies in the night. The Greeks were permitted to enter. Seuthes received them with rustic hospitality; before entering on business, challenged them to drink in large horns full of wine; then confirmed the promises of his ambassador; and still farther allured Xenophon by the hopes of receiving, besides the stipulated pay, lands and cattle, and an advantageous establishment on the sea-shore.

The Grecian
commanders
entertained
in the camp
of Seuthes.

Next day the Grecian army joined the camp of their new master. The commanders were again entertained with a copious feast, in which Seuthes displayed all his magnificence. After supper, the buffoons and dancers were introduced, the cup went briskly round, and the whole assembly were dissolved in merriment. But Seuthes knew how far to indulge, and when to restrain, the joys of festivity. Without allowing his revels to disturb the stillness of night, he rose with a martial shout, imitating a man who avoided a javelin; and then addressing the Grecian captains without any sign of intoxication, desired them to have their men ready to march in a few hours, that the enemy, who were as yet unacquainted with the powerful

The army
joins his
standard.

⁵⁰ Xenoph. p. 393. & seqq.

reinforcement

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XXVI.

Conjunct ex-
peditions of
the Greeks
and Thra-
cians.

By the affit-
ance of the
Greeks, Seu-
thes recovers
his hereditary
dominions.

reinforcement which he had received, might be taken unprepared, and conquered by surprise⁵¹.

The camp was in motion at midnight ; it was the middle of winter, and the ground was in many parts covered with a deep snow. But the Thracians, clothed in skins of foxes, were well prepared for such nocturnal expeditions. The Greeks suffered much⁵² by the cold ; but the rapidity of their march, animated by the certain prospect of success, made them forget their sufferings. Wherever they arrived, the villages were attacked and plundered, the houses were burned, many captives and cattle were taken, and the ravages of that bloody night sufficiently represent the uniform scene of cruelty, by which, in the course of a few weeks, Seuthes compelled into submission the inhabitants of that fertile and populous slip of land that lies between the Euxine and Propontis. But the possession of this territory, which formed the most valuable portion of his hereditary dominions, could not satisfy his ambition. He turned his arms northwards, and over-ran the country about Salmydessus, a maritime city situate at the mouth of a river of the same name, which flows from the southern branch of mount Hæmus into a spacious bay of the Euxine. There the allied army repeated the same destructive havoc which they had already made in the south ; and avenged, by their cruel incursions, the cause of violated hospitality ; for the Barbarians of those parts were so much accustomed to plunder the vessels which were often shipwrecked on their shoaly coast, that they had distinguished it by pillars, in the nature of land-marks, to prevent intestine quarrels, by ascertaining the property of the spoil⁵³.

⁵¹ Xenoph. p. 405, & seqq.

⁵² Ἡ δὲ χειμὼν τοῖσι καὶ ψυχῇ ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν ἔδωκεν ὁ ἀερινὸς αὐτῇ χειμῶνι, ἀντιπαρὶς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖσι ὀφθαλμοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἰσχυρὰς πύλλους καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἔμελλεν. There was much snow, and the

cold so intense, that the water froze as they were carrying it to supper, and the wine in the vessels. Many of the Greeks also lost their ears and noses. Xenoph. p. 403.

⁵³ Ibid. idem.

In the space of two months after his junction with the Greeks, Seuthes extended his possessions several days march from the sea; his numerous, but unskilful enemies, fighting singly, were successively subdued; each vanquished tribe encreased the strength of his army; the Odrysians, allured by the hopes of plunder, flocked to his standard, and the growing prosperity of his fortune, no longer requiring the support, disposed him to neglect the services, of his Grecian auxiliaries⁵⁴. The ungrateful levity of the Barbarian was encouraged by the perfidious counsels of his favourite Heraclides of Maronea, one of those fugitive Greeks, who having merited punishment at home for their wickedness, obtained distinction abroad by their talents; men sullied with every vice, prepared alike to die or to deceive, and who having provoked the resentment of their own countrymen by their intrigues and their audacity, often acquired the esteem of foreigners by their valour and eloquence, their skill in war, and dexterity in negotiation. Heraclides strongly exhorted his master to defraud the Greeks of their pay, and to deliver himself from their troublesome importunities, by dismissing them from his service. But the fears, rather than the delicacy of Seuthes, prevented him from complying with this advice; he lost his honour without saving his money; and the Grecian generals had an early opportunity to reproach his perfidy and ingratitude, being soon called to engage in a more honourable war⁵⁵, kindled by the resentment of Artaxerxes against the presumption of the Spartans, who had so strenuously supported the unfortunate rebellion of Cyrus.

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His signal in-
gratitude.

The Greeks
return to the
service of
their coun-
try.

⁵⁴ Xenoph. p. 414, & seqq.

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 427.

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Tissaphernes makes War on the Greeks, by Order of Artaxerxes.—Attacks the Æolian Cities.—Expedition of Thimbron.—He is succeeded by Dercyllidas.—His Treaty with Tissaphernes.—Agefilas King of Sparta.—Cinadon's Conspiracy.—Agefilas Commander of the Grecian Forces in Asia.—His Success.—Tissaphernes succeeded by Tibraustes.—Great Views of Agefilas.—War rekindled in Greece.—League against Sparta.—Campaign of Lyfander in Bœotia.—His Death.

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Tissaphernes prepares to make war on the Lacedæmonian allies in Asia, by order of Artaxerxes. Olymp. xcvi. 2.

A. C. 399.

IT does honour rather to the modesty than to the judgment of Xenophon, that he has excluded, from his general history of Grecian affairs, the account of an expedition, in which he himself acted so distinguished a part, and which immediately occasioned very important transactions both in Asia and in Europe. After the downfall of Athenian greatness, the Spartans were naturally exposed to the jealousy and resentment of Persia, by their dominion in Greece, by their conquests on the coast of Asia, by the pre-eminence of their naval power, and especially by their open participation in the rebellious designs of Cyrus. The former circumstances rendered their republic the rival of the king of Persia; but their co-operation with an ambitious rebel rendered them the personal enemies of Artaxerxes. His resolution to chastise their audacity was communicated to Tissaphernes, who, after harassing the retreat of the Greeks to the foot

foot of the Carduchian mountains, beyond which he had not courage to follow them, returned with a powerful army towards Lower Asia, to resume the government of Caria, his hereditary province, as well as to take possession of the rich spoils of Cyrus, bestowed on him by the gratitude of his master, in return for his recent and signal services against that dangerous pretender to the throne.

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Honoured with this magnificent present, Tissaphernes was farther entrusted with executing the vengeance of the great king against the Spartans. Without any formal declaration of war, which the late hostilities in the East seemed to render unnecessary, he attacked the Æolian cities; the satrap Pharnabazus readily entered into his views, and concurred with all his measures. The Lacedæmonian garrison, supported by the townsmen, defended themselves with their usual courage, earnestly soliciting, however, a reinforcement from home, which might enable them to resist and to surmount such an unexpected danger¹.

Attacks the
Æolian ci-
ties.

On this important occasion, the Spartan senate and assembly were not wanting to the assistance of their garrisons, or to the hopes of their Æolian allies. They immediately levied a body of five thousand Peloponnesian troops, and demanded a considerable supply from the Athenians. The latter sent them three hundred horsemen, who having served under the thirty tyrants, were cheerfully sacrificed to this dangerous duty by the partisans of the new democracy. The command of the joint forces was entrusted to the Spartan Thimbron, who had orders², as soon as he arrived in Æolis, to take into pay the Greeks who had engaged in the expedition of Cyrus, and who were actually employed in the dishonourable service of an ungrateful Barbarian. The mean and perfidious behaviour of Seuthes, who, in his new character of prince, still retained his original manners of a Thracian robber, rendered the proposal of joining Thim-

The Spar-
tans send
Thimbron
with an army
to their assist-
ance;

which is re-
inforced by
the Greeks
who had re-
turned from
Upper Asia.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 480. Dio-
dor. Sicul. l. xiv. p. 416.

² Xenophon. Hellen. p. 550. Diodor.
p. 416.

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brom extremely agreeable to Xenophon, who conducted to the Lacedæmonian standard six thousand men, the venerable remains of an army exhausted and ennobled by unexampled toils and dangers³.

Thimbron
opens the
campaign
with success;
Olymp.
xcv. 3.
A. C. 398.

Having received this powerful reinforcement, Thimbron opened the campaign against the lieutenant of Artaxerxes, at the distance of two years after Cyrus had marched from Ephesus to dispute the crown of Persia. The first impressions of the Grecian arms were attended with considerable success. Thimbron took, or regained, the towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Halisarnia, Myrina, Cymé, and Gryniun. But the walls of Larissa, a strong city in the Troade, defied his assault; the vigilant garrison baffled all his contrivances for depriving them of fresh water; and, assisted by the inhabitants of the place, made a vigorous sally, repelled the besiegers, and burned or demolished their works.

fails in the
siege of La-
rissa;

recalled and
disgraced;

Nothing but continual action, and an uninterrupted career of victory, could restrain the licentious passions of the troops, composed of a motley assemblage from so many different, and often hostile communities. Their seditious spirit rendered them formidable to each other, and to the Greeks of Asia. Their rapacity spared not the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who loudly complained to the senate, ascribing the violence of the troops to the weakness of the general. In consequence of this representation, Thimbron was recalled and disgraced⁴, and the command, for which he seemed so ill qualified, was bestowed on Dercyllidas, a man fertile in resources, who could often vary his conduct without changing his principles; who knew when to relax, and when to enforce the discipline of the camp, and who, to the talents of an able general, added the reputation of being the best engineer of his times. By a judicious direction of the machines of war which he invented, or improved, Dercyllidas overcame the obstinacy of Larissa; and in the

is succeeded
by Dercylli-
das;

who admi-
nisters with
equal ability
the affairs
of war and
peace.

³ Xenoph. Anabaf. l. vii. p. 47.

⁴ Xenoph. p. 481.

space of eight days, reduced eight other cities in the province of Pharnabazus. The rapidity of his conquests recommended him to the Spartan senate, and his moderate use of victory endeared him to the Asiatic colonies. He lessened their taxes, encouraged their industry, heard their complaints with candour, and decided their differences with the most impartial justice. Disdaining the cruel example of his predecessors, he imposed not any arbitrary exactions on the peaceful citizens and husbandmen; and lest the maintenance of his troops should prove burdensome to the allies and subjects of Sparta, he fixed his winter quarters in Bithynia, where the valour of Xenophon and his followers had lately spread the terror of the Grecian name.

Early in the spring, commissioners were sent from Sparta to inspect the affairs of Asia, and to prorogue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, provided their observations and inquiries confirmed the very favourable accounts that had been given of his administration. On their arrival at Lampfacus, where the army was then assembled, they visited the camp, and assured the soldiers, that the magistrates of the republic as much approved their conduct in the last, as they had condemned it in the preceding, year. A captain, expressing the sense of the multitude, replied, that the different behaviour of the troops, now and formerly, was yet less different than the characters of Thimbron and Dercyllidas. This testimony of military approbation was not more flattering to the general, than satisfactory to the commissioners; who afterwards, at his request, visited the neighbouring towns of Æolis and Ionia, and found them in a condition extremely happy and flourishing⁵.

Before taking leave of Dercyllidas they acquainted him, that the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonesus had lately sent to Sparta an embassy, requesting assistance against the fierce Barbarians who in-

CHAP.
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Commissioners sent from Sparta to prorogue his authority.
Olymp. xcv. 4.
A. C. 497.

Dercyllidas fortifies the Chersonesus.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 487.

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habited the adjoining territory; and that, should circumstances permit him to afford protection to those industrious and distressed Greeks, he would perform a signal service to the state. The inactivity of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the powerful army which he had conducted from Upper Asia, still expected further reinforcements from the East, encouraged the Grecian general to undertake this useful and meritorious enterprise. The Chersonesus was one of the most fertile⁶ and best cultivated spots in the ancient world. In an extent of fifty miles in length, and fifteen in breadth, it contained eleven rich and flourishing cities, and several commodious harbours. The fields producing the most valuable grains, were interspersed and adorned with delightful plantations and orchards, as well as with lawns and meadows, stored with all sorts of useful cattle. Had this beautiful country enjoyed an insular form, its happiness would have been complete; but a neck of land, thirty-seven furlongs in breadth, joined it to the territories of the fiercest tribes in Thrace. The troops of Dercyllidas could easily have repelled their inroads. They might have punished their cruelty by destroying their miserable villages in the open country; but the Barbarians would have found a secure refuge in their woods and mountains, and whenever the army was withdrawn, would have again poured down on the helpless Chersonesus with their native fury, heightened by revenge. Dercyllidas afforded a more useful assistance to those unhappy Greeks; and employed in their defence, not the courage, but the labour, of his soldiers. With incessant toil, begun in the spring, and continued almost to the autumn, they formed a strong wall across the isthmus; the space was marked out, and the labour distinctly apportioned to the separate communities from which the army had been levied; and the spur of emulation was sharpened by the incitement of gain, the general in person superintending the work, and bestowing re-

⁶ Περὶ φερτάτων καὶ ἀγροῦ. Xenoph. p. 488.

wards (lavishly furnished by the wealthy Cherfonites) on the most diligent and deserving⁷.

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Dercyllidas had scarcely returned from this employment, justly ennobled by its utility, when the combined forces of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes appeared in the neighbourhood of Ephesus. The general collected his whole strength in order to give them battle; the European foldiers displayed a noble ardour for action; but the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, who had flocked to his standard, were intimidated by the sight of an enemy whose numbers far exceeded their own. This panic might have proved fatal, had not the troops of Tissaphernes felt the terror which they inspired. They recollected the bravery of the ten thousand who had accompanied Cyrus; they perceived that the forces with whom they now had to contend exceeded that number; but they did not reflect that the army of Dercyllidas was swelled by the degenerate Greeks of Æolis and Ionia, whose minds had been enfeebled and degraded by a long series of oppression. The cowardice of the Persians engaged Tissaphernes, much against the inclination of Pharnabazus, to propose a conference; the cowardice of the Ionians engaged Dercyllidas to accept the proposal. Hostilities were thus suspended; mutual hostages were given; overtures of peace were made; and messengers were dispatched for instructions to the Spartan council, and to the court of Persia.

Enters into
treaty with
Tissapher-
nes.

The design of Tissaphernes, however, was only to gain time by amusing the enemy. The most solemn oaths and engagements had long lost their power over his perfidious mind. He treacherously watched an opportunity to renew the war, waiting with impatience for the promised reinforcements from the East, and especially for the equipment of a fleet, which Artaxerxes was preparing, with silence and celerity, in the ports of Phœnicia. These secret preparations were communicated to the Spartan magistrates by the patriot-

The Persians
secretly pre-
pare to re-
new the war.

⁷ Xenoph. p. 483.

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Agésilas de-
clared king
of Sparta.

son of Herodas, a Syracusan, who, animated by the love of Greece, betrayed his Phœnician master. The Spartans were alarmed with the danger, indignant at the treachery of Tisſaphernes, and perhaps displeased with the too easy credulity of their general. But the death of king Agis had given them, in the person of their first magistrate, a commander who equalled Dercyllidas in merit, and who has far surpassed him in renown.

The destructive expedition against the Eleans was the last exploit of the long and warlike reign of Agis. On his death-bed he acknowledged for his son Leotychides, whose legitimacy, the levity or the guilt of his mother Timæa had exposed to just suspicion. But this late avowal of a successor, whom he had so long disowned, did not satisfy the partisans of Agésilas, who was the brother of Agis on the side of his father Archidamus, but younger by many years, being born of a different mother, and failing Leotychides, the nearest heir to the throne. Under a diminutive and ignoble form, Agésilas concealed a vigorous and fervid mind, a manly elevation of character, a generous ambition of soul. These respectable qualities, adorned by the milder virtues of modesty, candour, condescension, and unlimited complaisance for his friends, early attracted the notice, and merited the esteem, of the first names of Sparta; and of none more than Lyſander, who, as his personal hopes of grandeur were blasted by the universal jealousy and resentment that had been justly excited in Sparta against his ostentatious abuse of power, confined all his projects of ambition to the aggrandisement of his favourite. That eloquence and address^s, which would have been ineffectual if em-

^s The partisans of Leotychides, in pleading his cause before the assembly, alleged an oracle that exhorted the Spartans to beware of a lame reign. This pointed at Agésilas, who limped in walking. But Lyſander, by one of those ready and unexpected turns, which often decide the resolutions of numerous assemblies, directed the battery of the oracle against Leotychides, asserting, that

it was the lameness of the title only which Apollo must have had in view, since it was a matter indifferent to the gods whether the Spartan king walked gracefully; but a matter of high importance whether they descended from Hercules, the son of Jupiter, or Alcibiades, an Athenian profligate and exile. Com. Plut. in Agésil. & Lyſand. & Xenoph. Agésil. Panegy. & Hellen. l. iii. p. 493.

ployed for himself, succeeded in behalf of another; and by the influence and intrigues of Lyfander, still more than by the strong claims of justice and of merit, Agefilaus was declared successor to the vacant throne; and, at the distance of about two years, commander in chief of the Greek forces in Asia; an office less splendid in name than that of king of Sparta, but carrying with it more solid weight and authority.

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In the interval of these successive honours, he approved his attentive vigilance in the service of the republic, of which the safety, and even the existence was endangered by a daring and bloody conspiracy. A youth named Cinadon, distinguished above his companions by extraordinary strength and agility, was not less conspicuous for undaunted courage and ambition. Descended of an obscure family, Cinadon felt and regretted the mortifying partiality of the government under which he lived. His pride was deeply wounded with the reflection, that whatever abilities his youth might promise, and his manhood mature, the unfortunate circumstances of his birth must for ever exclude him from the principal dignities of the state, which circulated among a few Spartan families, without the possibility of extending beyond that very limited sphere. The warmth of his character, and the impetuosity of his passions, prompted him to seek justice and revenge: nor was his blind and headlong ferocity alarmed by the means, however atrocious, that must lead to this favourite end. He communicated the horrid design to men of his own, and of an inferior condition, exaggerating their cruel treatment by a stern aristocracy, which he contrasted with the mild equality of the neighbouring communities; and perhaps asserting, that if they must submit to a master, it would be better to have one than many; that even the subjects of a monarchy enjoyed greater equality and liberty than the members of the Spartan republic, since the former all equally participated in those preferments and honours, to which not only the slaves, the Helots,

Cinadon's
conspiracy,

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and freedmen, but the whole body of the Lacedæmonian people, were forbidden to aspire. After this general representation, he neglected not, what was more effectual and important, to arraign the arrogance and cruelty of particular senators, and to inflame the resentment of individuals against their private and domestic foes; nor did he forget to encourage them all with the certain prospect of success, by contrasting their own strength and numbers with the weakness of an enemy, who might be taken unarmed, and cut off by surprise.

is discovered
when ripe for
execution.

The time for action approached, and the author of the conspiracy commanded his associates to stay at home, that they might be ready at a call. Agefilæus, meanwhile, performed the accustomed vows and sacrifices for the safety of the republic; the appearance of the entrails announced some dreadful and concealed danger; a second victim was slain, and the signs were still more unfavourable; but after examining the third sacrifice, the priest exclaimed, "We seem, O Agefilæus! to be in the midst of our enemies." Soon afterwards, a person, whose name has not been thought worthy of record, denounced Cinadon to the magistrates, as guilty of a treasonable design, of which he had endeavoured to render himself an accomplice. When the informer was desired to explain his declaration more fully, he told them, that Cinadon having conducted him to the great square of the city, which being destined for the public assembly and the market, was the usual place of rendezvous, desired him to count the number of Spartans whom he saw in that spacious resort. That he counted the king, the ephori, the senators, and about forty others, and then asked Cinadon, for what purpose he had required him to take that seemingly useless trouble? Because, replied the conspirator, I reckon the Spartans to be enemies, and all the rest, whose great numbers you behold in the marketplace, to be friends. Nor does this proportion apply to Sparta only;

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 493, & seqq.

in the farms and villages adjacent to the city, we shall in each house and family have one enemy, the master, but all the servants will be our friends. Cinadon then acquainted him with the object and cause of the conspiracy, which had been formed by men of probity and fortitude, and which was soon to be communicated to the slaves, peasants, and the whole body of Lacedæmonian people, whose animosity against the Spartans was too violent to be concealed. That the greatest part of the conspirators, being trained for war, had arms in their hands; that the shops of the armourers, the tools of those artificers who wrought in metal, wood, and stone, and even the instruments of agriculture, might furnish such weapons to the rest, as would fully answer the purpose against unarmed men.

This alarming intelligence roused the activity, without shaking the firmness, of the Spartan magistrates. It would have been imprudent to seize Cinadon in the capital, as they were unacquainted with the extent of his resources, and the number of his associates. On pretence of the public service, they contrived to send him to Aulon, (for in similar expeditions they had often employed his ready arm and enterprising valour), that he might seize, in that licentious city, and bring within the reach of justice, several daring violators of the Spartan laws, among whom was a very beautiful woman, who corrupted the manners of young and old¹⁰. The senate prepared waggon for conveying the prisoners, and furnished every thing necessary for the journey. A body of chosen horsemen was appointed to accompany Cinadon, who set out without suspecting that this long train of preparation was destined against himself alone. But no sooner had he reached a proper distance from the city, than he was seized as a traitor, and compelled, by the terror of immediate death, to denounce his accomplices. Their names were sent to the

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XXVII.Activity and
prudence of
the Spartan
magistrates.Cinadon and
his accom-
plices seized
and punished.

¹⁰ Αὐλὸν, ὃ ἐπέκειτο τῇ γῆνι καὶ ἡ πόλις μὴ μακρῇ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρὸς ὅτις καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐκείνη αὐτῶν ἡμετέρας ἀφῆκεν. Xenoph. p. 494.

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Agefilaus
takes the
command of
the Greek
forces in
Asia.
Olymp.
xcvi. 1.
A. C. 396.

Disgraces
Lyfander,
who alone
rivalled his
authority.

senate, who instantly secured their persons. Cinadon, Tifamenus, a priest, and the other leaders of the conspiracy, were scourged through the city, gored with instruments of torture, and finally relieved by death.

The rash enterprize of Cinadon still filled the Spartans with alarm, when intelligence was conveyed of the formidable preparations of Artaxerxes, against whom the persuasive influence of Lyfander encouraged them to employ the great and solid, but as yet unknown abilities, of their young and warlike prince. Since the reign of Agamemnon, Agefilaus was the first Grecian king who led the united forces of his country to make war in Asia; and his expedition, though not less important than the exploits of the sons of Atreus and Achilles, is much inferior in renown; because the panegyric of Xenophon, warm and splendid as it is, even beyond the usual colour of his compositions, must yet, like all the works of man, be for ever eclipsed by the lustre of the Iliad. But the conquests of Agefilaus, however different in fame, yet surpassed in misfortune, the war of Troy. Both were pernicious to the interests of Greece; but of the two, the victories of Agefilaus proved the most fatal, not indeed in their immediate, but in their remote consequences.

In the spring of the year three hundred and ninety-six before Christ, he left Sparta, with three thousand Lacedæmonian freedmen, and a body of foreign troops, amounting to six thousand, chiefly collected from the confederate cities of Peloponnesus. Since the irregular and unjustifiable conduct of Agis, in his unfortunate expedition against Argos, the Spartan kings were usually attended in the field by a council of ten senators, whose concurrence was held necessary in all public measures. Agefilaus demanded a council, not of ten, but of thirty Spartans: a refined stroke of policy, which strongly indicates that artful dexterity with which, during a long administration, he uniformly promoted the views of his interest and ambition. By augmenting the number of the council, he diminished its importance.

importance. Each member, as he possessed less weight and influence, felt himself less concerned in the honour of the body; and the whole were more easily swayed and governed by the king. Lyfander alone, whose name in Asia was illustrious or terrible, rivalled for a while the power of Agefilaus. But the colleagues of Lyfander were the first to dispute his pretensions, and to controul his authority. Agefilaus availed himself of their envy, and listened too easily to the dictates of selfishness, in humbling the arrogance of a rival who had been the chief author of his own greatness. By thwarting the measures of Lyfander, by denying his requests, by employing him in offices unbecoming his dignity", he rendered him contemptible in the eyes of those by whom he had been so long feared. This ungenerous treatment of a benefactor, as well as the aspiring pride of the benefactor himself, which could excite such black ingratitude in an otherwise virtuous breast, doubly prove the instability of friendship between ambitious minds. After a disgraceful rupture, which ended in an affected reconciliation, Lyfander was sent by Agefilaus and his council to command the Lacedæmonian squadron in the Hellespont, an inactive and subordinate service, in which he could not expect an opportunity to perform any thing worthy of his ancient fame. He returned, therefore, in a few months to Sparta, covered with disgrace, enraged by disappointment, and vowing implacable revenge against the cruel ingratitude of his friend, which he felt more deeply than the injustice of all his enemies together.

Agefilaus fixed his head-quarters at Ephesus, a place recommended by its central situation, as the most convenient rendezvous for the recruits which flocked to his standard from every part of the coast; at the same time that such a station enabled him to conceal from the enemy which of their provinces was the intended object of his

Treachery of
Tissaphernes.

" Lyfander was known in the East as a sary. Vid. Plut. in Agefil. & Lyfand. & conqueror; Agefilaus made him a commis- Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 497.

invasion,

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invasion. Thither Tissaphernes sent an embassy, demanding the reason of such mighty preparations. Agesilaus replied, "That the Greeks in Asia might enjoy the same liberty with their brethren in Europe." The messengers of Tissaphernes had orders to declare, that the king was inclined to acknowledge the ancient freedom and independence of the Grecian colonies; that the report of his hostile intentions against either them or the mother-country was totally void of foundation; and that, in consequence of the recent transactions between Tissaphernes and Dercyllidas, ambassadors might shortly be expected from Susa, impowered to ratify a firm and lasting peace between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. Until this desirable work should be completed, Tissaphernes earnestly desired a continuation of the truce, which, on his side, he was ready to seal by whatever formalities Agesilaus thought proper to require. The Spartan king frankly avowed his suspicions of treachery; yet being unwilling to embroil his country in an unnecessary war, he dispatched Dercyllidas, with two members of the Spartan council, to renew his late engagements with Tissaphernes. The perfidious satrap swore and deceived for the last time. No sooner had he received the long-expected auxiliaries from the East, than he commanded Agesilaus to leave Ephesus, and to evacuate the coast of Asia; if he delayed to comply, the weight of the Persian arms would enforce obedience. The prudent, or pious Spartan, while his friends were alarmed with this unexpected declaration, assumed an unusual gaiety of countenance, observing, that he rejoiced to commence the war under such favourable auspices, since the treachery of Tissaphernes must render the gods his enemies.

Innocent
stratagem of
Agesilaus;

Meanwhile he prepared to encounter the insidious arts of the satrap, with equal, but more innocent address. It was industriously given out, that he intended to march into the province of Caria, the favourite residence of Tissaphernes, which was adorned by his voluptuous parks and palaces, and strengthened by a fortress, the repository

pository of his treasures. The intervening cities were ordered to mend the roads, to furnish a market, and to prepare every thing most necessary to facilitate the march of the Grecian army. Tisaphernes, not doubting that Caria was the intended scene of war, especially as the mountainous nature of that province rendered it improper for horse, in which the Greeks were very poorly provided, encamped with his own numerous cavalry in the plains of the Meander, in order to intercept the passage of the enemy. But Agesilaus having posted a sufficient garrison in Ephesus, left that city, and turning to the north, advanced by rapid marches into Phrygia, the rich plunder of which rewarded the active diligence of his soldiers. The selfish satrap was unwilling to relieve the province of Pharnabazus, by weakening the defence of his own; and accordingly remained inactive on the fruitful banks of the Meander, whose winding stream skirts the northern frontier of Caria, still suspecting an invasion of the Greeks from Ephesus and the neighbouring seaports. During the greatest part of the summer Agesilaus ravaged Phrygia; the Barbarians were shamefully defeated in several encounters; at length they ceased to resist his arms; nor attempted even to harass his retreat, when, having gratified the just resentment of his country, he returned, loaded with spoil, to winter in Ephesus¹².

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He defeats
the Persians,
and plunders
Phrygia.

In the Phrygian expedition, Agesilaus shared, and surpassed, the toils of the meanest soldier, from whom he refused to be distinguished by his dress, his food, or his accommodations, by day or night. The inactive season of the year was most diligently and usefully employed. Ephesus and the neighbouring towns glowed with the ardour of military preparation. The Phrygian wealth was employed to urge the hand of industry. Shields, spears, swords, and helmets, filled every shop, and every magazine. The inhabitants of

Employment
of the Greeks
during their
winter quar-
ters in Phry-
gia.

¹² Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 498. & seqq.

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the country were allured by great rewards to form their best horses to the discipline of the field; and the wealthy citizens were exempted from the service of the ensuing campaign, upon condition only that they furnished a horseman, properly equipped, to perform their vicarious duty. The veteran soldiers, as well as the new levies, were daily exercised within the walls of Ephesus, in those martial amusements which represented a faithful image, and which formed the best school, of war. Agesilaus often condescended to dispute the prize of valour or dexterity; his popular manners endeared him to the troops; the superiority of his talents commanded their willing obedience; they vied with each other in loyalty to their prince; they vied in gratitude to the gods with their prince himself, who, as often as he obtained the crown of victory, dedicated the honourable reward in the admired temple of Ephesian Diana. "What then (adds a soldier, a philosopher, and a man of piety) might not be expected from troops who delighted in the exercise of war, respected their general, and revered the gods?"

Agesilaus
prepares for
the ensuing
campaign.
Olymp.
xcvi. 2.
A. C. 395.

The expectation of Xenophon, who beheld the interesting scenes at Ephesus, which he has inimitably described, was fully gratified by the success of the ensuing campaign. Agreeably to the annual revolution of offices in the Lacedæmonian republic, a commission of thirty Spartans was sent early in the spring to supply the place of Lyfander and his colleagues. Among the members of this new council Agesilaus distributed the various departments of military command. The superior abilities of Herippidas were entrusted with the veteran army who had served under Cyrus. Xenocles was appointed to conduct the cavalry. Mygdo commanded the Asiatic levies; Scythes, the Lacedæmonian freedmen; for himself, as his peculiar care, the general reserved the faithful and warlike body of Peloponnesian allies, chosen from the flower and vigour of many flourishing republics. With a view to encourage his soldiers

¹³ Xenoph. panegyr. Agesil.

before taking the field, he ordered the Phrygian prisoners to be brought forth, stripped, and exposed to sale. The Greeks viewed with contempt the delicate whiteness of their skins, their flaccid muscles, their awkward motions, their shapeless forms, their unwieldy corpulence, and the effeminate softness of their whole persons. Such an enemy they considered as nothing superior to an army of women¹⁴.

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Agefilas had declared, that he would be no longer satisfied with ravaging the extremities, but was determined to attack the center, of the Persian dominions. Tissaphernes, fearful of being deceived by a second feint, again conducted his squadrons to the banks of the Meander, and reinforced with the flower of his infantry the garrisons of Caria, which (as the contrary had been industriously reported) he concluded to be the main object of approaching hostilities. But the Spartan was too able a general to repeat the same game. On this occasion, therefore, he carried into execution the design which had been made public, marched towards the royal city of Sardis, and ravaged the adjoining territory without opposition. He had acquired much valuable booty, and shaken the fidelity of the Lydians, before any enemy appeared to resist his progress. That resistance, which was made too late, proved ineffectual. After several successful skirmishes, he defeated the Persians in a general engagement on the banks of the Pactolus, surrounded and took their camp, in which, beside other riches, he found seventy talents of silver. He likewise expected to have taken the unrelenting enemy of the Greeks, the perfidious Tissaphernes; but that crafty traitor, suspecting the event of the battle, had thrown himself, with a considerable body of troops, within the strong walls of Sardis, where his cowardice continued to reside, displaying the inglorious pride of pomp and luxury, while the provinces of Artaxerxes fell a prey to

Attacks the
center of the
Persian do-
minions in
Lower Asia.

Death of
Tissaphernes.

¹⁴ Xenoph. p. 500.

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the hostile invader. The time of his punishment, however, was now arrived. His whole life had been disgraceful to himself; but its last scene had disgraced the arms of his master, who cancelled, by one stroke of royal ingratitude, the merit of innumerable perfidies and cruelties committed for his service. Tithraustes was sent from court to take off the head of the obnoxious satrap; who, being allured to a conference, was caught by his own arts¹⁵, and met with a just fate; although the author of his death was, perhaps, the only man in Persia or in Greece with whom Tissaphernes had any claim of merit.

He is succeeded by
Tithraustes,
who pursues
the same line
of conduct.

Tithraustes, who had come from Babylon escorted by a powerful body of cavalry, possessed the mandate of the great king for assuming the government of Lower Asia, and the conduct of the war. Having removed the only rival who had interest or ability to dispute this extensive and honourable commission, his next care was to send an embassy to Agesilaus, which, instead of indicating the character of a great general (for such Tithraustes was esteemed in the East) betrayed the mean and temporising genius of his worthless predecessor. The ambassadors were instructed to declare, "That Tissaphernes, the author of those troubles which embroiled Greece and Persia, had suffered a just death; and that the king, who had been too long deceived by his artifices, was now ready to acknowledge the independence of the Grecian colonies, on condition that Agesilaus withdrew his troops from Asia." The Spartan honestly replied, "That the alternative of war or peace depended, not on himself, but on the resolution of the assembly and senate; nor could he remove his forces from the East without the express command of his republic." The artful satrap perceiving that it was impossible for him to interrupt, determined at least to divert, the course of hostilities. None knew better than Tithraustes the use of money as an

¹⁵ Polyænus, l. vii. The fact is mentioned with few circumstances in Diodorus, and with none in Xenophon, p. 501.

instrument of negotiation. He condescended to purchase from Agefilaus, by a very large sum, the tranquillity of Lydia; and as it seemed a matter of indifference to the Spartan king whichever part of the Persian dominions felt the weight of his invasion, he evacuated that province, and again entered Phrygia.

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While he pursued his march northwards, he was overtaken in Ionia by a welcome messenger from home, who delivered him a letter, testifying the grateful admiration of his countrymen, prolonging the term of his military command, and entrusting him with the numerous fleet, which had sailed two years before, to counteract the designs of the enemy¹⁶. This fleet, consisting of ninety gallies, was actually commanded by Pharax, who, during the glorious career of Agefilaus's victories, had silently performed very useful and meritorious service. The naval preparations of Artaxerxes, which, as above-mentioned, first excited the alarm in Greece, were still carried on with activity. Various squadrons were equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Cilicia, and other maritime provinces, of which the combined strength far exceeded the fleet of Greece. But the vigilant diligence of Pharax prevented their union. His ships were victualled by Nephres, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt; with whom, in the name of Sparta, he had contracted an alliance. The ports of Cyprus, Rhodes, and the Greek cities in the Carian Chersonesus, were open to his cruisers. Availing himself of those important advantages, he steered with rapidity along the hostile shores; and seasonably dividing or combining his fleet, effectually restrained the enemy from making their projected descents on Peloponnesus, and even deterred them from sailing the Asiatic seas¹⁷. Agefilaus, unmindful of this essential service, which had prevented any diversion of the Greek forces in the East, deprived Pharax of the command, and substituted in his stead

Agefilaus entrusted with the command of the Grecian fleet.
Olymp.
xcvi. 3.
A. C. 394.

Which he commits to Pisander.

¹⁶ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 501.

the name of the admiral, which we find in

¹⁷ Isocrat. Panegyry. He does not give Xenophon's Gr. Hist.

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Agefilaus
entertains
hopes of
conquering
the Persian
empire;

Pisander, a near relation of his own, who possessed indeed the ambitious valour, and manly firmness of the Spartan character, but neither the experience, nor the abilities, sufficient to qualify him for this weighty trust.

The first effects of this fatal error were eclipsed by a momentary blaze of glory. Agefilaus entered Phrygia; attacked, conquered, and pursued Pharnabazus; who, flying from post to post, was successively driven from every part of his valuable province¹⁸. The fame of the Grecian victories struck terror into the neighbouring countries. Cotys¹⁹, or Corylas, the proud tyrant of Paphlagonia, who disdained the friendship of the great king²⁰, sent humbly to request that the native valour of his numerous and invincible cavalry might be associated with the Spartan arms²¹. The inferior satraps, and especially their oppressed subjects, courted the protection of Agefilaus, expecting that the unknown dominion of Greece would be lighter than the yoke of Persia, of which they had long felt and regretted the severity. The deceitful Ariæus, who had shared the guilt, without sharing the punishment of Cyrus, could never be heartily reconciled to a master against whom he had once rebelled. His actual wealth, and ancient honours, gave him a powerful influence over the numerous Barbarians who had followed the standard of Cyrus and his own; and whose discontented spirits might easily be inflamed into a second revolt²². The commotion was general in Lesser Asia; and, as Egypt had already rebelled, Agefilaus, at the head of about twenty thousand Greeks, and innumerable Barbarian allies, might entertain a very rational expectation to shake the throne of Artaxerxes; especially as the experience of his friend and admirer, Xenophon, who was still the companion of his arms, must have powerfully encouraged him to that glorious design²³.

¹⁸ Xenophon compares him to the Scythian Nomades.

¹⁹ He is called Cotys in Xenoph. Gr. Hist. Plutarch, and Diodorus; and Corylas in Xenoph. Anabaf. l. v. p. 370.

²⁰ Xenoph. *ibid*.

²¹ Plut. in Agefil.

²² Idem, *ibid*. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 429.

²³ Diodor. *ibid*. & Xenoph. Agefil. Pa-negy. & Plut. in Agefil.

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which are
blasted by
unexpected
intelligence
from Greece.

But an undertaking of which the success, however splendid, could not probably have been followed by any solid advantages, because the diminutive territory and population of Sparta formed a basis far too feeble to support such a weight of conquest, was blasted, in the bloom of hope, by intelligence equally unexpected and distressful. Tithraustes, who knew the power of gold over the Grecian councils, determined, with the approbation of the king his master, to give full play to this main-spring of politics. The Cretan and Ægean seas were carelessly guarded by the unsuspecting confidence of the new admiral. Tithraustes perceived the neglect; and dispatched, without any fear of capture, various emissaries into Greece, well qualified by bribes and address, to practise with the discontented and factious demagogues, the natural enemies of Sparta, of aristocratic government, and of the public tranquillity²⁴.

The principal instrument of these secret negotiations was Timocrates of Rhodes, a man of an intriguing and audacious spirit, who carried with him no less a sum than fifty talents (above nine thousand pounds sterling), which he distributed, with lavish promises of future bounty, to Cyclon of Argos, to Timolaus and Polyantes of Corinth, to Androclides Ismenias and Galaxadorus of Thebes; names for the most part obscure in the annals of war, but important in the history of domestic faction. The tyranny of Sparta was the perpetual theme of these venal hirelings, not only in their respective communities, but in every quarter of Greece, to which they were successively carried with a mercenary diligence. They painted in the strongest colours the injustice, the cruelty, and the immeasurable ambition of that haughty republic, who had made soldiers of her slaves, that she might make slaves of her allies. The destructive and impious devastation of the sacred territory of Elis was arraigned with every term of reproach. The same calamities, it was pro-

Means by
which the
Persians
kindle a war
in that
country.

²⁴ Xenoph. p. 513. & seqq.

phesied,

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Motives by
which the
enemies of
Sparta
were actuated.

phesied, must soon overwhelm the neighbouring countries, unless they prepared (while it was yet time to prepare) for a vigorous defence; since Sparta pursued her conquests in Asia with no other view but to lull the security, and rivet the chains, of Greece²⁵.

Strong as these invectives may appear, and interested as they certainly were, they did not exceed the truth; and, what is of more importance, they were addressed to men well disposed to believe them. Since the subversion of the Athenian power, the imperious government of Sparta had rendered her almost alike odious to her old, and to her new, confederates. The former, and particularly the Corinthians, Arcadians, and Achæans, complained with the warmth which justice gives, that, after sharing the toils and dangers of the Peloponnesian war, they had been cruelly deprived of the fruits of victory. The latter, and especially such communities as had revolted from Athens, lamented that their blood and treasure had been spent in vain. They had fought for freedom and independence; but their valour had been rewarded by a more intolerable servitude. Argos had long been the enemy, and Thebes aspired to become the rival, of Sparta. Above all, the Athenians, animated by the patriotism of Thraſybulus, their deliverer from the Spartan yoke, longed to employ the first moments of returning vigour in the pursuit of glory and revenge.

Circumstances which encouraged their hostility.

The corruption of those morbid humours, which must have soon fermented of themselves, was accelerated by the mercenary emissaries of Tithraustes. The occasion, too, seemed favourable for assaulting the domestic strength of a republic, whose arms were ambitiously employed in extending her distant conquests. The conduct of the Thebans had already announced this design. They not only refused assistance to Agesilaus towards carrying on his eastern campaign, but treated him without respect or decency, while he crossed their

²⁵ Xenoph. p. 514.

dominions;

dominions; and, were not ambition blind, he must have perceived and resented their hostility, and have delayed to undertake his expedition against Asia, till he had extinguished the seeds of war in Greece.

But, notwithstanding the concurring causes which hastened a rupture, such was the terror of the Spartan name, increased by the recent glory of Agesilaus, that none of her numerous enemies had courage openly to take arms, and to avow their just animosity. After various, but secret conferences, held in the principal cities, it was determined to wound that republic through her allies, the Phocians, who were distinguished, amidst the very general discontent, by their unshaken attachment and fidelity. The Locri Ozolæ, a fierce and insolent people²⁶, who lived in the neighbourhood of Phocis, were easily persuaded to levy contributions from a district on their eastern frontier, to which they had not the smallest claim, and of which the dominion had been long a matter of dispute between the Phocians and Thebans. Both these states seem to have been injured, and exactly in the same degree, by this aggression; but the Phocians, who were the enemies of the Locri, took arms to revenge, while the Thebans, who were their friends, prepared to abet their injustice. They expected, and their expectation was gratified, that the Spartans would quickly interfere in a quarrel that affected the most important interests of their Phocian allies; a measure which tended precisely to that issue which prudence and policy required, since the Thebans would be compelled to arm in their own defence, and must appear to all the neutral states of Greece, and even to their Lacedæmonian enemies, to be undesignedly dragged into a war, not from an inclination to commit, but from the necessity to repel, injuries²⁷.

The irascible pride of Sparta, ever prone to chastise the smallest offences with unbounded severity, conspired with the most sanguine

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Their caution in beginning the war.

Campaign of
Lyfander in
Bœotia.

²⁶ Thucyd. l. i. p. 4. & p. 47.

²⁷ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. ad fin. Diodor. xiv. 82. Plutarch. in Lyfand. p. 448. & seqq.

hopes

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hopes of Thebes and her allies. Instead of condescending to remonstrate, instead of demanding satisfaction, instead of ordering the Thebans to evacuate the territory of Phocis, and to abstain from future injury, the Spartans flew to arms, and marched to invade Bœotia. On the first rumour of hostilities, the activity of Lyfander had been employed to assemble their northern confederates, the Maleans, Heracleans, with those who inhabited the villages of Doris and Mount Oeta. He penetrated into the Theban territory, gained Lebadea by force, Orchomenus by address, and prepared to assault the walls of Haliartus, which, next to Thebes, was the strongest of the Bœotian cities. The difficulty of this enterprise made him dispatch a messenger to hasten the arrival of Pausanias, the Spartan king, who had led forth six thousand Peloponnesians, to co-operate with this experienced commander. The unfortunate messenger was taken by the scouts of the Thebans, and with him a letter, in which Lyfander had signified his purpose, and appointed the time of rendezvous with Pausanias, that they might surprise Haliartus with their combined forces²⁸.

The Thebans march in the night to the defence of Haliartus.

At the same time that this useful intelligence was brought to Thebes, there arrived in that city a powerful reinforcement of Athenian troops, who, though their own capital was unwall'd and defenceless, had been persuaded by Thrasybulus to brave the resentment of Sparta. To these generous auxiliaries the Thebans committed their city, their wives, their children, and every object of their most tender concern; while the warlike youth, and almost all those of a military age, assembled in complete armour, set out in the dead of night, and performing a journey of fifteen miles with silence and celerity, reached, while it was yet dark, the gates of Haliartus. Their unexpected arrival struck a pleasing terror into their friends, who were affected still more deeply, when they understood the cause of this nocturnal expedition. The Thebans

²⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. p. 503, & seqq.

dispelled their fear, and animated their hope, expecting not only to save Haliartus, but to obtain a signal advantage over the unsuspecting confidence of the assailants.

For this purpose, they sent a strong detachment to lie in ambush without the walls. The rest, reinforced by the townsmen, formed themselves in battle array, and stood to their arms, behind the gates. Lyfander arrived in the morning; but Pausanias, who had not received his message, still continued in the neighbourhood of Platæa. The soldiers, flushed by recent victory, disdained to depend on the tardy motions of their auxiliaries. They requested Lyfander to lead them against the place; a measure to which he was otherwise much inclined, being eager to snatch the glory to himself, without dividing it with Pausanias, his rival and enemy.

He approached the town, and boldly began the attack, perceiving the walls and battlements to be unguarded. But before any breach was made, the different gates at once flew open, while the Thebans and Haliartians rushed forth with one consent, and with irresistible fury. Lyfander, with a priest who attended him, was slain on the first onset. His men began to rally, but the Thebans, posted in ambush without the city, occasioned a new terror. The enemy every where gave way; above a thousand fell in the field of battle, the rest were routed, put to flight, and pursued with great slaughter²⁹.

The first intelligence of this fatal disaster brought Pausanias to the scene of action, that he might examine the full extent of the calamity. It would have been fruitless to attempt the siege of Haliartus; but it was necessary to carry off the bodies of the slain. Pausanias held a council of war, to determine whether this pious duty should be effected by force, or whether he might condescend to solicit the humanity of the victors. Force seemed dangerous, as the

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Stratagem by
which they
defeat the
assailants.

Battle of Ha-
liartus, and
death of Ly-
fander.

²⁹ Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, & seqq. Plutarch. in Lyfand.

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principal destruction had happened immediately under the walls of the place, which it would be impossible to approach without suffering extremely from the missile weapons of the enemy, and without being exposed to a second attack, perhaps more bloody than the first. It was therefore unanimously resolved to send a Spartan herald to Haliartus, requesting leave to bury the dead. The demand was granted, on condition that the Peloponnesian army should immediately evacuate Bœotia. Pausanias complied, and returned to Sparta. His want of success, rather than his demerit, subjected him to trial and condemnation. He escaped capital punishment by flying to Tegea, where he soon afterwards sickened and died. His son Agesipolis assumed the Spartan sceptre, which, at that juncture, required the direction of more experienced hands³⁰.

³⁰ Id. *ibid.*

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Recal of Agesilaus from the East.—He invades Bæotia.—Views of Evagoras King of Cyprus.—His Friendship with Conon.—The latter entrusted with the Persian Fleet.—He defeats the Lacedæmonians.—Battle of Coronæa.—The Corinthian War.—Conon rebuilds the Walls and Harbours of Athens.—Conquests of Conon and Thrasybulus.—Peace of Antalcidas.

THE defeat at Haliartus, which exasperated, without humbling, the Spartans, confirmed the courage of their enemies, and hastened the defection of their allies. The league was openly ratified and avowed by the republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth. The spirit of revolt seized Eubœa, pervaded the provinces of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the rich cities of Chalcis, and the warlike principalities of Thessaly¹. The whole fabric of the Spartan power, raised and cemented by a war of twenty-seven years, was shaken to the foundation; their victorious leaders were no more; nor did any resource remain, but that of recalling Agesilaus from his Asiatic victories, that the fortune and valour of this accomplished general might sustain the falling ruins of his country. He received the fatal scythalé², intimating his recal, at the important crisis of his fortune. He had completed his preparations for marching into Upper Asia, and his heart already beat with the ardour of promised conquest and glory³.

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The league formed against Sparta obliges that republic to recal Agesilaus from the East. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394.

¹ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 443. Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 507.

² Plutarch. in Ageſil. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 513.

³ See Vol. I. c. xii. p. 421.

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He commu-
nicates his
recal to the
troops.

Having assembled the confederates, he communicated the revered order of the republic, with which he expressed his resolution immediately to comply. The generous troops, having associated their own honour with the renown of the general, testified their grief and their reluctance by tears and entreaties. But Agesilaus remained firm in his purpose, to obey the command of Sparta, to set bounds to his triumphs in the East, and to turn the direction of his arms towards a less promising field, to which he was summoned by the danger of his country⁴. Before crossing the Hellespont, he detached four thousand veteran soldiers, to strengthen the Asiatic garrisons; several of which he visited in person, every where assuring his friends, that it was his most earnest wish to rejoin them in Asia, whenever the troubles of Greece should permit his absence.

Their desire
to follow him
prudently
encouraged
by Agesilaus.

The greater part of the army, and particularly the new levies of Ionians and Æolians, who had passed their apprenticeship in arms under his fortunate standard, declared, with tears of affection, that they never would abandon their beloved general. Agesilaus encouraged this disposition, which was extremely favourable to his views; and lest it might be nothing but a folly of temporary enthusiasm, artfully secured its permanence, by proposing the distribution of valuable rewards, in the Thracian Chersonesus, to such officers as brought the best companies of foot or cavalry for the service of his intended expedition. He was able to perform his promises with a generous magnificence; since, after defraying the necessary expences of the war, he carried from Asia above a thousand talents, or an hundred and ninety-three thousand pounds sterling⁵.

His return to
Greece.

When the whole forces were assembled in the Chersonesus, they probably amounted to about ten thousand men. Their nearest rout

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. & Panegy. Agefil. & Plutarch. in Agefil. bestow seemingly immoderate praises on this resolution; but it is to be considered, that in the tumultuary governments of Greece, it was not uncommon

to behold a successful general, proud of the zeal and strength of his followers, set at defiance the feeble authority of his republic.

⁵ Id. Ibid. & Diodor. p. 441.

into Greece lay through the same countries that had been traversed near a century before by Xerxes; but the activity of Agesilaus accomplished in a month what, to eastern effeminacy, had been the journey of a laborious year. In the long interval of time between these celebrated expeditions, the Barbarians of Thrace and Macedon, through whose countries it was necessary to march, seem not to have made much improvement in the arts of war or peace. They were still undisciplined and disunited; and their desultory arms were alike incapable of opposing the Spartan and the Persian. Agesilaus descended without resistance into the plains of Thessaly, where his progress was stopped for a moment by the numerous cavalry of that country, whose petty princes had acceded to the alliance formed against the ambition of Sparta. By a judicious disposition of his forces, and by evolutions equally skilful and rapid, he speedily surmounted this obstacle. To the charge of the Thessalian cavalry, he opposed the weight of his heavy-armed men, by whom the enemy were routed and put to flight. Then, with his own horsemen, who would have proved an unequal match for the unbroken vigour of the Thessalians, he pursued them with great slaughter, took many prisoners, and erected a trophy of his victory, between the mountains Prantes and Nanthacium⁶, which form the western boundary of the extensive plain of Coronæa.

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He defeats
the Thessa-
lian cavalry.

Instead of continuing his journey through the hostile country of Locris, whose weakness he disdained to chastise, he marched through the friendly territories of Doris and Phocis, that he might turn the shock of the war against the daring and rebellious Thebans. He found them in arms with their powerful allies, rather provoked, than discouraged, by a bloody but undecisive battle, which, soon after the disaster at Haliartus, had been fought against the Lacedæmonians at Epiecia, a small town on the common frontier of Corinth and Sicyon. The confederate army was still about twenty thousand

Invades Bœo-
tia.

⁶ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 517.

strong;

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strong; the forces of Agesilaus fully equalled that number, as he had received considerable supplies from Sparta and Phocis; and, as the secondary cities, particularly Orchomenus of Bœotia, and Epidaurus of Argolis, had joined his arms, prompted by their usual envy, and resentment against their respective capitals. The hostile battalions approached; those of Agesilaus marching, in good order, from the banks of the Cephissus, while the Thebans impetuously descended from the mountains of Helicon. Before they arrived at the scene of action, in the Bœotian plain of Coronæ⁷, a city thirty miles distant from Thebes, the superstition of both armies was alarmed by an eclipse of the sun; and the wisdom of Agesilaus was alarmed, far more justly, by most unexpected intelligence from the East⁸.

Evagoras recovers his hereditary dominion in Cyprus.

Since his unfortunate partiality had intrusted the Lacedæmonian fleet to the obstinacy and inexperience of his kinsman Pisander, the Persian, or rather Phœnician squadrons, had been committed to the direction of a far more able commander. After the decisive engagement at Ægos Potamos, which was followed by the taking of Athens, and the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, Conon, the Athenian admiral, escaped with a few galleys into the harbour of Salamis, the capital of the isle of Cyprus. That city, and a considerable part of the island, was then subject to Evagoras, a man whom the voice of panegyric represents as governing, with consummate wisdom⁹, a kingdom, which he had acquired by heroic valour. This admired prince boasted a descent from Teucer, who, returning from the siege of Troy eight hundred years before the reign of Evagoras, had founded the first Grecian colony on the Cyprian shore. During that long space of time, Salamis had undergone various re-

⁷ The places distinguished by that name are described by Strabo, p. 407. 410. 411, and 434.

⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 518. Plut. in Agesil.

⁹ Isocrates's panegyric of Evagoras may be entitled the picture of a great king: the character is only too perfect.

volutions. Evagoras was born, and educated, under the reign of an usurper, who fell by the dagger of an assassin, who in his turn assumed the crown. Evagoras fled to Cilicia, obtained the protection of the satrap of that province, returned to Salamis with a handful of men, surprised and dethroned the new tyrant, to whom he was not bound by any tie of allegiance.

From the moment that he began to reign, he discovered the most partial fondness for Athens, in whose language, arts, and institutions, his youth had been liberally instructed; and which afterwards formed the study and delight of his manhood, the amusement and consolation of his declining age. But, unfortunately for the sensibility and affectionate gratitude of Evagoras towards a country to which he owed his education and his happiness, he lived at a period when, before the situation of his principality enabled him to afford any effectual assistance to Athens, he beheld that proud republic deprived of the splendour and dominion which she had enjoyed above seventy years. He lamented her misfortunes with a filial tenderness, and received with the kindest hospitality her oppressed and afflicted citizens. The virtuous and enterprising Conon deserved his affection and esteem, and soon acquired the unlimited confidence of a mind congenial to his own. They acted with the happiest concert for the security and aggrandisement of the little kingdom, alluring new inhabitants from Greece, increasing their arts and industry, extending navigation and commerce; and, in a short time, Salamis was able to fit out a considerable naval power, and to subdue and incorporate with her own subjects several of the neighbouring communities. The great king, who had long been considered as lord paramount of Cyprus, interfered not in the domestic concerns of the island, provided he received from thence his small customary tribute. The flourishing state of Evagoras's affairs might enable him to pay, and to exceed, the stipulated sum; though it is probable that he early meditated, what he afterwards attempted to accomplish,

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His attachment to Athens, and friendship for Conon, the Athenian.

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Evagoras
and Conon
determine to
retrieve the
fortune of
that republic.

accomplish, the deliverance of his country from this mark of bondage.

But a design which actually engaged him more deeply, and to which he was strongly incited by the ardent solicitations of Conon, was the restoration of Athens (which he considered as his adoptive country and parent) to that state of glory and pre-eminence from which she had miserably fallen. The virtuous and patriotic friends (for as such contemporaries describe them) are represented as pilots and mariners watching the tides and currents, and catching every propitious gale that might facilitate the execution of this hazardous enterprize. The victories of Agesilaus in the East, which threatened to shake the throne of Artaxerxes, furnished an opportunity too favourable to escape their vigilance. Conon had been already recommended to the great king by Evagoras; and the recommendation had been enforced by Pharnabazus, who knew and admired his merit. The experienced skill of the illustrious Athenian, and of his countrymen Hieronymus and Nicodemus, had assisted in equipping the Barbarian squadrons in the Cilician and Phœnician harbours. But the abilities of Pharax, the Spartan admiral, and the cowardice or negligence of the Persian commanders, hitherto rendered useless a fleet of near three hundred sail, which was ill manned, and which often wanted money.

Conon entrusted with the command of the Persian fleet.

The activity of Conon undertook to remedy these evils. He left Cilicia, travelled to Thapsacus, embarked in the Euphrates; and, as his vessel was moved by the combined impulse of winds, oars, and stream, he descended with rapidity along the winding channel to Babylon¹⁰. The only obstacle to his intended conference with Artaxerxes was, his unwillingness to degrade the Athenian character by depressing the body, bending the knee, and paying the usual marks of respectful submission, which were readily granted by Barbarians to the monarch of the East; but which the Greeks refused to

¹⁰ Diodorus, l. xiv. p. 442.

man, and reserved for the majesty of the gods. This difficulty, however, was at length overcome by those whose mutual interest strongly solicited an interview. Conon represented to the trembling monarch, who was still agitated by the terror of Agesilaus's victories, the necessity of opposing the Spartans vigorously by sea. Their fleet alone had acquired, and maintained, the command of the Asiatic coast. A single defeat at sea would excite their allies to revolt, and drive their armies from Asia. But to obtain this advantage, the great king must employ an admiral worthy to command, and men willing to obey. In looking for the first, the valour of Pharnabazus could not escape his notice. The second might be purchased by money. And should Artaxerxes entrust him with the requisite sum, he pledged his life that he would soon collect such a number of sailors (chiefly from the Grecian coasts and islands) as would enable him to defeat the fleet of Sparta, and to compel that republic to abandon her Eastern conquests. The proposal pleased Artaxerxes, the money was raised, and Conon returned to Cilicia to accomplish his undertaking.

From various sea-ports of Asia, from the smaller Greek cities, the reluctant subjects of Sparta, from several maritime towns whose inhabitants were ready to serve any master for pay, but chiefly from the powerful islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, he soon collected a naval force exceeding his most sanguine hopes; and which might have enabled him (independent of the Barbarian squadrons commanded by Pharnabazus) to contend on nearly equal terms with Pisander. With their combined strength, Conon and Pharnabazus sailed westward in quest of the hostile fleet, persuaded that the rash confidence of the Spartan admiral would not decline battle with a superior enemy. As the united armament turned the northern point of Rhodes, they perceived the Lacedæmonian squadron, amounting to near an hundred gallies, in the capacious bay which is formed between the projections of the Dorian shore, and the small

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He defeats
the Spartans,
and takes
fifty gallies.
Olymp.
xcvi. 3.
A. C. 394.

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islands called Sporades, from the careless irregularity with which they seem to have been scattered by the hand of nature". The unexpected approach of such a formidable fleet did not shake the sullen obstinacy of Pisander. He commanded (as it had been foreseen) his men to prepare for battle. They bore up against the enemy, but on a nearer survey were alarmed and terrified with the excessive disproportion of numbers. The greater part turned their prows, and retired towards the friendly shore of Cnidus. Pisander advanced in the admiral galley, and died fighting bravely in defence of the Spartan honour, vainly endeavouring to maintain, by the vigour of his arm, what had been betrayed by the weakness of his counsels. The victors pursued; and after destroying great numbers of the enemy, took and carried off fifty galleys; a capture sufficient to decide the fate of any Grecian republic¹².

The battle
of Coronæa.
Olymp.
xcvi. 3.
A. C. 394.

It was the intelligence of this battle, of which he anticipated the consequences, in the loss of the Spartan dominions from Cnidus to Byzantium, that justly alarmed and afflicted the patriotic breast of Agesilaus. He assembled the troops, honestly confessed the death of Pisander, but artfully declared, that, though the admiral was slain, his fleet had obtained a complete victory, for which it became himself and them to pay the usual tribute of thanks and sacrifices to the protecting gods. He then crowned himself with a chaplet of flowers, and set the example of performing this pious duty. The devout stratagem was attended with a very salutary effect; for in a

¹¹ Virgil expresses, in few words, the geography described in the text.

—Et crebris legimus freta confita terris.

Virg. *Æneid.* iii. v. 129.

¹² Polybius seems to consider the battle of Cnidus as the æra at which the Spartans lost the command of the sea, which they had acquired by their victory at *Ægos-Potamos*. He says, their dominion lasted twelve years. This number, however, is too large for the interval between those battles, as appears

from the text. Other writers say, that the Lacedæmonian empire, which the Greeks speak of as synonymous with the command of the sea, lasted thirty years, reckoning from the battle of *Ægos-Potamos* to the defeat at *Leuctra*. But this number again is too small for the interval between those events; a remarkable proof of the carelessness of Greek writers in matters of chronology. See *Isocrat. de Pace*, & *Cassaub. ad Polyb.* vol. iii. p. 97—99. edit. Gronov.

skirmish between the advanced guards, immediately preceding the battle, the Lacedæmonian troops, animated by their imagined victory in the East, defeated and repelled the enemy. Meanwhile the main bodies of either army advanced into the plain of Coronæa, at first in awful silence, but having approached within a furlong of each other, the Thebans raised an universal shout, and ran furiously to the charge. Their impetuosity bore down every thing before them; but the troops, immediately commanded by Agesilaus, repelled the left wing of the enemy, chiefly consisting of Argives and Athenians. Already those who surrounded his person saluted him as conqueror, and adorned him with the crown of victory; when it was told, that the Thebans had broke and totally routed the Orchomenians, and were advancing to seize the baggage. Agesilaus, by a rapid evolution, prepared to intercept them, in order to frustrate this design. The Thebans perceived this movement, wheeled about, and marched in an opposite direction, that they might join, and rally their allies, who fled towards the mountains of Helicon. In the rencounter which followed, Xenophon is disposed to admire rather the valour, than the prudence, of the Spartan king. Instead of allowing the Thebans to pass, that he might attack their rear and flanks, he boldly opposed their progress, and assailed their front. The shock was terrible; their shields meeting, clashed; they fought, slew, and were slain¹². No voice was heard, yet none was silent; the field resounded with the noise of rage and battle; and this was the most desperate and bloody scene of an action, itself the most desperate and bloody of any in that age. At length, the firmness of the Thebans effected their long-attempted passage to Helicon; but could not encourage their allies to renew the engagement. The Spartans thus remained masters of the field, the sight of which seems

¹² Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν ὁρμήσας παρ' αὐτῶν, ἢ μὲν ὅδε σφ' ἔ- passages, inimitable in any other language, φωνὴ δὲ τίς τις τοιαύτη, ὥστε οὐκ ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον shew the superiority of the Greek. παρ' αὐτῶν αἱ. Xenoph. Agesilaus, c. xii. Such

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{

to have deeply affected a spectator whose mind was habituated to such objects of horror. It was covered with steel and blood, with the bodies of friends and foes heaped promiscuously together, with transfix'd bucklers and broken lances, some strowed on the ground, others deeply adhering in the mortal wounds which they had inflicted, and others still grasped by the cold and insensible hands of the combatants who had lately fought with such impetuous ardour¹⁴.

Agefilaus himself had received several wounds from various kinds of weapons; yet did he restrain his resentment in the moment of victory. When informed that about fourscore of the enemy had taken refuge in a neighbouring temple of Minerva, he religiously respected the right of sanctuary, ordered his soldiers to abstain from hurting them, and even appointed a body of horse to conduct them to a place of security. The next day was employed by the victors in erecting a trophy on the scene of this important action; while the enemy acknowledged their defeat, by requesting the bodies of the slain. Notwithstanding his fatigue and wounds, Agefilaus then travelled to Phocis, that he might dedicate the tenth of his Asiatic spoil (amounting to above an hundred talents) in the temple of Delphian Apollo. Having returned towards the Peloponnesus, he disbanded his eastern troops, most of whom were desirous to revisit their respective cities; his Peloponnesian, and even Lacedæmonian forces, inclined also to return home, that they might reap the fruits of harvest¹⁵; and the general, probably to avoid a journey painful to his wounds, sailed to Sparta, and joined in the celebration of the Hyacinthian festival.

The sea-fight off Cnidus, and the battle of Coronæa, were the most important and decisive actions in the Bœotian or Corinthian

The Corinthian war.
Olymp.
xcvi. 3.
A. C. 394—
Olymp.
xcviii. 2.
A. C. 387.

¹⁴ Xenoph. Agefil. c. xii.

¹⁵ The solar eclipse, mentioned above in

the text, fixes the battle of Coronæa to the fourteenth of August.

war,

war, which lasted eight years. The contending republics seem at once to have put forth their sting; and to have retained only their resentment after they had lost their power. Petty hostilities indeed were carried on by mutual inroads and ravages in the spring and autumn; the Lacedæmonians issuing from Sicyon, and the Thebans from Corinth. The inhabitants of the latter city had eagerly promoted the alliance against Sparta; but when their country was made the seat of war, they began to repent of this rash measure. The noble and wealthy part of the community, who had most to fear, as they had most to lose, talked of a separate peace; and, as they were abetted by a majority of the people, their dependents or clients, they intended to summon an assembly which might confirm this laudable resolution. But the partisans of Timolaus and Polyanthes, who, though the mercenaries of a Barbarian slave, were the patrons of Corinthian liberty, anticipated a design so unfavourable to their interests, by committing one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. They chose the Euclean festival¹⁶, a circumstance which seemed to blacken the atrocity of a crime which nothing could aggravate. Many of the citizens were then enjoying themselves in the market-place, or assembled at the dramatic entertainments. The assault was rapid and general. The Corinthians were assassinated in the circles of conversation, some in the public walks, most in the theatre; the judges on the bench, the priests at the altar; nor did those monsters cease from destroying, till they had cut off whomever they deemed most willing, or most able, to oppose their measures. The great body of the people, who perceived that even the temples, and adored images of the gods (whose knees they grafted), afforded not any protection to the victims of this impious fury, prepared to fly from their country; when they were restrained, first, by the lamentable cries of their wives and children, and then by the

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XXVIII.Massacre in
Corinth.

¹⁶ Xenophon, with the superstitious insensibility of his age, dwells on the enormous impiety of this choice.

declaration

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declaration of the assassins, that they intended nothing farther than to deliver the city from traitors, the partisans of Sparta and slavery. This abominable massacre infected Corinth with the plague of sedition, which silently lurked, or openly raged, in that unfortunate republic, during the six following years. The Spartans and Argives assisted their respective factions; Corinth was alternately subject to the one and the other, but always to a foreign power; and of the two Corinthian harbours, which were considered as an important part of the capital, the Lechæum was long garrisoned by the Spartans, while the Cenchreæ remained in possession of the Argives.

The Spartans
successful by
land, and the
Athenians
by sea.

After the battles of Cnidus and Coronæa, there was not any general engagement by land or sea; and it is worthy of observation, that the partial actions, which happened on either element, generally followed the bias of those important victories. Success for the most part attended the sailors of Athens, and the soldiers of Sparta; though the naval exploits of Teleutias, the kinsman of Agesilaus, who surprised the Piræus with twelve galleys, took many merchantmen, destroyed several ships of war, and scoured the coast of Attica, formed an exception extremely honourable to that commander; and the military advantages of Iphicrates, the Athenian, though unimportant in their consequences, announced those great talents for war, which afterwards rendered him so illustrious. But, in general, Agesilaus and the Spartans maintained their superiority in the field; while Conon, Thrasylbus, and Chabrias proved successful against Timbron, Anaxibius, and the other naval commanders of the enemy¹⁷.

Conquests
of Conon.

In the actual state of Greece, the respective successes of the contending powers were not accompanied by proportional advantages. The Lacedæmonians derived not any solid or permanent benefit from their victory at Coronæa, unless we account as such the gratification of their revenge, in ravaging without resistance the Argive and Bœotian territory; but their defeat at Cnidus deprived

¹⁷ Diodor. l. xiv. ad Obsequ. xvi. 4. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. 5.

them

them in one day of the fruit of many laborious campaigns, since, with the assistance of a superior naval force, and with the command of the Persian treasury, Conon found little difficulty in detaching for ever from their dominion the whole western coast of Lesser Asia. This enterprize must have been effected with uncommon rapidity, and, unless the Persian fleet kept the sea in the middle of winter (which is not at all probable), could only employ about three months. The measures taken by the Spartans, either to preserve or to recover their important possessions in the East, have scarcely deserved the notice of history, if we except their resistance at Abydus, a place less famous for this memorable defence, (such is the love of fiction, and the contempt of truth!) than for the fabulous amours of Hero and Leander. Dercyllidas had obtained the government of this strong and populous town, as the reward of his military services. Instead of imitating the pusillanimity of the neighbouring governors, many of whom, alarmed by the disaster at Cnidus, fled in precipitation from the places entrusted to their command, Dercyllidas assembled the Abydenians; assured them that one naval defeat had not ruined the power of Sparta¹⁸, who, even before she had attained the sovereignty of the sea, now unfortunately lost, was able to reward her benefactors, and to punish her enemies. "The moment of adversity furnished an occasion to display their inviolable attachment to the republic; and it would be glorious for them alone, of all the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, to brave the power of Persia." Having confirmed the courage of the Abydenians, he sailed to the town of Sestos, across the most frequented and narrowest passage of the Hellespont. Sestos was the principal place of the Thracian Chersonesus, the inhabitants of which owed their protection and safety

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Brave de-
fence of
Abydus.

¹⁸ The remarkable expression of Xenophon shews the importance of this defeat in the general estimation of the Abydenians, and of Dercyllidas himself, though he would fain dissemble it. Εἰς δὲ ὅχλῳ ἡ τῶς ἰχθὺς ἢ τῆ

ναυμαχία ἐκράτηθησαν, ὅθεν ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ σῶμα. "The matter stands not thus, that because we have been worsted in the sea-fight, we are therefore nothing."

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to the useful labours of Dercyllidas¹⁹; and this claim of merit enabled him to secure their allegiance. The fidelity of these towns, amidst the general defection of the coast of Europe and of Asia, prevented the inconveniences and hardships to which the expelled Spartans, who had been employed in the garrisons of those parts, must have been otherwise exposed; and delivered them from the necessity of undertaking a winter's journey to the Peloponnesus, through the territories of many hostile republics. The unfortunate governors and garrisons, who had fled, or who had been driven, from the places of their respective command, took refuge within the friendly walls of Sestos and Abydos. Their numbers increased the security of those cities, and enabled Dercyllidas, who excelled in the art of fortification, to put them in such a posture of defence as baffled the attempts of Conon and Pharnabazus.

But the success of these commanders was still sufficiently complete; and the importance of their services excited the warmest gratitude in the breast of Artaxerxes. The merit of the satrap was acknowledged soon afterwards, by his obtaining in marriage the daughter of the great king.

Conon re-
builds the
walls and
harbours of
Athens.
Olymp.
xcvi. 4.
A. C. 393.

The patriotic Conon neither desired nor received any personal reward; but employed his favour with Artaxerxes to retrieve the affairs of Athens, the interest of which formed the honourable motive that had alone engaged, and that still retained him, in the Persian service. He inflamed the resentment which both Pharnabazus and his master had justly conceived against Sparta, and encouraged them, early in the spring, to send their victorious armament towards Greece, to retaliate the ravages committed in the East by the arms of Agesilaus. But he instructed them, that if they would render their vengeance complete, and humble for ever the Spartan pride, they must raise the fallen rival of that imperious republic. The

¹⁹ See above, p. 181.

disbursement of a sum of money, which would be scarcely felt by the treasury of Persia, might suffice to rebuild the walls and harbours of Athens; a measure by which they would inflict the deepest wound on the power, as well as on the pride, of their ambitious enemy. The proposal was heard with approbation; the expence was liberally supplied; the Persian fleet set sail, reduced the Cyclades and Cythera, ravaged the coast of Laconia, and, after performing in detached squadrons whatever seemed most useful for the Persian service, assembled in the long-deserted harbours of the Phalerus, Munichia and Piræus. There the important task, of restoring the ancient ornaments and defence of the city of Minerva, was begun, carried on, and accomplished, with extraordinary diligence. The ready service of the crews, belonging to the numerous fleet, assisted the industry of mercenary workmen, whom the allurements of gain had brought from every quarter of Greece; and the labour of both was seconded and encouraged by the voluntary and eager exertions of the Bœotians and Argives; but, above all, by the zeal of the Athenians themselves, who justly regarded their actual employment as the second foundation of their once glorious capital.

The work was completed before the return of spring; and the mortifying intelligence, when brought to Sparta, affected the magistrates of that republic with the cruelest anxiety. They were ready to abandon for ever the prospect of recovering their lost dominion in the East; they were desirous to obtain an accommodation with Artaxerxes on the most humiliating terms; they were willing to deprive themselves of the only advantage yet in their power, to forego even the pleasure of revenge, and to abstain from ravaging the territories of their neighbours and enemies, provided only the great king and his satraps would grant them a condition, with which it was easy to comply, since it required nothing but that they should cease to lavish their own money in raising the dangerous power of

Sparta alarmed by that measure, solicits peace from Persia.
Olymp.
xcvii. 1.
A. C. 392.

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the Athenians. For effecting this purpose, they sent successive embassies to the court of Persia, as well as to Teribazus, who had lately succeeded Tithraustes, in the government of the southern provinces. They industriously neglected Pharnabazus, from whom they could not reasonably expect any favour, as the hostilities of Agesilaus had peculiarly excited the resentment of that warlike satrap.

Employ-
Antalcidas
as their mini-
ster.

Among the ministers employed by Sparta, in this negotiation, was Antalcidas, a man whose prior history is little known. He appears to have had an intercourse of hospitality with several noble Persians²⁰; it is not improbable that he had served under the standard of Cyrus, and perhaps continued in the East during the successive expeditions of Thimbron, Dercyllidas, and Agesilaus. If we except the artful and daring Lyfander, Sparta never employed a more proper agent to treat with the Barbarians. Antalcidas was bold, eloquent, subtle, complying, a master in all the arts of insinuation and address, and equally well qualified, by his abilities and vices, to execute an insidious commission at a corrupt court. The revered institutions of his country were the objects of real or well-feigned contempt; he derided the frugal and self-denying maxims of the divine Lycurgus; but peculiarly delighted the voluptuous, cowardly, and treacherous satraps and courtiers, when he directed the poisoned shafts of his ridicule against the manly firmness, the probity, and the patriotism of Leonidas and Callicratidas, names equally glorious to Sparta and dishonourable to Persia.

His negotia-
tion facili-
tated by the
unreasonable
ambition of
Conon and
the Athe-
nians.

The success of such a minister, almost ensured by his own character and talents, was hastened by the imprudent ambition of Conon and the Athenians, too soon and too fatally intoxicated by the deceitful gifts of prosperity. When this illustrious commander cooperated with Pharnabazus in expelling the Lacedæmonians from the East, he earnestly exhorted the satrap to confirm the Asiatic

²⁰ Xenoph. Hellen.

Greeks in the enjoyment of their ancient liberties, left the fear of oppression might suggest the means of resistance, and oblige them to form a general alliance for their own defence, which might prove favourable to Artaxerxes. In this plausible advice the patriotic Athenian had a farther view than it was possible for the Persian at that time to discover. After rebuilding the walls and harbours of Athens, he requested Pharnabazus, who prepared to return to his province, that he might be allowed, for a few months longer, to employ a squadron of Persian ships, in conjunction with his own, to infest the territories of Sparta and her allies. The satrap, naturally unsuspicious, and perhaps betrayed by his resentment, readily granted this demand. But Conon, unmindful of his promised operations against the common enemy, thought only of promoting the interest of his republic. He sailed to the Cyclades, to Chios, to Lesbos, and even to the coast of Eolis and Ionia, displayed the strength of his armament, described the flourishing fortune of Athens, and endeavoured to persuade or to compel the astonished Asiatics and islanders to acknowledge the just authority of their ancient metropolis or sovereign, who having risen more splendid from her ruins, required only the attachment of her former allies and subjects, to recover her hereditary power and renown.

The success of this extraordinary enterprise is not particularly described, nor is the omission material, since this last expedition of Conon had not any other permanent effect but that of ruining himself. His unjustifiable ambition furnished powerful weapons to the dexterity of Antalcidas, who represented him as guilty of the most unexampled audacity, aggravated by the most perfidious ingratitude, in attempting to alienate and to conquer the king's dominions, even by the assistance of the king's forces, to which both his country and himself owed so many recent and signal benefits. The accusation was probably rendered more welcome to Teribazus, by the jealousy which he naturally entertained of the neighbouring satrap,

Negotiations
of the ad-
verse states
with Persia.

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the friend of Conon, and his own rival. But after the last unwarrantable transaction of the Athenian, which he could defend only by the obsolete Greek maxim, that every thing is lawful to a man in the service of his country, even his late colleague Pharnabazus seems to have withdrawn from him the protection and friendship by which he had been so long distinguished, so that the influence of that powerful satrap formed not any opposition to the negotiations and intrigues of Antalcidas. The Athenians, however, sent Dion, Hermogenes, with other emissaries, to watch and counteract his measures. Conon was named at the head of this deputation; and as he knew not the full extent of Teribazus's animosity, inflamed and exasperated by the address of Antalcidas, he expected that the personal presence of a man, who had formerly served the Persians with fidelity and success, might obtain an easy pardon from the satrap, and perhaps prove useful to the affairs of Athens. The Boeotians and Argives likewise sent their ambassadors, who had instructions to act in concert with Conon and his colleagues. But *their* overtures were little regarded, while those of Antalcidas met with warm approbation from Teribazus.

The overtures of Sparta most acceptable to the Persian ministers.

The Lacedæmonian ambassador declared that he had been commanded to offer such terms of peace as suited equally the dignity and the interest of the great king. "The Spartans resigned all pretensions to the Greek cities in Asia, which they acknowledged to be dependencies of the Persian empire. Why should Artaxerxes, then, continue to lavish his treasure in vain? Since the Spartans not only ceded to him the immediate object of dispute, but earnestly desired to promote the future prosperity of his dominions, by settling the affairs of Greece, as best answered his convenience. For this purpose they were ready to declare all the cities and islands, small and great, totally independent of each other; in consequence of which there would not be any republic sufficiently powerful thenceforth to disturb the tranquillity of Persia." These conditions, which the most

most insolent minister of the great king might himself have dictated, were too advantageous not to be liable to suspicion. But Teribazus was so blinded by partiality for the Spartan minister, that he seems not to have entertained the smallest doubt of his sincerity. The terms of peace were transmitted to the court of Susa, that they might be approved and ratified by Artaxerxes. The subtlety of Antalcidas was rewarded by a considerable sum of money; and the patriotism of Conon (a patriotism which had carried him beyond the bounds of justice and propriety) was punished by immediate death²¹, or by an ignominious confinement²². His fate is variously related; but his actions justly rank him with the first of Grecian names; and the fame of an illustrious father was supported and rivalled by that of his son Timotheus²³.

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Death of
Conon.

It might have been expected that a plan of accommodation, so advantageous and honourable for Persia, should have been readily accepted by Artaxerxes. But the negotiation languished for several years, partly on account of the temporary disgrace of Teribazus, who was succeeded by Struthas; a man who, moved by some unknown motive, warmly espoused the interest of the Athenians; and partly by the powerful solicitations and remonstrances of the Bœotian and Argive ambassadors, who accused the sincerity, and unveiled the latent ambition, of Sparta.

Obstacles to
the conclu-
sion of the
treaty of
peace.
Olymp.
xcvii. 3.
A. C. 390.

Meanwhile the war was carried on with unremitting activity. The Lacedæmonians and their allies sallied from their strong garrisons in Sicyon and the Lechæum, to destroy the harvests and the villages of their Peloponnesian enemies. The Bœotians and Argives retaliated these injuries by several hostile incursions into the territories of Sparta; while the Athenians, as if they had again attained the command of the sea, bent the whole vigour of their republic towards an element, long propitious to their ancestors.

Military operations.

²¹ Ifoc. Panegy.

²² Xenoph. Gr. Hist. l. iv.

²³ Dinarch. adv. Demost. p. 94, & Corn. Nepos, in vit. Conon. & Timoth.

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XXVIII.Conquests of
Thraſybulus.

The recent ſplendour of Conon had eclipsed the ancient and well-merited renown of Thraſybulus, whoſe extraordinary abilities, and more extraordinary good fortune, had twice reſcued his country from the yoke of tyrants. But after the lamented death or captivity of the former, the Athenian fleet, amounting to forty ſail, was entrusted to Thraſybulus; who, having ſcoured the Ægean ſea, failed to the Hellespont, and perſuaded or compelled the inhabitants of Byzantium, and ſeveral other Thracian cities, to aboliſh their ariſtocratic government, and to accept the alliance of Athens. His activity was next directed againſt the iſle of Lesbos, in which the Lacedæmonian intereſt was ſtill ſupported by a conſiderable body of troops. Having landed his men, he joined battle with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Methymna, and obtained a complete victory, after killing with his own hand Therimachus, the Spartan governor and general. The principal cities of the iſland acknowledged the Athenian power, and ſeaſonably reinforced the fleet, by the terror of which they had been ſubdued. Encouraged by this ſucceſs Thraſybulus failed towards Rhodes, in order to aſſiſt the democratic faction, who equally contended for the intereſt of Athens and their own.

He is ſur-
priſed and
ſlain.

Before proceeding, however, to that important iſland, he determined to multiply the reſources, and to confirm the affections, of the fleet. For this purpoſe he raiſed conſiderable ſupplies of whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for his expedition from the maritime towns of Aſia, and at length entered the mouth of the Eurymedon (the glorious ſcene of Cimon's victories) and levied a heavy contribution on Aſpendus, the principal ſea-port and capital of Pamphylia. But here his good fortune ended²⁴. The patient timidity of the Barbarians had endured the public depredation, to which they were long accuſtomed; but even *their* ſervility could not brook the pri-

²⁴ Corn. Nep. in vit. Thraſybul.

vate rapacity and intolerable exactions of the sailors and troops, which were imputed (not perhaps without reason) to the unrelenting avarice of the commander. The resentment of the Pamphylians overcame their cowardice. They attacked the Grecian tents in the night, and surprised the security of Thrasylbulus, who thus fell a sacrifice to a very unjustifiable defect, which, if we may believe a contemporary writer, greatly debased the dignity of his otherwise illustrious character²⁵.

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The unjust treatment of Aspendus, which had been retorted by such signal revenge, would never perhaps have reached the ears of Artaxerxes, had not his voluptuous indolence been beset by the active importunity of Antalcidas. This vigilant and artful minister let slip no opportunity to rouse the jealousy of the great king against the Athenians, his hereditary foes, and to obliterate his resentment against the Spartans, his recent but less natural enemies. The severe exactions from Pamphylia, a province acknowledging his authority, afforded a powerful topic of persuasion, which the Spartan ambassador could not fail to employ; but it is uncertain whether even this important argument would have conquered the reluctance of the Persian monarch to concur with the measures of a people, who had enabled the rebellious Cyrus to dispute his throne, and who had recently invaded and plundered, not a maritime city, but the interior provinces of the empire. His interest and inclination were combated by his resentment and his pride; when his fluctuating irresolution was at length decided by the Athenians, whose mad imprudence crowned the triumph of Antalcidas.

Activity of
Antalcidas
at the Per-
sian court.
Olymp.
xvii. 4.
A. C. 389.

²⁵ Lyfias against Ergocles. This Ergocles was the friend and confidant of Thrasylbulus. He had assisted him in expelling the thirty tyrants, and had recently accompanied him in his expedition to the coast of Thrace, mentioned in the text. The military exploits of Thrasylbulus in Thrace were highly honourable and meritorious; but his

private behaviour was the reverse. He stuck at nothing by which he could enrich himself or his dependants. Ergocles was condemned to death for the share which he had taken in this unjustifiable speculation and rapacity. Lyfias's Orations against Ergocles and Philocrates. See likewise Aristophanes Ecclesiaz. v. 356. & Schol. ad locum.

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Revolt of
Cyprus abet-
ted by the
Athenians.

The signal victories of Conon and Thraſybulus, and the riſing fortune of Athens, encouraged Evagoras king of Salamis, who had been offended by ſome late cauſe of diſguſt, to execute his long meditated deſign of revolting from Perſia. Egypt was actually in rebellion; Artaxerxes had undertaken a war againſt the barbarous Carduchians²⁶, who were by no means a contemptible enemy. Theſe were very favourable circumſtances; but the Perſian fleet, which, after performing the ſervice for which it had been equipped, had continued to lie inactive in the Phœnician and Cician harbours, was ready to be employed in any new enterpriſe. The ſkilful and experienced bravery of the king of Salamis, ſeconded by the youthful ardour of his ſon Protagoras, obtained an eaſy victory over the firſt ſquadrons that were ſent to invade his iſland. But there was reaſon to dread the arrival of a far ſuperior force. In this danger Evagoras requeſted, and obtained, the aſſiſtance of the Athenians; who not only enjoyed peace with Perſia, but whoſe ambaffadors were endeavouring to prevent that court from making peace with their enemies.

The great
king dictates
the terms of
a general
peace.
Olymp.
xcviii. 1.
A. C. 388.

This extraordinary meaſure of a people, in preferring their gratitude to their intereſt; a gratitude which they might have foreſeen to be uſeleſs to him whom they meant to oblige, and pernicious to the moſt important intereſts of their republic, finally determined Artaxerxes to eſpouſe the cauſe of the Spartans; and to dictate the terms of a general peace, almoſt in the ſame words which had been propoſed by Antalcidas: “ That the Greek cities in Aſia, with the iſland of Cyprus and the peninſula of Clazomené, ſhould be ſubject to Perſia; Athens ſhould be allowed to retain her immemorial jurifdiction in the iſles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; but all the other republics, ſmall and great, ſhould enjoy the independent government of their own hereditary laws. Whatever people rejected theſe con-

²⁶ Theſe and the following circumſtances through Diodorus, Iſocrates’s Panegyric of Athens, and the Panegyric of Evagoras.

ditions, so evidently calculated for preserving the public tranquillity, must expect the utmost indignation of the great king, who, in conjunction with the republic of Sparta, would make war, on their perverse and dangerous obstinacy, by sea and land, with ships and money ²⁷.”

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Teribazus and Antalcidas returned from the East, charged with the definitive resolutions, or rather the haughty mandate of Artaxerxes, which had been confirmed by the unalterable sanction of the royal signet. There was reason, however, to apprehend that Thebes, Athens, and Argos might still reject the terms of a peace proposed by their avowed enemies, pernicious to their particular and immediate interests, and equally disadvantageous and dishonourable to the whole Grecian name. The remembrance of the glorious confederacy, for defending the Asiatic colonies against the oppression of Barbarians, could not indeed much influence the degenerate councils of those republics; but the Thebans must resign, with reluctance, their real or pretended authority over the inferior cities of Bœotia; the Argives must unwillingly withdraw their garrison from Corinth, and leave that important capital in the power of the aristocratic or Lacedæmonian faction; and the Athenians must abandon, with regret, the fruits of their recent victories, and the hopes of recovering their ancient grandeur. The opposition of these states had been foreseen by Antalcidas, who took the most effectual measures to render it impotent. By the assistance of Persian money he equipped a fleet of eighty sail, from the mercenary sea-ports of Greece and Asia, from the intermediate isles, and even from the coasts of Italy and Sicily. This armament was independent of the squadrons with which Teribazus prepared to attack the isle of Cyprus, if the presumption of Evagoras, unassisted and alone, should dare to provoke

Which the
Grecian
states are
compelled to
accept.
Olymp.
xcviii. 2.
A. C. 387.

²⁷ The last words are literally translated I. xiv. c. cx. Plut. Agefil. p. 608; and Artaxerx. p. 1022. See likewise Diodor. p. 550.

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his hostility. The satrap also had collected a very considerable army, which was ready to embark for Greece, and to co-operate with Agefilaus, who had assembled the domestic troops and allies of Sparta to march, at the first summons, against any city or republic that might reject the peace of Antalcidas²⁸. These vigorous preparations, intimidating the weakness of the confederates, compelled them into a reluctant compliance with the terms of the treaty. The Thebans made the strongest and most obstinate resistance; but their pretensions were finally silenced by the threats of the Spartan king, the inveterate enemy of their republic. The Bœotian cities were acknowledged to be independent, and admitted as parties in the peace. The Argives retired from Corinth, which being deserted by the leaders of the democratical faction, became a faithful ally to Sparta. The military and naval operations ceased, tranquillity was restored, and the armies and fleets were, on both sides, disbanded and dissolved²⁹.

Evagoras
alone rejects
the authority
of Persia.

But amidst this universal and most obsequious submission to the court of Persia, one man avowed his discontent, and prepared to maintain his opposition. The article respecting Cyprus was loudly rejected by Evagoras, who asserted the independence of his native island; and, with a magnanimity that formed a striking contrast with the degenerate and disgraceful softness of his Grecian allies, set the power of Artaxerxes at defiance. Evagoras trusted to the resources of his own vigorous mind, to the superior skill of his seamen, and to the assistance of Acoris king of Egypt. But the numerous squadrons of Teribazus prevailed over all his hopes. He was discomfited in a naval engagement; his territories were invaded and ravaged; he was reduced to his capital Salamis; and even Salamis was threatened with a siege. His resistance

²⁸ Τῇ ἐπὶ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνῃ καὶ δυνάμει. Xenoph. p. 277.

²⁹ Διαλύθη μὲν τὰ πλοῖα, &c. Xenoph. p. 551.

had already exceeded what his strength warranted, or what his dignity required. His enemies were incapable of perseverance, or unwilling to drive him to despair. He resigned his numerous and recent conquests in Cyprus, but retained possession of the ancient principality of Teucer, which his fortunate arms had recovered from an usurper; and submitted, without dishonour, to imitate the example of many preceding princes of Salamis, and to acknowledge himself the tributary of the king of Persia¹⁰.

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Submits to
an honour-
able compro-
mise.

Olymp.
xcviii. 4.
A. C. 385.

¹⁰ Diodor. l. xv. p. 462.

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Reflections upon the Peace of Antalcidas.—Ambitious Views of Sparta.—State of Arcadia.—Siege of Mantinea.—Olynthian Confederacy.—The Spartans make War on Olynthus.—Submission of that Republic.—Pella becomes the Capital of Macedon.—Phæbidas seizes the Theban Citadel.—The Measure approved by Agesilaus.—Conspiracy of the Theban Exiles.—The Theban Democracy restored.

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Reflections
on the peace
of Antalcidas.

THE peace of Antalcidas forms an important and disgraceful era in the Grecian history. The valuable colonies in Asia, the cause, the object, and the scene, of so many memorable wars, were resigned and abandoned for ever to the power of a Barbarian master. The king of Persia dismembered the distant dependencies, and controuled the domestic arrangements of a people who had given law to his ancestors¹. Their ancient confederacies were dissolved; the smaller cities were loosened from dependence on their powerful neighbours; all were disunited and weakened; and Greece felt the languor of peace, without enjoying the benefits of security.

But if the whole Grecian name was dishonoured by accepting this ignominious treaty, what peculiar infamy must belong to the magistrates of Sparta, by whom it was proposed and promoted? What motives of advantage could balance this weight of

¹ See the articles of the treaty concluded in 449 A. C. Vol. I. c. xii. p. 4:6.

disgrace?

disgrace? Or rather, what advantage could the Spartans derive from such ignoble condescension as seemed totally unworthy of their actual power, but far more unworthy of their ancient renown? This question, like most political questions, may be best answered by facts; and the transactions which both preceded and followed the peace of Antalcidas clearly discover and ascertain the secret, but powerful, causes of that dishonourable, and seemingly disadvantageous, measure.

The ambition of making conquests in the East, which it now appeared impossible to retain, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of an authority, or rather dominion, in Greece, acquired by the success of the Peloponnesian war, and which they might have reasonably expected to preserve, and to confirm. Not only their power, but their safety, was threatened by the arms of a hostile confederacy, which had been formed and fomented by the wealth of Persia. Athens, their rival, their superior, their subject, but always their unrelenting enemy, had recovered her walls and fleet, and aspired to command the sea. Thebes and Argos had become sensible of their natural strength, and disdained to acknowledge the pre-eminence, or to follow the standard, of any foreign republic. The inferior states of Peloponnesus were weary of obeying every idle summons to war, from which they derived not any advantage but that of gratifying the ambition of their Spartan masters. The valuable colonies in Macedon and Thrace, and particularly the rich and populous cities of the Chalcidic region, the bloodless conquests of the virtuous Brasidas, had forsaken the interest of Sparta, when Sparta forsook the interest of justice. Scarcely any vestige appeared of the memorable trophies erected in a war of twenty-seven years. The eastern provinces (incomparably the most important of all) were irrecoverably lost; and this rapid decline of power had happened in the course of ten years, and had been chiefly occasioned by the fatal splendour of Agesilaus's victories in Asia,

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Motives
which en-
gaged the
Spartans
eagerly to
embrace that
treaty.

About

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which they
derived from
it.

About a century before, and almost on the same scene, the Spartans had been first deprived of their hereditary fame, and prescriptive honours². Almost every interference, in peace or war, with the Ionian colonies, had hurt the interests of their republic. They began to suspect, therefore, that such distant expeditions suited not the circumstances of Sparta, an inland city, with a fertile territory, but destitute of arts, industry, and commerce; and whose inhabitants, having little genius for the sea, were naturally unable to equip, or to maintain, such a naval force as might command the obedience of an extensive coast, attached by powerful ties to their Athenian rivals. The abandoning, therefore, of what they could not hope to regain, or if regained, to preserve, seemed a very prudent and salutary measure; since, in return for this imaginary concession, they received many real and important advantages. They were appointed to superintend and to direct the execution of the treaty; and in order to make their authority effectual, entitled to demand the assistance of Persian money, with which they might easily purchase Grecian soldiers. The condition requiring the smaller cities to be declared free and independent (although the dexterity of Antalcidas had proposed it as the best means of preventing the future invasion of Asia), was peculiarly beneficial to the Spartans. It represented them as the patrons of universal liberty, and restored them that honourable reputation which they had long lost. From the nature of the condition itself, it could only apply to such places as being kept in a reluctant subjection, still possessed courage to vindicate their freedom. In the secondary towns of Messenia and Laconia, the stern policy of Sparta had crushed the hope, and almost the desire, of obtaining this inestimable benefit. The authority of other capitals was less imposing and imposing; the sovereign and subject were more on a footing of equality; and it was a maxim in Greece, That men are disposed to reject the just rights of their equals, rather than to revolt

² See above, Vol. I. p. 420.

against the unlawful tyranny of their masters³. But Sparta expected not only to detach the inferior communities from their more powerful neighbours, but to add them to the confederacy of which she formed the head; and by such multiplied accessions of power, of wealth, and of fame, to re-establish that solid power in Greece, which had been imprudently abandoned for the hope of Asiatic triumphs⁴.

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That such considerations of interest and ambition, not a sincere desire to promote the public tranquillity, had produced this perfidious treaty, could not long be kept secret; notwithstanding the various artifices employed to conceal it. Thebes and Argos were required to comply with the terms of the peace; but no mention was made of withdrawing the Lacedæmonian garrisons from the places which they occupied. Lest this injustice might occasion general discontent, the Athenians were allowed the same privilege. The possession of the unimportant isles of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros, flattered their vain hopes, and lulled them into false security; and, as they expected to reap the fruits of the victories of Conon and Thraſybulus, they were averse to renew the war for the sake of their allies, whose interests were now separated from their own. Meanwhile the Spartan emissaries negotiated and intrigued in all the subordinate cities, encouraging the aristocratical factions, and fomenting the animosities of the citizens against each other, and against their respective capitals. The jealousies and complaints, which had been principally occasioned by these secret cabals, were usually referred to the Spartan senate; whose affected moderation, under pretence of defending the cause of the weak and the injured, always decided the contest in the way most favourable for themselves. But the warlike disciples of Lycurgus could not long remain satisfied with these juridical usurpations. They determined to take arms; which they pro-

Their ambitious designs immediately after that event.

³ Thucyd. passim. See particularly the speech of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Vol. I. c. xv. p. 527.

⁴ Vid. Hæcat. de Pace, passim.

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State of
Arcadia.
Olymp.
xcviii. 3.
A. C. 386.

bably hoped to employ with such artful dexterity as might prevent any general, or very dangerous, alarm; beginning with such cities as had not entered into the late confederacy against them, gradually extending their hostilities to the more powerful members of that confederacy; and thus conquering successively those, whose entire and collective strength it would have been vain to assail⁵.

The first victim of this ambitious policy was the flourishing republic of Mantinæa, whose territory was situate almost in the center of Arcadia, itself the center of the Peloponnesus. The origin of Mantinæa was the same with that of Tegea, Stymphalis, Heræa, Orchomenos, and other neighbouring cities, which had grown into populousness and power from the scattered villages of shepherds inhabiting the vallies and mountains of Arcadia. The exuberant fertility, the inland situation, the generous warmth, yet lively verdure⁶, together with the picturesque and animating scenery of this delightful region, seemed peculiarly adapted to inspire, and to gratify, the love of rural happiness; and to afford, in all their elegance and dignity, *those sublime and sacred joys of the country*, which the genius of ancient poets hath felt, and described with such affecting sensibility. Every district of Arcadia was marked and diversified by hills, some of which, could we credit the inaccuracy of geographical description, ascend two miles in perpendicular height⁷, and which supply innumerable streams, that water and fertilise the rich vallies which they inclose and defend. This secure and insulated position of their territory long preserved the Arcadians ignorant and uncorrupted; and a little before the period of history now under review, they were distinguished by the innocent simplicity of their manners, and by their fond attachment to a pastoral life. But the turbulent ambition of their neighbours had often obliged them

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. p. 551. & Diodor. l. xv. p. 448.

⁶ These circumstances are common to Arcadia with the other mountainous districts of

Greece, as well as with the islands of the Archipelago. TOURNEFORT.

⁷ Descript. Græc. apud Gronov. vol. I.

to employ the sword instead of the sheep-hook. They had reluctantly taken arms; yet, when compelled by necessity, or excited by honour, the mountaineers of Arcadia had displayed such stubborn valour, and exerted such efforts of vigour and activity, as made their services eagerly desired, and purchased with emulation, by the surrounding states. Nor had they trusted to their personal strength and bravery alone for the defence of their beloved possessions. Having quitted their farms and villages, they had assembled into walled towns, from which their numerous garisons were ready to sally forth against an hostile invader. The dangerous vicinity of Sparta had early driven the companions of Pan and the Nymphs from the vocal woods of Mount Mænalus*, into the fortifications of Tegea, formerly the principal city of the province°, but afterwards rivalled and surpassed by Mantinæa, which was become an object of jealousy and envy, not only to the neighbouring cities of Arcadia, but even to Sparta herself.

In the year immediately following the treaty of Antalcidas, Lacedæmonian ambassadors were sent to Mantinæa, to discharge a very extraordinary commission. Having demanded an audience of the assembly, they expressed the resentment of their republic against a people, who, pretending to live in friendship with them, had in the late war repeatedly furnished with corn their avowed enemies the Argives. That, on other occasions, the Mantinæans had unguardedly discovered their secret hatred to Sparta, rejoicing in her misfortunes, and envying her prosperity. That it was time to anticipate this dangerous and unjust animosity; for which purpose the Spartans commanded them to demolish their walls, to abandon their proud city, and to return to those peaceful villages in which their ancestors had lived and flourished¹⁰. The Mantinæans received this proposal

The proud
message of
the Spartans
to the Man-
tinæans.
Olymp.
xcviii. 3.
A. C. 386.

* Mænalus argutumque nemus pinosque
loquentes

Semper habet; semper pastorum ille audit
amores

Panaque, &c. VIRG. Ecl. viii. v. 22.

° Herodot. l. vi. c. 105.

¹⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. 2. & seqq.
Diodor. l. xv. c. 7. & seqq.

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Mantinæa
besieged.

with the indignation which it merited; the ambassadors retired in disgust; the Spartans declared war; summoned the assistance of their confederates; and a powerful army, commanded by king Agefipolis, invaded the hostile territory.

But the most destructive ravages could not bend the resolution of the Mantinæans. The strength and loftiness of their walls bade defiance to assault; nor could a regular siege be undertaken with certain success, as the magazines of Mantinæa were abundantly stored with various kinds of grain, the crops of the former year having been uncommonly plentiful. Agefipolis, however, embraced this doubtful mode of attack, and drew first a ditch, and then a wall, entirely round the place, employing one part of his troops in the work, and another in guarding the workmen. This tedious service exhausted the patience of the besiegers, without shaking the firmness of the Mantinæans. The Spartans were afraid to detain longer in the field their reluctant confederates; but Agefipolis proposed a new measure, which was attended with complete and immediate success. The river Ophis, formed by the collected torrents from mount Anchisius, a river broad, deep, and rapid, flowed through the plain, and the city of Mantinæa. It was a laborious undertaking to stop the course of this copious stream; which was no sooner effected, than the lower parts of the walls of Mantinæa were laid under water. According to the usual practice of the Greeks, the fortifications of this place were built of raw bricks, which being less liable to break into chinks, and to fly out of their courses, were preferred as the best defence against the battering-engines then in use. But it is the inconvenience of raw bricks, to be as easily dissolved by water, as wax is melted by the sun". The walls of Mantinæa began to yield, to shake, to fall in pieces. The activity of the inhabitants propped them with wood, but without any permanent advantage;

" This is the expression of Pausanias, in Arcad. who mentions the name of the river Ophis, omitted by Xenophon and Diodorus.

so that despairing of being able to exclude the enemy, they sent to capitulate, requesting that they might be permitted to keep possession of their city, on condition that they demolished their fortifications, and followed, in peace and war, the fortune of Sparta.

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The town
capitulates.

Ageſipolis and his counſellors reſuſed to grant them any other terms of peace than thoſe which had been originally propoſed by the republic. He obſerved, that while they lived together in one populous city, their numbers expoſed them to the deluſions of ſeditious demagogues, whoſe addreſs and eloquence eaſily ſeduced the multitude from their real intereſt, and deſtroyed the influence of their ſuperiors in rank, in wealth, and in wiſdom, on whoſe attachment alone the Lacedæmonians could ſafely depend. They inſiſted, therefore, that the Mantinæans ſhould deſtroy their houſes in the city; ſeparate into four diſtinct communities¹²; and return to thoſe villages which their anceſtors had inhabited. The terror of an immediate aſſault made it neceſſary to comply with this humiliating demand; but the moſt zealous partiſans of democracy, to the number of ſixty, afraid of truſting to the capitulation, were *allowed* to fly from their country; which is mentioned as an inſtance of moderation¹³ in the Lacedæmonian ſoldiers, who might have put them to death as they paſſed through the gates.

Hard conditions to which the inhabitants are compelled to ſubmit.
Olymp. xcvi. 4.
A. C. 385.

This tranſaction was ſcarcely finiſhed, when the Spartan magiſtrates ſeized an opportunity of the domeſtic diſcontents among the Phliſians, to diſplay the ſame tyrannical ſpirit, but with ſtill greater exertions of ſeverity. The little republic of Phlius, like every ſtate of Greece in thoſe unfortunate, at leaſt turbulent times, was diſtracted by factions. The prevailing party baniſhed their opponents, the friends of Sparta and ariſtocracy. They were allowed to return from exile, in conſequence of the commands and threats of Ageſi-

The Spartans regulate, with a ſtrong hand, the affairs of Phlius.
Olymp. xcix. 1.
A. C. 384.

¹² Xenophon ſays four, Diodorus five. Mantinæans, were not ſo temperate: vide Xenoph.

¹³ Or rather of good diſcipline; *παιδαγωγία*. P. 552.
The nobles of the Mantinæans, *οἱ ἐλευθέρων των*

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laus¹⁴; but met not with that respectful treatment which seemed due to persons who enjoyed such powerful protection. They complained, and Agesilaus again interfered, by appointing commissioners to try and condemn to death the obnoxious Phliasians; an odious office, which must have been executed with unexampled rigour, since the city of Phlius, which had hitherto been divided by a variety of interests, thenceforth continued invariably the steadfast ally of Sparta¹⁵.

Embassy of
Acanthus
and Apollonia
to Sparta.

Meanwhile ambassadors arrived from Acanthus and Apollonia, two cities of the Chalcidicé, requesting the Lacedæmonian assistance against the dangerous ambition of Olynthus. This city, of which we had occasion to mention the foundation towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was situated nine miles from the sea, in a fertile and secure district, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnias, which flow into the lake Bolyca, a name improperly bestowed on the inmost recess of the Toronaic gulph. The vexatious government of Athens first drove the maritime communities of the Chalcidic region within the walls of Olynthus; the oppressive tyranny of Sparta obliged them to strengthen these walls, as well as to provide sufficient garrisons to defend them; and the subsequent misfortunes of those domineering republics, together with the weakness of Macedon, encouraged and enabled the inhabitants of Olynthus successfully to employ, in offensive war, the forces which had been raised with no other view than to maintain their own independence. The towns which they subdued were either incorporated or associated with their own; and Olynthus became the head of a confederacy, whose extent, power, resources, and hopes, occasioned just alarm among the neighbouring communities of Greeks and Barbarians. They had already conquered the southern shores of Macedon, which comprehended the delightful regions of Chalcis and Pieria, indented by two great and two smaller bays, and affording, in the highest

¹⁴ Xenoph. in Agesil. & Hellen. l. v. p. 553.

¹⁵ Ibid. l. vii. p. 624.

perfection, the united benefits of agriculture, pasturage, and commerce. They aspired at acquiring the valuable district of mount Pangæus, whose timber and mines alike tempted their ambition and avarice; and Olynthus being favourably situate in the centre of the Chalcidicé, itself the centre of the Macedonian and Thracian coasts, might have preserved and extended her dominion, if the ambassadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not completely effected the object of their commission at Sparta. They applied to the Ephori, who introduced them to the greater assembly, consisting, not only of the Spartans and Lacedæmonians, but of the deputies sent by their confederates. Cleigenes, the Acanthian, spoke in the name of his colleagues: "We apprehend, O Lacedæmonians, and allies! that amidst the multiplied objects of your care and correction, you have overlooked a great and growing disorder which threatens, like a pestilence, to infect and pervade Greece. The ambition of the Olynthians has increased with their power. By the voluntary submission of the smaller cities in their neighbourhood, they have been enabled to subdue the more powerful. Emboldened by this accession of strength, they have wrested from the king of Macedon his most valuable provinces. They actually possess Pella, the greatest city in that kingdom; and the unfortunate Amyntas is on the point of abandoning the remainder of his dominions, which he is unable to defend. There is not any community in Thrace capable to stop their progress. The independent tribes of that warlike, but divided country, respect the authority, and court the friendship of the Olynthians, who will doubtless be tempted to extend their dominion on that side, in order to augment the great revenues which they derive from their commercial cities and harbours, by the inexhaustible mines in mount Pangæus. If this extensive plan should be effected, what can prevent them from acquiring a decisive superiority by sea and land? and should they enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (a measure actually in agitation), what will become,

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They petition the assistance of that republic against the Olynthian confederacy.

we

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The Spartans readily listen to a request probably suggested by themselves. Olymp. xcix. 2.
A. C. 383.

Their preparations for the Olynthian war.

we say not, of the hereditary pre-eminence of Sparta, but of its independence and safety? The present emergency, therefore, solicits by every motive of interest and of honour, the activity and valour of your republic. By yielding a seasonable assistance to Acanthus and Apollonia, which, unmoved by the pusillanimous example of their neighbours, have hitherto spurned the yoke, and defied the threats of Olynthus, you will save from oppression two peaceful communities, and check the ambition of an usurping tyrant. The reluctant subjects of the Olynthians will court your protection; and the Chalcidian cities will be encouraged to revolt, especially as they are not yet inseparably linked with the capital by the ties of intermarriage and consanguinity, and by the interchange of rights and possessions¹⁶. When such a connection shall take place (for the Olynthians have made a law to encourage it), you will be unable to break the force of this powerful and dangerous confederacy."

The speech of Cleigenes, and the ambitious views of the republic to which it was addressed, afford reason to conjecture that the ambassadors neither asked any thing in favour of their own communities, nor urged any accusation against Olynthus, which had not been previously suggested by the Spartan emissaries in Macedon. The reception given to the proposal of Cleigenes tends to confirm this conclusion. The Lacedæmonians, with affected impartiality and indifference, desired the opinion of their allies, before declaring their own. But there was not any occasion to declare what none could be so blind as to mistake. The confederates with one consent, but especially those who wished to ingratiate themselves with Sparta¹⁷, determined to undertake the expedition against Olynthus. The Spartans commended their resolution, and proceeded to deliberate concerning the strength of the army to be raised, the mode of levying it, and the time for taking the field. It was resolved, that

¹⁶ Επ' ἡγάμασι καὶ ἑκκλήσεσι παρὰλλήλαις. Xenoph. p. 555.

¹⁷ Καὶ μάλιστα ἡ Θολομένη χαρίζουσα τοῖς Ἀκαχαιοῖσι. Xenoph. *ibid*.

the whole forces should amount to ten thousand effective men; and a list was prepared, containing the respective contingents to be furnished by the several cities. If any state should be unable to supply the full complement of soldiers, money would be taken in their stead, at the rate of half a drachm a day (or three-pence halfpenny) for each man; but if neither the troops nor the money were sent in due time, the Lacedæmonians would punish the disobedience of the obstinate or neglectful, by fining them eight times the sum which they had been originally required to contribute.

The ambassadors then rose up, and Cleigenes again speaking for the rest, declared that these were indeed noble and generous resolutions; but unfortunately, could not be executed with such promptitude as suited the urgency of the present crisis. The dangerous situation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate assistance. He proposed, therefore, that those troops which were ready, should instantly take the field; and insisted on this measure as a matter of the utmost importance to the future success of the war.

The Lacedæmonians acknowledged the expediency of the advice; and commanded Eudamidas, with two thousand men, to proceed without delay to Macedon, while his brother Phœbidas collected a powerful reinforcement, in order to follow him. A very extraordinary event, which we shall have occasion fully to explain, retarded the arrival of those auxiliaries, until the season for action had been nearly spent. But Eudamidas, with his little band, performed very essential service. He strengthened the garrisons of such places as were most exposed to assaults from the enemy; the appearance of a Spartan army encouraged the spirit of revolt among the allies and subjects of Olynthus; and soon after his march into the Chalcidicæ, Eudamidas received the voluntary surrender of Potidæa, a city of great importance in the isthmus of Palléné.

Such was the first campaign of a war which lasted four years, and was carried on under four successive generals. Eudamidas, too much

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First campaign against Olynthus. Olymp. xcix. 2.
A. C. 383.

Eudamidas defeated and slain.

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Second cam-
paign under
Teleutias,
the brother
of Agefilaus.
Olymp.
xcix. 3.
A. C. 382.

elated by his first success, ravaged the Olynthian territory, and un-
guardedly approached the city. He was intercepted, conquered, and
slain, and his army dispersed or lost".

Teleutias, the brother of Agefilaus, whose naval exploits have
been already mentioned with applause, assumed the conduct of this
distant expedition, with a body of ten thousand men. He was
assisted by Amyntas, king of Macedon, and still more effectually by
Derdas, the brother of that prince, and the governor, or rather so-
vereign, of Elymea, the most western province of Macedon, which
abounded in cavalry. By the united efforts of these formidable
enemies, the Olynthians, who had been defeated in various ren-
counters, were shut up within their walls, and prevented from
cultivating their territory. Teleutias at length marched with his
whole forces, in order to invest, or if he found an opportunity,
to assault the place. His surprise and indignation were excited by
the boldness of the Olynthian horse, who ventured to pass the Am-
nias in sight of such a superior army; and he ordered the tar-
geteers, who were commanded by Tlemonidas, to repel their inso-
lence. The cavalry made an artful retreat across the Amnias,
and were fiercely pursued by the Lacedæmonians. When a consi-
derable part of the latter had likewise passed the river, the Olyn-
thians suddenly faced about, and charged them. Tlemonidas, with
above an hundred of his companions, fell in the action. The Spar-
tan general beheld with grief and rage the successful bravery of the
enemy. Grasping his shield and lance, he commanded the cavalry,
and the remainder of the targeteers, to pursue without intermis-
sion; and, at the head of his heavy-armed men, advanced with less
order than celerity. The Olynthians attempted not to stop their
progress, till they arrived under the walls and battlements. At that
moment the townsmen mounted their ramparts, and assailed the

⁴⁸ Xenoph. p. 556.

enemy with a shower of darts and arrows, and every kind of missile weapon, which greatly added to the confusion occasioned by the rapidity of their march. Meanwhile the flower of the Olynthian troops, who had been purposely drawn up behind the gates, sallied forth with irresistible violence; Teleutias, attempting to rally his men, was slain in the first onset; the Spartans who attended him gave ground; the whole army was repelled, and pursued with great slaughter, while they fled in scattered disorder towards the friendly towns of Acanthus, Apollonia, Spartolus, and Potidæa¹⁹.

This mortifying disaster did not cool the ardour of the Spartans for gaining possession of Olynthus. In the year three hundred and eighty-one before Christ, which was the third of the war, they sent Agesipolis, with a powerful reinforcement, into Macedon. The arrival of this prince, early in the spring, revived the hopes of the vanquished, and confirmed the attachment of the Lacedæmonian allies. He invaded and ravaged such parts of the Olynthian territory as had been spared in former incursions, and took by storm the strong city of Torona. But while he prepared to avail himself of these advantages for rendering his success complete, he was seized by a calenture, a disease incident to warm climates, and, as the name expresses, affecting the patient with a painful sensation of burning heat, which he is eager to extinguish by the most violent and dangerous remedies²⁰. Agesipolis had lately visited the temple of Apollo at Aphytis, a maritime town on the Toranaic gulph. In the paroxysm of his disorder, he longed for the fanning breezes, the shady walks and groves, and the cool crystalline streams, of that delightful retreat. His attendants indulged his inclination, but could not save his life. He died on

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Teleutias
likewise de-
feated and
slain.

Third cam-
paign under
king Age-
polis;
Olymp.
xcix. 4.
A. C. 381.

who dies of a
calenture.

¹⁹ Xenoph. p. 561. & seqq.

²⁰ It is supposed, with great probability, that the sailors who suddenly disappear in the Mediterranean, during the heat of summer, have been attacked in the night by the

calenture, and have thrown themselves into the sea. Cyclopæd. Par. ad voc. The disorder is examined by Dr. Shaw, Phil. Trans. Abridg. vol. iv.

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the seventh day of the disease, within the precincts of the consecrated ground. His remains, embalmed in honey, were conveyed to Sparta²¹. His brother Cleombrotus succeeded to the throne; and Polybiades, a general of experience and capacity, was invested with the command in Macedon.

Fourth campaign under Polybiades.
Olymp. c. 1.
A. C. 380.

Polybiades, imitating the example of his predecessors, conducted a powerful reinforcement against Olynthus, which was completely surrounded by land, while a squadron of Lacedæmonian galleys blocked up the neighbouring harbour of Mecerba. The events of the siege, which lasted eight or ten months, have not been thought worthy of record. It is probable that the Olynthians no longer ventured to sally forth against such a superior force: yet they must have been exceedingly distressed by famine before their obstinacy could be determined to capitulate. They formally relinquished all claim to the dominion of the Chalcidicé: they ceded the Macedonian cities to their ancient sovereign; and engaged, by solemn oaths, to obey, in peace and war, the commands of their Spartan confederates and masters²². In consequence of this humiliating treaty, or rather of this absolute submission of the Olynthians, Polybiades led off his victorious army, and Amyntas forsook the royal residence of Ægæ or Edeffa, and re-established his court at Pella, a place of great strength and beauty, situate on an eminence, which, with an adjoining plain of considerable extent, was defended by the rivers Axios and Lydias, and by impervious lakes and morasses.

Olynthus finally submits.

Pella restored to Amyntas, and continues thenceforth the capital of Macedon.

The city was distant only fifteen miles from the Ægean sea, with which it communicated by means of the above-mentioned rivers. It had been of old founded by Greeks, by whom it was recently conquered and peopled; but in consequence of the misfortunes and surrender of Olynthus, Pella became, and thenceforth continued, the capital of Macedon.

²¹ Xenoph. p. 564.

²² Ibid. p. 565.

The commencement, and especially the conclusion of the Olynthian war, breathed the same spirit with the peace of Antalcidas, and proved the degenerate ambition of the Spartans, who were prepared to aggrandise the Barbarians on every side, in order to obtain their assistance towards extending their own dominion in Greece. This selfish and cruel system of policy deserved the indignation and resentment of the whole Grecian name, who were at length excited against Sparta by a very extraordinary transaction, to which we already had occasion to allude. When Eudamidas undertook the expedition against Olynthus, it was intended that his brother Phœbidas should follow him at the head of eight thousand men. This powerful reinforcement marched from Peloponnesus, and, in their journey northwards, encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, which was then torn by the inveterate hostility of contending factions. Ismenias, whose name has already occurred on a very dishonourable occasion, headed the democratical party; Leontiades supported the interest of Sparta and aristocracy; and both were invested with the *archonship*, the chief magistracy in the commonwealth. It is not absolutely certain that Phœbidas had previous orders to interfere in this dissention²³, when he was accosted by Leontiadas, “ who exhorted him to seize the opportunity, which fortune had thrown in his way, of performing a signal service to his country. He then explained to the Lacedæmonian the distracted state of Thebes, and the facility with which he might become master of the citadel; so that while his brother Eudamidas was carrying on the war against Olynthus, he himself would acquire possession of a much greater city²⁴.”

A contemporary historian, whose known partiality for the Lacedæmonians disposed him to regard this singular enterprise as an act

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Daring enterprise of the Spartan Phœbidas.

²³ Diodorus boldly asserts that Phœbidas acted by orders of his republic, and that the feigned complaints against him were nothing but a mask to disguise or to conceal the injustice of the community.

²⁴ Xenoph. p. 297. & seqq. Plutarch in Pelopid. Diodor. p. 457.

In time of peace he seizes the Theban citadel. Olymp. xcix. 2. A. C. 383.

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of private audacity, represents Phœbidas as a man of a light and vain mind, who loved the fame of a splendid action more than life itself, and who embraced, with childish transports of joy²⁵, the proposal of Leontiades. The mode of executing their plan was soon settled between them. To elude suspicion Phœbidas made the usual preparations for continuing his journey, when he was suddenly recalled by his associate. It was the month of July; the heat was intense; and, at mid-day, few or no passengers were to be seen in the roads or streets. The Theban matrons celebrated the festival of Ceres, and prayed that bountiful divinity to preserve the hope of a favourable harvest. The appropriated scene of their female worship was the Cadmæa, or citadel, of which the gates had been purposely thrown open, and which was totally defenceless, as the males were universally excluded from this venerable ceremony. Every circumstance conspired to facilitate the design of Leontiades, who conducted the Lacedæmonians to the fortress, without finding the smallest opposition. He immediately descended to the senate, which, though it usually assembled in the Cadmæa, was then sitting in the market-place; declared that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his advice, and without any purpose of hostility; seized Ismenias with his own hand as a disturber of the public peace, and ordered the other leaders of the republican faction to be taken into safe custody. Many were caught and imprisoned, and about four hundred escaped to Athens²⁶.

The measure
approved by
Agefilaus.

When the news of this event reached Sparta, the senate and assembly resounded with real or well feigned complaints against the madness of Phœbidas, who, unprovoked by any injury, had violently seized a place in alliance and amity with the republic. Agefilaus, however, undertook his defence; his ambitious mind had long fomented the domineering arrogance of his country; possibly

²⁵ *Ανεκδιδομένη* is the expression used by Xenophon.

²⁶ Xenoph. p. 557.

he had prompted the enterprize of Phœbidas, which he warmly approved; and his influence being as extensive as his abilities, he easily persuaded his countrymen to justify the fortunate rashness²⁷ of that commander, by keeping possession of the Theban citadel.

During five years the Spartans maintained in the Cadmæa, a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Protected by such a body of foreign troops, which might be reinforced on the shortest warning, the partisans of aristocracy acquired an absolute ascendant in the affairs of the republic, which they conducted in such a manner as best suited their own interest, and the convenience of Sparta. Without pretending to describe the banishments, confiscations, and murders, of which they were guilty, it is sufficient for the purpose of general history to observe, that the miserable victims of their vengeance suffered similar calamities to those which afflicted Athens under the thirty tyrants. The severity of the government at length drove the Thebans to despair; and both the persecuted exiles abroad, and the oppressed subjects at home, prepared to embrace any measures, however daring and hazardous, which promised them a faint hope of relief²⁸.

Among the Theban fugitives, who had taken refuge in Athens, and whose persons were now loudly demanded by Sparta, was Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, a youth whose distinguished advantages might justly render him an object of envy, before he was involved in the misfortunes of his country. He yielded to none in birth; he surpassed all in fortune; he excelled in the manly exercises so much esteemed by the Greeks, and was unrivalled in qualities still more estimable, generosity and courage. He had an hereditary attachment to the democratic form of policy; and, previous to the

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The cruelties
of Sparta
drive the
Thebans to
despair.

Conspiracy
of the The-
ban exiles.
Olymp. c. 3.
A. C. 378.

²⁷ To save appearances, however, Phœbidas was fined. Even his accusers were of fended, not at his injustice, but at his acting without orders. Xenoph. *ibid.* & Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 336.

²⁸ Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. v. c. iv. Plut. in Pelopid. *idem de genio Socratis*, p. 322. & seqq.

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late melancholy revolution, was marked out by his numerous friends and adherents as the person most worthy of administering the government. Pelopidas had often conferred with his fellow-sufferers at Athens about the means of returning to their country, and restoring the democracy; encouraging them by the example of the patriotic Thraſybulus, who, with a handful of men, had iſſued from Thebes, and effected a ſimilar, but ſtill more difficult, enterpriſe. While they ſecretly deliberated on this important object, Mello, one of the exiles, introduced to their nocturnal aſſembly his friend Phyllidas, who had lately arrived from Thebes; a man whoſe enterpriſing activity, ſingular addreſs, and crafty boldneſs, juſtly entitle him to the regard of hiſtory.

Aſſiſſed by
Phyllidas,
ſecretary to
the Theban
council.

Phyllidas was ſtrongly attached to the cauſe of the exiles; yet by his inſinuating complaiſance, and officious ſervility, he had acquired the entire confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other magiſtrates, or rather tyrants²⁹, of the republic. In buſineſs and in pleaſure, he rendered himſelf alike neceſſary to his maſters; his diligence and abilities had procured him the important office of ſecretary to the council; and he had lately promiſed to Archias and Philip, the two moſt licentious of the tyrants, that he would give them an entertainment, during which they might enjoy the converſation and the perſons of the fineſt women in Thebes. The day was appointed for this infamous rendezvous, which theſe magiſterial debauchees expected with the greateſt impatience; and, in the interval, Phyllidas ſet out for Athens, on pretence of private buſineſs³⁰.

The time
and means
of execution
adjusted.

In Athens, the time and the means were adjusted for executing the conſpiracy. A body of Theban exiles aſſembled in the Thriaſian plain, on the frontier of Attica, where ſeven³¹, or twelve³², of the youngſt and moſt enterpriſing, voluntarily offered themſelves to enter the capital, and to co-operate with Phyllidas in the deſtruction of the magiſtrates. The diſtance between Thebes and Athens was

²⁹ Τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν αὐτὴν. Xenoph.

³⁰ Xenoph. p. 566.

³¹ Xenoph. p. 566.

³² Plutarch. in Pelopid.

about thirty-five miles. The conspirators had thirteen miles to march through a hostile territory. They disguised themselves in the dress of peasants, arrived at the city towards evening with nets and hunting poles, and passed the gates without suspicion. During that night, and the succeeding day, the house of Charon, a wealthy and respectable citizen, the friend of Phyllidas, and a determined enemy of the aristocracy, afforded them a secure refuge, till the favourable moment summoned them to action.

The important evening approached, when the artful secretary had prepared his long-expected entertainment in the treasury. Nothing had been omitted that could flatter the senses, and lull the activity of the mind in a dream of pleasure. But a secret and obscure rumour, which had spread in the city, hung, like a drawn dagger over the voluptuous joys of the festivity. It had been darkly reported, that some unknown strangers, supposed to be a party of the exiles, had been received into the house of Charon. All the address of Phyllidas could not divert the terrors of his guests. They dispatched one of their liors or attendants to demand the immediate presence of Charon. The conspirators were already buckling on their armour, in hopes of being immediately summoned to execute their purpose. But what was their astonishment and terror, when their host and protector was sternly ordered to appear before the magistrates! The most sanguine were persuaded that their design had become public, and that they must all miserably perish, without effecting any thing worthy of their courage. After a moment of dreadful reflection, they exhorted Charon to obey the mandate without delay. But that firm and patriotic Theban first went to the apartment of his wife, took his infant son, an only child, and presented him to Pelopidas and Mello, requesting them to retain in their hands this dearest pledge of his fidelity. They unanimously declared their entire confidence in his honour, and entreated him to remove from danger a helpless infant, who might become, in some
future

Fidelity of
the conspirators to each
other.

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future time, the avenger of his country's wrongs. But Charon was inflexible, declaring, "That his son could never aspire at a happier fortune, than that of dying honourably with his father and friends."

Their dis-
simulation and
address.

So saying, he addressed a short prayer to the gods, embraced his associates, and departed. Before he arrived at the treasury, he was met by Archias and Phyllidas. The former asked him, in the presence of the other magistrates, whose anxiety had brought them from table, "Who are those strangers said to have arrived the other day, and to be entertained in your family?" Charon had composed his countenance so artfully, and retorted the question with such well-dissembled surprise, as considerably quieted the solicitude of the tyrants, which was totally removed by a whisper of Phyllidas, "That the absurd rumour had doubtless been spread for no other purpose but that of disturbing their pleasures."

The Theban
magistrates
assassinated.

They had scarcely returned to the banquet, when Fortune, as if she had taken pleasure to confound the dexterity of Phyllidas, raised up a new and most alarming danger. A courier arrived from Athens with every mark of haste and trepidation, desiring to see Archias, to whom he delivered a letter from an Athenian magistrate of the same name, his ancient friend and guest. This letter revealed the conspiracy; a secret not entrusted to the messenger, who had orders, however, to request Archias to read the dispatch immediately, as containing matters of the utmost importance. But that careless voluptuary, whose thoughts were totally absorbed in the expected scene of pleasure, replied with a smile, "Business to-morrow;" deposited the letter under the pillow of the couch, on which, according to ancient custom, he lay at the entertainment; and resumed his conversation with Phyllidas concerning the ladies, whom he had promised to introduce. Matters were now come to a crisis; Phyllidas retired for a moment; the conspirators were put in motion; their weapons concealed under the flowing swell of female attire, and their

their countenances overshadowed and hid by a load of crowns and garlands. In this disguise they were presented to the magistrates, intoxicated with wine and folly. At a given signal they drew their daggers, and effected their purpose³³. Charon and Mello were the principal actors in this bloody scene, which was entirely directed by Phyllidas. But a more difficult task remained. Leontiades, with other abettors of the tyranny, still lived, to avenge the murder of their associates. The conspirators, encouraged by their first success, and conducted by Phyllidas, gained admission into their houses successively, by means of the unsuspected secretary. On the appearance of disorder and tumult, Leontiades seized his sword, and boldly prepared for his defence. Pelopidas had the merit of destroying the principal author of the Theban servitude and disgrace. His associates perished without resistance; men whose names may be assigned to just oblivion, since they were distinguished by nothing memorable but their cruel and oppressive tyranny.

The measures of the conspirators were equally vigorous and prudent. Before alarming the city, they proceeded to the different prisons, which were crowded with the unfortunate victims of arbitrary power. Every door was open to Phyllidas. The captives, transported with joy and gratitude, increased the strength of their deliverers. They broke open the arsenals, and provided themselves with arms. The streets of Thebes now resounded with alarm and terror; every house and family were filled with confusion and uproar; the inhabitants were universally in motion; some providing lights, others running in wild disorder to the public places, and all anxiously wishing the return of day, that they might discover the unknown cause of this nocturnal tumult.

During a moment of dreadful silence, which interrupted the noise of sedition, a herald proclaimed, with a clear and loud voice, the

The prisoners set
at liberty.

Epaminondas joins the
insurgents.

³³ Xenoph. p. 567. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 470.

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death of the tyrants, and summoned to arms the friends of liberty and the republic. Among others who obeyed the welcome invitation was Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, a youth of the most illustrious merit; who united the wisdom of the sage, and the magnanimity of the hero, with the practice of every mild and gentle virtue; unrivalled in knowledge and in eloquence; in birth, valour, and patriotism, not inferior to Pelopidas, with whom he had contracted an early friendship. The principles of the Pythagorean philosophy³⁴, which he had diligently studied under Lysis of Tarentum, rendered Epaminondas averse to engage in the conspiracy, lest he might embroil his hands in civil blood³⁵. But after the sword was once drawn, he appeared with ardour in defence of his friends and country; and his example was followed by many brave and generous youths who had reluctantly endured the double yoke of domestic and foreign tyranny.

The Theban
democracy
restored.
Olymp.
c. 3.
A. C. 378.

The approach of morning had brought the Theban exiles, in arms, from the Thriasian plain. The partisans of the conspirators were continually increased by a confluence of new auxiliaries from every quarter of the city. Encompassed by such an invincible band of adherents, Pelopidas and his associates proceeded to the market-place; summoned a general assembly of the people; explained the necessity, the object, and the extent of the conspiracy; and, with the universal approbation of their fellow-citizens, restored the democratic form of government³⁶.

The revolution
communicated to
the Athenians, who
assist in expelling the
Lacedæmonian garrison.

Exploits of valour and intrepidity may be discovered in the history of every nation. But the revolution of Thebes displayed not less wisdom of design, than enterprising gallantry in execution. Amidst the tumult of action, and ardour of victory, the conspirators possessed sufficient coolness and foresight to reflect that the Cadmeæ, or citadel, which

³⁴ See Vol. I. p. 391—408.

³⁵ Plutarch. de genio Socratis, p. 279, & passim.

³⁶ Xenoph. Diodor. & Plutarch. ibid.

was held by a Lacedæmonian garrison of fifteen hundred men, would be reinforced, on the first intelligence of danger, by the resentful activity of Sparta. To anticipate this alarming event, which must have rendered the consequences of the conspiracy incomplete and precarious, they commanded the messenger, whom, immediately after the destruction of the tyrants, they had dispatched to their friends in the Thriasian plain, to proceed to Athens, in order to communicate the news of a revolution which could not fail to be highly agreeable to that state, and to solicit the immediate assistance of the Athenians, whose superior skill in attacking fortified places was acknowledged by Greeks and Barbarians. This message was attended with the most salutary effects. The acute discernment of the Athenians eagerly seized the precious opportunity of weakening Sparta³⁷, which, if once neglected, might never return. Several thousand men were ordered to march; and no time was lost, either in the preparation, or in the journey, since they reached Thebes the day after Pelopidas had re-established the democracy.

The seasonable arrival of those auxiliaries, whose celerity exceeded the most sanguine hopes of the Thebans, increased the ardour of the latter to attack the citadel. The events of the siege are variously related³⁸. According to the most probable account, the garrison made a very feeble resistance, being intimidated by the impetuous alacrity and enthusiasm, as well as the increasing numbers of the assailants, who already amounted to fourteen thousand men, and received continual accessions of strength from the neighbouring cities of Bœotia. Only a few days had elapsed, when the Lacedæmonians desired to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to depart in safety with their arms. Their proposal was readily accepted; but they seem not to have demanded, or at least not to have obtained, any

The Cad-
mea surren-
ders.
Olymp.
c. 3.
A. C. 378.

³⁷ Dinarch. Orat. contra Demosth. p. 100.ophon and Plutarch, whom I have chiefly

³⁸ Diodorus differs entirely from Xenophon and Plutarch, whom I have chiefly followed.

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terms of advantage or security for those unfortunate Thebans, whose attachment to the Spartan interest strongly solicited their protection. At the first alarm of sedition, these unhappy men, with their wives and families, had taken refuge in the citadel. The greater part of them cruelly perished by the resentment of their countrymen; a remnant only was saved by the humane interposition of the Athenians³⁹. So justly had Epaminondas suspected, that the revolution could not be accomplished without the effusion of civil blood.

³⁹ Xenoph. & Plutarch. *ibid*.

C H A P. XXX.

The Bœotian War.—Unsuccessful Attempt of Sphodrius against the Piræus.—Doubts concerning Xenophon's Account of that Transaction.—Agefilaus invades Bœotia.—Military Success of the Thebans.—Naval Success of the Athenians.—Congress for Peace under the Mediation of Artaxerxes.—Epaminondas, Deputy from Thebes.—Cleombrotus invades Bœotia.—Battle of Leuctra.—State of Greece.—Jason of Thessaly.—His Character and Views.—Assassinated in the midst of his Projects.

THE emancipation of Thebes gave a deep wound to the pride and tyranny of Sparta; and the magistrates of the latter republic prepared to punish, with due severity, what they affected to term the unprovoked rebellion of their subjects. The Thebans were firmly resolved to maintain the freedom which they had assumed; and these dispositions on both sides occasioned a memorable war, which, having lasted with little interruption during seven years, ended with the battle of Leuctra, which produced a total revolution in the affairs of Greece.

The ardent mind of Agefilaus had long inspired, or directed, the ambitious views of his country. He enjoyed the glory, but could not avoid the odium, attached to his exalted situation; and fearing to increase the latter, he allowed the conduct of the Theban war to be committed to the inexperience of his unequal colleague.

‡

In

C H A P.
XXX.The Bœotian
war.
Olymp. c. 5.
A. C. 378.First cam-
paign under
Cleombro-
tus.

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In the heart of a severe winter, Cleombrotus, with a well-appointed army, entered Bœotia. His presence confirmed the obedience of Theſpiæ, Plataea, and other inferior communities. He defeated some straggling parties of the Thebans, repelled their incursions, ravaged their territory, burned their villages, but attempted not to make any impression on the well-defended strength of their city. After a campaign of two months, he returned home, leaving a numerous garrison in Theſpiæ, commanded by Sphodrias, a general of great enterprise, but little prudence.

Sphodrias
left with a
garrison in
Theſpiæ.

Stratagem of
Thebes for
widening the
breach be-
tween Athens
and Sparta.

Meanwhile the Athenians, alarmed by the nearer view of danger, publicly disavowed the assistance which they had given to Thebes; and having disgraced, banished, or put to death^{*}, the advisers of that daring measure, renewed their alliance with Sparta. The Thebans felt the full importance of this defection, and left nothing untried to prevent its fatal tendency, a design (could we believe tradition) in which they succeeded by a very singular stratagem. The light and rash character of Sphodrias was well known, we are told, to the Theban chiefs, who employed secret emissaries to persuade him, by arguments most flattering to his passions, to attack by surprise the imperfectly repaired harbour of Athens. These artful ministers of deceit represented to Sphodrias, that it was unworthy of his dignity, and of his valour, to employ the arms of Sparta in a predatory war, while an object of far more importance and glory naturally solicited the activity of his enterprising mind. “The Thebans, indeed, were vigilant in guard; and, being animated by the enthusiasm of newly-recovered freedom, were determined, rather than surrender, to bury themselves under the ruins of their country. But their secret and perfidious ally, whose assistance had recently enabled them to throw off the Spartan yoke, was lulled in security. The moment had arrived for crushing

^{*} Xenoph. p. 334. I have endeavoured to reconcile Xenophon and Diarrhus, cited above.

the implacable hatred of the Athenians, by surprising the Piræus, their principal ornament and defence; an action which would be celebrated by posterity above the kindred glory of Phæbidas, who, during the time also of an insidious peace, had seized the Theban citadel²."

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The distance between Thebes and Thespiæ, which was not more than twenty miles, furnished an easy opportunity for carrying on these secret practices; but the distance, which exceeded forty miles, between Thebes and Athens, rendered the enterprize of Sphodrias abortive. He marched from Thespiæ with the flower of his garrison, early in the morning, expecting to reach the Piræus before the dawn of the succeeding day. But he was surprised by the return of light in the Thriatian plain. The borough of Eleusis was alarmed; the report flew to Athens, and the citizens, with their usual alacrity, seized their arms, and prepared for a vigorous defence. The mad design, and the still greater madness of Sphodrias, in ravaging the country during his retreat, provoked the fury of the Athenians. They immediately seized the persons of such Lacedæmonians as happened to reside in their city. They sent an embassy to Sparta, complaining, in the most indignant terms, of the insult of Sphodrias. The Spartans disavowed his conduct. He was recalled and tried, but saved from death by the authority of Ageilaus. This powerful protection was obtained by the intercession of his son Cleonymus, the beloved companion of Archidamus, the son and successor of the Spartan king. Archidamus pleaded, with the modest eloquence of tears, for the father of a friend, his equal in years and valour, with whom he had been long united in the most tender affection. Cleonymus declared on this occasion, that he should never disgrace the ardent attachment of the royal youth: and illustrious as Archidamus afterwards became, Xenophon affirms,

Unsuccessful
attempt of
Sphodrias to
seize the Pi-
ræus.

² Xenoph. p. 340. Diodorus, p. 472.

that

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that his early and unalterable love of Cleonymus forms not the shade, but rather the fairest light, of his amiable and exalted character³.

Doubts concerning Xenophon's account of this transaction.

Such is the account of this transaction, given originally by Xenophon, and faithfully copied by other writers, ancient and modern. But there is some reason to suspect that Agefilaus was not totally unacquainted with the ambitious and unwarrantable design of Sphodrias; that the Spartans would have approved the measure, had it been crowned with success; and that even the philosophic Xenophon, a partial admirer of Agefilaus and the Lacedæmonians, has employed the persuasive simplicity of his inimitable style, to varnish a very unjustifiable transaction. Such, at least, it appeared to the Athenian assembly, who, offended by the crime, were still more indignant at the acquittal, of Sphodrias. From that time they began to prepare their fleet, to enlist sailors, to collect and to employ all the materials of war, with a resolution firmly to maintain the cause of Thebes and their own.

Agefilaus repeatedly invades Boeotia. Olymp. c. 4. A. C. 377. & Olymp. ci. i. A. C. 376.

While they were busied in such preparations, Agefilaus repeatedly invaded Boeotia, without performing any thing worthy of his former renown. His army amounted to eighteen thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse. The enemy were assisted by a considerable body of mercenaries, commanded by Chabrias the Athenian, who finally repelled the Spartan king from Thebes, by a stratagem not less simple than uncommon. The Theban army, prepared to act on the defensive against a superior force, had occupied a rising ground in the neighbourhood of their city. Agefilaus detached a body of light-armed troops, to provoke them to quit this advantageous post; but the Thebans cautiously maintained their ground, and obliged the enemy to draw out their whole forces, in order to dislodge them. Chabrias, waiting their approach, commanded his

³ Xenoph. p. 570.

troops to execute a new movement, which he had recently taught them for such an emergency. They supported their advanced bodies on their left knee, extended their shields and spears, and thus firmly maintained their ranks*. Alarmed at the determined boldness of an unusual array, which seemed to bid him defiance, Agefilaus withdrew his army from the capital, and contented himself with committing farther ravages on the country.

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In the skirmishes which happened after his retreat, the Thebans proved repeatedly victorious. He returned home, and continued at Sparta during the following year, to be cured of his wounds; where he suffered the mortifying reproaches of his adversary Antalcidas, "for teaching the Thebans to conquer." The generals who succeeded him had not better success. Phœbidas, the original author of the war, who had been appointed governor of Thespiæ, was defeated and slain, with the greatest part of the garrison of that place. Pelopidas, with his own hand, killed the Spartan commander in the action at Tanagra; and in the pitched battle of Tegyra, the Lacedæmonians, though superior in number, were broken and put to flight; a disgrace which, they reflected with sorrow, had never befallen them in any former engagement.

Success of the
Thebans.
Olymp. ci. 2.
A. C. 375.

While the war was thus carried on by land, the Athenians put to sea, and gained the most distinguished advantages on their fa-

Naval success
of the Athe-
nians.
Olymp. ci. 1.
A. C. 376.

* The words of Nepos, in Chabria, are better explained by reading, "Qui obnixo genu, scuto projectaque hasta impetum excipere hostium docuit." This agrees with the statue of Chabrias in the Villa Borghese, whose singular attitude has given so much trouble to antiquaries. Winkermann conjectures this master-piece of art to be the most ancient statue in Rome, from the form of the letters in the name Agasias with which it is inscribed. He observes, that it is erroneously supposed to be a gladiator, since the Greeks never honoured gladiators with such monuments; and the style of the workmanship proves it more an-

cient than the introduction of that inhuman spectacle into Greece. The body of the statue is advanced, and rests on the left thigh; the right arm grasps a javelin, or spear; around the left is seen the leather thong, or handle of a shield. It seems, says Winkermann, the particular attitude of a warrior on some dangerous emergency. What this emergency was, the learned and ingenious Lessing fortunately discovered, by the words of Cornelius Nepos. "Hoc (the stratagem of Chabrias) usque eò tota Græcia fama celebratum est, ut illo statu Chabrias sibi statum fieri voluerit, quæ publicè ei ab Atheniensibus in foro constituta est."

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yourite clement. The Lacedæmonian fleet, of sixty sail, commanded by Pellis, was shamefully defeated near the isle of Naxos, by the skilful bravery of Chabrias, who performed alternately, and with equal abilities, the duties of admiral and general⁵. But the principal scene of action was the Ionian sea, where Timotheus⁶ and Iphicrates every where prevailed over the commanders who opposed them. The fleet of Sparta was totally ruined by the victors, who repeatedly ravaged the coasts of Laconia⁷, and laid under heavy contributions the islands of Corcyra, Zacynthus, Leucadia, and Cephalenia. Even the isles and cities more remote from the scene of this naval war, particularly the valuable island of Chios, and the important city of Byzantium, deserted their involuntary connection with the declining fortune of Sparta, and once more accepted the dangerous alliance of the Athenians⁸.

The Greeks
assist Arta-
xerxes in the
Egyptian
war.

These hostile operations, which weakened, without subduing, the spirit of the vanquished, were interrupted by the solicitations and bribes of the king of Persia, who earnestly promoted the domestic tranquillity of Greece, that he might enjoy the assistance of its arms in crushing a new rebellion in Egypt. His emissaries met with equal success in Athens and Sparta, which were alike weary of the war, the former having little more to hope, and the latter having every thing to fear, from its continuance. Many of the inferior states, being implicitly governed by the resolves of these powerful republics, readily imitated their example. And so precarious and miserable was the condition of them all, in that disorderly period, that about twenty thousand men abandoned their homes and families, and followed the standard of the Persians. The merit of Iphicrates justly entitled him to the command of his countrymen, which

⁵ Xenoph. p. 577. Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. ci. i.

⁶ Corn. Nep. in vit. Timoth. & Dinarch. adv. Demosth. Such was the good fortune of Timotheus, that the satirical artists of the

times painted him asleep, covered with a net, in which the cities and islands entangled and caught themselves. Plutarch. de invid. & odio.

⁷ Xenoph. p. 578. ⁸ Id. ibid.

was unanimously conferred on him. But the expedition produced nothing worthy of such a general, who in a few months returned to Athens, disgusted with the ignorant pride, and slothful timidity, of the Persian commanders, who durst not undertake any important enterprize, without receiving the slow instructions of a distant court⁹.

Meanwhile the Thebans, who, elated by a flow of unwonted prosperity, had proudly disregarded the representations of Artaxerxes, profited of the temporary diversion made by the Egyptian war, to reduce several inferior cities of Bœotia. The walls of Theſpie were rased to the ground; Platæa met with the same fate; and its inhabitants, after suffering the cruellest indignities, were driven into banishment. It might be expected that the unfortunate exiles should have sought refuge in Sparta, whose authority they had uniformly acknowledged, since the dishonourable peace of Antalcidas. But so dissimilar were the fluctuating politics of Greece to the regular transactions of modern times (governed by the lifeless but steady principle of interest), that the Platæans had recourse to Athens, a city actually in alliance with the people, by whom they had been so unjustly persecuted. Their eloquence, their tears, the memory of past services, and the promise of future gratitude, prevailed on the Athenian assembly, who kindly received them into the bosom of their republic, and expressed the warmest indignation against their insolent oppressors¹⁰.

This affecting transaction threatened to deprive the Thebans of an ally, to whom they were in a great measure indebted for their prosperity. Their subsequent conduct tended still farther to widen the breach. They marched troops into Phocis, with an intention to reduce that country. They heard with equal disdain, the remonstrances of their friends, and the threats of their enemies.

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The Thebans rase Platæa. Olymp. ci. 3. A. C. 374.

Congress for peace held under the mediation of Artaxerxes, Olymp. cii. 1. A. C. 372.

⁹ Corn. Nepos in Iphicrat. Diodorus, ¹⁰ Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. & Isocrat. l. xv. ad Olym. c. iv. Orat. pro Plat.

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Their unusual arrogance totally alienated the Athenians, who seemed finally disposed to conclude a lasting peace with Sparta, on the principles of the treaty of Antalcidas, that their respective garrisons should be withdrawn from foreign parts, and the communities, small as well as great, be permitted to enjoy the independent government of their own equitable laws. The interest of the king of Persia, who still needed fresh supplies to carry on the Egyptian war, induced him to employ his good offices for promoting this specious purpose; and a convention of all the states was summoned to Sparta, whither the Thebans deigned indeed to send a representative; but a representative, whose firmness and magnanimity were well fitted to sustain and elevate the aspiring pretensions of his republic.

Epaminondas appears as deputy from Thebes.

In effecting this glorious revolution which gave freedom to Thebes, as well as in the military operations, which immediately followed that important event, the youthful merit of Pelopidas had acquired the fame of patriotism, valour, and conduct. The nobility of his birth, and the generous use of his riches, increased the ascendant due to his illustrious services. Every external advantage, the manly grace of his person, the winning affability of his deportment, his superior excellence in the martial exercises so highly prized by the Greeks, and especially by the Thebans, gained him the admiration of the multitude; or, in other words, of the legislative assembly of his country. He had been successively elected, during six years, to the first dignity of the republic; nor had the Thebans ever found reason to repent their choice". Yet in the present emergency, when they were required to appoint a deputy for the convention at Sparta (the most important charge with which any citizen could be entrusted), Pelopidas, with all his merit, was not the minister whom they thought proper to employ.

His character.

Epaminondas, naturally his rival, but always his friend, had hitherto been contented with a subordinate station: yet every office

" Plat. in Pelopid.

he

he exercised, whether in the civil or military department, derived new lustre from his personal dignity. His exterior accomplishments were not inferior to those of Pelopidas; but he had learned from the philosophy of Lyfis the Pythagorean, to prefer the mind to the body, merit to fame, and the rewards of virtue to the gifts of fortune. He resisted the generous solicitations of his friends to deliver him from the honourable poverty in which he was born; continuing poor from taste and choice, and justly delighting in a situation, which is more favourable, especially in a democratical republic, to that freedom and independence of mind which wisdom recommends as the greatest good. Nor was he more careless of money than avaricious of time, which he continually dedicated to the study of learning and philosophy, or employed in the exercise of public and private virtue. Yet to become useful he was not desirous to be great. The same solicitude which others felt to obtain, Epaminondas shewed to avoid, the dangerous honours of his country. His ambitious temper would have been better satisfied to direct, by a personal influence with the magistrates, the administration of government from the bosom of his beloved retirement¹², when the unanimous voice of the citizens, and still more the urgency of the times, called him to public life; and such was his contempt for the glory of a name, that had he lived in a less turbulent period, his exalted qualities, however admired by select friends, would have probably remained unknown to his contemporaries and posterity.

Such was the man to whose abilities and eloquence the Thebans committed the defence of their most important interests in the general congress of the Grecian states. The Athenians sent Antocles and Callistratus; the first a subtle¹³, the second an affecting orator¹⁴. Agesilaus himself appeared on the part of Sparta. Matters were

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Conference
at Sparta.
Olymp.
cii. 1.
A. C. 372.

¹² The conduct of Epaminondas coincides with, and confirms, the account above given of the Pythagorean philosophy.

¹³ Εὐριπίδης; *περὶ*, Xenoph. l. vi.

¹⁴ The pathetic pleading of Callistratus, for the citizens of Oropus first inspired Demosthenes with the ambition of eloquence. *Plat. in Demosth.*

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Epaminon-
das.

easily adjusted between those leading republics, who felt equal resentment at the unhappy fate of Theſſia and Platæa. They lamented their mutual jealousy, and unfortunate ambition, which had occasioned ſo many bloody and deſtructive wars; and commemorated the ſhort but glorious intervals of moderation and concord, which had tended ſo evidently to their own and the public felicity. Inſtructed by fatal experience, it was time for them to lay down their arms, and to allow that tranquillity to themſelves and to their neighbours, which was neceſſary to heal the wounds of their common country. The peace could not be uſeful or permanent, unleſs it were eſtabliſhed on the liberal principles of equality and freedom, to which all the Grecian communities were alike entitled by the treaty of Antalcidas. It was propoſed, therefore, to renew that ſalutary contract, which was accepted by the unanimous conſent of Athens, of Sparta, and of their reſpective confederates.

Epaminondas¹⁵ then ſtood up, offering to ſign the treaty in the name of the Bœotians. “The Athenians,” he took notice, “had ſigned for all the inhabitants of Attica; the Spartans had ſigned not only for the cities of Laconia, but for their numerous allies in all the provinces of the Peloponneſus. Thebes was entitled to the ſame prerogatives over her dependent cities, which had anciently acknowledged the power of her kings, and had recently ſubmitted to the arms of her citizens.” Ageſilaus, inſtead of anſwering directly a demand which could neither be granted with honour, nor denied with juſtice, aſked, in his turn, Whether it was the intention of the Thebans to admit, in terms of the treaty, the independence of Bœotia? Epaminondas demanded, Whether it was the intention of Sparta to admit the independence of Laconia? “Shall the Bœotians,” ſaid

¹⁵ The convention of Sparta is noticed by Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos. The firſt writer is ſilent with regard to Epaminondas. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos furniſh the hints which

I have made uſe of in the text. It is not poſſible that there were two conventions, at different times, reſpecting the ſame object. In that caſe Xenophon muſt have totally omitted one of them.

the king, with emotion, "be free?" "Whenever," replied Epaminondas with firmness, "you restore freedom to the Lacedæmonians, the Messenians, and the oppressed communities of Peloponnesus, whom, under the name of allies, you retain in an involuntary and rigorous servitude."

Then turning to the deputies of the allies, he represented to them the cruel mockery by which they were insulted. "Summoned to deliberate concerning the general freedom and independence, they were called to ratify a peace, which, instead of establishing these invaluable and sacred rights, confirmed the stern tyranny of an imperious master." That "the cities, small and great, should be free," was the verbal condition of the treaty; but its real drift and import was, that Thebes should give freedom to Bœotia, and thereby weaken her own strength, while Sparta kept in subjection the extensive territories of her confederates, in whose name she had signed that perfidious contract, and whose assistance she expected, and could demand, towards giving it immediate effect. If the allies persisted in their actual resolution, they consented to destroy the power of Thebes, which was the only bulwark to defend them against Spartan usurpation: they consented to continue the payment of those intolerable contributions with which they had long been oppressed; and to obey every idle summons to war, of which *they* chiefly suffered the fatigues and dangers, while the advantage and glory redounded to the Spartans alone. If they felt any respect for the glorious name of their ancestors; if they entertained any sense of their own most precious interests, they would be so little disposed to promote the reduction of Thebes, that they would imitate the auspicious example of that ancient and noble city, which had acquired the dignity of independent government, not by inscriptions¹⁶ and treaties, but by arms and valour.

He addresses
the deputies
of the allies.

¹⁶ The public deeds and transactions of the Greeks were inscribed on pillars of marble. Thucyd. & Xenoph. passim.

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Permanent
effect of his
representa-
tions,

The just remonstrances of Epaminondas made a deep impression on the deputies. Agefilas, alarmed at its effect, answered him in a strain very different from that despotic brevity¹⁷ which the Spartans usually affected. His speech was long and eloquent. He reasoned, prayed, threatened. The deputies were awed into submission, less perhaps by the force of his eloquence, than by the terror of the Spartan armies ready to take the field. But the words of Epaminondas sunk deep into their hearts. They communicated, at their return, the powerful impression to their constituents; and its influence was visible in the field of Leuctra, and in the events which followed that memorable engagement.

Reflections
on his con-
duct.

As the Grecian states were accustomed to grant more unre-served powers to their generals and ministers, than are allowed by the practice of modern times, we must be contented to doubt, whether, in this important negotiation, Epaminondas acted merely by the extemporary impulse of his own mind, or only executed, with boldness and dignity, the previous instructions of his republic. It is certain, that his refusal to acknowledge the freedom of Bœotia, not only excluded Thebes from the treaty, but exposed her to the immediate vengeance of the confederates; and according to the received principles of modern policy, there is reason to accuse both the prudence and the justice of the admired Theban; his prudence in provoking the strength of a confederacy, with which the weakness of any single republic seemed totally unable to contend, and his justice in denying to *several* communities of Bœotia their hereditary laws and government. Yet the conduct of Epaminondas has never been exposed to such odious reproaches. Success justified his audacity; and the Greeks, animated by an ambitious enthusiasm to aggrandise their respective cities, were taught to dignify by the names of patriotism and magnanimity, qualities which, in

¹⁷ Epaminondas said, or more probably the Spartans to lengthen their monosyllables. It was said for him, that he had compelled Plut. in Agefil.

the sober judgment of posterity, would be degraded by very different appellations. There are reasons, however, not merely specious, by which Epaminondas might justify his conduct at an impartial bar. He could not be ignorant that Thebes, unassisted and alone, was unable to cope with the general confederacy of Greece: but he knew that this confederacy would never exist but in words, since the jealousy of several states, and particularly of Athens, would be disposed rather to commiserate, than to increase, the calamities of a people at variance with Sparta¹⁸. He perceived the effect of his spirited remonstrances on the most steadfast adherents of that republic; and contemplating the circumstances of his country, and of the enemy, he found several motives of encouragement to the seemingly unequal contest.

The Spartans had been weakened by the defection and loss of their dominions, and dejected by their unfortunate attempts to recover them. They had been deprived of their prescriptive honours, and had forsaken their hereditary maxims. Their ancient and venerable laws had in a great measure ceased to govern them; and the seeds of those corruptions were already sown, which have been censured by philosophers and statesmen with equal justice and severity¹⁹. Nor were they exposed to the *usual* misfortunes, only, of a degenerate people; the institutions of Lycurgus formed one consistent plan of legislation, which could not be partially observed and partially neglected. While the submissive disciples of that extraordinary lawgiver remained satisfied with their simplicity of manners, their poverty, and their virtue, and had scarcely any other object in view, but to resist the solicitations of pleasure, and to repel the encroachments of enemies, the law, which discouraged a commercial intercourse with foreign nations, and which excluded strangers, whatever merit they might possess, from aspiring to the rank of citi-

which is justified by
the state of
Sparta.

¹⁸ Xenophon hints at this disposition, l. vi. p. 608.

¹⁹ Aristot. Politic. l. ii. c. 9.

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zens, was an establishment strictly conformable to the peculiar spirit of the Lacedæmonian constitution. But when Sparta abandoned the simplicity of her primitive maxims, became ambitious, wealthy, triumphant, and almost continually engaged in war, not as the means of defence, but as the instrument of power and conquest, consistency required that she should have laid aside her pretensions to those exclusive honours which she no longer deserved. When she relinquished the virtuous pre-eminence of her ancestors, the warlike inhabitants of Peloponnesus were not unworthy to be ranked with her citizens; and by admitting them to this honour, she would have given them an interest in her victories, and rendered them willing partners of her danger. But, instead of adopting this generous policy, which possibly might have rendered her what Rome, with more wisdom, indeed, but not with more virtue or more bravery, afterwards became, the mistress of the world, she increased her pretensions in proportion to the decline of her merit; spurned the equality of a fœderal union, to which the Peloponnesians were entitled; deprived even the Lacedæmonians of their just share in the government, and concentrated all power and authority within the senate and assembly of Sparta. A long course of almost uninterrupted hostilities had deprived her of the best half of her citizens, whose numbers were continually diminishing, without the possibility of ever being repaired; nor could it be difficult to overthrow an empire which depended on the address and bravery of about four thousand warriors, the splendor of a great name, and the reluctant assistance of insulted allies and oppressed subjects¹⁹.

The consideration of these circumstances, which could not fail to present themselves to the sagacity of Epaminondas, might have

¹⁹ The condition of Sparta, represented in the text, is taken from the history of the times in Xenophon and Diodorus, from Aristotle's Politics, l. ii. c. 9. the Oration of Archidamus, and the Panathanæan Oration of Isocrates. The last writer reduces the

number of Spartan citizens to two thousand; a diminution principally occasioned by the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, which happened a considerable time before the composition of that discourse.

encouraged

encouraged him to set the threats of his adversaries at defiance, especially when he reflected on the actual condition of Thebes, whose civil and military institutions had recently acquired new spirit and fresh vigour.

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The Thebans, with their subjects or neighbours in Bœotia, had been long regarded as an unworthy and faithless race, with strong bodies but ignoble souls, and infamous among the Greeks, on account of their ancient alliance with Xerxes and the Barbarians. The divine genius of Pindar had not redeemed them from the character of a sluggish and heavy people, noted even to a proverb for stupidity²⁰. From the age of that inimitable writer, they appear, indeed, to have been little addicted to the pursuit of mental excellence; but they uniformly continued to cultivate, with peculiar care, the gymnastic exercises, which gave the address and dexterity of art to the ponderous strength of their gigantic members. To acquire renown in war, such people only wanted that spark of ethereal fire which is kindled by a generous emulation. The tyranny of Sparta first animated their inactive languor. Having spurned an oppressive yoke, they boldly maintained their freedom; and, in the exercise of defensive war, gained many honourable trophies over enemies who had long despised them. Success enlivened their hopes, inflamed their ambition, and gave a certain elevation to their national character, which rendered them as ambitious of war and victory, as they had formerly been anxious for peace and preservation. They had introduced a severe system of military discipline; they had considerably improved the arms and exercise of cavalry; they had adopted various modes of arranging their forces in order of battle, superior to those practised by their neighbours. Emulation, ardour, mutual esteem, and that spirit of combination, which often prevails in turbulent and distracted times, had united a considerable number of

Compared
with that of
Thebes.

²⁰ Bœotum in crasso jurares aëre natum. Hor. Epist. i. l. 11.

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their citizens in the closest engagements, and inspired them with the generous resolution of braving every danger in defence of each other. This association originally consisted of about three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and commanded by Pelionidas, the glorious restorer of his country's freedom. From the inviolable sanctity of their friendship, they were called the Sacred Band, and their valour was as permanent as their friendship. During a long succession of years, they proved victorious wherever they fought; and at length fell together, with immortal glory, in the field of Chæronæa, with the fall of Thebes, of Athens, and of Greece. Such, in general, were the circumstances and condition of those rival republics²¹, when they were encouraged by their respective chiefs to decide their pretensions by the event of a battle.

Cleombrotus
invades Bœo-
tia.
Olymp.
cii. 2.
A. C. 371.

The Spar-
tans and
their con-
federates as-
semble in the
plain of
Leuctra.

In the interval of several months, between the congress at Sparta and the invasion of Bœotia, Agesilaus and his son Archidamus collected the domestic strength of their republic, and summoned the tardy aid of their confederates. Sicknefs prevented the Spartan king from taking the field in person; but his advice prevailed with the Ephori and senate, to command his colleague Cleombrotus (who, in the former year, had conducted a considerable body of troops into Phocis, in order to repel the Thebans from that country), to march without delay into the hostile territory, with assurance of being speedily joined by a powerful reinforcement. The rendezvous was appointed in the plain of Leuctra, which surrounded an obscure village of the same name, situate on the Bœotian frontier, almost at the equal distance of ten miles from the sea and from Platæa. The plain was encompassed on all sides by the lofty ridges of Hælicon, Cithæron, and Cynocephalæ; and the village was hitherto remarkable only for the tomb of two Theban damsels, the daughters of Scedafus, who had been violated by the brutality of three Spar-

²¹ Plut. in Pelopid. v. 11. p. 355—366.

tan youths. The dishonoured females had ended their disgrace by a voluntary death; and the afflicted father had imitated the example of their despair, after imploring vengeance in vain from gods and men²².

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The Spartans and their confederates joined forces in this neighbourhood, after repelling a few Theban detachments which guarded the defiles of Mount Helicon. Their army amounted to twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans could not muster half that strength, after assembling all their troops, which had been scattered over the frontier, in order to oppose the desultory irruptions of the enemy. Their cavalry, however, nearly equalled those of the Spartans in number, and far excelled them in discipline and in valour. Epaminondas exhorted them to march, and repel the invaders, if they would prevent the defection of Bœotia, and avoid the dangers and disgrace of a siege. They readily obeyed, and proceeded to the neighbouring mountains, on which having encamped, they obtained a commanding view of the forces in the plain.

The Thebans encamp on the neighbouring mountain.

Having heard an account of the superior numbers of the enemy, the Thebans still determined to give them battle. But as the eyes are the most timorous of the senses, they were seized with terror and consternation at beholding the massy extent of the Spartan camp. Several of the colleagues of Epaminondas (for he had no fewer than six) were averse to an engagement, strongly dissuading the general from this dangerous measure, and artfully increasing the panic of the troops, by recounting many sinister omens and prodigies. The magnanimous chief opposed the dangerous torrent of superstitious terror, by a verse of Homer²³, importing, that to men engaged in the pious duty of defending their country, no particular indication was necessary of the favourable will of Heaven, since they were immediately employed in a service peculiarly agreeable to the gods.

Proceedings of Epaminondas before the battle.

²² Xenoph. p. 595.

²³ Εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀριθμῶς ἀμυνέσθαι περὶ πατρίδας, Il. xii. v. 243.

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His magnanimity seconded by fortune.

Disposition of the forces on both sides.

At the same time, he counteracted the dejection of their imaginary fears, by encouragements equally chimerical. It was circulated, by his contrivance, that the Theban temples had opened of their own accord, in consequence of which the priestesses had announced a victory; that the armour of Hercules, repositied in the Cadmea, had suddenly disappeared, as if that invincible hero in person had gone to battle in defence of his Theban countrymen; above all, an ancient oracle was carefully handed about, denouncing defeat and ruin to the Spartans near the indignant tomb of the daughters of Scedafus. These artifices gained the multitude, while arguments more rational prevailed with their leaders, of whom the majority at length ranged themselves on the side of the general.

Before conducting them to battle, Epaminondas displayed his confidence of victory, by permitting all those to retire, who either disapproved his cause, or were averse to share his danger; a permission which the Thebians first thought proper to embrace. The unwarlike crowd of attendants, whose services were useless in time of action, gradually seized the same opportunity to leave the camp. The swelling multitude appeared as a second army to the Spartans, who sent a powerful detachment to oppose them. The fear of being cut off by the enemy threw them back on the Thebans, whose hopes were enlivened by the unexpected return of such a considerable reinforcement. Thus encouraged, they determined unanimously to stand by their admired chief, and either to defend their country, or to perish in the attempt; and the ardour of the troops equalling the skill of the general, both united rendered them invincible.

Cleombrotus had disposed his forces in the form of a crescent, according to an ancient and favourite practice of the Spartans. His cavalry were posted in squadrons along the front of the right wing, where he commanded in person. The allies composed the left wing, conducted by Archidamus. The Theban general, perceiving this disposition,

disposition, and sensible that the issue of the battle would chiefly depend on the domestic troops of Sparta, determined to charge vigorously with his left, in order to seize or destroy the person of Cleombrotus; thinking that should this design succeed, the Spartans must be discouraged and repelled; and that even the attempt must occasion great disorder in their ranks, as the bravest would hasten, from every quarter, to defend the sacred person of their king. Having resolved, therefore, to commit the fortune of the day to the bravery of the left division of his forces, he strengthened it with the choice of his heavy-armed men, whom he drew up fifty deep. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppose the Spartan horse, whom they excelled in experience and valour. Pelopidas, with the Sacred Band, flanked the whole on the left; and deeming no particular station worthy of their prowess, they were prepared to appear in every tumult of the field, whither they might be called, either by an opportunity of success, or by the prospect of distinguished danger. The principal inconvenience to which the Thebans were exposed, in advancing to the charge, was that of being surrounded by the wide-extended arms of the Spartan crescent. This danger the general foresaw; and in order to prevent it, he spread out his right wing, of which the files had only six men in depth, and the ranks proceeding in an oblique line, diverged the farther from the enemy, in proportion as they extended in length.

The action began with the cavalry, which, on the Spartan side, consisted chiefly of such horses as were kept for pleasure by the richer citizens in time of peace; and which, being an unequal match for the disciplined valour of the Thebans, were speedily broken, and thrown back on the infantry. Their repulse and rout occasioned considerable disorder in the Lacedæmonian ranks, which was greatly heightened by the impetuous onset of the Sacred Band. Epaminondas availed himself of this momentary confusion, to perform one of those rapid evolutions which commonly decide the

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fortune of battles. He formed his strongest, but least numerous division, into a compact wedge, with a sharp point, and with spreading flanks; expecting that the Lacedæmonians, as soon as they had recovered their ranks, would attack the weaker and more extended part of his army, which, from the oblique arrangement in which it had been originally drawn up, seemed prepared for a retreat. The event answered his expectation. While the Lacedæmonians advanced against his right wing, where they found little or no resistance, he rushed forward with his left; and darting like the beak of a galley²⁴ on the flank of the enemy, bore down every thing before him, until he arrived near the post occupied by Cleombrotus. The urgency of the danger recalled to their ancient principles the degenerate disciples of Lycurgus. The bravest warriors flew from every quarter to the assistance of their prince, covered him with their shields, and defended him with their swords and lances. Their impetuous valour resisted the intrepid progress of the Thebans, till the Spartan horsemen, who attended the person of Cleombrotus, were totally cut off, and the king himself, pierced with many wounds, fell on the breathless or expiring bodies of his generous defenders. The fall of the chief gave new rage to the battle. Anger, resentment, and despair, by turns agitated the Spartans. According to the superstitious ideas of paganism, the death of their king appeared to them a slight misfortune, compared with the disgraceful impiety of committing his mangled remains to the insults of an enemy. To prevent this abomination, they exerted their utmost valour, and their strenuous efforts were successful. But they could not obtain any further advantage. Epaminondas was careful to fortify his ranks, and to maintain his order of battle; and the firmness and rapidity of his regular assault gained a complete and decisive victory over the desperate resistance of broken troops. The

²⁴ Xenophon employs this expression on a similar occasion, in relating the battle of Mantinea.

principal strength of the allies had hitherto remained inactive, unwilling rashly to engage in a battle, the motives of which they had never heartily approved. The defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of Cleombrotus, decided their wavering irresolution. They determined, almost with one accord, to decline the engagement; their retreat was effected with the loss of about two thousand men; and the Thebans remained sole masters of the field²⁵.

The care of burying the dead, and the fear of reducing the enemy to despair, seem to have prevented Epaminondas from pursuing the vanquished to their camp; which, as it was strongly fortified, could not be taken without great slaughter of the assailants. When the Lacedæmonians had assembled within the defence of their ditch and rampart, their security from immediate danger allowed them time to reflect with astonishment and sorrow on the humiliating consequences of their recent disaster. Whether they considered the number of the slain, or reflected on the mortifying loss of national honour, it was easy for them to perceive, that, on no former occasion, the glory of their country had ever received such a fatal wound. Many Spartans declared their disgrace too heavy to be borne; that they never would permit their ancient laurels to be buried under a Theban trophy; and that, instead of craving their dead under the protection of a treaty (which would be acknowledging their defeat), they were determined to return into the field, and to recover them by force of arms. This manly, but dangerous resolution, was condemned in the council of war, by the officers of most experience and authority. They observed, that of seven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred had fallen; that the Lacedæmonians had lost one thousand, and the allies two thousand six hundred. Their army indeed still outnumbered that of the enemy; but their domestic forces formed scarcely the tenth part of their strength, nor could they repose any confidence in the forced assist-

The Spartans
crave per-
mission to
bury their
dead.

²⁵ Xenoph. p. 596, & seqq. & Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, & seqq.

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ance of their reluctant confederates, who, emboldened by the misfortunes of Sparta, declared their unwillingness to renew the battle, and scarcely concealed their satisfaction at the humiliation and disgrace of that haughty and tyrannical republic. Yielding, therefore, to the necessity of this miserable juncture, the Spartans sent a herald to crave their dead, and to acknowledge the victory of the Thebans ²⁶.

News of the
defeat at
Leuctra
brought to
Sparta.

Before they found it convenient to return home, the fatal tidings had reached their capital; and, on this memorable occasion, the Spartans exhibited that striking peculiarity of behaviour, which naturally resulted from the institutions of Lycurgus. Availing himself of the extraordinary respect which uncultivated nations bestow on military courage, in preference to all other virtues and accomplishments, that legislator allowed to the man who had lost his defensive armour, or who had fled in the day of battle, but one melancholy alternative, more dreadful than death to a generous mind. The unfortunate soldier was either driven into perpetual banishment, and subjected to every indignity, which, in a rude age, would naturally be inflicted by the resentment of neighbouring and hostile tribes; or, if he submitted to remain at home, he was excluded from the public assemblies, from every office of power or honour, from the protection of the laws, and almost from the society of men, without the shadow of a hope ever to amend his condition. The influence of this stern law, which seems to have been forgotten in the field of Leuctra, was illustrated in a very striking manner, after that unfortunate battle.

Singular behaviour of
the Spartans
on that occasion.

The messenger of bad news arrived, while the Spartans, according to annual custom, were celebrating, in the month of July, the gymnastic and musical entertainments, and invoking Heaven to preserve the fruits of the approaching autumn. Being introduced to the Ephori, he informed them of the public disaster. These magistrates

²⁶ Xenoph. & Plut. *ibid*.

commanded

commanded the festival to proceed; sending, however, to each family a list of the warriors whom it had lost, and enjoining the women to abstain from unavailing lamentations. Next day, the fathers and other relations of such as had perished in the field of battle, appeared in the public places dressed in their gayest attire, saluting and congratulating each other on the bravery of their brethren or children. But the kinsmen of those who had saved themselves by a shameful flight, either remained at home, brooding in silence over their domestic affliction, or, if they ventured abroad, discovered every symptom of unutterable anguish and despair. Their persons were shamefully neglected, their garments rent, their arms folded, their eyes fixed immoveably on the ground; expecting, in humble resignation, the sentence of eternal ignominy ready to be denounced by the magistrate against the unworthy causes of their sorrow²⁷. But, on this critical emergency, the rigour of the Spartan discipline was mitigated by Agesilaus, whom the number and rank of the criminals deterred from inflicting on them the merited punishment. He endeavoured to atone for abandoning the spirit of the laws, by what may appear a very puerile expedient; "Let us suppose," said he, "the sacred institutions of Lycurgus to have slept during one unfortunate day, but henceforth let them resume their wonted vigour and activity:" a sentence extravagantly praised by many writers, as preserving the authority of the laws, while it spared the lives of the citizens. But as, on the one hand, we cannot discover the admired sagacity of Agesilaus in dispensing this act of lenity, so, on the other, we cannot condemn as imprudent the act itself, which the present circumstances of his country rendered not only expedient, but necessary. If Sparta had been the populous capital of an extensive territory, the lives of three hundred citizens might, perhaps, have been usefully sacrificed to the honour of military discipline. But a community exceedingly small, and actually

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Decision of
Agesilaus
respecting
the van-
quished in
the field of
Leuctra.

²⁷ Xenoph. p. 596.

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weakened by the loss of four hundred members, could scarcely have survived another blow equally destructive. No distant prospect of advantage, therefore, could have justified such an unseasonable severity.

State of
Greece after
the battle of
Leuctra.
Olym. cii. 2.
A. C. 371.

When the intelligence was diffused over Greece, that the Thebans, with the loss of only three hundred men, had raised an immortal trophy over the strength and renown of Sparta, the importance of this event became every-where conspicuous. The desire, and hope, of a revolution in public affairs, filled the Peloponnese with agitation and tumult. Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, every people who had been influenced by Spartan councils, or intimidated by Spartan power, openly aspired at independence. The less considerable states expected to remain thenceforth unmolested, no longer paying contributions, nor obeying every idle summons to war. The more powerful republics breathed hatred and revenge, and gloried in an opportunity of taking vengeance on the proud senators of Sparta, for the calamities which they had so often inflicted on their neighbours.

Affected mo-
deration of
Athens.

But amidst this general ferment, and while every other people were guided rather by their passions and animosities, than by the principles of justice or sound policy, the Athenians exhibited an illustrious example of political moderation²⁸. Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, a Theban herald, adorned with the emblems of peace and victory, had been dispatched to Athens, in order to relate the particulars of the engagement, and to invite the Athenians to an offensive alliance against a republic, which had ever proved the most dangerous, as well as the most inveterate enemy of their country. But the assembly of Athens, governed by the magnanimity, or rather by the prudence, of Timotheus and Iphicrates, determined to humble their rivals, not to destroy them.

²⁸ Xenoph. p 598.

The ancient and illustrious merit of the Spartans, their important services during the Persian war, and the fame of their laws and discipline, which still rendered them a respectable branch of the Grecian confederacy, might have a considerable influence in producing this resolution. But it chiefly proceeded from a jealousy of the growing power of Thebes, the situation of whose territories might soon render her a more formidable opponent to Athens, than even Sparta herself. This political consideration for once prevailed over a deep-rooted national antipathy. The Theban herald was not received with respect, nor even with decency. He was not entertained in public, according to the established hospitality of the Greeks; and although the senate of the Five Hundred (who usually answered foreign ambassadors) was then assembled in the citadel, he was allowed to return home without receiving the smallest satisfaction on the subject of his demand. But the Athenians, though unwilling to second the resentment, and promote the prosperity of Thebes, prepared to derive every possible advantage from the misfortunes and distress of Sparta. Convinced that the inhabitants of Peloponnesus would no longer be inclined to follow her standard, and share her danger and adversity, they eagerly seized the opportunity of delivering them for ever from her yoke; and, lest any other people might attain the rank which the Spartans once held, and raise their own importance on the ruins of public freedom, ambassadors were sent successively to the several cities, requiring their respective compliance with the treaty of Antalcidas. Against such as rejected this overture, war was denounced in the name of Athens and her allies; which was declaring to all Greece, that the battle of Leuctra had put the balance of power in her hands, and that she had determined to check the ambition of every republic whose views were too aspiring²⁹.

²⁹ Xenoph. p. 602.

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The Thebans court the alliance of Jason of Theffaly.

His character, and fortunes.

Disappointed of the assistance of Athens, the Thebans had recourse to an ally not less powerful. The extensive and fertile territory of Theffaly, which had been so long weakened by division, was fortunately united under the government of Jason of Pheræ, a man whose abilities and enterprising ambition seemed destined to change the face of the ancient world³⁰. To the native virtues of hospitality and magnificence, which peculiarly distinguished his country, Jason added indefatigable labour, and invincible courage, with a mind capable to conceive the loftiest designs, and a character ready to promote them by the meanest artifices³¹. His family descended from the ancient kings of the heroic ages, and formed the wealthiest house in Pheræ, which had already attained considerable pre-eminence over the neighbouring cities of Theffaly. By contrivances extremely unworthy of that greatness to which they frequently conducted, Jason deceived his brothers and kinsmen, and appropriated almost the sole use of his domestic opulence. With this he hired a well-appointed body of mercenaries, by whose assistance he acquired greater authority in Pheræ, than any former general or king had ever enjoyed³². But the government of a single city could not satisfy his aspiring mind. By stratagem, by surprise, or by force, he extended his dominion over the richest parts of Theffaly; and was ready to grasp the whole, when his designs were obstructed by the powerful opposition of Polydamas the Pharsalian³³.

His ambition opposed by Polydamas,

Next to Pheræ and Larissa, Pharsalus was the largest and most flourishing city in that northern division of Greece. But the inhabitants, distracted by factions, exhausted their strength in civil discord and sedition, until a ray of wisdom illuminating both parties, they committed their differences, and themselves, to the probity and patriotism of Polydamas, which were equally respected at home and abroad. For several years Polydamas commanded the citadel, and

³⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. & seqq.

³¹ Polyæn. Stratagem.

³² Plut. Polit. & san. tuend.

³³ Xenoph. *ibid*.

administered

administered justice and the finances with such diligence and fidelity, as might reasonably have entitled him to the glorious appellation of Father of his country. He firmly opposed and counteracted the secret practices, as well as the open designs, of Jason, who eagerly solicited his friendship by every motive that could actuate a mind of less determined integrity.

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At a conference which was held between them at Pharsalus, where Jason had come alone and unattended, the better to gain the confidence of a generous adversary, the Phææan displayed the magnitude of his power and resources, which it seemed impossible for the weakness of Pharsalus to resist; and promised, that, on surrendering the citadel of that place, which must otherwise soon yield to force, Polydamas should enjoy in Thessaly the second rank after himself; that he would regard him as his friend and colleague; nor could there remain a doubt that their united labours might raise their common country to that station in Greece which it had been long entitled to hold. That the subjugation of the neighbouring states opened vaster prospects, which forced themselves irresistibly on his mind, when he considered the natural advantages of Thessaly, the fertility of the soil, the swiftness of the horses, the disciplined bravery and martial ardour of the inhabitants, with whom no nation in Europe, or in Asia, was capable to contend.

Conference
between
them.

Polydamas heard with pleasure the praises of his native land, and admired the magnanimity of Jason. But he observed, that his fellow-citizens had honoured him with a trust which it was impossible for him ever to betray; and that their community still enjoyed the alliance of Sparta, from which the neighbouring cities had revolted. That he was determined to demand the protection of that republic; and if the Lacedæmonians were willing and able to afford him any effectual assistance, he would defend to the last extremity the walls of Pharsalus. Jason commended his integrity and

Determined
integrity of
Polydamas.

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Jason declared tender
of the Theffalians.
Olym. cii. 3.
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and patriotism, which, he declared, inspired him with the warmer desire to obtain the friendship of such an illustrious character.

Soon afterwards Polydamas went to Sparta, and proposed his demand in the council; exhorting the magistrates not only to undertake the expedition, but to undertake it with vigour; for if they expected to oppose the forces of Jason by their undisciplined peasants, or half-armed slaves, they would infallibly bring disgrace on themselves, and ruin on their confederates. The Lacedæmonians were deeply engaged in the Theban war, which had been hitherto carried on unsuccessfully. They prudently declined, therefore, the invitation of Polydamas; who, returning to Theffaly, held a second conference with Jason. He still refused to surrender the citadel, but promised to use his best endeavours for making the Pharfalians submit of their own accord; and offered his only son as a pledge of his fidelity. Jason accepted the offer, and, by the influence of Polydamas, was soon afterwards declared captain-general of Pharfalus, and all Theffaly; a modest appellation, under which he enjoyed the full extent of royal power³⁴.

His admirable discipline;

He began his reign by adjusting, with equity and precision, the proportion of taxes, and the contingent of troops, to be raised by the several cities in his dominions. The new levies, added to his standing army of mercenaries, amounted to eight thousand horse, twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and such a body of targeteers, as no nation of antiquity could match³⁵. But numbers formed the least advantageous distinction of the army of Jason. Every day he exercised his troops in person; dispensed rewards and punishments; cashiered the slothful and effeminate; honoured the brave and diligent with double, and sometimes treble pay, with large donatives in

³⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. 1, & seqq. πειραστικόν γε μὴν ἔμεινεν πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀντι-
& Diodor. Sicul. l. xv. p. 488. ταχθῆναι, p. 600.

³⁵ Xenophon expresses it more strongly;

money,

money, and with such other presents as peculiarly suited their respective tastes. By this judicious plan of military administration the foldiers of Jason became alike attached to their duty, and to the person of their general, whose standard they were ready to follow into any part of the world ³⁶.

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He began his military operations by subduing the Dryopes ³⁷, the Dolopians, and the other small but warlike tribes, inhabiting the long and intricate chain of mounts Oeta and Pindus, which form the southern frontier of Thessaly. Then turning northwards, he struck terror into Macedon, and compelled Amyntas to become his ally, and most probably his tributary. Thus fortified on both sides, he retaliated the inroads of the Phocians, who had long profited of the divisions, and insulted the weakness, of his country; and by conquering the small and uncultivated district of Epirus, which then formed a barbarous principality under Alcetas ³⁸, an ancestor of the renowned Pyrrhus, he extended the dominion of Thessaly from the Ægean to the Ionian sea, and encompassed, as with a belt, the utmost breadth of the Grecian republics.

and rapid
success.

It cannot be doubted that the subjugation, or at least the command of those immortal commonwealths, was the aim of the Thessalian prince, who declared to his friends, that he expected, by the assistance of Greece, to imitate the glorious example of Cyrus and Agesilaus, and to effect, by the united strength of the confederacy, what these generals had nearly accomplished by a body of ten or twelve thousand foldiers ³⁹. While the Spartans, however, preserved their long-boasted pre-eminence, and regarded it as their

His views on
Greece.

³⁶ Xenoph. p. 600.

³⁷ Strabo, l. viii. p. 299.

³⁸ In speaking of Arrybas (the son of Alcetas, and the grandfather of Pyrrhus), who received his education at Athens, Justin says,

“Quanto doctior majoribus suis, tanto et

gratior populo fuit. Primus itaque leges & senatum annuosque magistratus & republicæ formam composuit. Et ut a Pyrrho sedes, sic vita cultior populo ab Arryba statuta.”

³⁹ Xenoph. p. 600.

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hereditary and unalienable right to conduct their confederates to war, Jason could not hope to attain the principal command in an Asiatic expedition. As the natural enemy of that haughty people, he rejoiced in their unprosperous war against the Thebans; nor could he receive small satisfaction from beholding the southern states of Greece engaged in perpetual warfare, while he himself maintained a respected neutrality, and watched the first favourable occasion of interfering, with decisive effect, in the final settlement of that country.

His alliance
with Thebes.

He seldom ventured indeed into the Peloponnesus; but, in order to examine matters more nearly, he undertook, upon very extraordinary pretences, several journeys to Athens and Thebes. From policy, and perhaps from inclination, he had formed an intimate connection with the most distinguished characters of those republics, and particularly with Pelopidas and Timotheus. The latter, after serving his country with equal glory and success, was, according to the usual fortune of Athenian commanders, exposed to a cruel persecution of his rivals and enemies, which endangered his honour and his life. On the day of trial the admirers and friends of that great man appeared in the Athenian assembly, in order to intercede with his judges; and among the rest Jason, habited in the robe of a suppliant, humbly soliciting the release of Timotheus, from a people who would not probably have denied a much greater favour to the simple recommendation of so powerful a prince⁴⁰. In a visit to Thebes he endeavoured to gain or secure the attachment of Epaminondas, by large presents and promises; but the illustrious Theban, whose independent and honourable poverty had rejected the assistance of his friends and fellow-citizens, spurned with disdain the insolent generosity of a stranger⁴¹. Yet, by the intervention of

⁴⁰ Demosthenes & Cornel. Nepos in Timoth.

⁴¹ Plut. Apophtheg.

Pelopidas,

Pelopidas, Jason contracted an engagement of hospitality with the Thebans, in consequence of which he was invited to join their arms, after their memorable victory at Leuctra.

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The Theſſalian prince accepted the invitation, though his deſigns reſpecting Greece were not yet ripe for execution. He was actually engaged in war with the Phocians, of which, whatever might be the pretence, the real object was to obtain the ſuperintendence of the Delphic oracle, and the adminiſtration of the ſacred treaſure. To avoid marching through a hoſtile territory, he ordered his galleys to be equipped, as if he had intended to proceed by ſea to the coaſt of Bœotia. His naval preparations amused the attention of the Phocians, while Jason entered their country with a body of two thouſand light horſe, and advanced with ſuch rapidity that he was every where the firſt meſſenger of his own arrival.

Rapidity of
his move-
ments.

By this unuſual celerity, he, without encountering any obſtacle, joined the army of the Thebans, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Leuctra, at no great diſtance from the enemy. Inſtead of an auxiliary, Jason thought it more ſuitable to his intereſt to act the part of a mediator. He exhorted the Thebans to reſt ſatisfied with the advantages which they had already obtained, not to drive their adverſaries to deſpair; that the recent hiſtory of their own republic and of Sparta, ſhould teach them to remember the viciffitudes of fortune. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, he reminded of the difference between a victorious and vanquiſhed army. That the preſent criſis ſeemed totally adverſe to the re-eſtabliſhment of their greatneſs; that they ſhould yield to the fatality of circumſtances, and watch a more favourable opportunity to reſtore the tarniſhed luſtre of their arms. His arguments prevailed; hoſtilities were ſuſpended; the terms of a peace were propoſed and accepted: but it is remarkable, that the Spartans and their allies had ſo little confidence in this ſudden negotiation, that they decamped the night following, and continued to march homeward with the diligence

His views in
mediating a
truce be-
tween
Thebes and
Sparta.

C H A P. of distrust and fear, until they got intirely beyond reach of the
XXX. Thebans ⁴².

Jason had not, probably, more confidence in a treaty hastily concluded between enemies, whose resentments were irritated and inflamed by so many mutual injuries offered and retorted. Nothing could have been more contrary to his views than a sincere and lasting peace between these powerful republics; but as this was not to be apprehended, he wished to obtain the reputation of appeasing the dissensions of Greece; a circumstance of great importance to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.

He is assassinated in the midst of his projects.
 Olymp.
 cii. 3.
 A. C. 370.

In his return home, he demolished the walls of Heraclea, a town situate near the straits of Thermopylæ; not fearing, says his historian ⁴³, that any of the Greek states should invade his dominions from that side, but unwilling to leave a place of such strength on his frontier, which, if seized by a powerful neighbour, might obstruct his passage into Greece. Thither he determined to return at the celebration of the Pythian games, at which he meant to claim the right of presiding, as an honour due both to his piety and to his power. He commanded, therefore, the cities and villages of Thessaly to fatten sheep, goats, swine, and oxen, and proposed honourable rewards to such districts as furnished the best victims for the altars of Apollo. Without any burthenfome imposition on his subjects, he collected a thousand oxen, and, of smaller cattle, to the number of ten thousand. At the same time, he prepared the whole military strength of his kingdom, by whose assistance, still more effectually than by the merit of his sacrifices, he might maintain his pretensions to the superintendence of the games, the direction of the oracle, and the administration of the sacred treasure, which he regarded as so many previous steps to the conquest of Greece and Asia. But, amidst these lofty projects, Jason, while reviewing the

⁴² Xenoph. p. 600.

⁴³ Ibid. p. 599.

Pheræan cavalry, was stabbed by seven youths, who approached him, on pretence of demanding justice against each other. Two of the assassins were dispatched by his guards. Five mounted fleet horses, which had been prepared for their use, and escaped to the Grecian republics, in which they were received with universal acclamations of joy, and honoured as the saviours of their country from the formidable power of a brave but ambitious tyrant⁴⁴. The projects and the empire of Jason perished with himself; Thessaly, as we shall have occasion to explain, relapsed into its former state of division and weakness: But it is the business of history to relate not only great actions, but great designs; and even the designs of Jason announce the approaching downfall of Grecian freedom.

⁴⁴ Xenoph. & Diodor. *ibid.* & Valerius Maximus, l. ix.

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Tumults in the Peloponnesus.—Invasion of Laconia.—Epaminondas rebuilds Messenê.—Archidamus restores the Fortune of Sparta.—Foundation of Megalopolis.—Affairs of Thessaly and Macedon.—Negotiations for Peace.—The Pretensions of Thebes rejected.—Epaminondas invades the Peloponnesus.—Revolutions in Achaia.—Speech of Archidamus in the Spartan Council.—Designs of Thebes.—Disconcerted by Athens.—Pelopidas's Expedition in Thessaly.—The Arcadians seize the Olympic Treasure.—Battle of Mantinæa.—Agæslaus's Expedition into Egypt.

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XXXI.

History of
the last stage
of Grecian
freedom.

THE death of Jason removed the terror of Greece ; but of a country which owed its safety to the arm of an assassin, the condition may justly be regarded as extremely unstable and precarious. There elapsed, however, thirty-three years of discord and calamity, before the Greeks finally experienced, in Philip of Macedon, such ambition and abilities as enabled him fully to accomplish the lofty designs of the Thessalian. The history of this last stage of tumultuous liberty comprehends the bloody, but indecisive wars, which exhausted Greece during eleven years that intervened between the battle of Leuctra, and the accession of Philip to the Macedonian throne, together with the active reign of that prince ; a memorable period of twenty-two years, illuminated by the success and glory

glory of Macedon, and clouded by the disgrace and ruin of the Grecian republics.

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The unexpected issue of the battle of Leuctra was doubly prejudicial to the Spartans, by weakening their own confederacy, and strengthening that of their enemies. In less than two years after that important event, the alliance in Peloponnesus, over which Sparta had so long maintained an ascendant, was totally dissolved, and most cities had changed not only their foreign connections, but their domestic laws and government. During the same period, the confederacy of which Thebes was the head, had, on the contrary, been very widely extended. Many communities of the Peloponnesus courted her protection; and, in the north of Greece, the Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, the whole breadth of the continent, from the Ionian to the Ægean sea, and even the isle of Eubœa, increased the power, and in some measure acknowledged the dominion of Thebes. The history of these revolutions is very imperfectly related by ancient writers; but their consequences were too remarkable not to be attended to and explained. The Peloponnesians, after being delivered from the oppression of the Spartan yoke, were subjected to the more destructive tyranny of their own ungovernable passions¹. Every state and every city was torn by factions which frequently blazed forth into the most violent seditions. The exiles from several republics were nearly as numerous as those who had expelled them. Fourteen hundred were banished from Tegea; two thousand² were slain in Argos; in many places the contending factions alternately prevailed; and those who, in the first encounter, had got possession of the government and the capital, were sometimes attacked³ and conquered by the numerous fugitives, who formed

Tumults and
seditions in
the Pelopon-
nesus after
the battle of
Leuctra.
Olymp.
ciii. 3.
A. C. 370.

¹ Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, & seqq. *Monocrat.* in Archidam. & de Pace.

² This number is made out by comparing different authors, and uniting in one view the different scenes of the sedition, which is called the Scytalism by Diodorus (*ubi supra*),

and Pausanias (Corinth), from the Greek word *σκυταλ*, signifying a club, which, it seems, was the principal instrument of slaughter.

³ Diodorus, *ibid.*

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a camp in the adjoining territory. The Mantinæans alone seem to have acted wisely. With one accord, and with equal diligence, they laboured to rebuild their walls, which the insolence of Sparta had demolished. The work was soon brought to a conclusion; and the Mantinæans united in one democracy, fully determined thenceforth to preserve the strength of their city, which appeared necessary to maintain their political independence.

The exiles
fly to Sparta.

Neither the Thebans nor the Spartans immediately interfered in this scene of disorder. The former found sufficient employment for their arms and negotiations in the northern parts of Greece; and the latter were so much humbled by their defeat at Leuctra, that they contented themselves with preparing to defend the banks of the Eurotas, and to repel the expected assault of their capital. For this purpose they had armed the aged and infirm, who were legally exempted from military service*. They had commanded into the field even those citizens who were employed in such sacred and civil offices as are deemed most useful in society; and, as their last resource, they talked of giving arms to the Helots. But the convulsions of Peloponnesus soon supplied them with less dangerous auxiliaries†. The incensed partizans of aristocracy, who had been expelled from Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia, had recourse to the most ancient and distinguished patrons of their political principles. Encouraged by this seasonable reinforcement, the Spartans set at defiance the Theban invasion, by which they had been so long threatened, and sent a considerable detachment to recover their lost authority in Arcadia. But it was the fate of Sparta, to regain neither in that, nor in any other state of the Peloponnesus, the influence which she had lost in the field of Leuctra. Polytropos, who commanded her allies in this expedition, was defeated and slain in the first rencounter with the Arcadians and Lycomedes, their intrepid and magnani-

That republic
attempts
in vain to re-
cover her au-
thority in
Arcadia.

* Xenoph. l. vi. p. 597.

† Id. p. 603.

mous leader. Nor did Agefilaus perform any thing decisive against the enemy. He was contented with ravaging the villages and delightful fields of Arcadia, in which he met with little resistance from the inhabitants, who declined an engagement, until they should be joined by the Theban confederacy, whose assistance they had sent to solicit, and had just reason to expect⁶.

At length the far-renowned Thebans took the field, having carefully pondered their own strength, and collected into one body the flower and vigour of their numerous allies. They were accompanied by the warlike youth of the towns and villages of Bœotia, by the Acarnanians, Phocians, Locrians, and Eubœans, and by a promiscuous crowd of needy fugitives, who were attracted to their camp by the allurements of plunder. They had no sooner arrived on the frontier of Arcadia, than they were joined by the inhabitants of that country, as well as by the Elians and Argives. This united mass of war exceeded any numbers, that either before or afterwards ever assembled in Greece under one standard, amounting to fifty, some say to seventy thousand men⁷. The Thebans, and the rest of the Bœotians, were commanded by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to whom the generous admiration of their colleagues had voluntarily resigned their authority. Apprised of the march of such a formidable army, conducted by generals of such unquestionable merit, Agefilaus prepared to evacuate Arcadia, a measure which he fortunately effected, before his soldiers beheld the fires kindled in the hostile camp, and thus avoided the disgrace of retiring before the enemy⁸. His unresisted devastation of the territory which he had invaded, as well as his successful retreat, gave fresh spirits to his followers, and made them return with better hopes to defend their own country, which was now threatened with invasion.

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The Thebans take the field at the head of their allies. Olymp. cii 4⁺. A. C. 369.

The Spartans evacuate Arcadia.

⁶ Xenoph. p. 605.

l. vi. Pausan. Bœotic. Diodorus, l. xv.

⁷ The numbers differ in Xenoph. Hellen. & Plut. in Pelopid. ⁸ Xenoph. p. 606.

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Laconia.

The Thebans, though they had no longer any occasion to protect the Arcadians from insult, were determined⁹ by many powerful motives, to employ the vast preparations which they had collected. Their particular resentment against Sparta was heightened by the general voice of their allies, who exhorted them to embrace an opportunity which, perhaps, might never return, utterly to destroy a people who neither could enjoy tranquillity, nor allow their neighbours to enjoy it. The inhabitants of Carya, and of several other towns in Laconia, declared their resolution to revolt from Sparta, as soon as the enemy should enter their boundaries. In a council of war summoned by the Theban generals, it was therefore determined to march without farther delay into the Lacedæmonian territories, to lay waste the country, and, if possible, to take possession of the capital.

Brave defence of the
district Sciritis.

That this resolution might be executed with the greater celerity and effect, the army was thrown into four divisions, destined, by separate roads, to break into the devoted province, to join forces at Sellasia, and thence to march in one body to Sparta. The Bœotians, Elians, and Argives penetrated, without opposition, by the particular routes which had been assigned them. But when the Arcadians, who formed the fourth division of the army, attempted to traverse the district Sciritis, the brave Ischilas, who guarded that important pass, determined to repel them, or to perish. The example of Leonidas at Thermopylæ kindled a generous enthusiasm in the breast of this gallant Spartan. The number of the Arcadian levies so far exceeded his own, that death seemed the sure reward of his courage. Yet he exhorted all those to decline the danger who were not ambitious to share it. He even *commanded* the youth to leave

⁹ They at first opposed the eagerness of the Arcadians, Elians, and Argives for invading Laconia, considering ότι δυσμενέστερον ταῦτα μὴ ἢ λακωνικῇ ἐπιβίβωσιν εἶναι, σφίσι δὲ καὶ βέλτερον ὑπομίζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπερσπένδεσσι. "That it would be difficult to penetrate into a country defended by the natural strength of its frontier, or by vigilant garrisons." Xenoph. p. 607.

his camp before the engagement, deeming their lives too precious to be risked in so desperate an enterprise. He, with the old soldiers who followed him, chose the present opportunity to meet a glorious death in defence of their country. But their lives were sold dearly. The action was long doubtful: the loss of the Arcadians great; nor did the battle cease till the last of the Spartans had perished¹⁰.

The confederates having soon after assembled at Sellasia, the place of rendezvous, marched forward to Sparta, burning and destroying all before them. During five hundred years Laconia had not experienced a similar calamity. The guards who defended the city were thrown into consternation. The women were terrified by the smoke and tumult raised by the invaders; a spectacle, concerning which it had been their usual boast, that they alone of all the Grecian females, had never beheld it in their native land. Alarmed by the danger which threatened them, and which they were sensible of their own inability to repel, the Spartans embraced the doubtful expedient of giving arms to their peasants and slaves, whom they commonly treated with such an excess of cruelty. Not less than six thousand of these unhappy men were engaged, by threats or promises, to undertake the reluctant defence of the proud tyrants, whom they detested. Their formidable numbers increased the general panic, which had seized the magistrates and citizens, and which did not finally cease until the arrival of a powerful body of men from Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Pallené; cities which, though they had ever opposed the *despotism*, were unwilling to permit the *destruction* of Sparta.

Devastation
of Laconia.

This seasonable reinforcement not only removed the consternation of the Spartans, but made them pass with rapidity from the depths of despondency to the joys of success. The kings and magistrates could scarcely restrain their impetuosity from rushing into the field:

Vigilant in-
trepidity of
Ageilaus.

¹⁰ Xenoph. l. vi. p. 607. & Diodor. l. xv. ἀμείνωνθαι διεφύγε. "Unless, perhaps, some p. 376. The former indeed adds, *ἢ μὴ τις* one escaped unknown through the enemy."

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The Spartans
and their al-
lies negotiate
at Athens a
treaty of
defence.

and this martial enthusiasm, guided by the consummate prudence of Agefilæus, enabled them to repel the first assaults of the enemy, and to convince them that every succeeding attempt to get possession of the city, must be attended with such fatigue, and danger, and loss of men, as could not be compensated by the success of that enterprise. The conduct of Agefilæus, during this critical emergency, has been highly extolled by all writers¹¹, and never beyond its merit. By a well-contrived ambush in the temple of the Tyndaridæ¹², he defeated the designs of the assailants: by very uncommon presence¹³ of mind, he quelled a dangerous insurrection; and while, by force or stratagem, he overcame the united efforts of domestic and foreign enemies, he negotiated the most powerful assistance for the relief of his country.

Immediately after the battle of Leuctra the Athenians had declared their resolution to renew and confirm the treaty of Antalcidas, which, though it diminished the grandeur, yet secured the tranquillity of Greece, and prevented the weakness of any one republic from falling a prey to the ambition of another. But notwithstanding this declaration, which was universally approved by their neighbours, they had, either from resentment or from policy, remained above two years spectators of the decline of the Lacedæmonian, and the growth of the Theban league. Whatever uneasiness might be occasioned by the increasing strength of their new rival, was sufficiently balanced by the decay and downfall of their ancient and inveterate enemy. But though, doubtless, they ardently desired the ruin of

¹¹ Xenoph. & Plut. in Agefilæo. Diodorus, l. xv. & Pausanias Lacon.

¹² Castor and Pollux, so called from their mother Tyndaris, or Leda.

¹³ The mutineers had entered into a conspiracy to seize an important post in the city. Agefilæus observed them as they marched thither, and immediately suspecting their design, called out, that they had mis-

taken his orders; adding his meaning to be, that they should separate into different divisions, and repair to the several posts which he named. The conspirators naturally concluded that he knew nothing of their purpose, and separating, as he commanded, could never afterwards find an opportunity to unite in such numbers as rendered them dangerous.

the Spartan power, they could not sincerely approve the cruel destruction of their persons, and of their city. When informed of the terrible devastation of Laconia, they naturally felt a return of compassion for a people whose exploits, on many memorable occasions, had done such signal honour to the Grecian name.

The emissaries of Agesilaus, whose superior mind had assumed dictatorial power amidst the distress of his country, seized the favourable opportunity to urge, with the Athenians, many motives of action, which seldom operate amidst the cold lifeless politics of modern times. They took notice that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had often mutually assisted each other in seasons of distress, and that the most glorious æra of their story was that in which the two republics had united their councils and measures against a common enemy. That when the spirit of rivalry and ambition had unhappily divided Greece, and the Athenians were exposed to the calamities of a long and unfortunate war, they had been protected by the humanity of Sparta against the implacable rage of the Thebans, who wished to demolish the city of Athens, and to reduce its territory to the barren solitude of the Crissæan plain. That by the moderation of Sparta, the Athenians had not only been saved from the vengeance of foreign enemies, but delivered from the yoke of domestic tyrants, and the cruel tyranny of the Pisistratidæ. The merit of these services deserved the reward of gratitude; the hereditary renown of Athens urged her to protect the miserable; and justice demanded that she should assert, and maintain, the conditions of a recent treaty, which she herself had proposed, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had so manifestly violated.

A loud and discordant murmur ran through the assembly. Some approved the demand, others observed that the Spartans changed their language with their fortune; that they had formerly, and probably would again, when never they became powerful, assume a very different tone, and, instead of colouring by false disguises, display

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Arguments
which they
employed for
this purpose.

How received
by the Athe-
nians.

in

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Speech of
Cleiteles, the
Corinthian.

in its native force their inveterate enmity to Athens. That the late treaty of peace could not entitle them to any assistance, since they themselves had begun the war by the invasion of Arcadia; a war undertaken from the unjust motive of supporting the tyrannical usurpation of the nobles of Tegea over the rights of their fellow-citizens.

Together with the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, had come those of Corinth and Phlius, cities eminently distinguished by an unshaken fidelity to their ancient confederate and protector. Cleiteles the Corinthian, observing what turn the debate was likely to take, stood up and said, "Were it a matter of doubt, Athenians! who are the aggressors, the melancholy experience of *our* state would remove the difficulty. Since the renovation of the peace of Antalcidas, the Corinthians, surely, have not committed hostilities against any power in Greece. Yet the Thebans have entered our territory, cut down our trees, burned our houses, plundered our cattle and effects. How, then, can you refuse your assistance to those who have been so manifestly injured, in direct violation of the treaty, to which, at your express desire, they acceded and swore." The assembly loudly approved the discourse of Cleiteles, which was supported and confirmed by the arguments and eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian.

Of Patrocles,
the Phliasian.

"It is manifest, I think, to all of you, Athenians! that should Sparta be destroyed, Athens must be the next object of the hostility of Thebes, since that city alone would then stand in the way of her ambition. The cause of the Lacedæmonians, therefore is, in fact, your own. You must embrace it with ardour, as the last opportunity which the gods perhaps will afford you, of defending the general freedom at the head of your allies, and of preventing the dangerous domination of the Thebans; the effects of which, you, who are their neighbours, would feel with peculiar severity. By taking this resolution, which is equally generous and salutary, you will

will acquire a fund of merit, not only with the Spartans, than whom none were ever more mindful of favours, or more ambitious of honest fame, but also with us their allies, who, since we have continued faithful to our friends in their adversity, cannot be suspected of ingratitude to our prosperous benefactors. I have heard with admiration how, in ancient times, the injured and afflicted always had recourse to Athens, and were never disappointed of relief. I now no longer hear, but see, the Lacedæmonians, with their faithful allies, soliciting your protection against the Thebans, whose unrelenting cruelty could not persuade Sparta, in the height of her resentment and of her power, to desolate your country, and to reduce you into servitude. Your ancestors acquired just renown by saving the dead bodies of the Argives, to whom the impiety of Thebes denied the sacred rites of burial¹⁴. How much greater renown will redound to you, when the Lacedæmonians, by your generous assistance, shall be saved from death. It was deemed meritorious in *them* to have defended the children of Hercules against the unnatural persecution of Eurytheus; but it will be far more glorious for *you* to have defended not only the descendants of that hero, the hereditary kings of Lacedæmon, but, along with them, the senate, the magistrates, the people; in one word, to have delivered the whole nation from a danger dreadful in itself, and otherwise inevitable. During the prosperity of their empire, the Lacedæmonians prevented your destruction by a decree, which displayed their humanity, without exposing their safety. You are called to defend the Lacedæmonians, not by inactive decrees, but by arms and courage. Arm, then, in their behalf; and, forgetful of recent animosities, repay the important services which, in the Barbarian war, the valour of Sparta rendered to Athens and to all Greece.”

¹⁴ See vol. i. c. i. p. 19. The facts alluded to in the text are related in all the panegyrics of Athens, by Plato, Lysias, Isocrates, and Thucydides.

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Iphicrates,
with twelve
thousand
men, sent
to defend
Laconia.

The assembly was so deeply affected by the persuasive discourse of the Phliasian, that they refused to hear any thing in opposition to it, and determined, almost unanimously, to take the field. Iphicrates was named general; twelve thousand men were ordered to repair to his standard; the sacrifices were propitious; the troops took a short repast; and such was their ardour to meet the enemy, that many of them marched forth without waiting the orders of their commander¹⁵.

Epaminon-
das continues
his ravages
in that pro-
vince.

Epaminondas, meanwhile, had committed dreadful devastation in Laconia. His repulse from the capital had exasperated his hostilities against the country. He had desolated the fertile banks of the Eurotas, which were thick planted with houses, and abounding in all the conveniencies of life, known to the austere simplicity of Sparta. He had assaulted Helos, and Gythium; and, traversing the whole province, had destroyed the villages by fire, and the inhabitants by the sword. Even these terrible ravages did not satisfy his resentment; he determined, that the invasion of Laconia should not be a temporary evil, which the labour of years might repair; and for this purpose employed an expedient, which, even after he might evacuate their country, must leave the Lacedæmonians exposed to the rage of an implacable enemy.

Rebuilds
Messénie.
Olym. cii. 2.
A. C. 369.

We have had occasion to relate the various fortunes of the Messenians. About three centuries before the period now under review, their city had been demolished by the Spartans; their territory had been seized, and divided among that people; the ancient inhabitants had been reduced into servitude, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of cruel masters; or dispersed in miserable banishment, over Greece, Italy, and Sicily. After two centuries of humiliation and calamity, the humanity, or perhaps the policy of Athens, took compassion on this unfortunate race, and

¹⁵ This whole transaction is explained in Xenoph. p. 609—613.

settled them in the territory of Naupactus, and the neighbouring island of Cephallenia. The Messenians displayed their gratitude by important services during the Peloponnesian war; but their most vigorous exertions could not long retard the declining fortune of Athens. The event of that war rendered Sparta the arbiter of Greece; and the Messenians were the first objects of her memorable tyranny, being universally enslaved, banished, or put to death. It is probable that the scattered remains of this miserable community would flock from every quarter to the standard of Epaminondas, rejoicing in an opportunity to retaliate the unrelenting persecution of a people, who now suffered the calamities which they had so often inflicted. But the general voice of history ascribes to Epaminondas the merit of assembling the Messenians¹⁶. It is certain, that he rebuilt their city, and put them in possession of their territory; an act of generous compassion which inflicted a most unexpected and cruel punishment on the Spartans, who beheld the ashes of a nation, which they had twice endeavoured to extinguish, revive and flourish in their neighbourhood; continually increase by the accession of Spartan subjects and slaves; and, encouraged by a Theban garri-son, and their own inveterate hostility, watch every favourable occasion to exert the full power of their vengeance¹⁷.

Epaminondas had accomplished this extraordinary enterprise, when he received intelligence of the motions of the Athenian army commanded by Iphicrates. That illustrious general had allowed the ardour of his troops to evaporate, by pursuing a conduct which it is impossible, at this distance of time, to explain, but which the military historian¹⁸ condemns, as highly unworthy of his former renown. When celerity was of the utmost importance, he wasted several precious days at Corinth, without any necessity, or even pretence, for this unseasonable delay. His soldiers loudly demanded to


The Athenians take the field.

¹⁶ Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 491. Pausan. Messen. p. 265.

¹⁷ Diodor. l. xv. c. 16.

¹⁸ Xenophon. l. vi. versos finem.

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meet the enemy, or even to assault the walls of Argos, the strongest and most populous city in Peloponnesus, and not inferior to Thebes itself in active animosity against their common foe. Iphicrates, however, embraced none of those measures, but led his army towards Arcadia; expecting, perhaps, what actually happened, that the news of his arrival there would deliver Laconia from the hostile invader.

The The-
bans evacuate
Laconia.

It cannot be imagined, indeed, that Epaminondas feared the issue of an engagement with the Athenians. But he was justly alarmed with the interest which even that people had taken in the danger of Sparta. The indignation and resentment which they, the rivals and enemies of the injured, discovered on this occasion, taught him what sentiments his conduct must excite in more impartial states, should he persist in his original plan, destroy the Lacedæmonian capital, and, as the orator Leptines expressed it, “pluck out an eye of Greece¹⁹.” Many concurring causes tended also to accelerate his departure. The Arcadians were called home to defend their houses and families. The Eleans and Argives were anxious to secure their booty by an expeditious retreat. Even the Thebans were weary of an expedition which had consumed several winter months, a season in which they were not accustomed to keep the field. Provisions likewise grew scarce; and Epaminondas, pressed by difficulties on every side, prepared to evacuate the Lacedæmonian territories; but not (in the words of Xenophon) until “every thing of value had been consumed or plundered, poured out, or burned down²⁰.”

The The-
bans and
Athenians
respectively
accuse their
commanders.

At the same time that the Thebans left Laconia, Iphicrates withdrew the Athenians from the country which they had invaded. The two armies filed off, as by mutual consent, and returned to their respective cities by separate roads, without any attempt to interrupt the progress of each other. Iphicrates was blamed for

¹⁹ Aristot. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 10.

²⁰ Xenoph. p. 612.

allowing

allowing an enemy, heavy with plunder, and exhausted by the fatigue of a winter's campaign, to pass unmolested through the Isthmus of Corinth. Pelopidas and Epaminondas were accused and tried before the Theban assembly, for protracting the term of their command beyond the time limited by law. The former discovered less courage than might have been expected from his impetuous and daring character. He, who had never feared the sword of an enemy, trembled at the angry voice of his insolent accusers. But Epaminondas displayed, on this occasion, the superiority of philosophical firmness, seated in the mind, to that constitutional courage which is the result of blood and spirits. The latter is sufficient for a day of battle; but the former alone can yield support in every vicissitude of fortune.

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Instead of observing the formality of a regular defence, the illustrious Theban undertook the invidious task of pronouncing his own panegyric²¹. After relating his exploits, without amplification, and without diminution, he concluded by observing, "that he could submit to death without reluctance, secure of immortal fame, earned in the service of his country." The seditious demagogues were awed by his magnanimity; the anger of the assembly against himself and his colleague dissolved in admiration; and Epaminondas was conducted from the tribunal with as much glory as from the field of Leuctra.

Epaminondas defends his conduct.

From the invasion of Laconia to the general engagement at Mantinea, there elapsed six years of indecisive war, and tumultuous activity; battles lost and gained, conquests made and abandoned, alliances concluded and broken; treaties of peace proposed, accepted, and violated, by those who felt the unhappy effects of dissensions which their rancorous animosity was unwilling to terminate. In examining the history of this period, we may perceive the same confusion in

Intricacy of the subsequent events.

²¹ Plutarch. de sui Laude, p. 540.

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the relation, which appears at first sight to have been in the events themselves. It is necessary, however, to reduce them into the form of a regular narrative. In important concerns, numerous bodies of men, however they may act without effect, cannot be supposed to act *entirely* without design: their motives, unsteady and capricious as they often are, form the invisible chain which it is the business of the historian to investigate and to follow; since it is otherwise impossible that the transactions which he describes, should afford either real instruction, or any rational entertainment.

The alliance
between
Athens and
Sparta con-
firmed and
extended.
Olymp.
ciii. 1.
A. C. 368.

Early in the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians, with the few allies who still adhered to their cause, dispatched an embassy to Athens, in order to strengthen the bands of amity and union with that republic. In the conference held for that purpose, it appeared that the Spartans were either very deeply affected by the recent obligations conferred on them, or that they very earnestly desired the continuance of similar favours. They acknowledged that the experience, the bravery, the naval victories and fortune of Athens, justly entitled her to the sovereignty of the Grecian seas; and when this concession, which had hitherto been withheld with such disdain, could not satisfy the more patriotic, or rather the less generous members of the assembly, they condescended to grant another acknowledgment still more inconsistent with the pride of their hereditary pretensions; that in such military expeditions as were undertaken by the joint forces of both republics, the command should be equal and alternate; so that an army of Lacedæmonians (a thing hitherto unexampled) would be commanded during half the campaign by Athenian generals. Patrocles the Phliasian, whose eloquence and address had been distinguished in the former negotiation, was not less active in the present; chiefly by *his* intervention, matters were finally adjusted; an alliance of the most intimate kind was concluded between the two republics; and, by the assistance of the generous Phliasian, the Spartans obtained this important advantage,

tage,

tage, without the disgrace of many ineffectual overtures, or the mortification of long supplicatory speeches, which they deemed of all things the most grievous²².

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The Spartan negotiations, so fortunate in Athens, were equally successful with Dionysius tyrant of Sicily, and Artaxerxes king of Persia. The former, himself a Dorian, naturally lamented the humiliation and distress of a people, who, during seven hundred years, had formed the principal ornament and defence of the Dorian race; and the latter pursued his ordinary system of politics, of assisting the weaker party, in order to balance the contending powers, and to perpetuate the hostilities of Greece.

The Spartans negotiate treaties with Dionysius and Artaxerxes.

While the Lacedæmonians gained strength by these important alliances, their enemies took the field. The Arcadians began the campaign by entering the territory of Pallene, an Achæan republic, which still remained faithful to Sparta. The country was laid waste, the villages burned, the city taken by storm, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred men, partly Lacedæmonians, put to the sword. Soon after this success, the Arcadians were joined by the Elians and Argives. Epaminondas likewise marched southward at the head of the Thebans, their foot amounting to seven thousand, and their cavalry to five hundred. Before he reached the Isthmus, the Lacedæmonians had been reinforced by a body of two thousand Sicilian troops, agreeably to their treaty with Dionysius; and the Athenians had taken the field, under the command of Chabrias, actually the most respected, or at least the most popular, of their generals. It was naturally the object of the Spartan and Athenian commanders, to prevent the junction of Epaminondas with his southern allies. For this purpose they strongly guarded, and even fortified the Isthmus; an expedient which had not been put in practice since the expedition of Xerxes. The Thebans, however, broke through, took Sicyon, and assaulted Corinth. But Chabrias,

Military operations.

²² Xenoph. p. 613—616.

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Retreat of
the Thebans.

Pretension
of the Arcadians.

who happened at this time to enjoy the alternate command, repulsed them with such loss, that Epaminondas judged proper to retire homeward; on which account he was blamed and disgraced by his countrymen, who, insolent with prosperity, thought themselves entitled always to conquer.

The unexpected retreat of the Thebans, of which it is not easy to conjecture the real cause²³, occasioned much dissatisfaction among their confederates, particularly the Arcadians. This simple, but warlike people, had obtained distinguished honour in several recent expeditions. They were usually conducted by the Mantinæan Lycomedes, a man gallant in enterprize, and persevering in execution; rich, noble, eloquent, generous, and affable. Under a commander equally respected and beloved, the Arcadians found nothing too arduous for their courage. In regular engagements, they commonly proved victorious wherever they fought. But their principal merit was displayed in ambushes and surprise, and all the dangerous stratagems of desultory war. When a favourable occasion summoned their activity, neither length of way, nor difficult mountains, nor storms, nor darkness, could interrupt their course, or prevent their unexpected assault²⁴. Unassisted and alone, they had often defeated superior strength and numbers; and when, together with their Peloponnesian allies, they served under the Theban standard, their prowess had been acknowledged and admired by the united army.

Encouraged
by Lycomedes.

The repulse and retreat of Epaminondas gave relief and splendour to the recent glory of Arcadia, and inspired Lycomedes with an ambition which he easily communicated to his countrymen. He told them, "That they were the most ancient, the most populous, and surely not the least warlike community, in Peloponnesus; but that

²³ The Theban demagogues, as we learn from Diodorus and Plutarch, accused Epaminondas of treacherous correspondence with

the enemy, or at least of secretly favouring their cause; but this is altogether improbable.

²⁴ Vid. Xenoph. p. 618, & seqq.

they had hitherto neglected to profit of the advantages which they possessed. In the memorable war of twenty-seven years, they had joined with the Lacedæmonians, whom they had raised to an authority, of which the Arcadians, as well as the rest of Greece, felt the intolerable oppression. That of late years they had acted with the Thebans, who, by *their* assistance chiefly, had attained a very alarming degree of power, which they occasionally exerted or remitted, as suited their own convenience, without the smallest regard to the interest of their confederates. If this power should be increased, might not the yoke of Thebes become as grievous as that of Sparta? It was time for the Arcadians to know their own worth; to disdain following the standard of any foreign state; and not only to vindicate their freedom, but to claim their just pre-eminence." The assembly applauded the manly²⁵ resolution of Lycomedes; and in order to render it effectual, determined to keep possession of such places as they had taken from the Lacedæmonians or their allies in Elis and Achaia, and to complete their conquests in these and the neighbouring provinces of Peloponnesus.

For several months they met with little interruption in this design, the Spartans; after the departure of their auxiliaries, not venturing to take the field until the beginning of the ensuing year, when they received a new supply of troops from Dionysius, and both troops²⁶ and money from Artaxerxes. The Theban arms were actually employed in Thessaly and Macedon, as we shall have occasion hereafter to relate; so that every circumstance conspired to hasten the march of Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonians. But the infirmities incident to old age made him decline the command, which was entrusted to his son Archidamus; his colleague Agesipolis not possessing great abilities either for war or government.

The Spartans take the field to oppose the designs of the Arcadians. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

²⁵ Xenophon's expression is lively; καὶ μόνον ἀνδρὶ ἄνθρωπος, "thinking him the only man." L. vii. p. 618.

²⁶ These were not Persians, but ξεινοί, "Greek mercenaries." Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619.

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A—
Glorious
campaign of
the Spartans
under Archi-
damus.

The rapid success of Archidamus, who seemed destined to restore the declining fortune of Sparta, justified the prudent choice of the magistrates and people. He expelled the hostile garrisons from the inferior cities of Laconia, stormed Caryæ, and put the rebellious inhabitants to the sword. From thence he hastened to Arcadia, laid waste the southern frontier of that province, and prepared to attack the populous city of Parrhasia, when the united strength of the Arcadians, commanded by Lycomedes, and reinforced by the Argives, approached to its relief. Their arrival made Archidamus withdraw to the hills that overhang the obscure village of Midea. While he encamped there, Cissidas, who commanded the Sicilians, declared that the time limited for his absence was expired, and, without waiting an answer, ordered his forces to prepare their baggage, and to march towards Laconia. But the nearest passage into that country had been seized by the Messenians. In this difficulty Cissidas applied to Archidamus, who hastened to his defence. The Arcadians and Argives at the same time decamped. The hostile armies encountered near the joining of the two roads which led towards Sparta from Midea and Eutresios. As soon as Archidamus beheld the enemy prepared for an engagement, he commanded the Spartans to form, and when they were ready to advance, addressed them as follows: "Fellow-citizens and friends! if we are still brave, we may look forward with confidence; we may yet retrieve our affairs, and deliver down the republic to posterity as we received it from our ancestors. Let us strive, then, by one glorious effort, to recover our hereditary renown; and let us cease being the reproach (instead of what the Spartans once were, the ornament and defence) of our friends, our parents, our families, and our country."

Battle of Mi-
dea won by
the Spartans
without the
loss of a man.

While he yet spoke, it thundered on the right, though the day was clear and serene. The soldiers, roused by the noise, looked towards the direction from which it came, and beheld, in a consecrated grove at no great distance, an altar and statue of Hercules, the great progenitor

progenitor of Archidamus and the Spartan kings. Animated by the wonderful concurrence of such auspicious circumstances, they were transported with an enthusiasm of valour, and impetuously rushed against their opponents, in full confidence of victory. The enemy, who thought that they had to do with a vanquished and spiritless people, were astonished at their mien and aspect as they advanced to the attack. The few who waited their approach, were totally destroyed; many thousands perished in the pursuit: it is said by ancient historians²⁷, that the Spartans lost not a man. Archidamus erected a trophy, and dispatched a messenger to Sparta. The people were assembled, when he communicated his extraordinary intelligence. The aged Agefilæus shed tears of joy. The Ephori and senators sympathised with the emotions of their king. The patriotic weakness was communicated from breast to breast; the amiable contagion spread; the sternest members of this numerous assembly dissolved in softness, and melted in sensibility²⁸.

The Spartans were prevented from reaping the full fruits of this victory, by a considerable reinforcement which the Arcadians soon afterwards received from Thebes. By the assistance of these troops, the Menalians and Parrhasians, who, from their situation on the southern frontier of Arcadia, were most exposed to the incursions of the enemy, found means to execute a design said to have been formerly suggested by Epaminondas. They abandoned twenty straggling and defenceless villages; and choosing an advantageous situation in the centre of their territory, erected a fortress there, which they surrounded with a strong wall. The benefit of security attracted new inhabitants; the walls were extended; the place acquired the magnificent name of Megalopolis²⁹, the last city built by

Foundation
of Megalo-
polis.

²⁷ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 620. Diodor. & *τις αἰς χαρὰ καὶ λυγρὰ δακρυὰ ἔστι.* "So common
Plut. ubi supra. are tears to joy and sorrow."

²⁸ Xenoph. ibid. He observes, *ἕτα κρηὶν* ²⁹ "The great city."

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Revolutions
in Thessaly.

the Greeks, while they preserved the dignity of independent government³⁰.

The temporary success of the Spartans under Archidamus, which is generally ascribed to the valour of that commander, was principally occasioned by the withdrawing from Peloponnesus, at a very critical juncture, the numerous army of Thebes, which was at that time called northward, in order to take an important and honourable part in the affairs of Macedon and Thessaly. Since the atrocious murder of the heroic Jason, the latter kingdom had been afflicted by a continued train of crimes and disorders. Just gratitude and respect towards the memory of their generous and warlike chief, engaged the Thessalians to perpetuate the honours of his family. He was succeeded by his brothers Polydore and Polyphron; of whom the latter, not being able to endure the restraint of a limited, much less of a divided rule, attained, by the assassination of his colleague, the sole dominion of Thessaly. His stern despotism was abolished by the hand of Alexander, who avenged the blood of his kinsman³¹ Polydore, the only meritorious action of his life. For Alexander (as his character is represented to us) exceeded the cruelties of Polyphron, and of all the detested tyrants that have ever been condemned to the infamy of history. The Thessalians were delivered from such a monster by the domestic conspiracy of his wife Thebé, the daughter of Jason, and her brothers Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron; who governed with precarious sway, till the power and address of Philip destroyed their usurpation, and rendered their distracted country, which seemed incapable of freedom, a province of Macedonia. Such, in few words, were the revolutions of Thessaly; but the bloody reign

³⁰ I have melted together Pausanias in Bœotic. and Diodorus, l. xv. p. 384, but followed the chronology of the latter.

³¹ His brother, uncle, or father, according to different authors.

of Alexander demands more particular attention, being connected with the general revolutions of Greece.

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Tyranny of
Alexander.

A cautious reader will always receive, with some distrust, the accounts transmitted by ancient republicans of the lives and actions of tyrants³². The popular histories of Alexander remind us of the fanciful descriptions of Busris or Pygmalion. Yet it cannot be doubted that the tyrant of Thessaly was cruel to his subjects, perfidious to his allies, implacable to his enemies, a robber by land, and a pirate at sea³³: but that it was his usual diversion to bury men alive, to inclose them in the skins of wild beasts, as a prey to ravenous dogs, to mutilate and torture children in the presence of their parents³⁴, can scarcely be reconciled with his shedding tears for the imaginary sufferings of Hecuba and Andromaché, during the representation of the Troades³⁵. It is true, that he is said to have been ashamed of this weakness, and to have left the theatre with confusion; but what could have engaged a monster, such as Alexander is described, to listen to the pathetic strains of the tender Euripides? What pleasure, or what pain, could a tyger, thirsting for human blood, receive from such an entertainment? Although we abstract from his story many incredible fictions, Alexander might well deserve the resentment of the Thessalians. His injured subjects took arms, and solicited the protection of Thebes, whose justice or ambition readily embraced their cause. As Epaminondas still continued under the displeasure of his country, the Theban army was conducted by Pelopidas and Ismenias. Their arrival struck terror into the conscious breast of the tyrant, who, without daring to trust his defence to the

The affairs
of Thessaly
settled by
Pelopidas.

³² The acceptation of the word tyrant in Greek history is well known. The Greeks called τυραννι, "tyrants," those who had acquired sovereignty in states formerly republican. Thessaly, Sicily, Corinth, &c. were governed, not by βασιλες, but τυραννι, "not by kings, but tyrants;" whereas Macedonia, which had never been subject to

any species of popular government, was ruled, not by τυραννι, but βασιλες, "not by tyrants, but kings."

³³ These are the words of Xenophon, p. 601.

³⁴ Plut. in Pelopid.

³⁵ Id. de Fort. Alexand.

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Pelopidas
establishes
Perdiccas on
the throne of
Macedon,
and receives
Philip as an
hostage.
Olymp.
ciii. 2.
A. C. 367.

numerous guards and mercenaries by whom his usurpation was supported, implored the clemency of the Theban generals, submitting to the most humiliating conditions which their wisdom might judge proper to exact for the future security of his subjects³⁶.

This transaction was scarcely ended, when the Thebans, whose reputation and success rendered them the most proper mediators in the affairs of their neighbours, were invited into Macedon, which, since the death of Amyntas II. had been a prey, during six years, to all the calamities of a disputed succession. Amyntas left three legitimate sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and a natural son, Ptolemy, whose intrigues chiefly occasioned the disorders of the kingdom. He could not prevent the accession of Alexander to the throne, as that prince had attained the age of manhood at the time of his father's death. But he embittered and shortened his reign, which lasted only one year; after which Ptolemy assumed the reins of government, as guardian of the minority of Perdiccas, and protector of Macedon. It soon appeared, however, that his ambition would not rest satisfied with the borrowed power of a regent. He gained a considerable party to his interest, baffled the opposition of Perdiccas's partisans, and boldly usurped the sovereignty. The friends of that unfortunate prince had recourse to the justice and power of Thebes. Pelopidas entered Macedon at the head of his army; restored the numerous exiles whom Ptolemy had banished; asserted the just rights of Perdiccas to the throne; and, after receiving hostages from the contending factions, among whom was Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, afterwards king of Macedon, and conqueror of Greece, returned towards Thebes, having finally re-established the tranquillity of the neighbouring kingdom³⁷.

Is treacher-
ously seized
and impris-
oned by
Alexander,

In his journey through a country where he had so lately acted the part of a judge and master, it seemed as if little danger could

³⁶ Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. & Plut. in Pelopid.

³⁷ Id. ibid.

reasonably

reasonably be apprehended. Pelopidas had sent before him a considerable detachment of his army, to conduct the Macedonian hostages towards Thebes. With the remainder he marched securely through the territory of his Thessalian confederates, when he was informed that Alexander had come to meet him at the head of his mercenaries. Even this suspicious circumstance could not undeceive the sanguine credulity of the Theban chief. He imagined that the tyrant had taken this measure in order to shew him respect, and to justify himself against some recent complaints of his injured subjects. With an imprudence which all historians agree to condemn³⁸, both Pelopidas and Ismenias threw themselves into the hands of a traitor, who gloried in despising laws human and divine. They were instantly seized by his order, carried to Pheræ, bound, imprisoned, and exposed to the insulting eyes of an invidious multitude.

It might be expected that the Theban soldiers should have been animated with indignation and rage at the unexampled treatment of their leaders and chiefs. But their numbers were too small to contend with the Thessalian mercenaries; and when a powerful reinforcement arrived from Bœotia, they fatally experienced, in the first encounters with the enemy, the absence of Pelopidas, and the degradation of his magnanimous friend. The army was reduced to the utmost difficulties, encompassed on every side, unwilling to fight, and unable to fly. The troops justly accused the inexperience of their commanders, remembering their glorious campaigns in the Peloponnesus, where they contended with far more formidable enemies. Epaminondas, who had commanded them on those memorable occasions, actually served in the ranks. The soldiers with one accord saluted him general. The singular abilities of this extraordinary man soon changed the posture of affairs; the tyrant

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in his journey through
Thessaly.
Olymp.
ciii. 2.
A. C. 367.

Delivered by
Epaminondas.

³⁸ Besides Diodorus and Plutarch, the sage Polybius severely arraigns the imprudent confidence of Pelopidas. Polyb. Casaub. t. ii. p. 98. Polybius in that passage speaks

of the expedition as an embassy. I have carefully compared the different writers, and adopted the account that seemed most probable and consistent.

was defeated in his turn, and compelled to retire. Epaminondas, instead of pushing him to extremity, which might have turned his desperate fury against the valuable lives of the Theban prisoners, hovered round with a victorious army, ostentatiously displayed the advantages of military skill and conduct; and while he kept Alexander in continual respect and fear, yet left him sufficient time for repentance and submission. This judicious plan of operations was attended with success. The tyrant implored peace; but he only received a truce of thirty days, on condition of restoring the persons of Pelopidas and Ismenias³⁹.

Interview of
Pelopidas,
during his
confinement,
with Thebé
queen of
Thessaly.

Those who love to find in history events extraordinary and romantic, would not easily excuse my omitting to mention the interview of Pelopidas, during his imprisonment, with the Thessalian queen. The daughter of the heroic Jason united the beauty of the one sex with the courage of the other, and was beloved by her husband with such love as a tyrant can feel, which is always corrupted by suspicion. At her earnest and repeated entreaties, Thebé was permitted to see, and converse with, the Theban general, whose merit and fame she had long admired. But his appearance did not answer her expectation. At beholding his neglected and squalid figure, she was seized with an emotion of pity, and exclaimed, "How much, Pelopidas, do I lament your wife and family." "You, Thebé! are more to be lamented," replied the Theban hero, "who, without being a prisoner, continue the voluntary slave of a perfidious and cruel tyrant." The expression is said to have sunk deep into the heart of the queen, who remembered the reproach of Pelopidas, when, ten years afterwards, she supported the courage, and urged the hand, of the assassins of Alexander⁴⁰. But this moral narrative, however strongly authenticated, cannot be attentively read without occasioning some degree of scepticism concerning the history

³⁹ Plut. in Pelopid. & Diolorus, ibid.

⁴⁰ Xenoph. p. 601.

of Alexander. Had he been the monster which resentment or credulity have taken pleasure to delineate, who never entered the apartment of his wife without an armed attendant, who slept in a lofty inaccessible tower, to which he mounted by a ladder, and which was guarded by a fierce dog⁴¹, it is incredible that he should have permitted an interview between a secret and open enemy.

Nor will it be easy to reconcile with the fierceness of the Thessalian, another anecdote, which has probably been invented to display the magnanimity of Pelopidas, but which displays still more strongly the patience of Alexander. During the confinement of the former at Pheræ, the latter is said to have exceeded his usual cruelties towards the inhabitants of that city. Pelopidas consoled their affliction, and encouraged them to hope for vengeance. He even sent to reproach the absurdity of the tyrant, in destroying daily so many innocent men, from whom he had nothing to fear, while he allowed an enemy to live, who would employ the first moment of freedom to punish his manifold enormities. "And is Pelopidas so desirous to die?" was the answer of the Thessalian. "Yes," replied the prisoner, "that *you* may the sooner perish, having rendered yourself still more odious to gods and men⁴²." The resentment of Pelopidas, if ever it was expressed, proved an empty boast; for immediately after his deliverance, the Theban army was, for very urgent reasons, withdrawn from Thessaly.

The Theban expedition in the north had allowed the Spartans, in some degree, to recover their influence in the south of Greece. Archidamus had obtained a complete victory over the Arcadians, the bravest and most powerful of the confederates. The crafty⁴³ Antalcidas, with Euthycles⁴⁴, a Spartan of abilities and intrigue, had

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Anecdote of
Pelopidas
and Alexander.

Congress of
Grecian deputies in
Perth.
Olymp.
ciii. 2.
A. C. 367.

⁴¹ Cicero de Offic. l. i. Plut. in Pelopid. But the story, as related by Xenophon, is divested of such improbable actions; and Xenophon seems hardly to believe all that he relates. He says, *ἀντὶ τῆς αἰτίας*,—and repeats, that it was a hearsay, a few sentences below.

⁴² Plutarch. *ibid.*

⁴³ Plut. in Antalcid.

⁴⁴ Xenoph. Hellen.

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been sent as ambassadors to Persia, in order to hasten the supplies of troops, or money, expected from that country. It was time for Thebes to assert her interest in the Peloponnesus, and to counteract the dangerous negotiations of her enemies with Artaxerxes. Epaminondas, whose recent and illustrious merit had silenced the unjust clamours of faction, was confirmed in his military command; and Pelopidas, whose unfortunate adventure in Thebæ was ascribed less to his own imprudence than to the treachery of Alexander, was dispatched to the East, as the person best qualified to conduct a negotiation with the ministers of the great king. He was accompanied by the ambassadors of Elis, Argos, and Arcadia; those of Athens followed soon afterwards; so that there appeared, for the first time, a general congress of the Grecian states, to settle and adjust their interests at the court of a foreign prince. It might be expected, that a scene so new and interesting, should have excited the attention of historians; yet they have left us ignorant in what city of his dominions Artaxerxes received the Greeks. At their arrival, the king treated Antalcidas with that partial kindness due to an ancient guest and favourite; but at their public audience, the appearance, the fame, and the eloquence of Pelopidas, more majestic than that of Athens, more nervous than that of Sparta⁴⁵, entitled him to a just preference, which the king, whose rank and temper alike disdained restraint, was at no pains to conceal.

Representations of Pelopidas to the Persian monarch.

The Theban represented, that in the battle of Platæa, fought above a century ago, and ever since that memorable engagement, his countrymen had uniformly adhered to the interest of Persia, at the risk of losing whatever men hold most precious. That the dangerous war in which they were actually engaged, had been occasioned by their open and steady opposition to the measures of the Spartans, previous to their destructive invasions of Asia. The im-

⁴⁵ Plut. in Pelopid.

perious pride of Agefilaus could never forget the affront offered him at Aulis, when, in imitation of Agamemnon, he intended to offer sacrifice before his embarkation. He had begun hostilities without justice, and carried them on without success. The field of Leuctra had been alike fatal to the strength and glory of Sparta; nor would that ambitious republic have reason to boast of its recent success in Arcadia, if, at that unfortunate juncture, the Thebans had not been prevented, by reasons equally important and honourable, from assisting their Peloponnesian confederates." Timagoras the Athenian, guided by motives which ancient⁴⁶ history has not condescended to explain, seconded, with vigour and address, the arguments of the illustrious Theban. In vain did Leon, the colleague of Timagoras, remonstrate against his perfidy. The other deputies were confounded by his impudence; and before they had time to express their astonishment and indignation, the king desired Pelopidas to explain the object of his commission, and the demand of his countrymen. The Theban replied, that he had been sent to propose and ratify a treaty between his republic and Persia, on conditions equally advantageous to both, since the carrying of them into execution would destroy the power of those states which had

Behaviour of
the other de-
puties.

⁴⁶ The extraordinary behaviour of Timagoras deserves attention. He co-operated with the enemy of his country, and the ambassador of a state actually at war with it. We may guess his motives by his reward. He received from the king of Persia, at his departure, gold and silver, and other valuable presents, particularly a bed of curious construction, with Persian slaves to make it, the Greeks being little acquainted with that operation; and he was carried in a sedan to the sea-shore at the king's expence. Yet this man had the effrontery to return to Athens, and to appear in the public assembly. He knew the force of eloquence and intrigue over the capricious minds of his countrymen; he knew that the practice of receiving bribes was so usual, that the Athenians had lost the proper sense of its base-

ness. He perhaps remembered the pleasant proposal of Epicrates, that instead of nine Archons, the Athenians should annually elect nine ambassadors, chosen from the poorest citizens, who might return rich from Persia. Epicrates had acquired a very undue proportion of wealth by this infamous means, as we learn from an oration of Lyfias: Yet the Athenians were less indignant at his guilt, than delighted with his humour. Timagoras, however, was not so fortunate; he was accused by his colleague Leon, and condemned to death, not, if we may credit Plutarch, because he had betrayed his trust, and accepted bribes, but because the Athenians were extremely displeased that Pelopidas had effected the object of his commission at the Persian court. Plut. in Pelopid.

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hitherto occasioned so much disturbance and danger to all their neighbours. His proposals were, that the Athenians should be commanded to lay up their fleet, and that the fertile country of Messenia should be declared totally independent of Sparta. If any opposition to the treaty were made by these powers, that war should be levied against them by Persia, Thebes, and their allies; and if the inferior cities of Greece declined to engage in so just a cause, that their obstinacy should be punished with an exemplary severity. The king approved these articles, which were immediately consigned to writing, confirmed by the royal seal, and read aloud to the ambassadors. On hearing the clause which related to Athens, Leon exclaimed, with the freedom peculiar to his country, "The Athenians, it seems, must look out for some other ally, instead of the king of Persia." After this daring threat, the ambassadors took leave, and returned to Greece with all possible expedition⁴⁷.

Overtures of the Persians and Thebans rejected in a convention of the Grecian states;

Pelopidas was accompanied by a Persian of distinction, intrusted with the instrument containing the treaty. On his arrival in Thebes, the people were immediately assembled, and being acquainted with the happy fruits of his embassy, they commended his diligence and dexterity. Without losing a day, messengers were dispatched to demand the attendance of representatives from the Grecian states, whose interests were all alike concerned in the late important negotiation. It does not appear that either Athens or Sparta condescended to obey the summons. The convention, however, was very numerous. The Persian read the treaty, shewed the king's seal, and, in the name of his master, required the agreement to be ratified with the formality of oaths usually employed on such occasions. The representatives almost unanimously declared that they had been sent to hear, not to swear; and that before the treaty could be ratified by general consent, its conditions must be

⁴⁷ Xenoph. p. 621, & seqq.

previously discussed in the particular assembly of each independent republic. Such was the firm, but moderate answer of the other deputies; but the high-spirited Lycomedes went farther than his colleagues. His friend and countryman, Antiochus, who had lately acted as the ambassador of Arcadia at the Persian court, returned disgusted by the contempt shewn towards his country by the great king, who hesitated not to prefer Elis to Arcadia. In giving an account of his embassy to the Ten thousand (the name usually bestowed on the Arcadians since the re-union of their tribes in Mantinea and Megalopolis), he indulged himself in many contumelious expressions against Artaxerxes and his subjects, which were greedily listened to by the resentment and envy of his hearers. "Neither the wealth nor the power of the great king were so great in reality as flattery and falsehood represented them. The golden plane-tree, which had often been so ostentatiously described, could scarce afford shade to a grasshopper. He himself had been an attentive observer; yet all he could find in Persia was the idle retinue of vice and luxury, bakers, butlers, and cooks, a useless and servile train; but men fit to contend with the Greeks, he neither himself saw, nor thought it possible for others to discover." The proud disdain of Antiochus had been communicated entire to the breast of Lycomedes. He declared, that Arcadia needed not any alliance with the great king; and that were such a matter in agitation, Thebes would not be the proper place to determine it, since every convention tending to a general peace ought to be held in that country which had been the principal scene of war.

The Theban magistrates discovered the mingled symptoms of disappointment, indignation, grief, and rage. They accused Lycomedes as a traitor to Thebes, and an enemy to his country; but he despised their empty clamours, and, without deigning an answer, walked from the assembly, and was followed by all the deputies of Arcadia. Notwithstanding this severe mortification, the Thebans did

and by each
republic in
particular.

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not abandon the ambitious project at which they had long aimed. Nothing favourable, they perceived, could be expected in the general congress of the states, so that they allowed the assembly to break up without insisting farther on their demands. But at the distance of a short time, they renewed the same proposal to the several republics, beginning with Corinth, one of the weakest, yet most wealthy, in hopes that whatever opposition the overtures of the king of Persia, and their own, had found in the united strength and confidence of the assembled confederacy, few single states at least would venture to provoke the indignation of such powerful adversaries. But in this, too, they were disappointed. The Corinthians declined entering into any alliance with the king of Persia, and set his power at defiance. The magnanimous example was imitated by their neighbours; the secret practices of the Thebans were equally fruitless with their open declarations and demands.

Epaminondas invades the Peloponnesus. Olymp. ciii. 3. A. C. 366.

Epaminondas encouraged his countrymen to acquire, by arms, that pre-eminence which they had vainly expected to obtain by negotiation. His renown, justly increased by the recent transactions in Theffaly, rendered his influence irresistible. He was again intrusted with the command of a powerful army, with which, for the third time, he invaded the Peloponnesus. The Elians and Arcadians, though hostile to each other, were alike disposed for rebellion against Thebes; but instead of marching into their territories, a measure which might have engaged them to settle their private differences, and to unite against the common enemy, Epaminondas endeavoured to quash their disaffection by the rapid conquest of Achaia, which, stretching along the Corinthian gulph, skirted the northern frontiers of Elis and Arcadia. From the nature of their government the Achæans usually enjoyed more tranquillity than their neighbours. They possessed not any great town, whose needy and turbulent inhabitants, seduced by popular demagogues, could rouse the whole province to arms and ambition. Towards the east and the isthmus

Compels the Achæans to accept the Theban alliance.

of

of Corinth, the cities of Sicyon and Phlius had long been regarded as separate republics, unconnected with the general body of the Achæan nation. Ægium enjoyed the prerogative of constituting the usual place of convention for the states of Achaia; but Dymé, Tir-tæa, and Pellené, scarcely yielded to Ægium in populousness and power, and seem, with several places of inferior note, to have formed so many separate and independent communities, all alike subject to the same equitable system of Achæan laws. Immediately before the Theban invasion the aristocracy had acquired an undue weight in the constitution of Achaia, so that the principal nobles and magistrates were no sooner informed of the approach of an enemy, than they flocked from all quarters of the province to meet Epaminondas, soliciting his favour and friendship, and little anxious about the independence of their country, provided they might preserve their personal privileges and private fortunes. The people perceiving themselves betrayed by those who ought to have been their protectors, abandoned all thoughts of resistance. Epaminondas accepted the submission of the magistrates, and received pledges of their engagement, that Achaia should thenceforth adhere to the interest of Thebes, and follow the standard of that republic⁴⁸.

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This conquest, which was effected without striking a blow, and without producing any internal revolution of government, was destructive and bloody in its consequences. Epaminondas, for reasons not sufficiently explained, returned with his army to Thebes; but before he arrived there, various complaints against his conduct had been made in the Theban assembly. The Arcadians and Argives complained that a people, who knew by their own recent experience the inconveniencies of aristocracy, should have confirmed that severe form of government in a dependent province. The democratic faction in Achaia secretly sent emissaries to second the complaint. The ene-

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in Achaia.

⁴⁸ Xenoph. p. 622.

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mies of Epaminondas seized the favourable opportunity of accusing and calumniating that illustrious commander, and the capricious multitude were persuaded to condemn his proceedings, and to send commissioners into Achaia, who, with the assistance of the populace, as well as of a considerable body of mercenaries, dissolved the aristocracy, banished or put to death the nobles, and instituted a democratic form of policy. The foreign troops had scarcely left that country, when the exiles, who were extremely numerous and powerful, returned with common consent, and, after a bloody and desperate struggle, recovered their ancient influence in their respective cities. The leaders of the populace were now, in their turn, put to death or expelled; the aristocracy was re-established; and the magistrates, knowing that it was dangerous to depend on the unsteady politics of Thebes, craved the protection of Sparta, which was readily granted them. The Achæans approved their gratitude by ravaging the northern, while the Lacedæmonians infested the southern frontier of Arcadia; and that unhappy province felt and regretted the inconvenience of its situation between two implacable enemies⁴⁹.

Euphron
usurps the
government
of Sicyon.
Olymp.
ciii. 3.
A. C. 366.

Sicyon, though governed by the Achæan laws, did not follow, on this occasion, the example of its neighbours. That unfortunate city, which had long been the seat of luxury and the arts, was reserved for peculiar calamities. Euphron, a bold, crafty, and ambitious demagogue, having already acquired great credit with the Lacedæmonians, was desirous of obtaining equal consideration among the enemies of that people, hoping, by so many foreign connexions, to render himself absolute master of his little republic. For this purpose he secretly reminded the Arcadians and Argives, that "Sicyon, having the same laws and government, would naturally embrace the same alliance with the neighbouring cities; but the danger of

⁴⁹ Xenoph. p. 623.

this event he would undertake to remove, with very slender assistance from Argos and Arcadia." The admonition was not lost; a body of armed men arrived at Sicyon; Euphron assembled the people; the government was changed; new magistrates were appointed, and Euphron was entrusted with the command of the national force, consisting chiefly of mercenaries. Having obtained this, he obtained all. By caresses, bribes, and flattery, the troops were gained over to his party, and became attached to his person. His colleagues in the government were removed by secret treachery or open violence. His private enemies were held the enemies of the state, accused, condemned, and banished; and their confiscated estates augmented the wealth of Euphron, whose rapacity knew no bounds, sparing neither the property of individuals nor the public treasury, nor the consecrated gold and silver which adorned the temples of Sicyon. The sums amassed by such impious means enabled him to confirm his usurpation. He augmented the number of his mercenary guards, who, while they oppressed the republic, were useful auxiliaries to the Argives and Arcadians. Whatever these nations thought proper to command, the soldiers of Euphron were ready to obey; and partly by this alacrity in their service, partly by bribing⁵⁰ the principal men in Argos and Arcadia, the crafty tyrant expected to prevent those neighbouring communities from interfering in the domestic affairs of Sicyon.

Such was the venality and corruption of the Greeks, that this detestable policy was attended with success, until Æneas, the Stymphalian, obtained the command of the Arcadians. This man, availing himself of the vicinity of Sicyon to Stymphalus, the place of his birth and residence, had formed a connexion with the oppressed citizens of the former. Æneas, perhaps, had not sufficiently shared the lar-

His usurpation overturned by Æneas, the Stymphalian.

⁵⁰ Τα μὲν τὰ καὶ χρηματὶ διαγορεύεται. Xenoph. p. 624.

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gesses of Euphron; perhaps the humanity of his nature ⁵¹ lamented the sufferings of the Sicyonians. Whatever was his motive, it is certain that he endeavoured to expel their tyrant, and to restore their liberty.

Euphron is
assassinated at
Thebes.

Euphron, however, had the dexterity to engage successively in his favour the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Thebans. He spared neither pains, nor promises, nor bribes. He was commonly his own ambassador; and his activity and abilities must have risen far above the ordinary pitch, to engage the principal states of Greece, one after another, to support, in direct opposition to their principles, the tyranny of a single man. Insurrections at home, and hostilities from abroad, at length occasioned his downfall. He escaped to Thebes with the greatest part of his treasure. His enemies sent proper persons to counteract his intrigues there. The money, however, and the address of Euphron, prevailed with the Theban magistrates, and he expected to be restored in triumph by the Thebans, as he had already been by the Athenians. But the Sicyonians, who followed him to Thebes, perceiving his familiarity ⁵² with the principal men of that city, had recourse to the only expedient that seemed capable of frustrating his designs, and assassinated Euphron in the Cadmeæ, while the Theban archons and senators were assembled within the walls of that edifice ⁵³.

This action
publicly justified.

The murderers were seized, and the atrocity, as well as the indignity of their crime, was strongly represented to the senate by one of the archons, who probably regretted the death of Euphron, as the loss of a wealthy client. The criminals denied the fact, till one, bolder than the rest, not only avowed but justified the assassination as equally lawful, advantageous, and honourable. And so little

⁵¹ Xenophon seems to approve this reason. He says Æneas, the Stymphalian, νομισας οτι ανικτος εχεν τα εν σικωνη. "Thinking the grievances of the Sicyonians intolerable."

⁵² Ως δ' ευφρον αυτον οικειως τοις αθησιν συνιτα Xenoph. p. 6, 9.

⁵³ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 630.

horror

horror do men feel at crimes which prevail in their own age, and with which their fancies are familiar, that the assassins were unanimously acquitted by the Theban senate, whose award was approved by the assembly ²².

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Meanwhile the war languished on both sides, and the hostile confederacies were on the point of being dissolved. The Athenians and Arcadians, equally disgusted with their respective allies, concluded a treaty of peace and mutual defence, by the intervention of Lycomedes, the Mantinean, who was slain in his return from Athens by a party of Arcadian exiles. This negotiation gave general alarm; the Arcadians, who had entered into treaty with Athens were the allies of Thebes; and the united strength of these three republics was at that time sufficient to subdue and enslave the rest of Greece. The terror was increased when it appeared that the Athenians had little inclination to evacuate several places in the Corinthian territory which they had undertaken to defend against the Arcadians and Thebans. By seasonable vigilance the Corinthians anticipated a design, too unjust to be publicly avowed; they cautiously dissembled their fears; graciously thanked Chares, who had arrived with an Athenian fleet on pretence of offering them his service, but took care not to admit him within their harbours; and by extreme kindness and condescension, accompanied with warm professions of gratitude for the protection hitherto afforded them, they got rid of the foreign garrisons, without coming to an open rupture with the Athenians. But the narrow escape which they had made, and the dread of being exposed in future to any similar danger, made them extremely solicitous to promote a general peace on the terms proposed by Artaxerxes and the Thebans. Motives of the same kind influenced the cities of Achaia, and the little republic of Phlius, which, together with Corinth, were the only allies that remained

The allies of
Sparta ask
permission of
that republic
to negotiate
a peace with
Thebes.
Olymp.
ciii. 3.
A. C. 366.

²² Xenoph. l. vii. p. 631. & seqq.

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faithful to Sparta. A similarity of interests occasioned a close communication of views and measures among all those communities; who agreed, by common consent, to dispatch an embassy to Sparta, requesting that she would accept the conditions of peace lately offered by Thebes, or if she thought it inconsistent with honour to cede her just pretensions to Messen^e, that she would allow her faithful but helpless allies to enter into a separate negotiation with the Theban republic.

Reasonableness of this demand.

The reasonableness, and even modesty, of this request, must have been apparent to the Spartans, when they reflected on the useful services of the allies, and considered how much they had already suffered in their cause. The Phliasians, in particular, had, during five years, given such illustrious proofs of their unshaken adherence to Sparta, as stand unrivalled in the history of national honour and fidelity. Situated in the midst of enemies, they had continually, since the battle of Leuctra, suffered the invasions and assaults of the Thebans, Arcadians, and Argives. Their territory was totally wasted; their city closely besieged; their citadel, more than once, surprised and taken; their wealth, public and private, was exhausted, and they subsisted precariously on provisions brought from Corinth, for the payment of which they had pledged their beasts of burden and instruments of agriculture. Yet, under the pressure of these multiplied calamities, they had preserved their fidelity inviolate; they had disdained to accept the peace which the Thebans offered them on condition of their forsaking Sparta; even, at last, they were determined to negotiate with Thebes for neutrality alone; nor had they humbly solicited permission to embrace this measure, until Corinth, the only source of their subsistence, seemed ready to forsake them⁵⁵.

The Spartans deliberate on that subject.

The strength of such arguments urged by the eloquence of Patrocles, the Phliasian, might have softened, if any thing could have

⁵⁵ Xenoph. 624. & 634.

softened, the inflexible temper of the Spartan senate, and disposed that assembly to prefer the interest of their allies, and their own immediate safety, to the insisting on a fruitless claim to Messenê, which, unaided and alone, they could never expect to maintain. But the pretensions of this extraordinary people seem to have become more lofty, in proportion to their inability to support them; and, on that particular occasion, the proud obstinacy, natural to the Spartans, was increased by an animated speech of Archidamus, full of the most confident hopes, and glowing with all the warmth of his age and character.

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Speech of
Archidamus.

He spoke with contempt concerning the defection of the confederates. “The Phliasiens, the inhabitants of Corinth and Achaia, may, without exciting surprise, express an anxiety for peace; safety, not glory, is their aim. But the Spartans have a character to sustain, which it would be infamous to relinquish. They expect not barely to exist, but to enjoy fame and honour, the true sweeteners of existence; and, if that be impossible, they must perish! Yet is not their situation desperate: A nation cannot be reduced to any condition of distress, in which a warlike genius, and a well-regulated government, may not afford relief. But in military experience and abilities, we are still unrivalled; and such a system of policy as we enjoy, no other people can boast. We enjoy, besides, temperate and laborious habits, the contempt of pleasure and wealth, an ardour for martial glory, and an ambition of honest fame. These are powerful auxiliaries, when protected by the immortal gods, whose oracles anciently approved our just conquest of Messenê. Nor, though the Corinthians and Achæans forsake us, shall we be destitute of warlike allies. The Athenians, ever jealous of Thebes, their most formidable neighbour, will again take arms in our cause. Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, gives us hope of farther assistance; the king of Egypt, and many princes of Asia, declared enemies of Artaxerxes, are all naturally our friends. We possess, besides, though not the persons and actual

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service, the hearts and affections at least, of whatever is most eminent in Greece. In all the republics, whoever is distinguished by his fame, his wealth, or his virtues, though he may not accompany our standard, secretly wishes success to our arms. I am of opinion, too, that the crowd⁵⁶ of Peloponnesus, that mob on which we at first too vainly relied, will at length return to their duty. They have obtained none of those advantages, the vain prospect of which urged them to revolt. Instead of acquiring the independent government of their own laws, they have fallen a prey to lawless anarchy, or been subjected to the inhuman cruelty of tyrants. The bloody seditions, of which they once knew the nature by report only, they have long experienced; and there are actually more exiles from particular cities, than were formerly from all Peloponnesus. But even banishment is happiness to those who, while they remained at home, butchered each other at the altars; and who, instead of that peaceful abundance which they enjoyed under the Spartan government, perished for want of bread. Such is the condition of the Peloponnesians, whose lands have been laid waste, their cities desolated, and that constitution and those laws, under which they once lived the happiest of men, overturned from the foundation. We might subdue them by force; but that is not necessary; they will voluntarily return to their allegiance, and solicit our protection, as alone capable to alleviate their misery, and prevent their total ruin.

“ But had we nothing of this kind to expect, and were the one half of Greece not more disposed to injure us, than the other to abet their injustice, I have still one resolution to propose, harsh indeed and severe, but becoming those sentiments which have ever animated the Spartans. Prosperity, that conceals the infamy of cowardice, robs fortitude of half its glory. It is adversity alone that can display the full

⁵⁶ Ορχαίος. Isocrat. in Archid. He means the Arcadians, Elians, &c. formerly allies of Sparta.

lustre of a firm and manly character. I propose, therefore, that rather than cede a territory, which your ancestors acquired by the blood and labour of twenty victorious campaigns, you should remove from Sparta your wives, children, and parents, who will be received with kindness in Italy, Sicily, Cyrené, and many parts of Asia. Those who are fit to bear arms must also leave the city, and carry nothing from thence that may not easily be transported. They must, then, fix on some post well fortified by nature, and which art may render secure against every hostile assault. This, thenceforth, must be their city and country; and from this, as a centre, they must on all sides infect the enemy, until either the Thebans remit their arrogance, or the last of the Spartans perish⁵⁷."

The speech of Archidamus expressed the general sense of his country. The allies were dismissed with permission to act as best suited their convenience, but with assurance that Sparta would never listen to any terms of accommodation while deprived of Messené. With this answer the ambassadors returned to their respective cities. Soon afterwards they were dispatched to Thebes, where, having proposed their demands, they were offered admission into the Theban confederacy. They answered, that this was not peace, but only a change of the war; and at length, after various propositions and reasonings, they obtained the much desired neutrality⁵⁸.

The Spartans, thus deserted on every side, would probably have been the victims of their pride and obstinacy, if circumstances, unforeseen by Archidamus, had not prevented the Thebans and Arcadians from carrying on the war with their usual animosity. Projects of glory and ambition had disarmed the resentment of Epaminondas. That active and enterprising leader, who thought that nothing was done, while any thing was neglected, had set himself to render

The Spartans determine to persevere in the war.

Ambitious views of Epaminondas and the Thebans. Olymp. civ. 1. A. C. 364.

⁵⁷ Isocrat. in Archidam.

⁵⁸ Xenoph. ubi supra.

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Disconcerted
by the acti-
vity of
Athens.

Last expedi-
tion of Pello-
pidas into
Thessaly.
Olymp.
civ. 1.
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Thebes mistress of the sea. The attention and labour of the republic was directed to this important object; preparations were made at Aulis with silence and celerity; and when the design seemed ripe for execution, Epaminondas sailed to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, to concert measures with those maritime states, which had already begun to feel the severe yoke of the Athenians, and become eager to shake it off. But the vigilance of the latter, who had sent out a strong fleet under Laches, a commander of reputation and ability, prevented the dangerous consequences of this defection; and the Theban arms were, at the same time, summoned to a service, which more immediately concerned their interest and honour.

Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, began once more to display the resources of his fertile genius, and the inhuman cruelty of his temper. His numerous mercenaries, whom he collected and kept together with singular address, and the secret assistance of Athens, enabled him to over-run the whole territory, and to gain possession of all the principal cities, of Thessaly⁵⁹. The oppressed Thessalians had recourse to Thebes, whose powerful protection they had so happily experienced on former occasions, and whose standard they had uniformly followed, with an alacrity which afforded a sufficient pledge of their gratitude. The Thebans decreed to assist them with ten thousand men, and the command was entrusted to Pelopidas, the personal enemy of Alexander. But the day appointed for the march was darkened by an eclipse of the sun, which greatly diminished the army, as Pelopidas was unwilling to exact the reluctant services of men dispirited by the imaginary terrors of superstition. Such only as despising vain omens, desired to follow their beloved general, were conducted into Thessaly; and being joined by their allies in that country near the town of Pharfalus, they encamped at the foot of the mountains of Cynoscephalæ.

⁵⁹ Plutarch. in Pelopid.

The tyrant approached with an army twenty thousand strong, boldly offering them battle. Nor did Pelopidas decline the engagement, though his foot were, in number, inferior to the enemy. The action began with the cavalry, and was favourable to the Thebans; but the mercenaries of Alexander having gained the advantage of the ground, pressed with vigour the Theban and Theſſalian infantry. In this emergency, Pelopidas rode up, and encouraging the retiring troops with his voice and action, gave them such fresh spirits, that Alexander did not doubt their having received a considerable reinforcement. The mercenaries were pressed in their turn, and thrown into disorder. Pelopidas darting his eye through their broken ranks, espied Alexander in the right wing rallying his men, and preparing to advance with his usual intrepidity. At this sight the Theban was no longer master of his passion. Naturally a foe to tyrants, he beheld a personal foe in the tyrant Alexander. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he impetuously rushed forward, calling aloud to his adversary, and challenging him to single combat. Alexander, fearing to meet the man whom he had injured, retired behind his guards, who received, first with a shower of javelins, and then with their spears, the little band of Pelopidas; who, after producing such carnage⁶⁰ as Homer ascribes to the rage of Diomed or Achilles, fell a victim to the blindness of his own ungovernable fury. Meanwhile, his troops advancing to the relief of their general, the guards of the tyrant were repelled; the Thebans, with their allies, proved victorious in every part of the battle; the enemy were dispersed in flight, and pursued with the loss of three thousand men.

But the death of Pelopidas threw a gloom over the victory. He was lamented by the Thebans and Theſſalians with immoderate demonstrations of sorrow. Accompanied by an innumerable crowd

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He is slain in
the battle of
Cynosce-
phalæ.

Honours
paid to his
memory.

⁶⁰ Diodorus says, that the bodies of those whom he slew covered a long tract of ground. Plutarch is equally hyperbolic. The battles of Homer rendered the marvellous in mili-

tary description too familiar to the Greek historians, I mean, Diodorus, Plutarch, Pausanias; Thucydides and Xenophon knew their duty better.

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The tyrant
stripped of
all his con-
quests.

The The-
bans demo-
lish Orchomenus.

The Arcadians seize
Olympia,
and prepare
to celebrate
the games.
Olym. civ. 1.
B. C. 364.

of real mourners, his body was carried in procession to Thebes. The Theſſalians, in whose service he had fallen, requested the honour of supplying the expences of his funeral, which was celebrated with every circumstance of sad magnificence. The multitude recollected the eclipse which preceded his departure, and which, as they believed, announced his misfortune; and, in allusion to that fatal omen, exclaimed, "that the sun of Thebes was set, and her glory departed for ever." The Thebans appointed Malcitas and Diogeiton to the command in Theſſaly. The tyrant was again defeated, and stripped of all his conquests. But what appears extraordinary, he was allowed to live and reign in Pheræ⁶¹, while the neighbouring cities entered into a close alliance with Thebes.

The foreign expeditions which have been described, were not the only causes that diverted the attention of the Thebans from the affairs of Peloponnesus. While Epaminondas was employed abroad in the fleet, and Pelopidas in Theſſaly, the government of Thebes was on the point of being overturned by an aristocratical faction. The inhabitants of Orchomenus, the second city in Bœotia, and anciently the rival of Thebes⁶², entered into this conspiracy, which was to be executed at the annual review of the Orchomenian troops. But the plot was discovered by the fears or the repentance of some accomplices, who became informers. The cavalry of Orchomenus, to the number of three hundred, were surrounded and cut to pieces in the Theban market-place. Nor did this vengeance satisfy the enraged multitude, who marched in a body to Orchomenus, besieged and took the city, rased it to the ground, put the men of full age to the sword, and dragged their wives and children into captivity⁶³.

While operations, destructive or fruitless, employed the activity of Thebes, her allies in Arcadia were occupied with designs still more blameable. Their own strength and numbers, together with a con-

⁶¹ Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

⁶² Pausanias Bœotic.

⁶³ Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

fidence in Athens, their new confederate, encouraged the Arcadians to give full scope to their ambition, by which they had been long animated. To pave the way for the total conquest of the Peloponnesus, in which they had already obtained a dangerous ascendant, they began by wresting several places from the Elians, the least warlike, and most wealthy, of their neighbours. The Elians, worsted in every encounter with the enemy, craved the assistance of Sparta, which being reinforced by the Achæans (notwithstanding the neutrality so recently stipulated), made several vigorous, but unsuccessful efforts, for the defence of the Elian territory. The Arcadians still pushed their conquests in that country, gaining one town after another, and at length Olympia itself, the most precious jewel of the Elians, and the greatest ornament of the Peloponnesus. As possessors of the sacred city, and by virtue of a pretended right derived from the inhabitants of Pisa, an ancient but decayed place in the neighbourhood of Olympia, the Arcadians prepared to celebrate the hundred and fourth Olympiad, the time of which was at hand. At the approach of this august solemnity, the concourse, as usual, was great from every part of Greece; hostilities were suspended; and all parties united in common amusements, and common ceremonies of religion.

The prayers and sacrifices were performed, and the military games had begun, when the performers and spectators were alarmed by the sudden clashing of armour, and the sight of a *real* battle. The Elians had marched forth with their whole forces, and surprised the Arcadians, who, with two thousand Argives, and a body of Athenian cavalry amounting to four hundred, guarded the sacred groves and temples of Olympia. The vigour of their unexpected assault successively repelled these intruders, who fled in disorder through the streets, and were pursued by the Elians with an *inspired* valour, "since," says Xenophon, "Heaven alone can do, in one day, what no other power can accomplish but in great length of time;

Which are interrupted by the arrival of the Elians in arms.

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make cowards courageous⁶⁴. The Arcadians, however, recovering from their consternation, began to rally. The assailants were resisted with obstinacy; but did not retire, till having lost Stratolas their commander, with other brave men, they retreated in good order, after giving a conspicuous proof of their courage and intrepidity to those who had long despised the softness of their unwarlike character. The Arcadians renewed the guard with double vigilance; fortified the avenues that led to the Stadium and Hippodrome; and having taken these necessary precautions against a second surprise, proceeded with the remaining ceremonies of the festival, which, though brought to an undisturbed conclusion, was never acknowledged in the records of the Elians⁶⁵.

The Arcadians seize the Olympic treasure.

After celebrating the Olympic games, the mixed concourse of people returned to their respective homes, and the Arcadians found themselves sole masters of the city and temple of Jupiter, containing the collected treasures of many centuries, the rich gifts of vanity and superstition. Opportunity, joined to want, is naturally the mother of injustice. The Arcadians, who, to promote their ambitious designs, had raised a body of standing troops called Eparitot, laid hold of the sacred treasure, in order to pay those mercenaries, whose demands they were otherwise incapable of satisfying, without great inconvenience. The Mantinæans first protested against this unwarrantable rapacity. Instead of accepting their proportion of the plunder, they imposed, for the payment of the mercenaries, a tax on themselves, of which they transmitted the produce to the archons, or magistrates, appointed by the Ten Thousand to administer the general concerns of the Arcadian nation. The archons, who had themselves freely handled the sacred money, represented to their

The Mantinæans protest against this impiety.

⁶⁴ Τοῖσιντο ὑπομαρτο αὐς τῆς ἀρετῆς βίος μὲν ἀν ἐμπνυσσας δὲ λυκίτο καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἀποδίδουσι* ἀνθρώποις ἐδὲ ἀν ἐν πολλῶν χρημάτων μὴ οὕτως ἀλκιμῶς πενήσειναι. p. 639.

⁶⁵ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 638, & seqq. & Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

constituents the affected delicacy of the Mantinæans as an obstinacy extremely dangerous to the states of Arcadia, and insinuated that this unseasonable regard for justice and piety most probably concealed some very criminal design.

The Ten Thousand, or, as we should say, the States-General, listened to this insidious accusation; and summoned the municipal magistrates of Mantinæa, to appear and answer for their conduct. They refused to obey; a detachment of the Eparitoi was sent to bring them by force; the Mantinæans shut their gates. This firmness roused the attention of the States; and many members of weight in that assembly began to suspect that the Mantinæans must possess some secret ground of confidence, that encouraged them to set at defiance an authority which they were bound to revere. They reflected first on the alarming consequences to which Arcadia might be exposed by plundering the shrines of Jupiter; and then on the injustice and impiety of the deed itself. These sentiments, enforced by the superstition of the age, spread with rapidity in the assembly; it was determined thenceforth to abstain from a consecrated fund, the violation of which might prove dangerous to themselves, and entail a curse on their posterity; and, to prevent the bad consequences of the desertion of the Eparitoi, whose pay must thereby be diminished, many wealthy Arcadians, who could subsist on their private incomes, enrolled themselves in their stead.

These measures, though approved by the States, gave great uneasiness to the archons, to the mercenaries, and to all who had shared the Olympic spoil, lest they might be called to account for their rapacity, and compelled to refund the sums which they had embezzled. To prevent this danger, they had recourse to the Thebans, from whom they requested immediate assistance, on pretence that the States of Arcadia were ready to revolt to Sparta. The States, on the other hand, sent an embassy requesting the Thebans not to pass the Isthmus, until they should receive farther in-

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The States-General of Arcadia approve the resolution of the Mantinæans;

and restore
Olympia to
the Elians.

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Those who
had em-
bezzled the
Olympic
treasure seize
their oppo-
nents by as-
sistance of
the Thebans.

vation. Nor were they satisfied with barely counteracting the negociations of their enemies. Having determined not to derive any benefit from the wealth of Olympia, they thought proper to restore that city, as well as the direction of the games, to those who had, from time immemorial, enjoyed both, and to conclude a peace with the Elians, who solicited it with much earnestness, as a measure highly conducive to the general interest of the Peloponnesus.

The congress, assembled for this beneficial purpose, was held at Tegea, and consisted of deputies from Elis, and from many cities of Arcadia. When matters were seemingly adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties, entertainments, as usual, were prepared; and the deputies, except those of Mantinæa, most of whom were invited home by the vicinity of their city, remained at Tegea to celebrate the feast of peace. While they were employed in drinking and merriment, the archons, and such others as dreaded the consequences of this hasty accommodation, addressed themselves to a Theban general, who commanded a considerable body of Bœotian troops that had long garrisoned Tegea, in order to secure the fidelity of that place and the adjacent territory. The Theban had himself made free with the sacred treasure, and was therefore easily prevailed on to embrace any measure that might prevent an inquiry into that enormous crime. Nothing appeared so proper for this purpose as to seize and detain the unsuspecting deputies, who consisted of the leading men from most cities of Arcadia. This scheme was no sooner proposed, than carried into execution. The gates of Tegea were secured; a body of armed men surrounded the place of entertainment; the deputies, who had prolonged to a late hour the joys of festivity, were taken unprepared, and conducted to various places of confinement, their number being too great for one prison to contain⁶⁶.

⁶⁶ Xenoph. p. 640.

Next day, the Mantinæans, being apprised of this unexpected event, dispatched messengers, demanding some few of their citizens who happened to remain at Tegea, after the departure of their companions; and at the same time acquainting the magistrates of that place, the archons, and the Theban general, that no Arcadian could be put to death without a fair and open trial. They likewise, without loss of time, dispatched an embassy to the several cities of Arcadia, rousing them to arms in their own defence, and exhorting them to rescue their imprisoned citizens, and to avenge the insult offered to the general body of their nation. When those who had committed the outrage, and especially the Theban general, were acquainted with the vigour of these proceedings, they began to be more alarmed than before. As they had seized but few Mantinæans, they could derive little advantage from the hostages of that city, whose resentment they had most reason to fear. They were sensible of deserving the indignation of Arcadia; and that the general voice of Greece must condemn the irregularity and violence of their measures. Intimidated by such reflections, the Theban commander at once set the prisoners at liberty; and appearing next day before an assembly as numerous as could be collected in such troublesome times, endeavoured to excuse his conduct, by saying, that he had heard of the march of the Lacedæmonian army towards the frontier, and that several of the deputies, whom he had seized, were prepared to betray Tegea to the public enemy. The Arcadians were not the dupes of this shallow artifice; yet they abstained from punishing their own wrongs, and sent ambassadors to Thebes, who might describe the injury that had been committed, and impeach the criminals⁶⁷.

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The prisoners set at liberty.

Upon hearing the accusation, Epaminondas, who was then general of the Bœotians, declared, that his countrymen had done better in seizing, than in discharging the Arcadians, whose conduct was

Epaminondas prepares to march to the Peloponnese, at the head of the Bœotians and their confederates.

⁶⁷ Xenoph. p. 641.

highly

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Olym. civ. 2.
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highly blameable in making peace without the advice of their confederates. "Be assured," continued he to the ambassadors, "that the Thebans will march into Arcadia, and support their friends in that province." This resolution, which expressed the general sense of the republic, was heard with great indignation by the Arcadian states, and their allies of Elis and Achaia. They observed, that the Thebans could not have felt, much less have expressed, any displeasure at the peace of Peloponnesus, if they had not deemed it their interest to perpetuate the divisions and hostilities of a country which they wished to weaken and to subdue. They entered into a stricter alliance with each other, and prepared for a vigorous defence; sending ambassadors to Athens and Sparta, that the former might be ready to thwart the measures of a neighbouring and rival state, and that the latter might take arms to maintain the independence of that portion of Greece, of which the valour of Sparta had long formed the strength and bulwark.

His last expedition into that country.
Olym. civ. 2.
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During these hostile preparations, Epaminondas took the field with *all* the Bœotians, with the Eubœans, and with a strong body of Thessalians, partly supplied by Alexander, and partly raised by the cities which Pelopidas had recently delivered from the yoke of that cruel tyrant. Upon his arrival in the Peloponnesus, he expected to be joined by the Argives, the Messenians, and several communities of Arcadia, particularly the inhabitants of Tegea and Megalopolis. With these hopes, he proceeded southward to Nemea, an ancient city in the Argive territory, distinguished by the games celebrated in honour of Hercules. There he encamped for several days, with an intention to intercept the Athenians, whose nearest route into Peloponnesus lay through the district of Nemea; convinced that nothing could more contribute, than an advantage over that people in the beginning of the campaign, to animate the courage, as well as to increase the number of the Theban partisans in every part of Greece. But this scheme was defeated by the prudence

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denre of the Athenians, who, instead of marching through the Isthmus, failed to the coast of Laconia, and proceeded from thence to join their confederates at Mantinæa. Apprised of this design, Epaminondas moved his camp, and marched forward to Tegea, which being strongly fortified, and enjoying a lofty and central situation, was judiciously chosen as the place of rendezvous for his Peloponnesian confederates. Having continued several weeks at Tegea, he was much disappointed that none of the neighbouring towns sent to offer their submission, and to solicit the protection of the Theban arms. This waste of time gave him the more uneasiness, as his command was limited to a short term. The strength of the enemy at Mantinæa was continually increasing. Agefilaus had already conducted the Lacedæmonians to the frontier of Arcadia. If *they* likewise should join, the combined forces would prove superior to the army of Epaminondas, which amounted to thirty thousand in number, and of which the cavalry alone exceeded three thousand. Considering these circumstances, he suddenly determined on an enterprise, which, if crowned with success, would render the present hitherto fruitless expedition not unworthy of his former fame.

Having decamped with his whole army in the night, he performed a hasty march of thirty miles, in order to surprise Sparta; and had not the extraordinary swiftness of a Cretan deserter apprised Agefilaus of the danger, that city would have been taken unprepared, and totally incapable of defence⁶⁸. The bulk of the Lacedæmonian army had proceeded too far on the road to Mantinæa, to anticipate the design of the enemy; but the aged king, with his son Archidamus, returned with a small, but valiant band, to the defence of Sparta. The engagement which followed, as related by Xenophon, appears one of the most extraordinary that history records. Epaminondas had employed every precaution which his peculiar fa-

Fails in his attempt to surprise Sparta:

⁶⁸ Xenophon says, ὡς περ νεκρῶν παντάπασιν “As a nest quite destitute of its defenders.” Xenophon, p. 644. ers.”

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gacity could suggest; he did not approach Sparta by those narrow roads, where a superiority of numbers would afford him small advantage; he did not draw up his forces in the plain, in which, while entering the town, they might have been annoyed with missile weapons; nor did he allow an opportunity of surprising him by stratagem or ambuscade, in the management of which the Spartans were at all times so dexterous. Seizing an eminence which commanded the town, he determined to descend into it with every advantage on his side, and without the seeming possibility of being exposed to any inconvenience. But the issue of so well-concerted an enterprize, the historian hesitates whether to refer to a particular providence of the gods, or to ascribe to the invincible courage of men actuated by despair. Archidamus, with scarcely an hundred men, opposed the progress of the enemy, cut down the first ranks, and advanced to assault the remainder. Then, strange to relate! "those Thebans, says Xenophon, who breathed fire, who had so often conquered, who were far superior in number, and who possessed the advantage of the ground, shamefully gave way. The Spartans pursued them with impetuosity, but were soon repelled with loss; for the divinity, whose assistance had produced this extraordinary victory, seems also to have prescribed the limits beyond which it was not to extend."

and in that
against Man-
tinæa;

Epaminondas, foiled in an attempt which promised such a fair prospect of success, did not sink under his disappointment. As he had reason to believe that the whole forces at Mantinæa would be withdrawn from that place to the defence of Sparta, he immediately founded a retreat, returned to Tegea with the utmost expedition,

⁶⁹ Plutarch tells a story on this occasion, of a young Spartan named Isadas, who stripped naked, anointed himself with oil, sallied forth with a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other, and traced his path in blood through the thickest of the enemy. He returned unhurt, was crowned for his valour, but fined for fighting without his shield.

Plut. in Ageſil. To a modern reader, Xenophon's account of the battle will appear a pompous description of the effect of panic terror with which the Thebans were inspired, by finding, instead of *manu rerum*, "a defenceless net," the vigorous opposition of men in arms.

and

and allowing his infantry to take time for rest and refreshment, he, with admirable presence of mind, ordered the horse to advance forward to Mantinæa (which was distant only twelve miles), and to maintain their ground until his arrival with the rest of the army. He expected to find the Mantinæans totally unprepared for such a visit; and as it was then autumn, he doubted not that most of the townsmen would be employed in the country, in reaping and bringing in the corn. His plan was wise, and well executed. The situation of the Mantinæans corresponded to his hopes. But it seemed as if fortune had delighted to baffle his sagacity. Before the Theban forces arrived at Mantinæa, a numerous and powerful squadron of Athenian cavalry entered that place, commanded by Hegelochus, who then first learned the departure of the allies to protect the Lacedæmonian capital. He had scarcely received this intelligence, when the Thebans appeared, and advancing with great rapidity, prepared to effect the purpose of their expedition. The Athenians had not time to refresh themselves; they had eat nothing that day; they were inferior in number; they knew the bravery of the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, with whom they must contend; yet, regardless of every consideration but the safety of their allies, they rushed into the field, stopped the progress of the assailants, and, after a fierce and bloody engagement, which displayed great courage on both sides, obtained an acknowledged victory. The enemy craved the bodies of their dead; the victors erected a trophy of their useful valour, which had saved the corn, cattle, slaves, women, and children⁷⁰ of Mantinæa from falling a prey to the invaders.

which is
saved by the
Athenian ca-
valry.

The repeated misfortunes, which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary commander, only determined Epaminondas to a general engagement, in which he might either wipe off the memory of his late disgrace, or obtain an honourable death, fighting

Epaminon-
das deter-
mines to risk
a general en-
gagement.

⁷⁰ Xenophon, l. vii. p. 644.

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His move-
ments pre-
ceding the
battle of
Mantinæa.

to render his country the sovereign of Greece. The confederates had re-assembled at Mantinæa, strengthened by considerable reinforcements. Fresh succours had likewise arrived to the Thebans. Never had such numerous armies⁷¹ taken the field during the perpetual wars in which those unhappy republics were engaged. But battles become really interesting, not so much by the number of the troops, as by the conduct of the generals. It is worth while, says the military historian⁷², to observe the operations of Epaminondas on this memorable occasion. Having ranged his men in battalions, he led them, not along the plain, which was the nearest road to Mantinæa, but turning to the left, conducted them by a chain of hills which joined that city and Tegea, and skirted the eastern extremity of both. The enemy, apprised of his march, drew up their forces before the walls of Mantinæa; the Lacedæmonians, and such Arcadians as had embraced the more honourable cause, in the right wing, the Athenians in the left, the Achæans and Elians forming the main body. Meanwhile Epaminondas marched slowly along, extending his circuit, as if he wished to decline the engagement. Having approached that part of the mountain which faced the hostile army, he ordered his men to halt, and to lay down their arms. His former movements had occasioned great doubt and perplexity; but now it seemed evident that he had laid aside all thoughts of fighting that day, and was preparing to encamp. This opinion, too lightly conceived, proved fatal to the enemy. They abandoned their arms and their ranks, dispersed in their tents, and lost not only that external arrangement, but that inward preparation⁷³, that martial ardour of mind, which ought to animate foldiers at the near prospect of an engagement. Epaminondas seized the decisive moment of attack. Facing to the right, he converted the column of march into an order of battle. His

⁷¹ Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

⁷² Xenoph. p. 645.

⁷³ Ελπει μιν των πολεμων την εν ταις ψυχαις

προς την μάχην παρασκευην ελπει δε την εν ταις συνταξιων. Xenoph. *ibid.*

troops were thus disposed instantaneously in the same order in which he meant to fight. At the head of his left wing, which consisted of the flower of the Bœotians, and which, as at the battle of Leuctra, he formed into a firm wedge, with a sharp point, and with spreading flanks, he advanced against the Spartans and Mantinæans; and trusting the event of the battle to the rapid impulse of this unexpected onset, he commanded the center and right wing, in which he placed less confidence, to proceed with a slow pace, that they might not come up and grapple with the opposing divisions of the enemy, until the victory of his left wing had taught them to conquer.

This judicious design was crowned with merited success. The enemy, perceiving the dreadful shock to which they were exposed, flew to their arms, put on their bucklers and helmets, bridled their horses, and suddenly resumed their ranks; but these different operations were performed with the trepidation of surprise and haste, rather than with the ardour of hope and courage; and the whole army had the appearance of men prepared rather to suffer, than to inflict, any thing cruel or terrible⁷⁴. The Spartans and Mantinæans, drawn up in firm order, sternly waited the first brunt of the assailants. The battle was fierce and bloody, and after their spears were broken, both parties had recourse to their swords. The wedge of Epaminondas at length penetrated the Spartan line, and this advantage encouraged his center and right wing to attack and repel the corresponding divisions of the enemy. The Theban and Thessalian cavalry were equally successful. In the intervals of their ranks Epaminondas had placed a body of light infantry, whose missile weapons greatly annoyed the enemy's horse, who were drawn up too deep. He had likewise taken the precaution to occupy a rising ground on his right with a considerable detachment, which might

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Mantinæa.
Olymp.
civ. 2.
A. C. 363.

⁷⁴ Παντες δι' περιουσιαν τις μαλλον η ποιητησιν ιφικασαι. Xenoph. p. 646.

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take the Athenians in flank and rear, should they advance from their post. These prudent dispositions produced a victory, which Epaminondas did not live to complete or improve. In the heat of the battle he received a mortal wound⁷⁵, and was carried to an eminence, which was afterwards called the Watch-tower⁷⁶, probably that he might the better observe the subsequent operations of the field. But with the departure of their leader was withdrawn the spirit which animated the Theban army. Having impetuously broke through the hostile ranks, they knew not how to profit of this advantage. The enemy rallied in different parts of the field, and prevailed in several partial encounters. All was confusion and terror. The light infantry, which had been posted amidst the Theban and Theſſalian horſe, being left behind in the purſuit, were received and cut to pieces by the Athenian cavalry, commanded by Hegilochus. Elated with this ſucceſs, the Athenians turned their arms againſt the detachment placed on the heights, conſiſting chiefly of Eubœans, whom they routed and put to flight, after a terrible ſlaughter. With ſuch alternations of victory and defeat ended this memorable engagement. Both armies, as conquerors, erected a trophy; both craved their dead, as conquered⁷⁷: and this battle, which being certainly the greateſt, was expected to have proved the moſt deciſive, ever fought among the Greeks, produced no other

⁷⁵ Pausanias in Arcad. ſays, that Epaminondas was killed by Gryllus, the ſon of Xenophon, the Athenian; and as a proof of this aſſertion, mentions a beautiful picture of the battle of Mantinæa, in the Ceramicus of Athens, as well as the monument of Gryllus, erected by the Mantinæans on the field of battle; both ſubſiſting in the time of Pausanias, and both aſcribing to this Athenian the honour of killing Epaminondas. Plutarch, in Ageſilao, ſays, that Anticrates, a Spartan, killed Epaminondas with a ſword; that his poſterity were thence called Machaïrionides; and that, as late as the days of

Plutarch, they enjoyed certain immunities and honours as a recompence for the merit of their anceſtor Anticrates in deſtroying the worſt enemy of Sparta. Gryllus the ſon of Xenophon fell in the battle of Mantinæa; and the words, or rather the ſilence of his father, is very remarkable concerning the death of Epaminondas: "The Theban column broke the Spartans, *but when Epaminondas fell*, the reſt knew not how to uſe the victory." What ſublimity in this paſſage, if Gryllus really ſlew Epaminondas!

⁷⁶ Pauſan. ubi ſupra.

⁷⁷ Xenoph. l. vii. ad fin.

conſequence

consequence but that general languor and debility long remarkable in the subsequent operations of those hostile republics.

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Death of
Epaminon-
das.

When the tumult of the action ceased, the most distinguished Thebans assembled around their dying general. His body had been pierced with a javelin; and the surgeons declared, that it was impossible for him to survive the extraction of the weapon. He asked whether his shield was safe? which being presented to him, he viewed it with a languid smile of melancholy joy. He then demanded, whether the Thebans had obtained the victory? Being answered in the affirmative (for the Lacedæmonians indeed had first sent to demand the bodies of their slain), he declared himself ready to quit life without regret, since he left his country triumphant. The spectators lamented, among other objects of sorrow, that he should die without children, who might inherit the glory of his name, and the fame of his virtues. "You mistake," said he with a cheerful presence of mind, "I leave two fair daughters, the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, who will transmit my renown to the latest ages." So saying, he ordered the weapon to be extracted, and immediately expired. The awful solemnity of his death corresponded with the dignified splendor of an active and useful life. He is usually described as a perfect character⁷⁸; nor does the truth of history oblige us to detract any thing from this description, except that in some instances, and particularly in his last fatal invasion of the Peloponnesus, he allowed the blaze of patriotism to eclipse the mild light of justice and benevolence. He was buried in the field of battle, where his monument still existed, after four centuries, in the time of Pausanias, with an inscription in elegiac verse, enumerating his exploits. Hadrian, then master of the Roman world, added a second column, with a new inscription⁷⁹, in honour of a

⁷⁸ Cicero Acad. Quæst. l. i. & passim. Plutarch. Corn. Nepos. Pausan.

⁷⁹ Vid. Pausan. in Arcad. & Bæotic.

character,

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character, whom that unsteady emperor had genius to admire, but wanted firmness to imitate.

An elegant Roman writer gives a brief but comprehensive panegyric of Epaminondas, that during his lifetime Thebes was the arbiter of Greece; whereas both before and afterwards, that republic continually languished in servitude or dependence⁸⁰. But this observation betrays the inaccurate partiality of a biographer, who often exalts the glory of a favourite hero, at the expence of historic truth. By the death of Epaminondas, Thebes was deprived of her principal ornament and defence, the source of her confidence, and the spring of her activity; and her councils were thenceforth less ambitious, and her arms less enterprising⁸¹. But six years after that event, she controuled the decisions of the Amphictyonic council, and, instead of being reduced to a condition of dependence, her power was still formidable to the most warlike of her neighbours.

Agefilaus's
expedition
into Egypt.
Olymp.
civ. 3.
A. C. 362.

Soon after the battle of Mantinæa, a general peace was proposed under the mediation of Artaxerxes, who wanted Grecian auxiliaries to check the insurrections in Egypt and Lesser Asia, which disturbed the two last years of his reign. The only condition annexed to this treaty was, that each republic should retain its respective possessions. The Spartans determined to reject every accommodation until they had recovered Messenia; and as Artaxerxes had uniformly opposed this demand, they transported forces into Egypt, to foment the defection of that province. At the head of a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, and ten thousand mercenaries, Agefilaus supported one rebel after another, having successively set on the throne Taches and Nectanebus⁸². In this dishonourable war he amassed consider-

⁸⁰ Hujus de virtutibus vitæque satis erit dictum, si hoc unum adjunxero, quod *remis erat* Epaminondas; Thebas & ante Epaminondam natum. & post ejus interitum, perpetuo alieno imperio; contra ea, quamdiu ille præfuerit reipublicæ, caput fuisse totius Græciæ. Corn. Nepos, in Epam.

⁸¹ Vid. Polyb. Hist. l. vi. c. xli.

⁸² Plut. in Agefilao. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xxii.

able wealth, by means of which he probably expected to retrieve the affairs of his country. But returning home by Cyrenaica, he died on that coast, in the eighty-fourth year of his age, and forty-first of his reign⁸³. His character has been sufficiently illustrated in the course of this work. He was the greatest, and the most unfortunate of the Spartan kings. He had seen the highest grandeur of Sparta, and he beheld her fall. During the time that he governed the republic, his country suffered more calamities and disgrace than in seven centuries preceding his reign. His ambition and his obstinacy, doubtless, contributed to her disasters; yet so natural were the principles from which he acted, so probable his hopes of success, and so firm and manly his struggles for victory, that a contemporary writer, who could see through the cloud of fortune, ventured to bestow on Agesilaus a panegyric⁸⁴, which exalts him beyond the renown of his most illustrious predecessors.

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His death.
Olymp.
civ. 4.
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⁸³ Diodor. l. xv. c. xxii.

⁸⁴ 'Ο λόγος εἰς Ἀγισιλάου, by Xenophon.

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State of Greece after the Battle of Mantinæa.—The Amphictyonic Council.—Returning Prosperity of Athens.—Vices resulting from its Government.—Abuses of the judiciary Power.—Of the Theatre.—Degeneracy of Grecian Music.—Extreme Profligacy of the Athenians.—The Vices of Chares render him the Id. of the Multitude.—The Social War.—Banishment of Timotheus and Iphicrates.—Disgraceful Issue of the War.—Philosophy.—Statuary. Praxiteles. The Cnidian Venus.—Painting. Pamphilus, Nicias, Zeuxis.—Literature. Xenophon. His Military Expeditions. Religious and Literary Retreat. Lysias. Isocrates. Plato. His Travels. He settles in the Academy. His great Views. Theology. Cosmogony. Doctrine of Ideas. Of the Human Understanding. The Passions. Virtues. State of Retribution. Genius, and Character.

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State of
Greece after
the battle of
Mantinæa.

WITH the battle of Mantinæa ended¹ the bloody struggle for dominion, which had long exhausted Thebes and Sparta. In that, or in the preceding engagements, they had lost their ablest

¹ Xenophon's Greek history likewise ends with that battle. Henceforth we follow Plutarch and Diodorus, from whom we learn the principal circumstances of great events, which the orators Isocrates and Demosthenes,

Aristotle's Treatise of Politics, and Xenophon's Discourses on the Revenues and Government of Athens will enable us more fully to explain.

generals, and the flower of their troops. No Theban arose to emulate the magnanimity of Epaminondas, and to complete the designs of that illustrious patriot. Archidamus, who succeeded to the Spartan throne, imperfectly justified the high opinion conceived of his early wisdom and valour. Weakened by their wounds, and fatigued by exertions long and fruitless, those republics sunk into such weakness, as encouraged pretensions of their neighbours that had long lain dormant.

During the *superiority*, or, in the language of ancient writers, during the *empire* of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, the majesty of the amphiſtyonic council had degenerated into an empty pageant. Its deliberations were confined to matters of mere form; it regulated some ceremonies of superstition; it superintended games and spectacles; it preserved peace and good order among the crowd of strangers who assembled, at stated times, to consult the oracle of Apollo. But for more than a century past, the public measures of the Greeks had been directed by councils held, not at Delphi, the residence of the Amphiſtyons, but in Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, in one or other of which the allies convened on every important emergency, acknowledging by their presence there, the respective authority of those capitals which were regarded as the heads of their several confederacies. But when first the Peloponnesian, then the Bœotian war, and last of all the battle of Mantinæa, had levelled the greatness, and overthrown the proud tyranny of those domineering republics, the Amphiſtyonic council once more emerged from obscurity; and the general states of Greece having assembled according to their national and hereditary forms, spurned the imperious dictates of any single community.

While this event strengthened the fœderal union, and tended to restore the primitive equality of the Grecian states, various circumstances concurred to revive the aspiring ambition of Athens. During the Bœotian war, the Athenians had acted as auxiliaries only; without making such efforts as enfeebled their strength, their arms

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The Amphiſtyonic council resumes its ancient authority.
Olymp. civ. 4.
A. C. 361.

The Athenians recover many of their maritime possessions.
Olymp. cv. 1.—cv. 3.
A. C. 360—358.

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had acquired great lustre. Their powerful rivals were humbled and exhausted: experience had taught them the danger of attempting to subdue, and the impossibility of keeping in subjection, the territories of their warlike neighbours: but the numerous islands of the Ægean and Ionian seas, the remote coasts of Thrace and Asia, invited the activity of their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign conquests, fearless of domestic envy. It appears, that soon after the death of Epaminondas, Eubœa again acknowledged the authority² of Athens; an event facilitated by the destruction of the Theban partisans, belonging to that place, in the battle of Mantinæa. From the Thracian Bosphorus to Rhodes, several places along both shores submitted to the arms of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; men, who having survived Agesilaus and Epaminondas, were far superior, in abilities and in virtue, to the contemporary generals of other republics. The Cyclades and Corcyra courted the friendship of a people capable to interrupt their navigation, and to destroy their commerce. Byzantium had become their ally, and there was reason to hope that Amphipolis would soon be rendered their subject. Such multiplied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, which once more commanded the sea, with a fleet of near three hundred sail, and employed the best half of her citizens and subjects in ships of war or commerce³.

The vices ascribed to the supposed degeneracy of the Athenians, result-
ed from the nature of their govern-
ment.

This tide of prosperity, which flowed with most apparent force immediately after the battle⁴ of Mantinæa, has been supposed productive of very important consequences. While Epaminondas lived,

² Comp. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 513. & Demosthenes de Chersoneso sub fine, & Æschines in Ctesiphont. It appears, however, from these authors that the Thebans soon afterwards endeavoured to recover Eubœa. The Athenians again rescued it from their power, at the exhortation of Timotheus, whose pithy speech is commended by Demosthenes: "What, my countrymen, the Thebans in the island, and you still delibe-

rating! Why not already in the harbour? why not embarked? why is not the sea covered with your navy? Demosthen. ubi supra.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vii. p. 615. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xi. Isocrat. Panegyri. & de Pace.

⁴ Justin. l. vi. c. ix. first made this observation, which has been so frequently repeated.

the Athenians, it is said, were kept vigilant in duty through jealousy and fear; but after the death of this formidable enemy, they sunk into those vices which occasioned their ruin. This splendid remark is not founded in truth. Two centuries before the birth of Epaminondas, the injustice, the avarice, the total corruption of the Athenians, is forcibly described by one of the most respectable of their countrymen⁵, who composed a system of wise laws in order to ascertain their rights, and to reform their manners. But it was difficult to correct abuses that seem inherent in the nature of democracy, which, even as regulated by Solon, but still more as new-modelled by Pericles, left the citizens tyrants in one capacity, and slaves in another. The division of the executive power of government among the archons, the senate, assembly, and even various committees of the assembly, rendered it impossible to perceive, or prevent, the hand of oppression. Men knew not from what quarter their safety might be assailed; and being called to authority in their turn, they, instead of making united opposition to the injustice of their magistrates, contented themselves with inflicting the same injuries which they had either previously suffered, or still apprehended, from the malice of their enemies. Nor is this inconvenience peculiar to the Greek republics. While human nature remains unchanged, and the passions of men run in their ordinary channel, the right to exercise power will commonly be attended with a strong inclination to abuse it. Unless power, therefore, be counteracted by liberty; unless an impervious line of separation be drawn between prerogative and privilege, and that part of the constitution which sustains its political life, be kept separate and distinct from that which tends to corruption, it is of little consequence whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thousand; in both cases alike the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law.

⁵ See above vol. i. c. xiii. p. 456, and that can only be translated by a paraphrase, the elegiac verses of Solon preserved in Demosthenes Oration against Aeschines; a title "the misconduct of Aeschines in his embassy."

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XXXII.This subject
illustrated;

This radical defect in the Grecian policies produced many ruinous consequences in affairs foreign and domestic, which were commonly directed by the selfish passions of a few, or the fluctuating caprices of the multitude, rather than by the rational and permanent interest of the community. But as diseases and other accidents often bring to light the latent weakness and imperfections of the body, so the vices of the Athenian government first appeared in their full magnitude after the unfortunate war of Peloponnesus; and, although the excess of the malady sometimes checked itself, and returns of ease and prosperity sometimes concealed its virulence, yet the deep-rooted evil still maintained its destructive progress, till it wrought the ruin of the constitution.

in the abuses
of the judi-
ciary power;

In the tumultuary governments of Greece, where the judiciary power frequently prevailed over the legislative, the sources of dissension were innumerable; while the feeble restraint of laws, ill administered, was unable to counteract their force. Although hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded, the poor and rich formed two distinct parties, which had their particular views and separate interests. In some republics the higher ranks bound themselves, by oath, to neglect no opportunity of hurting their inferiors⁶. The populace of Athens commonly treated the rich as if they had entered into an engagement not less atrocious⁷. During the intervals of party rage, private quarrels kept the state in perpetual fermentation. Beside the ordinary disputes concerning property, the competitions for civil offices, for military command, for obtaining public honours, or eluding punishments or burthens, opened an ever-flowing source of bitter animosity. Among this litigious people, neighbours were continually at variance. Every man was regarded as a rival and enemy, who had not proved himself a friend⁸. Hereditary resentments were perpetuated from one generation to another; and the seeds of

⁶ Aristot. Polit. Isocrat. & Lyfias, passim.⁷ Xenoph. de rep. Athen.⁸ See Lyfias passim. & Xenoph. Memorab. l. ii. p. 748, & seqq.

discord being sown in such abundance, yielded a never-failing crop of libels, invectives, and legal prosecutions. The usual employment of six thousand Athenians consisted in deciding law-suits, the profits of which afforded the principal resource of the poorer citizens. Their legal fees amounted annually to an hundred and fifty talents; the bribes, which they received, sometimes exceeded that sum; and, both united, formed a sixth part of the Athenian revenues⁹, even in the most flourishing times. As the most numerous but most worthless class of the people commonly prevailed in the assembly, so they had totally ingrossed the tribunals, and it was to be expected that such judges would always be more swayed by favour and prejudice than by law and reason. The law punished with death the man guilty of giving bribes; but "we," say the Athenian writers¹⁰, "advance him to the command of our armies; and the more criminal he becomes in this respect, with the higher and more lucrative honours is he invested." Those who courted popular favour, lavished not only their own, but the public wealth, to flatter the passions of their adherents; an abuse which began during the splendid administration of Pericles¹¹, extended more widely under his unworthy successors; and, though interrupted during the calamities of the republic, revived with new force on the first dawn of returning prosperity¹².

In the licence of democratic freedom, the citizens, poor and rich, thought themselves alike entitled to enjoy every species of festivity. Pericles introduced the practice of exhibiting not only tragedies, but comedies, at the public expence, and of paying for the admission of the populace. At the period of which we write, a considerable portion of the revenue was appropriated to the theatre; and some years afterwards¹³, a law was proposed by the demagogue Eubulus, and

and in those
of the
theatre.

⁹ Aristoph. Vesp.

¹² Plut. in Pericle.

¹⁰ Isocrates de pace, & Demosthenes, passim.

¹³ Before Christ 349, according to S. Petition, de Leg. Attic. p. 385.

¹¹ Thucydides, p. 103, 8. seqq.

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stances which
rendered
the Grecian
theatre pe-
culiarly li-
able to abuse,

enacted by the senate and people, rendering it capital to divert, or even to propose diverting, the *theatrical* money to any other end or object¹⁴.

Of all amusements known in polished society, the Grecian theatre was, doubtless, the most elegant and ingenious; yet several circumstances rendered it peculiarly liable to abuse. The great extent of the edifices in which plays were represented, naturally introduced masques, the better to distinguish the different *persons*¹⁵, or characters, of the drama; since the variations of passion, with the correspondent changes of countenance, which form the capital merit of modern performers, could scarcely have been observed by an immense crowd of people, many of whom must have been placed at a great distance from the scene. The same causes, together with the inimitable harmony of the Greek language, gave rise to musical declamation¹⁶, which might sometimes fortify passion, but always rendered speech more slow and articulate, and therefore more easily heard by the remote part of the audience. In combining the different parts of a tragic fable, the poet naturally rejects such incidents as are improper for representation. These, if necessary for carrying on the action of the piece, are supposed to be transacted elsewhere, and barely related on the theatre. The time required for such events, when they are not simultaneous with those exhibited on the stage, necessarily interrupts the representation, and leaves room for the choral songs, which being incorporated with the tragedy, heightens its effect, and increases the spectator's delight; consequences extremely different from those attending the act tunes and detached airs of modern plays and operas, universally condemned by good judges, as suspending the action, and destroying the interest of

¹⁴ Plutarch. *ibid.* & Demosthen. Oration. *passim*.

¹⁵ It is well known that the word *persona* originally signified a masque, from *personare*, because the ancient masques, both Greek and Roman, were so made as to increase and invigorate sound.

¹⁶ The Greeks never embraced the absurd custom of dividing the acting and speaking between two persons. This is mentioned by Livy, as the invention of Titus Andronicus, who flourished 240 years before Christ.

the drama, and only affording opportunities to effeminate throats to shine in trills and divisions, at the expence of poetry and good sense. But in ancient, as well as modern times, the corrupt taste of the licentious vulgar was ever at variance with the discerning judgment of the wise and virtuous. The form and arrangement of the Grecian tragedy was exactly imitated in the extravagant pieces of Aristophanes, and his profligate contemporaries and successors¹⁷. These pernicious productions formed the favourite entertainment of the populace. The masque, disguising the countenance of the performer, allowed him to indulge in the most unblushing licence of voice and gesture; the declamation was effeminate and vicious; above all, the music became glaring, tawdry, voluptuous, and dissolute in the highest degree, and suited only that perverse debauchery of soul from which it originally sprung, and which it served afterwards to inflame and nourish¹⁸.

A mysterious cloud hangs over the Grecian music, to which effects are ascribed far transcending the actual power of that art. Yet we cannot refuse our assent to the concurring testimony of ancient writers, who refer to this principle the extreme degeneracy and corruption which almost universally infected the Athenians at the period now under review. Causes which operate on the many, are not easily mistaken; but should we still doubt the cause, the effect at least cannot be denied. The Athenian youth are said to have dissipated their fortunes, and melted the vigour of mind and

Extreme profligacy of the Athenians.

¹⁷ See above, Vol. I. c. xiii. p. 484.

¹⁸ Aristotle, l. viii. de Republ. says ironically, "Every kind of music is good for something; that of the theatres is necessary for the amusement of the mob; being well suited to the perversion of their minds and manners, and let them enjoy it." Plato, Aristoxenus, and Plutarch, bitterly complain of the corruption of music, as the main source of vice and immorality. That art, which had anciently been used as the vehicle of religious

and moral instruction, was employed in the theatres to excite every voluptuous and dissolute passion. Plato de Legibus, l. iii. Aristoxenus, quoted by Athenæus, l. xiv. & Plutarch. de Musica. In speaking of the vices of London, a writer, who had the spirit of an ancient legislator, says, "That were a man permitted to make all the ballads of a nation, he needed not care who should make its laws." Fletcher of Saltoun's Works, p. 266.

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Their idleness, poverty, and ignorance.

body, in wanton and expensive dalliance with the female performers on the theatre¹⁹. Weary and fastidious with excess of criminal indulgence, they lost all capacity or relish for solid and manly occupations; and at once deserted the exercises of war, and the schools of philosophers. To fill up the vacuities of their listless lives, they, as well as persons more advanced in years, loitered in the shops of musicians, and other artists²⁰; or sauntered in the forum and public places, idly enquiring after news, in which they took little interest, unless some danger alarmed the insipid uniformity of their pleasures²¹. Dice, and other games of chance, were carried to a ruinous excess; and are so keenly stigmatised by the moral writers of the age, that it should seem they had begun but recently to prevail, and prove fatal²². The people at large were peculiarly addicted to the sensual gratifications of the table; and, might we believe a poet quoted by Athenæus, had lately bestowed the freedom of their city (once deemed an honour by princes and kings²³) on the sons of Chærephilus, on account of the uncommon merit of their father in the art of cookery²⁴.

Idleness, indulgence, and dissipation, had reduced the greater part of the Athenian citizens to extreme indigence. Although landed property was more equally divided in Greece than in any modern country, we are told that about one fourth of the Athenians were totally destitute of *immoveable* possessions²⁵. Their dress was

¹⁹ Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. who gives a general description of Athenian profligacy.

²⁰ Licrat. in Areopag. and Lysias's defence of a poor man accused before the senate, translated in the Life of Lysias, p. 114.

²¹ Demosthen. Philipp. passim.

²² Athenæus, l. xii. Lysias in Alcibiad.

²³ Demosthen. de Republic. Ordinand.

²⁴ Athenæus. l. iii. p. 119.

²⁵ See the Discourse of Lysias upon a proposal for dissolving the ancient government of Athens. Lysias's orations were chiefly written in the space of twenty years, between 407 and

384 before Christ. They afford a uniform picture of the poverty, misery, and vices of his contemporaries; which the reader will find abridged in the introduction to my translation of that writer. The Athenian affairs became more flourishing after the fall of Thebes and Sparta. Their resources were again exhausted by the war with their allies. The revenues were greatly raised by the conquests of Timotheus, Phocion, &c. and the good management of Lysurgus and Demosthenes. Plut. in Lycurg. in lib de Dec. Orator.

frequently

frequently so mean and dirty, that it was difficult, by their external appearance, to distinguish them from slaves; a circumstance which arose not from slovenliness, but from poverty, since we are assured that such as could afford the expence spared no pains to adorn their persons; and that many who danced during summer in embroidered robes, spent the winter in places too shameful to be named²⁶. And how is it possible (to use the words of their own authors²⁷) that wretches, destitute of the first necessities of life, should administer public affairs with wisdom? We find accordingly, that they were extremely ill qualified for executing those offices with which they were intrusted. As the lower ranks had in a great measure ingrossed the administration of justice, it was not uncommon to bribe the clerks employed in transcribing the laws of Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them. What is still more extraordinary, such a gross artifice frequently succeeded; nor was the deceit discovered until litigant parties produced in court contradictory laws²⁸. When their negligence could not be surpris'd, their avarice might be bribed; justice was sold; riches, virtue, eminence of rank or abilities, always expos'd to danger, and often ended in disgrace²⁹. For those needy Athenians, who formed the most numerous class in the republic, endeavoured to alleviate their misery by a very criminal consolation; persecuting their superiors, banishing them their country, confiscating their estates, and treating them on the slightest provocation, and often without any provocation at all, with the utmost injustice and cruelty³⁰. Though occasionally directed by the equity of an Aristides, or the magnanimity of a Cimon, they, for the most part, listened to men of an opposite character. He who could best flatter and deceive them obtained most of their confidence. With such qualifications, the turbu-

²⁶ Isocrates on reforming the government of Athens.

²⁹ See Lyfias's pleading throughout.

²⁷ Isocrat. & Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

²⁸ Life of Lyfias, prefixed to his orations,

p. 116.

³⁰ Isocrates de Pace; and the numerous examples of that kind, which have already occurred in this history.

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lent, licentious, and dissolute, in a word, the orator who most resembled his audience, commonly prevailed in the assembly; and specious or hurtful talents carried off the rewards due to real merit. Isocrates³¹ assures us of the fact; and Xenophon³² affirms, that it is perfectly conformable to the nature and principles of the Athenian form of government.

The vices of
Chares render him the
favourite of
the multi-
tude.

With such principles and manners, the Athenians required only a daring and profligate leader, to involve them in designs the most extravagant and pernicious. Such a personage presented himself in Chares, whose soldier-like appearance, blunt address, and bold impetuous valour, masked his selfish ambition, and rendered him the idol of the populace. His person was gigantic and robust, his voice commanding, his manners haughty; he asserted positively, and promised boldly; and his presumption was so excessive, that it concealed his incapacity not only from others, but from himself. Though an enterprising and successful partisan, he was unacquainted with the great duties of a general; and his defects appear the more striking and palpable, when compared with the abilities of Iphicrates and Timotheus, his contemporaries, who prevailed as often by address as by force, and whose conquests were secured to the republic by the moderation, justice, and humanity, with which they had been obtained, and with which they continued to be governed. Chares proposed a very different mode of administration; he exhorted his countrymen to supply the defects of their treasury, and to acquire the materials of those pleasures which they regarded as essential to their happiness, by plundering the wealth of their allies and colonies. This counsel was too faithfully obeyed; the vexations, anciently exercised against the tributary and dependent states, were renewed and exceeded³³. The weaker communities complained, and remonstrated, against this intolerable rapacity and oppression; while

³¹ In his oration on reforming the government of Athens.

³² In his treatise de Republic. Athen.

³³ Diodor. l. xvi. & Isocrat. de Pace.

the islands of Chios, Coos, Rhodes, as well as the city of Byzantium, prepared openly to revolt, and engaged with each other to repel force by force, until they should obtain peace and independence³⁴.

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Chares, probably the chief instrument, as well as the adviser of the arbitrary measures which had occasioned the revolt, was sent out with a powerful fleet and army, to quash at once the hopes of the insurgents. He sailed towards Chios, with an intention to seize the capital of that island, which was supposed to be the centre and prime mover of rebellion. The confederates, informed of his motions, had already drawn thither the greatest part of their force. The city of Chios was besieged by sea and land. The islanders defended themselves with vigour. Chares found it difficult to repulse their sallies. His fleet attempted to enter their harbour without success; the ship of Chabrias alone penetrated thus far; and that able commander, whose valour and integrity merited a better fortune, though deserted by the fleet, yet forsook not the ship intrusted to him by the republic. His companions threw away their shields, and saved themselves by swimming to the Athenian squadron, which was still within their reach. But Chabrias, fighting bravely, fell by the darts of the Chians, preferring an honourable death to a disgraceful life³⁵.

The social
war.
Olymp.
cv. 3.
A. C. 358.

Encouraged by advantages over an enemy who had at first affected to despise them, the insurgents augmented their fleet, and ravaged the isles of Lemnos and Samos. The Athenians, indignant that the territories of their faithful allies should fall a prey to the depredations of rebels, fitted out, early in the next year, a new armament under the command of Mnestheus, the son of Iphicrates, and son-in-law of Timotheus, expecting that the new commander would respectfully listen to the advice of those great men, who perhaps declined acting as principals in an expedition where Chares possessed any share of authority. That general had raised the siege of Chios,

³⁴ Diodor. l. xvi. pp. 413. 423.

³⁵ Nepos in Chabr. & Diodor. l. xvi. p. 423, & seqq.

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and now cruised in the Hellespont; where, being joined by Mneſtheus, the united squadrons amounted to an hundred and twenty ſail. It was immediately determined to cauſe a diverſion of the enemy's forces from Samos and Lemnos, by laying ſiege to Byzantium. The deſign ſucceeded; the allies withdrew from theſe iſlands, collected their whole naval ſtrength, and prepared vigorously for defending the principal city in their confederacy.

Chares ac-
cuſes Timo-
theus and
Iphicrates.

The hoſtile armaments approached each other, with a reſolution to join battle, when a ſudden and violent ſtorm aroſe, which rendered it impoſſible for the Athenians to bear up to the enemy, or even to keep the ſea, without being expoſed to ſhipwreck. Chares alone confidently inſiſted on commencing the attack, while the other commanders, more cautious and experienced, perceived the diſadvantage, and declined the unequal danger³⁶. His impetuouſity, thus over-ruled by the prudence of his colleagues, was converted into reſentment and fury; he called the ſoldiers and ſailors to witneſs their oppoſition, which he branded with every odious epithet of reproach; and, with the firſt opportunity, diſpatched proper meſſengers to Athens, to accuſe them of incapacity, cowardice, and total neglect of duty. The accuſation was ſupported by venal orators in the pay of Chares.

Their trial;

Timotheus and Iphicrates were tried capitally. The former truſted to his innocence and eloquence; the latter uſed a very extraordinary expedient to ſway the judges, conformable, however, to the ſpirit of that age, when courts of juſtice were frequently inſtruments of oppreſſion, governed by every ſpecies of undue influence, eaſily corrupted and eaſily intimidated. The targeteers, or light infantry, who had been armed, diſciplined, and long commanded, by Iphicrates, enjoyed the ſame reputation in Greece, which the

³⁶ We are not informed by Diodorus or Nepos, why the diſadvantage and danger being better ſailors, they expected to profit of their ſkill in *manœuvre*, which the ſtorm rendered uſeleſs and unavailing.

Fabian soldiers afterwards did in Italy. They were called the *Iphicratian* troops, from the name of their commander, to whom they owed their merit and their fame, and to whose person (notwithstanding the strictness of his discipline) they were strongly attached by the ties of gratitude and esteem. The youngest and bravest of this celebrated band readily obeyed the injunctions of their admired general; surrounded, on the day of trial, the benches of the magistrates; and took care seasonably to display the points of their daggers³⁷.

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It was the law of Athens, that, after preliminaries had been adjusted, and the judges assembled, the parties should be heard, and the trial begun and ended on the same day; nor could any person be twice tried for the same offence. The rapidity of this mode of procedure favoured the views of Iphicrates. The magistrates were overawed by the imminence of a danger, which they had neither strength to resist, nor time to elude. They were compelled to an immediate decision; but, instead of the sentence of death, which was expected, they imposed a fine³⁸ on the delinquents, which no Athenian citizen in that age was in a condition to pay. This severity drove into banishment those able and illustrious commanders. Timotheus sailed to Chalcis in Eubœa, and afterwards to the isle of Lesbos, both which places his valour and abilities had recovered for the republic, and which, being chosen as his residence in disgrace, sufficiently evince the mildness of his government, and his moderation in prosperity. Iphicrates travelled into Thrace, where he had long resided. He had formerly married the daughter of Cotys, the most considerable of the Thracian princes; yet he lived and died in ob-

and banish-
ment.

³⁷ It was probably during this trial, that Iphicrates being reproached with betraying the interests of his country, asked his accuser, "Would you, on a like occasion, have been guilty of that crime?" "By no means,"

replied the other. "And can you then imagine," replied the hero, "that Iphicrates should be guilty?" Quintilian. l. v. c. xii.

³⁸ One hundred talents, about twenty thousand pounds.

scurity;

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scurity"; nor did either he or Timotheus thenceforth take any share in the affairs of their ungrateful country³⁹. Thus did the social war destroy or remove Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, the best generals whom Greece could boast; and, the brave and honest Phocion excepted, the last venerable remains of Athenian virtue⁴⁰.

Chares entrusted with the sole conduct of the war;
Olymp. cv. 4.
A. C. 357.

By the removal of those great men, Chares was left to conduct, uncontrouled, the war against the allies; and to display the full extent of his worthlessness and incapacity. His insatiable avarice rendered him intolerable to the friends of Athens; his weakness and negligence exposed him to the contempt of the insurgents. He indulged his officers and himself in a total neglect of discipline; the reduction of the rebels was the least matter of his concern; he was attended by an effeminate crowd of singers, dancers, and harlots⁴¹, whose luxury exhausted the scanty supplies raised by the Athenians for the service of the war⁴². In order to satisfy the clamorous demands of the soldiers, Chares, regardless of the treaties subsisting between Athens and Persia, hired himself and his forces to Artabazus, the wealthy satrap of Ionia, who had revolted from his master Artaxerxes Ochus, the most cruel and detestable tyrant that ever disgraced the throne of Cyrus. The arms of the Greeks saved Artabazus from the implacable resentment of a monster incapable to pity or forgive; and their meritorious services were amply rewarded by the lavish gratitude of the satrap.

which ends disgracefully for the Athenians.
Olymp. cvi. 1.
A. C. 356.

This transaction, how extraordinary soever it may appear to the modern reader, neither surprised nor displeased the Athenians. They

³⁹ Diodorus only says, that he was dead before the battle of Chæronæa, which happened twenty years after his banishment.

⁴⁰ Nepos says, that after the death of Timotheus, the Athenians remitted nine parts of his fine; but obliged his son Conon to pay the remaining tenth, for repairing the walls of the Piræus, which his grandfather had rebuilt from the spoils of the enemy.

⁴¹ *Military* virtue. Hoc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Atheniensium, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus; neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa arbe fuit dignus memoria. Nepos in Timoth. The biographer forgets Phocion.

⁴² Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

⁴³ Demosthen. Philipp. 1.

were

were accustomed to allow their commanders in foreign parts to act without instructions or controul; and the creatures of Chares loudly extolled his good management in paying the Grecian troops with Persian money. But the triumph of false joy was of short duration. Ochus sent an embassy to remonstrate with the Athenians on their unprovoked infraction of the peace; and threatened, that unless they immediately withdrew their forces from Asia, he would assist the rebels with a fleet of three hundred sail. This just menace, want of success against the confederates, together with a reason still more important, which will soon come to be fully explained, obliged the Athenians to recal their armament from the East, and to terminate the social war, without obtaining any of the purposes for which it had been undertaken. The confederates made good the claims which their boldness had urged; regained complete freedom and independence⁴⁴; and lived twenty years exempt from the legal oppression of subsidies and contingents, till they submitted, with the rest of Greece, to the arms and intrigues of Philip, and the irresistible fortune of the Macedonians.

Notwithstanding the decay of martial spirit, the extravagance of public councils, and the general corruption of manners, which prevailed in Athens, and in other cities of Greece, the arts and sciences were still cultivated with ardour and success. During the period now under review, the scholars of Hippocrates and Democritus enriched natural philosophy with many important discoveries⁴⁵. The different branches of mathematics, mechanics, and astronomy, received great improvements from Eudoxus⁴⁶ of Cnidus, Timæus⁴⁷ of Locri, Archytas of Tarentum, and Meton of Athens⁴⁸. The Megaric school flourished under Stilpo, the most learned and acute of that disputatious sect, which, from its continual wranglings, me-

State of philosophy.

⁴⁴ Diodor. p. 424.

⁴⁶ Laert. l. viii. sect. 86. & Suid. in Eudox.

⁴⁵ Galenus. de Natur. facultat. & Hippocrat. Περὶ ἀρχῶν, &c.

⁴⁷ Jambl. de Pythagor.

⁴⁸ Cenforin. de Die natal.

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Of the fine
arts.
Sculptury.

The works of
Praxiteles.
Olymp.
c. v. 1.
A. C. 460.

rited the epithet of contentious⁴⁹. The doctrines of Aristippus were maintained by his daughter Areté, and improved by Hegesias and Anneceris, who paved the way for Epicurus⁵⁰. The severe philosophy of Antisthenes had fewer followers⁵¹. But Diogenes alone was equal to a sect⁵².

Statuary was cultivated by Polyclethus and Canachus of Sicyon, by Naucydes of Argos, and by innumerable artists in other cities of Greece, Italy, and Ionia. The works of Polyclethus were the most admired. His greatest work was the colossal statue of Argive Juno, composed of gold and ivory. Bronze and marble, however, still furnished the usual materials for sculpture. The Grecian temples, particularly those of Delphi and Olympia, were enriched with innumerable productions of this kind, during the period to which our present observations relate. One figure of Polyclethus acquired peculiar fame. From the exactness of the proportions⁵³, it was called the rule, or standard. Even Lysippus, the contemporary and favourite of Alexander, regarded it as a model of excellence, from which it was imprudent to depart.

Between Polyclethus and Lysippus flourished Praxiteles, whose works formed the intermediate shade between the sublime style, which prevailed in the age of Pericles, and the beautiful, which attained perfection under Lysippus and Apelles, in the age of Alexander. The statues of Praxiteles bore a similar relation to those of Phidias, which the paintings of Guido and Corregio bear to those of

⁴⁹ EPIST. Laert. l. vi. sect. 107.

⁵⁰ Laertius & Suidas.

⁵¹ Ælian. Var. Hist. l. x. c. xvi.

⁵² We shall have occasion to speak more fully of Diogenes hereafter.

⁵³ Winckelmann, p. 653, and his translator Mr. Huber, vol. iii. p. 34. differ from Pliny, l. 35. c. 19. They confound the statue, called the Rule, or Canon, with another called the Doryphorus, because grasping a spear. Pliny's words are, "Polyclethus

Sicyonius Diadumenum fecit molliter juvenem, centum talentis nobilitatum; Idem et Doryphorum viriliter puerum. Fecit et quem canona artifices vocant, lineamenta artis ex eo petentes, velut a lege quadam; foliusque hominum artem ipse (forse ipsam) fecisse, artis opere judicatur." They have followed Cicero de Clar. Orator. c. 86.—yet Cicero, speaking incidentally on the subject, might more naturally mistake than Pliny, writing expressly on sculpture.

Julio Romano, and Raphael. The works of the earlier artists are more grand and more sublime, those of the later more graceful and more alluring; the first class being addressed to the imagination, the second to the senses. The works of Praxiteles were in the Ceramicus of Athens; but neither in the Ceramicus, nor in any part of the world, was a statue to be seen equal to his celebrated Venus, which long attracted spectators from all parts to Cnidus. Praxiteles made two statues of the goddess at the same time, the one clothed, the other naked. The decent modesty of the Coans preferred the former; the latter was purchased by the Cnidians, and long regarded as the most valuable possession of their community. The voluptuous Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, languished after this statue; to purchase such unrivalled charms he offered to pay the debts of Cnidus, which were immense; but the Cnidians determined not to part with an ornament from which their republic derived so much celebrity. "Having considered," says an ancient author⁵⁴, "the beautiful avenues leading to the temple, we at length entered the sacred dome. In the middle stands the statue of the goddess, in marble of Paros. A sweet smile sits on her lips; no garment hides her charms; the hand only, as by an instinctive impulse, conceals those parts which modesty permits not to name. The art of Praxiteles has given to the stone the softness and sensibility of flesh. O Mars, the most fortunate of the gods!" But it is impossible to translate his too faithful description into the decency of modern language; a description more animated and voluptuous than even the chisel of Praxiteles.

The honour which Polyclethus and Praxiteles acquired in sculpture, was, during the same age, attained in painting by Eupompus and Pamphilus of Sicyon, by Euphranor of Corinth, by Apollodorus and Nicias of Athens; above all by Zeuxis and Timanthes⁵⁵.

The

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The Cnidian
Venus.

The state of
painting.

⁵⁴ Lucian. Amor.

⁵⁵ Pliny, in his 35th book. I have paid little attention to his pretended Epochs of
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Art, when inconsistent with the information of more ancient authors. The Greek historians, from whom he copied this part of his work,
3 A

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Works of
Pamphilus.

Of Euphranor.

The works of Eupompus are now unknown, but in his own times his merit and celebrity occasioned a new division of the schools, which were formerly the Grecian and the Asiatic; but after Eupompus, the Grecian school was subdivided into the Athenian and Sicyonian. Pamphilus, and his scholar Apelles, gave fresh lustre to the latter school, which seems to have flourished longer than any other in Greece, since the paintings exhibited at the celebrated procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus were all the productions of Sicyonian masters⁵⁶.

Few works of Pamphilus are described by ancient authors. His picture of the Heraclidæ, carrying branches of olive, and imploring the assistance of the Athenians, has not, however, escaped the vigilant eye of national vanity⁵⁷. He was by birth a Macedonian, but well versed in literature and science, which he thought indispensably necessary to a painter. He received about two hundred pounds from each of his scholars, and seems to have been the first who put a high price on his works. He lived to enjoy his fame, and rendered his profession so fashionable, that it became customary in Sicyon, and afterwards in other parts of Greece, to instruct the sons of wealthy families in the art of design. This liberal profession was forbidden to slaves; nor, during the existence of Grecian freedom, did any celebrated production in sculpture or painting come from servile hands⁵⁸.

Euphranor the Corinthian excelled both in painting and statuary. The dignity of his heroes was admired. He painted

work, found it convenient, at every pause in their narrative, to give some account of men who had distinguished themselves in the arts and sciences, of whom they had no opportunity to make mention in relating public transactions, and describing wars and negotiations. The æra of every peace furnished a proper resting-place to the historian; from which he looked back, and collected the names worthy to be handed down to posterity. Every such æra, therefore, Pliny, and

after him Winkelmann, have considered as an epoch of art; not reflecting, that arts do not suddenly arise and flourish, and when once they flourish, do not suddenly decay; since the mind long retains the impulse which it has received; and the active powers of man, when once directed to their proper objects, are not easily lulled to repose.

⁵⁶ Athen. Deipn. l. v. p. 196.

⁵⁷ Aristoph. Plut. v. 385.

⁵⁸ Plin. l. xxxv. c. xxvii. sect. 5.

the twelve gods. He said that *his* Theseus had fed on flesh, that of Parrhasius on roses. He wrote on colours and symmetry. Apollodorus the Athenian was deemed the first who knew the force of light and shade⁵⁹. His priest in prayer, and his Ajax struck with lightning, were held in high estimation. Nicias, his fellow-citizen, excelled in female figures, and in all the magic of colouring. His Calypso, Iö, and Andromeda, claimed just fame; but his greatest composition was the Necromanteia of Homer⁶⁰. Attalus king of Pergamus (for Nicias lived to a great age) offered twelve thousand pounds for this picture; but the artist, who was extremely wealthy, gave it in a present to his native country. Praxiteles, when asked which of his statues he most valued, answered, "Those of which the models were retouched by Nicias."

Zeuxis is said to have been born at Heraclæa, but it is uncertain in which of the cities known by that name. He acquired great wealth by his works; at length he refused money, boasting that no price could pay them. The modesty of his Penelope was equal to a lesson of morality. He painted Hercules strangling the serpents in the presence of the astonished Amphitryon and Alcmena. His picture dedicated in the temple of Juno Lucina, at Agrigentum, has been often mentioned. Being allowed to view the naked beauty of that populous city, it is known that he chose

⁵⁹ This is the commendation of Plutarch. Pliny speaks more highly of Apollodorus. "Festinus ad lumina artis, in quibus primus refulsit Apollodorus Atheniensis . . . neque ante eum tabula ullius ostenditur, quæ teneat oculos." Pliny's praises often clash with each other. He frequently calls different persons the first in the art, and even in the same branch of it. The warmth of his fancy leaves him no time for calculating the weight of his expressions. His credulity, love of wonder, and inaccuracy, cannot be defended. Yet his judgments on pictures and statues are not without their me-

rit; since the perfection of those works of art consists in making a deep impression, in transporting and elevating the affections, and in raising that glow of sentiment, which Pliny is so happy in communicating to his readers.

⁶⁰ Long before all the celebrated works of art, Homer had viewed nature with a picturesque eye. For the innumerable pictures copied from him, see Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. vi. p. 345. Homer gave the idea of what is grand and pathetic in intellect, which painters and statuary translated into what is touching and awful to the eye.

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as models five virgins, whose united charms were expressed in this celebrated piece. His greatest work was Jupiter sitting on his throne, and surrounded by the gods⁶¹.

Timanthes.

Timanthes reached the highest perfection of his art; but his genius surpassed the art itself. In his sacrifice of Iphigenia, a gradation of sorrow was seen in the faces of the spectators. It was carried to the utmost height, consistent with beauty, in the countenance of her uncle Menelaus. But Agamemnon, who was still more deeply afflicted with the unhappy fate of his daughter, veiled his face with his robe. In several others of his pieces, Timanthes discovered the power of transporting the mind beyond the picture. He painted to the fancy rather than to the eye. In his works, as in the descriptions of Homer and Milton, more was understood than expressed.

Expression of
Greek painting.

The power of expression was carried to a degree of perfection which it is not easy to believe, and scarcely possible to comprehend. The civil

⁶¹ Valerius Maximus, l. iii. c. vii. speaks of his Helena painted for the city of Crotona. On his naked Helen Zeuxis inscribed the following lines of Homer:

Οὐρανὸν, Τρώας καὶ Διοτρίδας ἄρχεις
Τὸν δακρυῖ γενναῖα πόδες χροὶα ἀλγία πασχόν
Ἀνὰς ἀβυσσὸν δὲρ ἰστανά τινος.

Il. iii. v. 154.

“ They cry’d, No wonder such celestial
creatures.

For nine long years have set the world in
arms:

What winning graces! what majestic mien!
She moves a goddess, and she looks a
queen.” POPE.

Pope has paraphrased the last line, “ For she is wonderfully like to the immortal gods.” This must have sounded nobly to the Greeks, who would doubtless have considered “ looking a queen,” as a sinking in poetry. But I have cited the lines, to shew by what difficult means poetry and painting attain the same end. Both Homer and Zeuxis convey an idea of Helen’s beauty; but Homer does it by the effect of that beauty, which

could animate the cold age of Priam, Panthoos, &c. whom he has just imitantly described:

Γυναῖ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον πεισάμεναι, ἀλλ’ ἀγορεύει
Ἑδρῆναι, τιτύγιστος ἰσχυρὴ ὡς καὶ ἴδμεν
Διὶ δὲ ἐφίερα ὅσα λυγροτάταις εἴσι.

When the Greek monk, Constantinus Marnasses (Chron. p. 20.) describes the beauty of Helen,

Ἡ δὲ γυνὴ περικλυτὴ ἑστῆς ἡ χροῖα τῆς
Εὐπαρίου; ὑπερσώματος δούπης; χρυσοῦ; &c.

and so on, through a dozen of lines, the imagination of the reader cannot follow him; each epithet of beauty drives the preceding from the memory; and we fancy that we see a man laboriously rolling stones up one side of a hill, which immediately roll down the other. Ariosto’s description of the beauty of Alcina (cant. viii.), is in the same bad taste. How different is Virgil’s “ Pulcherrima Dido.” Virgil knew the difference between poetical and picturesque images. Our English romances abound with examples of this species of bad taste, arising from mistaking the boundaries of distinct, though kindred, arts. See above, vol. i. c. xiv. p. 509.

and

and military arrangements of the Greeks gave, doubtless, great advantages to their artists in this respect. Aristides, a Theban painter, represented the sacking of a town; among other scenes of horror, a child was painted clinging to the breast of its wounded mother, who "*felt and feared*"⁶², that after she was dead, the child should suck blood instead of milk." Parrhasius of Ephefus, in an earlier age, personified the people of Athens, in a figure that characterised them as at once cruel and compassionate, proud and humble, brave and cowardly, elevated and mean. Such discriminations, as well as such complications of passion, are unquestionably beyond the reach of modern art, and will therefore be pronounced imaginary. It is worthy of remark, that the same Parrhasius, who seems to have united the excellencies of Dominichino, Raphael, and Correggio, was distinguished by the gliding motion of his outline, and the sweetness with which it melted into the ground⁶³.

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Ideal beauty, just proportion, natural and noble attitudes, an uniform greatness of style, are acknowledged to have equally belonged to the ancient painters and statuaries. But the vanity or envy of modern times is unwilling to allow any merit to the former, which the remains of the latter do not justify and confirm. The Greek painters, therefore, have been supposed deficient in colouring; and this supposition has been supported by the words of Pliny:

⁶² These are the words of Pliny.

⁶³ Pliny considers this as the perfection of art. "*Hæc est in pictura summa sublimitas. Corpora enim pingere et media rerum, est quidem magni operis; sed in quo multi gloriam tulerint. Extrema corporum facere, & desinentis picture modum includere, rarum in successu artis invenitur. Ambire enim debet se extremitas ipsa, & sic desinere, ut promittat alia post se; ostentatque etiam quæ occultat.*" Ibid. c. xxxvi. sect. 5. Mr. Falconet, in his observations on this passage, is

of a different opinion. He thinks it more difficult to paint the middle parts, than the shades and tones which round the extremities of objects; because the former, though exposed to the light, must have their form, relief, depth, and all the tints of nature. He instances the heads painted by Rubens and Vandyck seen in front. Pliny, had he lived in later times, might have instanced, in his turn the sweet outlines and inimitable softness of Correggio.

"With

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“ With four colours only Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, and Nicomachus produced those immortal works, which were singly purchased by the commonwealth of cities and republics.” The colours were white, red, yellow, and black. It has been often said that with these only on his palette, a painter cannot colour like nature, far less attain the magic of the *clair obscure*. Yet a great artist of our own country thinks that four colours are sufficient for every combination required. “ The fewer the colours, the cleaner, he observes, will be their effect. Two colours mixed together will not preserve the brightness of either of them single, nor will three be as bright as two.” Pliny says, that Apelles spread over his pictures, when finished, a transparent liquid like ink, which increased the clearness and brilliancy of the whole, while it softened the glare of too florid colours. This, according to the same excellent painter, is a true and artist-like description of a scrambling or glazing, as practised by the Venetian school, and by Correggio, in whose works, as well as those mentioned by Pliny, it was perceptible only to such as closely examined the picture. He very reasonably concludes, therefore, that if the master-pieces of ancient painting remained, we should probably find them as correctly drawn as the Laocoon, and as admirably coloured as the glowing productions of Titian.

Clair obscure.

That the Greeks were acquainted with the effect of the *clair obscure*, or the distribution of all the tones of light and shade relatively to the different plans of the picture, has been denied by those who allow them the highest excellence in colouring single figures. They might excel, it has been said, in a solo, but were incapable of producing a full piece for a concert of different instruments. Whether this observation be well founded can only be discovered by carefully examining ancient authors, from whom it

“ See Sir Joshua Reynolds's notes on Mr. Mason's translation of Fresco's Art of Painting.

would

would appear that even in this branch the Greek painters were not deficient⁶⁵.

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Of all the arts cultivated during the period now under review, none attained higher proficiency than composition in prose. The history of Thucydides was continued by Xenophon; but we should form a very imperfect notion of this amiable writer were we to judge him by his Grecian history, to which he seems not to have put the last hand. Yet in this, as well as in his more finished works, we see the scholar of Socrates; and, of all others, the scholar who most resembled his master in his sentiment and expression⁶⁶, in the excellencies as well as in the respectable weaknesses⁶⁷ of his character. The same undeviating virtue, the same indefatigable spirit, the same erect probity, the same diffusive benevolence, the same credulity, the same enthusiasm, together with that unaffected propriety of thought and diction, whose native graces outshine all ornaments of art.

Literary
composition.

Xenophon.

His charac-
ter.

This admirable personage, who, had he lived before the Athenians were grown too conceited to learn, and too corrupt to mend, might have proved the favour of his country, reached his fiftieth year in a happy obscurity, enjoying the confidential society of Socrates and

His military
expeditions.

⁶⁵ In speaking of Nicias, Pliny says, "Lumen et umbras custodivit, atque ut emerent à tabulis picturæ maxime custodivit."

Unless the *clair obscure* be meant, the second member of this sentence is a pleonasm. Another passage is highly to the purpose, l. xv. v. c. xi. "Tandem se arripit dilinxit, et invenit lumen atque umbras, differentia colorum alterna viæ sese excitante. Deinde adjectus est splendor, alius hic quam lumen: quem, quia inter hoc & umbram esset, appellarunt tonon: commissuras verò colorum et transitus, harmogen." *Clair obscure* in painting is something like counterpoint in music; and if the ancients cultivated neither of them, perhaps the more substantial parts of the arts lost nothing by the neglect. In

melody and design, effect and expression, they probably excelled the most boasted productions of later ages.

⁶⁶ See the description which Alcibiades gives of Socrates's eloquence in Plato's Symposium.

⁶⁷ It is remarkable that the superstitious belief of Xenophon in celestial warnings, of which see innumerable examples, particularly Anabaf. l. iii. c. i. l. v. c. viii. and l. vi. c. i. never encouraged him to any thing imprudent or hurtful, and never restrained him from any thing useful or virtuous. The admonitions likewise of Socrates's dæmon were always the same with the dictates of right reason.

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a few select friends. Of these Proxenus, an illustrious Theban exile, who well knew the worth of Xenophon, invited him to Sardis, from a desire to introduce him to Cyrus, the brother of Artaxerxes, and governor of Lower Asia, whose friendship he himself had found more valuable than the precarious honours of his capricious and ungrateful republic. Xenophon communicated the proposal to Socrates, who, suspecting that the Athenians might not relish his friend's design, because the Persians were then allied with Sparta, desired him to consult the oracle of Delphi⁶⁸. This counsel was but partially followed; for Xenophon, who seems to have been fond of the journey, asked not the oracle whether it ought to be undertaken, but only by virtue of what prayers and sacrifices it might be rendered successful. Socrates approved not this precipitation; yet as the god had answered, he thought it necessary for Xenophon to obey. The important consequences of this resolution to the Ten thousand Greeks who followed the standard of Cyrus, have been related in a former part of this work. After his glorious retreat from Upper Asia, Xenophon remained several years on the western coast, and shared the victories of his admired Agesilaus, with whom he returned to Greece, and conquered in the battle of Coronæa.

His religious
and literary
retreat.

Meanwhile a decree of banishment passed against him in Athens. But having acquired considerable riches in his Asiatic expedition, he had deposited them at Ephesus with the Sacristan of Diana's temple, with this injunction, that if he perished in battle, his wealth should be employed in honour of the goddess. Having survived the bloody engagement of Coronea, which he afterwards so affectingly described in his *Hellenica*, he settled in the town of Scilluns, a new establishment formed by the Lacedæmonians, scarce three miles distant from Olympia. Megabyzus, the Sacrist of Diana, came to behold the games, and faithfully restored his deposit, with which Xenophon, as enjoined

⁶⁸ Anabasi. l. v. p. 356. & seqq.

by an oracle, purchased in that neighbourhood a beautiful spot of ground, watered by the Sellenus, a name which coincided with that of the river near Ephesus. On the banks of Iliau Sellenus, Xenophon erected a temple, incomparably smaller indeed, yet similar in form to the great temple of Diana. His image of the goddess resembled that at Ephesus, as much as a figure in cypress could resemble a statue of gold. The banks of the river were planted with fruit trees. The surrounding plains and meadows afforded excellent pasture. The adjoining forests and mountains abounded in wild boar, red deer, and other species of game. There Xenophon's sons often hunted with the youth of the neighbouring towns and villages; and the whole inhabitants of the country round were invited and entertained by him at an annual festival sacred to Diana. A modest inscription on a marble column, erected near the temple, testified the holiness of the place. "This spot is dedicated to Diana. Let him, whoever shall possess it, employ the tenth of its annual produce in sacrifice, and the remainder in keeping in repair, and in adorning the temple. His neglect will not be overlooked by the "goddess." By this inscription, wherein Xenophon ventures not to mention the name of the founder, his mind seems to forebode the calamities which at last befel him. In the war between the Lacedæmonians and Elians, the town of Scilluns, together with the circumjacent territory, was seized by Eliau troops; and the amiable philosopher and historian, who had, in this delightful retreat, composed those invaluable works, which will inspire the last ages of the world with the love of virtue, was compelled, in the decline of life, to seek refuge in the corrupt and licentious city of Corinth.

His expedition, his Grecian history, his description of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments, have been noticed in their proper place. The *Cyropædia*, or institutions of the elder Cyrus, is a philosophical romance, intended to exemplify the doctrines taught

His works.

⁶⁹ Xenoph. *Anabaf.* l. v. p. 356. & seq.

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by Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, and to prove the success which naturally attends the practice of wisdom and virtue in the great affairs of war and government. The highest panegyric of this work is, that many learned men have mistaken it for a true history, and, deceived by the inimitable *naïveté* and persuasiveness of the narrative, have believed it possible that, during the various stages of a long life, Cyrus should have invariably followed the dictates of the sublimest philosophy. In his *Oeconomics*, Xenophon undertakes the humbler but not less useful task, of regulating the duties of domestic life. The dialogue, intituled *Hiero*, paints the misery of tyrants contrasted with the happiness of virtuous princes, in colours so lively, and in lines so expressive, that an admirer of the ancients might challenge the ingenuity of modern ages to add a single stroke to the picture. In speaking of the works of Xenophon, we must not forget his treatise on the Revenues of Athens. It was written long after his banishment. Instead of resenting the obdurate cruelty of his countrymen, he gave them most judicious and seasonable advice concerning the improvement of the public revenues, which, there is reason to believe, was in part adopted.

The orators:
Lysias and
Isocrates.

The orators Lysias and Isocrates flourished in the period now under review. The former was distinguished by the refined subtilty of his pleadings; the latter by the polished elegance of his moral and political orations⁷⁰. Isocrates ventured not to speak in public, neither his constitution nor his voice admitting the great exertions necessary for that purpose. His school of oratory and composition was frequented by the noblest youths of Athens, of the neighbouring republics, and even by foreign princes; and as his maxims were borrowed from the Socratic school, his long and honourable labours tended to keep alive some sparks of virtue among his degenerate countrymen⁷¹.

⁷⁰ See the lives of Lysias and Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of their works.

⁷¹ Idem, *ibid*.

But the man of learning in that age, whose abilities, if properly directed, might have most benefited his contemporaries, was the celebrated Plato, a man justly admired, yet more extraordinary than admirable. The same memorable year which produced the Peloponnesian war gave birth to Plato. He was descended from the Codridæ, the most illustrious as well as the most opulent family in Athens. His education was worthy of his birth. The gymnastic formed and invigorated his body; his mind was enlarged and enlightened by the studies of poetry⁷² and geometry, from which he derived that acuteness of judgment, and that warmth of fancy, which, being both carried to excess, render him at once the most subtle and the most flowery writer of antiquity⁷³. In his twentieth year he became acquainted with Socrates; and having compared his own poetical productions with those of his immortal predecessors in this walk of literature, he committed the former to the flames, and totally addicted himself to philosophy. During eight years he continued an assiduous hearer of Socrates; an occasional⁷⁴ indisposition prevented him from assisting at the last conversations of the sage, before he drank the fatal hemlock. Yet these conversations, as related to him by persons who were present, Plato has delivered down to the admiration of posterity; and the affecting sensibility with which he minutely describes the inimitable behaviour of Socrates, on this trying occasion, proves how deeply the author was interested in his subject.

⁷² Diogen. Laert. l. ii.

⁷³ Plato's Dialogues are so different from each other, in point of thought and expression, that, if we knew not the versatility of his genius, it would be difficult to believe them the works of one man. He is over-refined, wire-drawn, and trifling in the Cratylus, Parmenides, Meno, Theætetus, and Sophistes. He is flowery, pompous, and tumid in his Timæus, Panegyric, Symposium, and Phædrus. But in those invaluable writings, the Apology, Crito, Alci-

biades, Gorgias, Phædo, and the greater part of his books of laws, in which he adheres to the doctrines of Socrates, and indulges, without art or affectation, the natural bent of his own genius, his style is inimitably sweet and attractive, always elegant, and often sublime. His Republic, which is generally considered as his greatest work, abounds in all the beauties, and in all the deformities, for which he is remarkable. See Dionys. Halicarn. de Platone.

⁷⁴ Πλάτων δὲ (μεταί) πρῶτον. Phædo, 2.

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XXXII.His travels.

Fear or disgust removed the scholar of Socrates from the murderers of his master. Having spent some time in Thebes, Elis, and Megara, where he enjoyed the conversation of several of his fellow disciples, the love of knowledge carried him to Magna Græcia; from thence he sailed to Cyrené, attracted by the fame of the mathematician Theodorus; Egypt next deserved his curiosity, as the country to which the science of Theodorus owed its birth, and from which the Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia derived several tenets of their philosophy.

He settles in
the academy.

At his return to Athens, Plato could have little inclination to engage in public life. The days were past when the virtues of a Solon, or of a Lycurgus, could reform the manners of their countrymen. In early periods of society, the example and influence of one able and disinterested man may produce a happy revolution in the community of which he is a member. But in the age of Plato, the Athenians had fallen into dotage and imbecillity. His luxuriant fancy compares them sometimes to old men, who have outlived their senses, and with whom it is vain to reason; sometimes to wild beasts, whom it is dangerous to approach; sometimes to an unfruitful soil, that choaks every useful plant, and produces weeds only⁷⁵. He prudently withdrew himself from a scene, which presented nothing but danger or disgust, and purchased a small villa in the suburbs near the academy or gymnasium, that had been so elegantly adorned by Cimon⁷⁶. To this retirement, his fame attracted the most illustrious characters in his age: the noblest youths of Athens daily frequented the school of Plato; and here he continued above forty years, with little interruption except from his voyages into Sicily, instructing his disciples, and composing his Dialogues, to which the most distinguished philosophers in ancient and modern times are greatly indebted, without excepting those who reject his doctrines, and affect to treat them as visionary.

⁷⁵ Republic, l. vi. p. 52.⁷⁶ See above, vol. i. p. 431.

The capacious mind of Plato embraced the whole circle of science. The objects of human thought had, previously to his age, been reduced, by the Pythagoreans, to certain classes or genera⁷⁷; the nature of truth had been investigated; and men had distinguished the relations⁷⁸, which the predicate of any proposition can bear to its subject. The sciences had already been divided into the natural and moral; or, in the language of Plato, into the knowledge of divine and human things. The frivolous art of syllogism was not as yet invented; and the logic of Plato⁷⁹ was confined to the more useful subjects of definition and division, by means of which he attempted to fix and ascertain not only the practical doctrines of morals and politics, but the abstruse and shadowy speculations of mystical theology. It is much to be regretted that this great and original genius should have mistaken the proper objects as well as the natural limits of the human understanding, and that most of the enquiries of Plato and his successors should appear extremely remote from the public transactions of the times in which they lived. Yet the speculations in which they were engaged, how little soever they may be connected with the political revolutions of Greece, seem too interesting in themselves to be entirely omitted in this historical work, especially when it is considered that the philosophy of Plato and his

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General character of his philosophy.

⁷⁷ Many less perfect divisions had probably been made before Archytas of Tarentum distinguished the ten Categories. Simplicius & Jamblichus apud Fr. Patricium. *Disf. cuss. Peripatet.* t. ii. p. 182. This division, the most perfect of any that philosophers have yet been able to discover, Plato learned from Archytas. It consisted in substances and modes. The former are either primary, as all individual substances, which neither are in any other subject, nor can be predicated of it; or secondary, which subsist in the first, and can be predicated of them, to wit, the genera and species of substances. Of modes there are nine kinds, quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, having,

doing, and suffering. *Aristot. de Categor.*

⁷⁸ These are called by logicians the five Predicables, or, more properly, the five classes of Predicates. They are the genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident. The use of these distinctions is universal in every subject requiring definition and division; yet if meant to comprehend whatever may be affirmed of any subject, the enumeration is doubtless incomplete.

⁷⁹ The science properly called Logic was invented by Aristotle; the division of the sciences into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, was first given by his contemporary Xenocrates. *Vid. Bucker. de Aristot. & Xenocrat. Of Aristotle more hereafter.*

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disciples has been very widely diffused among all the civilised nations of the world; that during many centuries, it governed with uncontroubled sway the opinions of the speculative part of mankind; and that the same philosophy still influences the reasonings, and divides the sentiments, of the learned in modern Europe.

Difficulty of explaining and abridging his doctrines.

The lively, but immethodical, manner in which the opinions of Plato are explained by himself, renders it difficult to collect and abridge them. The great number of interlocutors in his dialogues, the irony of Socrates, and the continual intermixture of Plato's own sentiments with those of his master, heighten the difficulty, and make it impossible, from particular passages, to judge of the scope and tendency of the whole. The works of Xenophon, however, may enable a diligent student to separate the pure ore of Socrates from the adventitious matter with which it is combined in the rich vein of Platonism; and by carefully comparing the different parts of the latter, he may with certainty determine the principal designs of its author.

The great views of that philosopher.

From this view of the subject, it would appear that Plato aimed at nothing less, than to reconcile the appearances of the natural and moral world with the wise government of a self-existent unchangeable cause; to explain the nature and origin of the human mind, as well as of its various powers of perception, volition, and intellect; and, on principles resulting from these discoveries, to build a system of Ethics, which, in proportion as it were followed by mankind, would promote not only their independence and security in the present world, but their happiness and perfection in a future state of existence.

Metaphysics.

Let us look where we will around us, we shall every-where, said Plato, perceive a passing procession⁸⁰: the objects which compose the

⁸⁰ This was borrowed from Heraclitus, Vid. Platon. in Theatet. p. 83. & in Sophist. who expressed the same idea, by saying, that all corporeal things were in a perpetual flux.

material world, arise, change, perish, and are succeeded by others, which undergo the same revolutions⁸¹. One body moves another, which impels a third, and so forwards in succession; but the first cause of motion resides not in any of them. This cause acts not fortuitously; the regular motions of the heavenly bodies⁸², the beautiful order of the seasons, the admirable structure of plants and animals, announce an intelligent Author⁸³. It is difficult by searching to find out the nature of the Divinity, and impossible by words to describe it; yet the works which he has done, attest his power, his wisdom, and his goodness to be greater than human imagination can conceive⁸⁴. In the self-existent cause, these attributes must unite. He is therefore unchangeable⁸⁵, since no alteration can increase his perfections, and it would be absurd to suppose him ever inclined to diminish them⁸⁶.

Impelled by his goodness, the Deity, viewing in his own intellect the ideas or archetypes of all possible existence, formed the beautiful arrangement of the universe from that rude indigested matter, which, existing from all eternity, had been for ever animated by an irregular principle of motion⁸⁷. This principle, which Plato calls the irrational soul of the world, he thought sufficiently attested, in the innumerable deviations from the established laws of nature, in the extravagant passions of men, and in the physical and moral evil, which, in consequence of these deviations and passions, so visibly prevail in the world. Without admitting a certain stubborn intractability, and disorderly wildness, essential to matter, and therefore incapable of

Cosmogony.

⁸¹ *Timæus*, sub initio.

⁸² By these he meant the fixed stars; the motions of the planets he ascribed to another cause, as will appear below.

⁸³ *Plato de Legibus*, l. x. p. 609.

⁸⁴ *Timæus*, p. 477. & *de Repub.* l. ii. p. 144.

⁸⁵ For the immutability of the Deity, passim.

Plato, contrary to his general custom, condescends to use an argument from induction,

“Even of material things, the most perfect least feel the effects of time, and remain longest unaltered.” *De Repub.* p. 150.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 150.

⁸⁷ *Politic.* p. 120, & seqq. & *Timæus*,

being

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Plato's doctrine of ideas.

being entirely eradicated or subdued, it seemed impossible to explain the origin of evil under the government of Deity⁸⁸.

From these rude materials, God, according to the fanciful doctrine of Plato, formed the four elements, and built the beautiful structure of the heavens and the earth, after the model of those eternal exemplars⁸⁹, or patterns, which subsist in the divine Intelligence⁹⁰. Considering that beings possessed of mental powers were far preferable to those destitute of such faculties, God infused into the corporeal world a rational soul, which, as it could not be immediately combined with body, he united to the active, but irrational principle, essentially inherent in matter⁹¹. Having thus formed and animated the earth,

⁸⁸ De Legibus, l. x. p. 608. Philem. p. 160.

⁸⁹ These exemplars, or *παράδειγματα*, are the *ideas* of Plato, which were so much misrepresented by many of the later Platonists, or Eclectics. He names them, indifferently, *ἰδέαι, ἰδέαι, εἰκασίαι, τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα, & ἁπλῆς εἰρήνη*. The two last expressions are used to distinguish them from the fleeting and perishable forms of matter. Plato represents these ideas as existing in the divine intellect, as beings entirely mental, not objects of any of the senses, and not circumscribed by place or time. By the first universal Cause, these ideas were infused into the various species of created beings, in whom (according to Ammonius in Porphyry. *Introduc.* p. 29.) they existed, as the impression of a seal exists in the wax to which it has been applied. In its pre-existent state, the human mind viewed these *intelligible* forms in their original seat, the field of truth. But since men were imprisoned in the body, they receive these ideas from external objects, as explained in the text. Such is the doctrine of Plato. But many of the later Platonists, and even several writers of the present age, have imagined that he ascribed to ideas a separate and independent existence. Vid. Brucker, *Hist. Philosoph.* p. 695, & seqq. Gedike *Hist. Philosoph.* ex Ciceron. collect. p. 183, &

seqq. Monboddo, *Origin of Language*, vol. i. c. ix. Of all the absurdities embraced by philosophers, this doubtless would be the greatest, to believe eternal unchangeable patterns of the various genera and species of things existing apart, and independent of the mind by which these abstract notions are conceived. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that many writers of the Alexandrian school, whose extravagant fancies could fix and embody metaphysical abstractions, and realise intellectual ideas, should animate and personify the *λογος το θεος*, the divine intellect, in which, according to Plato, these ideas resided, and from which they were communicated to other intelligences. The same visionary fanatics who discovered, in the *λογος* of Plato, the second person of the Trinity, recognised the Holy Spirit in his Soul of the World; but as this irrational principle of motion ill corresponded to the third person of the Godhead, they invented an hyper-cosmian soul, concerning which Plato is altogether silent. See the *Encyclopedie*, article *Eclectique*. Brucker, *Hist. Philosoph.* vol. i. p. 712, & seqq. & Meiner's *Beytrag zur geschichte der denkart der ersten Jahrhunderte nach Christi geburt in einigen betrachtungen über die neu Platonische Philosophie*.

⁹⁰ *Timæus*, *Polit.* l. vi. ⁹¹ *Ib.* p. 477, & seqq.

the sun, the moon, and the other visible divinities, the great Father of spirits proceeded to create the invisible gods and dæmons⁹², whose nature and history Plato describes with a respectful reverence for the religion of his country⁹³. After finishing this great work, the God of gods again contemplating the ideal forms in his own mind, perceived there the exemplars of three species of beings, which he realised in the mortal inhabitants of the earth, air, and water. The task of forming these sensible, but irrational beings, he committed to the inferior divinities; because, had this last work likewise proceeded from his own hands, it must have been immortal like the gods⁹⁴. The souls of men, on the other hand, he himself formed from the remainder of the rational soul of the world. They first existed in the state of dæmons, only invested with a thin æthereal body. Having offended God by neglecting their duty, they were condemned to unite with the gross corporeal mass, by which their divine faculties are so much clogged and encumbered⁹⁵.

It was necessary briefly to explain the metaphysical theology of Plato, how visionary soever it may appear, because the doctrine of ideal forms, together with that of the pre-existent state of the human mind, are the main pillars of his philosophy. Before their incarceration in the body, the souls of men enjoyed the presence of their Maker, and contemplated the unchangeable ideas and essences of things in the field of truth. In viewing and examining these eternal archetypes of order, beauty, and virtue, consisted the noblest energy, and highest perfection of celestial spirits⁹⁶, which, being emanations of the Deity, can never rest satisfied with objects and occupations unworthy their divine original. But in their actual state, men can perceive with their corporeal senses, only the fleeting images and imperfect representations of these immutable essences of things, in the fluctuating objects of the material world, which are so little steady

Plato's
morals.

⁹² Timæus, p. 480.

⁹³ Apolog. Socratis.

⁹⁴ Timæus, p. 480, & 481. ⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Repub. l. vi. Phædrus, Philæbus, &c.

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and permanent, that they often change their nature and properties, even while we view and examine them⁹⁷. Beside this, our senses themselves are liable to innumerable disorders; and unless we are constantly on the watch, never fail to deceive us⁹⁸. Hence the continual errors in our judgments of men and things; hence the improper ends we pursue; hence the very inadequate means by which we seek to attain them; hence, in one word, all the errors and misery of life. Yet even in this degraded state, to which men were condemned for past offences, their happiness ceases not to be an object of care to the Deity. As none can rise so high, none can sink so low, as to escape the eye and arm of the Almighty⁹⁹. The divine Providence observes and regulates the meanest, as well as the greatest, of its productions. But the good of the part being subordinate to that of the whole, it is necessary that each individual should be rewarded or punished, in proportion as he fulfils the task assigned him. It is by the performance of his duty alone, that man can regain the favour of his Maker¹⁰⁰; for it is ridiculous to think that this inestimable benefit can be purchased by rich presents, and expensive sacrifices. Religion cannot be a traffic of interest¹⁰¹. What can we offer to the gods, which they have not first bestowed on us? Will they thank us for restoring their own gifts? It is absurd to think it. To please the Divinity, we must obey his will concerning us; nor can we comply with the purpose of our creation, and fulfil our destiny, without aspiring at those noble powers with which we were originally endowed¹⁰²; and which, even in our present degenerate state, it is still possible, by proper diligence, to recover¹⁰³.

His account
of the origin
of human
knowledge.

Our senses give us information of external objects, which are stored up in the memory, and variously combined by the imagina-

⁹⁷ Phædo, Timæus, &c.

⁹⁸ Phædo, p. 31. & Repub. l. v.

⁹⁹ De Legibus.

¹⁰⁰ Eutylphon.

¹⁰¹ Repub. l. ii. p. 100, & seqq.

¹⁰² Minos, p. 510. Timæus, p. 500.

¹⁰³ Repub. l. v.

tion¹⁰⁴. But it is remarkable that those ideas, thus acquired and retained, have the power of suggesting others far more accurate and perfect than themselves, and which, though excited by material objects, cannot be derived from them, unless (which is impossible) the effect were more beautiful and perfect than the cause. That we possessed, in a pre-existent state, those ideas which modern philosophers refer by an easy solution to the powers of generalization and abstraction¹⁰⁵, Plato thought evident from the facility with which we recalled them¹⁰⁶. Of this he gave an example in Meno's slave, who, when properly questioned by Socrates, easily recollected and explained many properties of numbers and figures, although he had never learned the sciences of arithmetic and geometry¹⁰⁷. According to Plato, therefore, all science consisted in reminiscence, in recalling the nature, proportions, and relations of those uniform and unchangeable essences, about which the human mind had originally been conversant, and after the model of which all created things were made¹⁰⁸. These intellectual forms, comprehending the true essences of things, were the only proper objects of solid and permanent science¹⁰⁹; their fluctuating representatives in the material world,

¹⁰⁴ Theatet. p. 85, & seqq. & Philem. 184, & seqq.

¹⁰⁵ The ancients were not ignorant of this philosophy. Simplicius, speaking of the origin of intelligible forms, or ideas, in the human mind, says, ἡμῶν ἀφαιρούμεν αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέροις νοήσεσιν κατὰ ἑαυτὰ υπέρκειμαι: "We ourselves, abstracting them in our thoughts, have, by this abstraction, given them an existence in themselves." Simp. in Præd. p. 17.

¹⁰⁶ Menon. p. 344.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Repub. l. vi.

¹⁰⁹ ἑπιστήμη, science, in opposition to δόξα, opinion. The material world he called τὰ δῶρα; that of which the knowledge admitted of probability only, Republ. l. v. The

ideas of Plato, which, according to that philosopher, formed the sole objects of real and certain knowledge, were powerfully combated by his scholar and rival Aristotle. Yet the latter, who was so sharp-sighted to the faults of Plato, never accuses him of maintaining the separate and independent existence of intellectual forms. The obscure passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, p. 201, which has been construed into such an accusation, means nothing more, than that Socrates regarded the *τα κατ' ἑαυτὸν*, general ideas, as differing in no respect from our notions of the genera and species of things; whereas Plato made a distinction between them, asserting these ideas to have existed in the divine intellect before the creation, &c. as explained in the text. Aristotle discusses the doctrine

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Of the
powers of
perception
and intellect.

world, the actions and virtues of men, the order and beauty visible in the universe, were only so far real and substantial as they corresponded to their divine archetypes¹¹⁰; but as this correspondence never became complete, the examination of the perishing objects of sense could only afford us unsteady and uncertain notions, fleeting and fugitive like themselves¹¹¹. From these observations, Plato thought it evident, that the duty and happiness of men consisted in withdrawing themselves from the material, and approaching the intellectual world¹¹², to which their own natures were more congenial. To promote this purpose was the great aim of his philosophy. If we were deceived by the senses, he observed, that we were still more fatally endangered by the passions, those flimsy sails of the mind, which were expanded and agitated by every varying gust of imagined good or evil¹¹³. The pains and pleasures of the body were all of a mixed kind, and nearly allied to each other. The God who arranged the world, desirous to unite and incorporate these seemingly opposite natures, had at least joined their summits; for pleasure was nothing else but a rapid cessation of pain; and the

doctrine of ideas more perspicuously in his Ethics, to Nicomachus, l. i. c. vi. He regards them as mere fictions of the fancy, and the knowledge founded on them as altogether visionary. "The idea of good," he observed, "might be applied to substances, as the Deity, the mind of man; to qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as mediocrity; to time, as the juncture or nick of time; in short, through all the categories. There is not, therefore, any one general idea of good, common to all these. Were there one idea, the same in all, there could be but one science respecting it. But there are many, physic, gymnastic, the military art, &c. which all have some good in view. Things are good in themselves, or good as means to an end. But even those things which are ultimately good, as wisdom, honour, pleasure, are not comprehended under

any one definition of good, though distinguished by the same epithet from some analogy or resemblance, as the understanding is called the eye of the mind. If there is any such general idea, it is surely incapable of being applied to any practical use; not as a model, otherwise the arts and sciences, all of which have some good in view, would continually have this model before them. Yet they all neglect it, and justly; for what benefit could they derive from this abstract idea? A physician, for instance, contemplates not health in that general manner, but the health of man, or rather of a particular man, who happens to be his patient: for with individuals only his art is concerned."

¹¹⁰ Parmen. p. 140.

¹¹¹ Repub. l. vii.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 134. & Phæd. p. 26.

¹¹³ Phædrus.

liveliest of our bodily enjoyments were preceded by uneasiness, and followed by languor¹¹⁴. To illustrate the necessity of governing with a strong hand the appetites and passions, Plato compared the soul to a little republic, composed of different faculties, or orders¹¹⁵. The judging, or reasoning faculty, justly entitled to the supremacy, was seated, as in a firm citadel, in the head; the senses were its guards and servants; the various desires and affections were bound to pay it obedience.

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Of these desires, which were all of them the natural subjects of the ruling faculty, Plato distinguished two orders, ever ready to rebel against their master. The first consisted of those passions which are founded in pride and resentment, or in what the schoolmen called the irascible part of the soul¹¹⁶; and were seated in the breast. The second consisted of those passions which are founded in the love of pleasure, or in what the schoolmen called the concupiscible¹¹⁷ part of the soul, and were seated in the belly, and inferior parts of the body. These different orders, though commonly at variance with each other, were alike dangerous to the public interest, and unless restrained by the wisdom and authority of their sovereign, must inevitably plunge the little republic of man into the utmost disorder and misery¹¹⁸.

Of the passions.

Yet, according to Plato, both these sets of passions were, in the present state of things, necessary parts of our constitution; and, when properly regulated, became very useful subjects. The irascible asserted our rank and dignity, defended us against injuries, and, when duly informed and tempered by reason, taught us with becoming fortitude to despise dangers and death, in pursuit of what is honourable and virtuous. The concupiscible provided for the support and necessities of the body; and, when reduced to such sub-

Of the virtues; and wisdom the greatest virtue.

¹¹⁴ Phæd. Philem. & Repub. l. ii. p. 262, & seqq.

¹¹⁵ Repub. l. iv.

¹¹⁶ The *το θυμωδεις*, of Plato.

¹¹⁷ The *Το επιθυμητικον* of Plato. Both are included under what Plato and Aristotle call the *συναρτικαι*, the seat of the desires and passions.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p. 254.

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mission as to reject every gratification not approved by reason, gave rise to the virtue of temperance. Justice took place, according to Plato, when reason directed and passion obeyed, and when each passion performed its proper office, and acknowledged due respect towards its superior. In the strength, acuteness, and perfection of the ruling faculty, consisted the virtue of prudence, the great source and principle of all other virtues, without which temperance, fortitude, and even justice itself, were nothing but empty shadows, that deluded the ignorant vulgar. In the exercise of prudence or wisdom, man resembled his Maker, and contemplated those intellectual forms, which taught him to discern with certainty the ends proper to be pursued, and the means necessary to attain them. The wise man compares the mind with the body, eternity with time, virtue with pleasure. He thus learns to despise the inferior parts of his nature, to defy its pains, to disdain its pleasures. Without attaining this true elevation of mind, he never can be virtuous or happy, since whoever depends on the body, must consider death as an evil, the fear of which can only be overcome by some greater terror; so that in him who is not truly wise, fortitude itself must be the effect of timidity¹¹⁹. In the same manner, his pretended moderation and temperance will spring from the impure source of the opposite vices. He will deny himself some pleasures, to attain others which he regards as more valuable, and will submit to small pains to avoid the greater¹²⁰. He thus continues through life, exchanging one trifle for another; a traffic which never can enrich him, while he rejects wisdom, the only precious merchandise.

Causes of the
diversity of
moral cha-
racter.

But the temple of wisdom is, according to Plato, situate on a rock, which few men have the strength to ascend¹²¹. This difference of ability proceeds from various causes: 1. At their creation, all minds were not alike excellent and perfect¹²². 2. They

¹¹⁹ *Repub.* l. vi.

¹²⁰ *Phædo*, p. 26, & seqq.

¹²¹ *Repub.* l. vi. p. 74.

¹²² *Phædrus*.

were not alike criminal during their pre-existent state¹²³. 3. The gross bodies which they now inhabit are variously moulded, some being too strong, others too weak, and very few in just harmony with the divine principle by which they are animated¹²⁴. 4. Early institution and example occasion great differences among them. Such, indeed, is the power of education and habit, that the errors and crimes of men are less chargeable on those who commit them, than on their parents, guardians, and instructors¹²⁵; and it seems hardly possible for those who have the misfortune to be born in a licentious age and country, to attain wisdom and virtue. Even when the most favourite circumstances unite, the mind must still, however, have a tendency to degenerate, while united with matter¹²⁶. The body, therefore, must be continually exercised and subdued by the gymnastic, the soul must be purified and ennobled by philosophy. Without such attention, men can neither reach the perfection of their nature, or, when they have reached it, maintain that elevated post, from which they look down with compassion on the errors and misery of their fellow-creatures¹²⁷.

In the description of his imaginary sage, Plato employs the colours which were afterwards borrowed by the Stoics and Epicureans. But neither of these sects, as will appear hereafter, were so well entitled as the Platonists, to boast their philosophical happiness, and to assert their superiority to the vicissitudes of time and fortune. Plato was the first philosopher who supported the doctrine of a future state, by arguments that seemed capable to convince intelligent and thinking men. From the properties of mind, he inferred the simplicity and indestructibility of the substance in which they reside¹²⁸. He described the mental powers with an eloquence that Cicero¹²⁹ and Buffon¹³⁰ have not been able to surpass. And since he regarded the soul as the prin-

Plato's sage;

Immortality
of the soul.¹²³ Phædrus.¹²⁴ Timæus.¹²⁵ Ibid.¹²⁶ Ibid. p. 484. & *Repub.* *passim*.¹²⁷ Ibid.¹²⁸ Phædo, p. 25, & *seqq.*¹²⁹ See *Cicer. de Offic. l. i. & passim.*¹³⁰ Buffon sur l'Homme.

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State of re-
tribution.

His republic.

Genius and
character of
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ciple of life and motion, he thought it absurd to suppose that the diseases and death of the body should take from this principle such qualities as it essentially possessed in itself, and accidentally communicated to matter¹³¹. It was his firm persuasion, that according to the employment of its rational and moral powers, the soul, after its separation from the body, would be raised to a higher, or depressed to a lower state of existence¹³².

This belief, which raised his hopes to a higher scene, gave him not, however, that contempt, affected by a very different class of philosophers, for the perishing affairs¹³³ of the present world. Like some others of the scholars of Socrates, he traced the plan of a perfect commonwealth; though his work, known by that title, as has been justly observed by a great genius¹³⁴, is rather a treatise of education than a system of policy. The real republic of Plato is contained in his books of laws, in which he explains, with no less acuteness than elegance, the origin and revolutions of civil society, and traces the plan of a republic nearly resembling the Spartan model.

His practical morality, which he borrowed from Socrates, is profusely scattered through his dialogues; and in his own times, Plato was not considered as that visionary speculatist which he has appeared to later ages. His scholars, Aristonymus, Phormio, and Eudoxus, were successively sent by him to regulate the republics of the Arcadians, Elians, and Cnidians¹³⁵, at the earnest request of those communities. From Xenocrates, another of his disciples, Alexander derived rules for good government¹³⁶. The fame of Aristotle is well known; and it will afterwards appear how much he was indebted to a master, whose opinions he often combated with

¹³¹ Phædo. ¹³² Phædrus, & Phædo, passim.

¹³³ The Epicureans.

"Non res humana; perituraque regna."

GEORG.

¹³⁴ Rousseau in his Emile.

¹³⁵ Plutarch. advers. Colot. Epicur.

¹³⁶ Idem, ibid.

Of this more below.

seeming

seeming reluctance, and real satisfaction. Plato was no less capable to distinguish ideas than to combine images. He united warmth of fancy, and acuteness of understanding, in a greater degree than perhaps has fallen to the share of any other man. Yet when compared with his master Socrates, his genius will appear more subtle than sagacious. He wanted that patient spirit of observation which distinguished the illustrious sage, who in all his reasonings kept facts ever in his view, and at every step he made, looked back with wary circumspection on experience. Accompanied by this faithful guide, Socrates trod securely within the bounds of truth and nature; but his adventurous disciple, trusting to the wings of fancy, often expatiates in imaginary worlds of his own creation.

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History of Macedon.—Reign of Archelaus.—Series of Usurpations and Revolutions.—Perdiccas defeated by the Illyrians.—Distracted State of Macedon.—First Transactions of Philip.—State of Thrace and Pæonia.—Philip defeats Argæus and the Athenians.—His Treatment of the Prisoners.—His Military Arrangements.—He defeats the Illyrians.—His designs against Amphipolis.—He prevents an Alliance between Athens and Olynthus.—Amuses the Athenians.—Takes Amphipolis.—His Conquests in Thrace.—The Mines of Crenidæ.—Philip marries Olympias.—His Letter to Aristotle.

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The kingdom of Macedon founded by Caranus.
A. C. 814.

FOUR hundred and sixteen years before the Christian æra, and little more than half a century before Philip assumed the government of Macedon, that country, to a superficial observer, might have appeared scarcely distinguishable from the barbarous kingdoms of Thrace, Pæonia, and Illyricum, which surrounded it on the north, east, and west. Towards the south it was excluded from the sea by a chain of Grecian republics, of which Olynthus and Amphipolis were the most flourishing and powerful. To this inland district, originally confined to the circumference of about three hundred miles, Caranus, an Argive prince of the numerous race of Hercules, eluding the dangers which proved fatal to royalty^a in

^a Justin. l. vii. c. i. Velleius Paterculus, l. i. c. vi.

most communities of Greece², conducted a small colony of his adventurous and warlike countrymen, and, having conquered the barbarous natives, settled in Edeſſa, the capital of the province then named Emathia, and afterwards Macedonia, for reasons equally unknown³. The establishment of this little principality, which, under Philip, grew into a powerful kingdom, and, under Alexander, swelled into the most extensive empire known in the ancient world, was adorned (could we believe historic flattery) by many extraordinary circumstances, presaging its future greatness. The gods took care of the infancy of Macedon, and sent, as oracles had announced, a herd of goats to conduct Caranus to his new capital of Edeſſa, which thence changed its name to *Ægæ*, the city of goats; a fiction unworthy of record, did it not explain the reason why goats were adopted as the ensigns of Macedon, and why the figures of those animals are still to be seen on the coins of Philip, and those of his successors.

Caranus, as well as the princes Cœnus⁴ and Thyrimas, who immediately followed him, had occasion to exercise their prudence still more than their valour. Their feeble colony of Greeks might have fallen an easy prey to the inhospitable ferocity of the barbarous tribes, by whom it was on all sides surrounded. But the policy of the first kings of Macedon, instead of vainly attempting to repel or to subdue, endeavoured, with more success, to gain, by good offices, the ancient inhabitants of Emathia and the neighbouring districts. They communicated to them the knowledge of many useful⁵ arts; they gave them the Grecian religion⁶ and government⁷ in that state of happy simplicity which prevailed during the heroic ages; and while, to render intercourse more easy and familiar, they adopted,

Prudent conduct of its first kings the primary cause of the greatness of Macedonia.

² See vol. i. p. 77.

³ Crophius Antiquit. Macedon.

⁴ Justin. ubi supra. Syncell Chronic.

⁵ Pausanias Achaic. & Thucyd. l. ii.

⁶ Arrian Exped. Alexand. l. iv. p. 83.

⁷ Φιλίππου μὴ παῖδι, Ἑρακλείδῃ δὲ ἀπὸ γυναι-

δὲν οὐ προσηναι ἐξ Ἀργεὺς εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, ἢ διὰ ἄλλα καὶ αἱ Μακεδόνες ἀρχόντες διέταλσαν. Arrian, l. iv. p. 36. In another passage of the same book he says, the subjects of Macedonia had more liberty than the citizens of Greece.

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in some degree, the language and manners of the barbarous natives, they, in their turn, imparted to the latter a tincture of the Grecian language and civility⁸. By this judicious and liberal system, so unlike to that pursued by their countrymen in other parts of the world, the followers of Caranus gradually associated with the warlike tribes in their neighbourhood, whom it would have been alike impossible for them to extirpate or to enslave; and the same generous policy, being embraced by their descendants, deserves to be regarded as the primary cause of Macedonian greatness.

Transactions
of the Macedonians pre-
ceding the
reign of Ar-
chelaus I.
A. C. 713—
416.

Perdiccas, the first of that name, so far eclipsed the fame of his three predecessors, that he is accounted the founder of the monarchy by Herodotus⁹ and Thucydides¹⁰. His history has been magnified by fable, which has also obscured or distorted the actions of the five princes¹¹ that intervened between him and Alexander I. who filled the Macedonian throne when Xerxes invaded Greece¹². Here we attain historic ground. Alexander, as related above¹³, took an important and honourable part in the affairs of Greece and Persia, without neglecting the interest of his own kingdom, which he extended to the river Nessus on the east, and to the Axios on the west. His son, Perdiccas II. inherited the abilities of his father, without inheriting his integrity. During the Peloponnesian war, the alliance of this prince formed an object of important concern to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. He espoused the cause of the latter, which he regarded as his own, because the Athenians, who had occasionally levied tribute on his ancestors¹⁴, were then masters of the Greek settlements along the Macedonian coast, the vicinity of which naturally tempted the ambition of Perdiccas. Under the specious pretence of enabling Olynthus and the other cities of Chalcidicé to

⁸ Demosthenes, Arrian, and Curtius.

⁹ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxxxvii.

¹⁰ Thucydid. l. ii. p. 168.

¹¹ Argæus I. Philip I. Aëropus I. Alce-
tas, Amyntas I. Justin. l. vii. c. ii.

¹² Herodot. l. v. c. xix.

¹³ Vol. i. p. 357.

¹⁴ Thucydid. ubi supra, & Demosthenes
passim.

recover their independence, he lent his aid to destroy the Athenian influence there, expecting to establish the Macedonian in its stead. But this design failed of success. The Olynthian confederacy was broken, its members became subject to Sparta, and after the misfortunes of that republic had encouraged the Olynthians to resume their freedom, they felt themselves sufficiently powerful not only to resist the encroachments of Macedon, but to make considerable conquests in that country¹⁵.

Archelaus I. who succeeded to the throne, displayed an enlightened policy, far more beneficial to his kingdom than the courage of Alexander, or the craft of Perdiccas. Like those princes, Archelaus was ambitious to enlarge his dominions (having conquered Pydna and other towns in the delightful region of Pieria¹⁶); but his main care was to cultivate and improve them. He facilitated communication between the principal towns of Macedon, by cutting straight roads through most parts of the country; he built walls and places of strength in the situations most favourable for that purpose; encouraged agriculture and the arts, particularly those subservient to war; formed magazines of arms; raised and disciplined a considerable body of cavalry; and, in a word, added more to the solid grandeur of Macedon than had been done by all his predecessors together¹⁷. Nor was he regardless of the arts of peace. His palace was adorned by the works of Grecian painters. Euripides was long entertained at his court; Socrates was earnestly solicited to live there after the example of this philosophic poet, formed by his precepts, and cherished by his friendship: Men of merit and genius, in all the various walks of literature and science, were invited to reside in Macedon, and treated with distinguished regard by a mo-

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The state of
Macedon
greatly im-
proved by
that prince.
A. C. 416—
410.

¹⁵ See above, vol. ii. c. xxix. p. 236. & seqq.

¹⁶ Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. xvi.

¹⁷ Thucydides says, "than the eight kings who preceded him," counting Perdiccas for the first. Αρχαλαὸς ὁ Περδίκκου υἱός, Βα-

σιλαὸς γενόμενος τὰς πόλεις ἐν οὐκ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀναδό-
μενος, καὶ ἰδίαις ἐκδομασίαισι, καὶ πόλιν διέκοσμεναι·
τὰς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἴσταναι καὶ ἄλλας καὶ τῶν
ἀλλῶν παρασκευῶν κρησσοῖν ἢ ἐξαρτάντας ὁ αὐτοῦ Βα-
σιλεὺς οὐκ ἐν τῇ πόλει αὐτοῦ γενόμενος. Thucydides,
p. 168.

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Series of
usurpations
and revolu-
tions.
A. C. 405—
360.

narch duly attentive to promote his own glory and the happiness of his subjects¹⁸.

A reign of six years was too short a period for accomplishing the important ends which Archelaus had in view. By his death the prosperity of Macedon was interrupted for almost half a century, crowded by a succession of ten¹⁹ princes or usurpers, whose history is a perpetual series of crimes and calamities. Amidst these disorders, the sceptre still remained in the family of Hercules; but almost every prince of the blood had an ambition to reign. In order to attain their purpose, the different competitors courted the assistance of the Thracians, of the Illyrians, of the Thessalians, of the Olynthian confederacy, of Athens, of Sparta, and of Thebes; and each of those powers endeavoured to turn to their own immediate profit the dissensions in Macedon. Bardyllis, an active and daring chief, who by his abilities in acquiring, and his equity²⁰ in dividing the spoil, had risen from the condition of a private robber to the command of the Illyrian tribes, entered Macedon at the head of a numerous army, dispossessed Amyntas II. the father of Philip, and placed Argæus on the throne, who consented to become the tributary of his benefactor²¹. The Thracians supported the title of another prince named Pausanias: but the assistance of Thessaly and Olynthus enabled Amyntas to resume the government; the Olynthians refusing, however, to surrender several places of importance which Amyntas had entrusted to their protection, or which they had

A. C. 385.

A. C. 383.

¹⁸ Aristot. Rhetor. l. ii. c. xxix. Stobæus Sermon. 237.	Amyntas again re-established,	383
¹⁹ Their names, with the dates of their accession or usurpation, are as follows:	7 Alexander II.	372
1 Oreites, A. C. 405	8 Perdiccas III.	371
2 Eropus II. 402	9 Ptolemy,	370
3 Archelaus II. 394	Perdiccas,	368
4 Amyntas II. 392	Ptolemy,	367
5 Pausanias, 391	Perdiccas,	365
Amyntas II. 390	10 Amyntas,	360
6 Argæus II. 385	To him Philip succeeded in the same year.	
	²⁰ Cicero de Offic. l. ii.	
	²¹ Diodor. l. xiv. c. xcii.	

conquered

conquered from his competitor. Amyntas complained to Sparta, and that republic, for reasons above²² related, declared war against Olynthus, and reinstated the Macedonian king in full possession of his dominions. In consequence of that event Amyntas established, and thenceforth held, his court at Pella, where he enjoyed several years of tranquillity, cultivating the friendship of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.

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A. C. 380.

The short reign of his son Alexander was disturbed by a fresh invasion of the Illyrians, from whom he purchased a precarious peace²³. He left two brothers, Perdiccas and Philip, of whom the eldest was still a minor. Availing himself of *their* youth and weakness, Pausanias found means to usurp the throne, being supported not only by the Thracians, but by a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, as well as by a powerful party in Macedon.

The usurper
Pausanias.

Iphicrates, the Athenian, happened at this critical juncture to return from Amphipolis, the recovery of which formed the main object of his expedition. In former journeys to the coast of Thrace, he had been treated with distinguished regard by Amyntas, whose widow Eurydicé now craved the protection of Iphicrates for the sons of his friend. This princess was descended from the Bacchiadæ, the noblest family of Corinth, who, rather than live on an equality with their fellow-citizens in that republic, had become the leaders of the Lyncestæ, a barbarous tribe inhabiting the most western district of Macedon. Eurydicé inherited all the ambition of her race, and was distinguished by a bold intriguing spirit²⁴ still more than by her beauty and accomplishments. With her young sons she suddenly appeared before Iphicrates, in the supplicating form of calamity and woe; presented the eldest to his hand, placed Philip, the younger, on his knee, and conjured him by "the sincere friendship which Amyntas had ever entertained for Athens and for him-

Dethroned
by Iphicrates
at the en-
treaty of
Eurydicé.
A. C. 370.

²² See vol. ii. c. xxix. p. 242.

²⁴ Justin. l. vii. c. iv.

²³ Diodorus & Justin. ubi supra.

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self, to pity their tender years, oppressed by cruel usurpation." The dignity of her sorrow prevailed with Iphicrates, who respected the sacred ties of hospitality, and who saw the advantage that might accrue to Athens by gaining an interest in Macedon. We are not informed by what means he established Perdiccas on the throne. The revolution was effected with such rapidity²⁵, that we may suppose a sudden insurrection of the people, who, on important emergencies, were accustomed, as in the heroic ages, to assemble in arms.

Ptolemy de-
throned by
Pelopidas,
who sends
Philip as a
hostage to
Thebes.
A. C. 367.

During the minority of the young prince the kingdom was governed by his natural brother Ptolemy, whose ambition, unsatisfied with a delegated power, openly aspired to reign. This usurper (as we have related above) was dethroned by Pelopidas and the Thebans, who reinstated Perdiccas in his dominions; and, in order to secure the dependence of Macedon on Thebes, carried into that city as hostages thirty Macedonian youths, and with them Philip, the younger brother of the king.

Perdiccas de-
feated by the
Illyrians.

Perdiccas seemed proud of his chain. Elated with the protection of the Thebans, then in the height of their prosperity, he forgot the gratitude due to Iphicrates and the Athenians; disputed the right of that people to Amphipolis, which had been acknowledged by the general council of Greece²⁶; and his opposition rendered fruitless their well-directed endeavours to recover that important establishment. The Athenians found an avenger in Bardyllis the Illyrian, to whom Perdiccas had denied the tribute that had been paid by his predecessors Argæus and Alexander. Bardyllis maintained his claim by force of arms. The Macedonians met him in the field, but were totally defeated with the loss of four thousand men²⁷. Perdiccas was taken prisoner, and soon after died of his wounds. His son Amyntas was an infant. Thebes having lost her

²⁵ Cornel. Nepos, in Iphicrat. *Æschin.*
de falsa legatione.

²⁶ Demosth. de falsa legat.

²⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. sect. 2.

pre-eminence in Greece, was unable to protect her distant allies. Athens was hostile, and Macedon, surrounded by enemies on every side, already experienced the fury of barbarian invaders.

Not only the Illyrians and Bardyllis, who ravaged the west, but the Pæonians, a powerful and warlike tribe, having received some cause of offence from Perdiccas, now indulged their revenge, and insulted the northern frontier without interruption or controul. The Thracians still supported the cause of Pausanias, whom they prepared to send back into Macedon at the head of a numerous army. Ptolemy was dead; but Argæus, the ancient competitor of king Amyntas, emboldened by the victory of the Illyrians, who had formerly placed him on the throne, renewed his pretensions to that dignity; and, grown old in intrigue, easily persuaded the Athenians, by the hopes of recovering Amphipolis, to exert themselves in his favour, especially against the son and brother of Perdiccas, by whose insolence and ingratitude they were justly provoked and disgusted. Impelled by such motives, the Athenians launched their fleet, and sailed towards the coast of Macedon, with three thousand heavy-armed men commanded by Mantias²⁸.

Such were the evils which threatened, and the calamities which oppressed, that unfortunate and distracted kingdom, when Philip appeared, asserting, unterrified, the rights of his infant nephew, against two candidates for the throne, and four formidable armies. A prince of less courage than Philip would have shrunk from a design seemingly desperate and impracticable; and had courage been his principal virtue, he would have only heightened the disorders which he hoped to remedy²⁹. But on this emergency, the young Macedonian (for he was only in his twenty-third year³⁰) displayed those extraordinary abilities which distinguish his reign, and render it the most interesting spectacle that history can present to those who

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Macedon distracted by two pretenders to the throne, and desolated by four foreign armies.

Amidst these calamities Philip arrives in Macedon. Olymp. cv. 1. A. C. 360.

²⁸ Diodorus, ubi supra.

²⁹ Olivier Vie de Philippe, p. 47.

³⁰ Comp. Diodor. p. 510. & Justin, l. ix. c. viii.

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His educa-
tion, and
transactions
preceding
that period.

are delighted with surveying, not the vulgar revolutions of force and fortune, but the active energies and resources of a vigorous and comprehensive mind. Such was the obscurity in which his merit had hitherto lain concealed from the public, that historians³¹ disagree as to the place of his residence, when he was informed of the defeat and death of his brother Perdiccas. From the age of fifteen he had lived chiefly in Thebes, in the family, and under the direction of Epaminondas³², whose lessons and example could not fail to excite in a kindred mind the emulation of excellence, and the ardour of patriotism³³. It is probable that, agreeably to the custom of Greece and Rome, where the youth alternately frequented the school and the camp, and might sometimes find a school of philosophy in the tent of a general, that Philip accompanied the Theban hero in many of his military expeditions. It is certain that, attended suitably to his rank, he visited the principal republics of Greece, whose institutions in peace and war he examined with a sagacity far superior to his years³⁴. The tactics of the Lacedæmonians were the first new establishment which he introduced into Macedon. Nor was the improvement of his knowledge the only fruit of his travels. The brother of a king found an easy access to whomever he had an interest to know and cultivate. Even in Athens, then hostile to Thebes, and naturally unfavourable to a pupil of Epaminondas, Philip acquired the friendship and esteem of Plato³⁵, Isocrates³⁶, and Aristotle³⁷; and the early connection which he formed with the principal leaders of Athens, and the neighbour-

³¹ Diodorus places him in Thebes; Athenæus, l. ii. p. 506, in Macedon; and adds, *Διότι οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑταίρας, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Περγάδας, ἐξ ἑορῆς, δοκεῖται ὁ φησὶς, περὶ τοῖς πρῶτοις.* Words which admirably correspond to the rapid motions of Philip after the death of Perdiccas.

³² Plutarch. in Pelopida.

³³ Plutarch speaks with the partiality of a Boeotian for Epaminondas, and the resent-

ment of a native of Chæronea against Philip. See Plutarch in Pelopid.

³⁴ Plutarch in Alexand. Athenæus, l. xi. p. 506.

³⁵ Athenæus, l. xi. Zelian, l. iv. c. xix.

³⁶ Isocrates Epistole, & Oratio ad Philipp.

³⁷ Aristotle at this time lived in the Academy with Plato, where, most probably, Philip first saw him. Dionys. Halicarnas. Epist. ad Ammæum.

ing republics, contributed, perhaps, in no small degree, to the success of his future designs³⁸.

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The Illyrians
evacuate Macedon.

His seasonable appearance in Macedon, after the defeat and death of Perdiccas, suddenly changed the fortune of that seemingly devoted kingdom. Yet our admiration of Philip ought not to make us overlook the favourable circumstances which seconded his abilities, and conspired to promote his success. The places of strength built by Archelaus furnished a secure retreat to the remains of Perdiccas's army; the Macedonians, though conquered, were not subdued; they had considerable garrisons in the fortresses and walled towns scattered over the kingdom³⁹; their whole forces had not been engaged in the unfortunate battle with the Illyrians⁴⁰; and those fierce invaders, impatient of delay, and only solicitous for plunder, having ravaged the open country, returned home to enjoy the fruits of their violence and rapine. They probably intended soon to assault Macedon, with increased numbers, and to complete their devastations; but they seem to have been alike incapable of concert or to pursue any permanent plan of conquest; and being distinguished, as historians relate, by their blooming complexions, active vigour, and longevity⁴¹, they were not less distinguished by that irregular and capricious mode of acting, and that inattention to remote consequences, which characterise the manners of barbarians.

The warriors of Pæonia and Thrace⁴² were less formidable by their numbers, and equally contemptible for their ignorance and indocility. In early times, the Pæonians indeed had been regarded as a tribe less savage, and more considerable⁴³ than their Macedonian neighbours; but the former had remained stationary, in the rudeness of their primitive state, while the latter had been improved by a Grecian colony, and by frequent communication and inter-

State of
Thrace and
Pæonia.

³⁸ Demosthen. passim.

³⁹ Thucyd. I. xi. p. 168.

⁴⁰ Athenæus, I. xi. p. 506.

⁴¹ Lucian. in Macrobiiis, & Cornel.

Alexand. apud Plinium, lib. vii. cap. clvii.

⁴² Cornel. Nepos in Iphicrat. Xenoph.

Anab. I. vii. p. 393.

⁴³ Hippocrat. de Epidem.

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Philip dis-
arms the re-
signment of
those coun-
tries.

Philip de-
clared king
of Macedon.
Olymp.
cv. 1.
A. C. 360.

course with the Grecian republics. Of the Thracians we have had occasion to speak in the preceding parts of this work. The destructive ravages of Scuthes⁴⁴ represent the ordinary condition of that unsettled and inhospitable country, sometimes united under one chief, more frequently divided among many, whose mutual hostilities banished agriculture, industry, and every useful art. Exclusive of the Grecian settlements on the coast, Thrace contained not any city, nor even any considerable town. The barbarian Cotys, who was dignified with the title of king, led a wandering life, encamping on the banks of rivers with his flocks and followers⁴⁵. War and pasturage formed the only sources of his grandeur, and even the only means of his subsistence.

Such were the first enemies with whom Philip had to contend. Their own capricious unsteadiness delivered him from the Illyrians. To the Pæonians, who ravaged the north, he either sent a deputation, or applied in person; and partly by bribes, partly by artful promises and flattery, persuaded the invaders to retire. The same arts prevailed with the selfish king of Thrace⁴⁶, whose avarice readily sacrificed the cause of Pausanias, while Philip thought the remaining wealth of Macedon usefully consumed in removing these barbarous foes, that he might resist, with undivided strength, the more formidable invasion of Argæus and the Athenians.

The Athenian fleet already anchored before the harbour of Methoné; Argæus, with his numerous followers, had encamped in the province of Pieria; and their united forces prepared to march northward to Edessa, or Ægæ, the ancient capital of Macedon, where they expected to be joined by a powerful party, whom fear or inclination would bring to the standard of the banished king.

⁴⁴ See above, c. xxvi. p. 174, & seqq.

⁴⁵ Athenæus, l. xii. p. 331.

⁴⁶ Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 3. Horace alludes to these events:

diffidit urbium
Portas vir Macedo, & subruit æmulos
Reges muneribus. Lib. iii. Ode 16.

The Macedonians who adhered to the interest of Perdiccas, or rather of his infant son, had been dispirited by the recent victory of the Illyrians, and the misfortunes consequent on that event. But the manly exhortations, and undaunted deportment of Philip, roused them from their despair. They admired the dexterity with which he had disarmed the resentment of the Thracians and Pæonians. His graceful person, insinuating address, and winning affability, qualities which he possessed in a very uncommon degree⁴⁷, gained the affections of the Macedonians, who either recollected, or were studiously reminded of, a prophecy⁴⁸, that announced great glory to their nation under the reign of the son of Amyntas. In an assembly held at *Ægæ*, they exclaimed, with one consent, "This is the man whom the gods point out as the founder of the Macedonian greatness. The dangerous condition of the times admits not of an infant reign. Let us obey the celestial voice, and entrust the sceptre to hands alike worthy to hold, and able to defend it⁴⁹." This proposal seemed not extraordinary in a country, which had been long accustomed to interruptions in the lineal order of succession. Amyntas was set aside, and Philip, who had hitherto possessed only the delegated power of regent, was invested with the royal title and authority⁵⁰.

While all ranks of men were thus animated with affectionate admiration of their young king, the obsolete claims of *Argæus* could only be maintained by arms. Attended by his Athenian allies, he marched towards *Edeffa*; but that city shut its gates against him. Dispirited by this repulse, he made no farther attempts to gain admission into any of the Macedonian cities, but directed his course

He defeats the pretender *Argæus*, and his Athenian auxiliaries.

⁴⁷ *Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.*

⁴⁸ In the Sibylline verses preserved in *Pausanias* (in *Achaic.*) Philip is named as the author of the Macedonian greatness, and the destruction of the kingdom is foretold under another Philip. These verses, though

evidently composed after the event, serve to confirm the fact, that the superstition of the multitude was wrought upon for the purposes of Philip. *Justin. l. vii. c. vi.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid. idem.*

⁵⁰ *Diodorus, ibid.*

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Uncommon
treatment of
the Athenian
and Macedo-
nian prison-
ers.

backward to Methoné. Philip, who had now collected sufficient strength to take the field, harassed his retreat, cut his rear to pieces, and defeated him in a general engagement, in which Argæus himself fell, with the flower of his army. The rest, whether Greeks or Barbarians, were made prisoners of war⁵¹.

It was on this occasion that Philip first displayed that deep and artful policy, which, in the course of a long reign, gained him such a powerful ascendant over the passions of other men, and enabled him uniformly to govern his own by the interest of his ambition. In the midst of prosperity, his proud and lofty spirit must have been highly provoked by the Athenians, as well as by the followers of Argæus; and the barbarous maxims and practices which prevailed in that age, left him at full liberty to wreck his vengeance on the unhappy prisoners of both, who had fallen into his hands. But the interest of Philip required him rather to soothe than to irritate the people of Athens, and to obtain by good offices (what he could not command by force) the confidence of his Macedonian subjects. The captives of the latter nation were called into his presence, rebuked with gentleness and humanity, admitted to swear allegiance to their new master, and promiscuously distributed in the body of his army. The Athenian prisoners were treated in a manner still more extraordinary⁵². Instead of demanding any ransom for their persons, he restored their baggage unexamined, and entertained them at his table with such condescending hospitality, that they returned home, full of admiration for the young king, and deeply persuaded of his attachment and respect for their republic⁵³.

⁵¹ Diodorus, l. xvi. sect. 3. & Demosth. in Aristocrat.

⁵² The fair side of Philip's character is described by Diodor. l. xvi. p. 510, & seqq. and p. 559. By Just. l. ix. c. viii. The most disadvantageous description of him is given by Demosthenes, passim, and by Athenæus, l. iv. c. xix. l. vi. c. xvii. & l. x. c. x. Ci-

cero seems not to have regarded the assertions of Demosthenes, when, in speaking of Philip and Alexander, he says, "*Alter semper magnus, alter sæpe turpissimus.*" But the artificial character of Philip, which varied with his interest, merits neither the panegyrics nor invectives too liberally bestowed on it.

⁵³ Demosthenes in Aristocrat.

They had only time to blaze forth the praises of Philip, when his ambassadors arrived at Athens⁵⁴. He knew that the loss of Amphipolis principally excited the resentment of the Athenians; he knew that the interest of Macedon required that resentment to be appeased. Impressed with these ideas, he renounced all jurisdiction over Amphipolis, which was formally declared a free and independent city, subject only to the government of its own equitable laws⁵⁵. This measure, together with the distinguished treatment of the Athenian prisoners, insured the success of his embassy. An ancient treaty was renewed, that had long subsisted between his father Amyntas and the Athenians. That capricious and unsteady people, not less susceptible of gratitude, than prone to anger, were thus lulled into repose, at a time when Fortune having placed them at the head of Greece, both their present power and ancient glory urged them to take the front of the battle against Philip. Confiding in the insidious treaty with that prince, they engaged in a ruinous war with their allies⁵⁶; and ceased, during several years, to make any opposition to the ambitious designs of the Macedonian.

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Philip amuses
the Athenians with a
treaty of
peace and
friendship.
Olymp.
cv. 2.
A. C. 359.

The young king, having given such illustrious proofs of his abilities in negotiation and war, availed himself of the affectionate admiration of his subjects to establish, during a season of tranquillity, such institutions as might maintain and extend his own power, and confirm the solid grandeur of Macedon. The laws and maxims which prevailed in the heroic ages, and which, as we have already observed, had been early introduced into that kingdom, circumscribed the royal authority within very narrow bounds. The chiefs and nobles, especially in the more remote provinces, regarded themselves as the rivals and equals of their sovereign. In foreign war they followed his standard, but they often shook his throne by do-

Philip institutes the
order of
Diadochi,
Spaurmen,
companions.
Olymp. cv. 2.
A. C. 359.

⁵⁴ Demosthenes in Aristocrat.

⁵⁶ See above, c. xxxii. p. 353.

⁵⁵ Polyæn. Strateg. l. iv. c. 17.

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messic sedition; and, amidst the scanty materials for explaining the internal state of Macedon in ancient times, we may discover several instances in which they disavowed their allegiance, and assumed independent government over considerable districts of the country⁵⁷. The moment of glory and success seemed the most favourable for extinguishing this dangerous spirit, and quashing the proud hopes of the nobles. In this design Philip proceeded with that artful policy which characterises his reign. From the bravest of the Macedonian youth, he chose a select body of *companions*⁵⁸, who, being distinguished by honourable appellations, and entertained at the royal table, attended the king's person in war and in hunting. Their intimacy with the sovereign, which was regarded as a proof of their merit, obliged them to superior diligence in all the severe duties of a military life⁵⁹. The noble youth, animated with the hope of glory, vied with each other to gain admission into this distinguished order; and while, on one hand, they served as hostages⁶⁰ for the allegiance of their families, they formed, on the other, an useful seminary of future generals⁶¹, who, after conquering for Philip and Alexander, at length conquered for themselves, and divided the spoils of the ancient world.

His military
arrange-
ments.

It is ignorantly said by some writers⁶², that Philip, in the first year of his reign, invented the phalanx, a body of six thousand men, armed with short swords, fit either for cutting or thrusting; strong bucklers, four feet in length, and two and a half in breadth; and pikes fourteen cubits long, which, usually arranged sixteen deep,

⁵⁷ Strabo, l. vii. p. 326. Xenoph. Hist. Grec. l. v.

⁵⁸ Arrian, & Ælian.

⁵⁹ Ælian, l. xiv. c. 49.

⁶⁰ Arrian says, "ταὶ ἐν τῇσι Μακεδόνων τῇσι πατρὶσι," "the sons of men in office;" which well agrees with the idea of their being hostages for the fidelity of their parents. He also ascribes the institution to Philip. Ex

Φίλιππον καὶ καθιστῆκος. Arrian, l. iv. p. 89.

⁶¹ Curtius, l. viii. c. 6.

⁶² Diodorus Siculus, l. xvi. f. 3. and all the Roman writers of Greek history. It was natural for the Romans, who began to know Greece and Macedon almost at the same time, and who found the phalanx most complete in the latter, to suppose it invented in that country.

formed

formed the main battle of the Macedonians. But this is nothing different from the armour and arrangement which had always prevailed among the Greeks, and which Philip adopted in their most perfect form; nor is there reason to think that a prince, who knew the danger of changing what the experience of ages had approved, made any alteration in the weapons or tactics of that people⁶³. His attention was more judiciously directed to procure, in sufficient abundance, arms, horses, and other necessary instruments of war; in reviewing and exercising his troops; and in accustoming them to that austere and laborious life⁶⁴, which is the best preparation for the field.

The military resources which his activity had provided, his ambition did not allow to remain long unemployed. The death of Agis, the most warlike chieftain, or, as he is called by an historian⁶⁵, king of the Pæonians, drew Philip into the field, to revenge recent injuries which those Barbarians had inflicted on Macedon. Among a people where the laws of peace or war are neglected or unknown, almost every thing depends on the precarious character of their leaders. Deprived of the valour of Agis, the Pæonians lost all hopes of defence. Philip over-ran their country without resistance; carried off slaves and plunder; imposed a tribute on their chiefs; took hostages; and reduced Pæonia to an absolute dependence on Macedon.

It is probable, that, according to the practice of the age, he permitted or required a certain number of the vanquished to follow his standard; but the Pæonians were no sooner reduced, than Philip, to

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Conquers
Pæonia.
Olymp.
cv. 3.
A. C. 358.

Defeats the
Illyrians, and
extends his
territory to
the Ionian
sea.

⁶³ The improvement in the countermarch, to which Philip gave the appearance of advancing, instead of retreating, mentioned by Ælian in his Tactics, c. xxviii. was borrowed, as this author tells us, from the Lacedæmonians. If Philip increased the phalanx, usually less numerous, to six thousand men, this was far from an improvement; and the latter kings of Macedon, who swelled

it to sixteen thousand, only rendered that order of battle more unwieldy and inconvenient. The highest perfection of Grecian tactics is to be found in Xenophon's expedition. See above, c. xxvi. p. 154, & seqq. See also Polyb. l. xvii. p. 764, & Liv. l. xlv. c. 40.

⁶⁴ Polyænus, l. iv. c. 3. Frontin. Strat. l. iv. c. 1.

⁶⁵ Diodorus, l. xvi. sect. 4.

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whom all seasons seemed alike proper for war, undertook a winter's campaign against Bardyllis and the Illyrians, the hereditary enemies of his family and kingdom. He marched towards the frontier of Illyria⁶⁶ at the head of ten thousand foot, and six hundred horse; and, before entering the country, animated the resentment and valour of his troops by a military oration, after the custom of the Greeks, whose manners, he seemed, on every occasion, ambitious to imitate. Indignation of past injuries, the honour of his subjects, and the glory of his crown, might be topics proper to influence the Macedonian soldiers⁶⁷, who could not fully enter into the more refined motives of their sovereign. Illyria had been extended on the east, to the prejudice of Macedon, which it totally excluded from the excellent harbours on the Hadriatic⁶⁸. This was an important consideration to a prince who seems to have early meditated the raising of a naval power. Beside this, it was impossible for Philip to undertake with safety the other measures which he had in view, should he leave his kingdom exposed to the predatory incursions of a neighbouring enemy, who, unless they feared Macedon, must always be formidable to that country. Directed by such solid principles of policy, rather than governed by resentment, or allured by the splendour of victory, Philip proceeded forward, with the caution necessary to be observed in an hostile territory. After a fruitless negotiation, Bardyllis met him in the field with an adequate body of infantry, but with only four hundred horse. The precise scene of the engagement is unknown. The Macedonian phalanx attacked the

⁶⁶ The Greek name of this country is *Illyria*, but more commonly *Illyria*, from its inhabitants. Vid. Arrian, l. i. passim. The Latin name is *Illyricum*; most English writers of ancient history use *Illyria*, probably from the French *Illyrie*. The Greek *Illyria* is described by Strabo, l. vii. p. 317. It comprehended the eastern shore of the Hadriatic, between Epirus and Ithia. The Latin *Illyricum*

had a signification far more extensive. See Gibbon's History, vol. i. p. 27.

⁶⁷ The heads of the speech are given, indirectly, in the fragments of Theopompus.

⁶⁸ Strabo says, *ἀπαντα τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν*, (scilicet *χεῖμα*) *σφοδρὰ πλεονεχὺς ὕδατος*; and adds, that the shore of Illyria is as abundant, as the opposite coast of Italy is defective, in good harbours. Strabo, l. vii.

Illyrian column⁶⁹ in front, while the targeteers and light-armed troops galled its flanks, and the cavalry harassed its rear. The Illyrians, thus surrounded on every side, were crushed between two opposite assaults, without having an opportunity to exert their full strength⁷⁰. Their resistance, however, must have been vigorous, since seven thousand were left on the field of battle, and with them their gallant leader Bardyllis, who fell, at the age of ninety, fighting bravely on horseback. The loss of their experienced chief, and of the flower of their youthful warriors, broke the strength and courage of the Illyrian tribes, who sent a deputation to Philip, humbly craving peace, and submitting their fortune to the will of the conqueror. Philip granted them the same terms⁷¹ which he had lately imposed on the Pæonians. *That* part of their country which lies east of the lake Lychnidus, he joined to Macedon; and probably built a town, and settled a colony on the side of the lake, which watered a fertile country, and abounded in different kinds of fish, highly esteemed by the ancients. The town and lake of Lychnidus were fifty miles distant from the Ionian sea; but such was the ascendant that the arms and policy of Philip acquired over his neighbours, that the inhabitants of the intermediate district soon adopted the language and manners of their conquerors; and their territory, hitherto unconnected with any foreign power, sunk into

⁶⁹ The Illyrians were drawn up in the order of battle called *πλινθίαι*, from *πλινθος*, a brick; which clearly points out its form.

⁷⁰ Frontinus Strateg. l. ii. c. 3.

⁷¹ It should seem from Diodorus, that the Illyrians had entertained the same superstitious terror of neglecting the interment of the dead, which prevailed among the Greeks. Yet Diodorus, perhaps, only used a privilege too common among historians, of transferring their own feelings to those concerning whom they write. He says, that Philip "restored their dead, and erected a trophy." Pausanias (in *Βοιωτία*) denies that either

Philip or his son Alexander ever erected any of those monuments of victory; which practice, he says, was contrary to a Macedonian maxim, established as early as the time of Caranus, when a lion having overturned one of his trophies, the wise founder of the monarchy regarded this event as a warning to forbear raising them in future. But the medals of Philip and Alexander, of which the reverse is sometimes charged with trophies, refute the assertion of Pausanias; which is likewise contradicted by Arrian, Curtius, and all the writers of the life, or expedition, of Alexander.

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Philip's de-
signs against
Amphipolis.
Olymp.
cv. 4.
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such an absolute dependence on Macedon, that many ancient geographers considered it as a province of that country⁷².

Having settled the affairs of Illyria, Philip returned home, not to enjoy the sweets of victory and repose, but to pursue more important and more arduous designs, than those which he had hitherto carried on with such signal success. He had secured and extended the northern and western frontier of Macedon; but the rich southern shores, chiefly inhabited by Greeks, presented at once a more tempting prize, and a more formidable enemy. The confederacy of Olynthus, having thrown off the yoke of Sparta, had become more powerful than ever. It could send into the field ten thousand heavy-armed men, and a large body of well-disciplined cavalry. Most towns of the Chalcidicé had become its allies or subjects; and this populous and wealthy province, together with Pangæus on the right, and Pieria on the left, the cities of both which were either independent, or subject to the Athenians, formed a barrier sufficient not only to guard the Grecian states against Macedon, but even to threaten the safety of that kingdom. Every motive concurred to direct the active policy of Philip towards acquisitions immediately necessary in themselves, and essential to the completion of his remote purposes. In the course of twenty years he accomplished his designs, and conquered Greece; often varying his means, never changing his end; and notwithstanding the circumstances and events that continually thwarted his ambition, we behold the opening and gradual progress of a vast plan, every step in which paved the way for that which followed, till the whole ended in the most signal triumph, perhaps ever attained by human prudence, over courage and fortune.

Importance
of that place.

The importance of Olynthus and the Chalcidicé could not divert the sagacity of Philip from Amphipolis, which he regarded as a more necessary, though less splendid, conquest. The possession of

⁷² Strabo, l. vii. p. 327.

Amphipolis, which would connect Macedon with the sea, and secure to that kingdom many commercial advantages, opened a road to the woods and mines of Mount Pangæus, the former of which was so essential to the raising of a naval power, and the latter to the forming and keeping on foot a sufficient military force. The place itself, Philip, in the beginning of his reign, had declared independent, to avoid a rupture with the Athenians, who still asserted their pretensions to their ancient colony. But their measures to regain Amphipolis had hitherto been rendered ineffectual by the caprice or perfidy of Charidemus, a native of Eubœa, who, from the common level of a soldier of fortune, had risen to the command of a considerable body of mercenaries, frequently employed by the indolence and licentiousness of the Athenians, a people extremely averse both to the fatigue and restraint of personal service. They determined, however, to renew their attempts for recovering their dominion, while the Amphipolitans, having tasted the sweets of liberty, prepared to maintain their independence.

In this posture of affairs, the hostile designs of Philip, which all his artifice had not been able to conceal from the suspicious jealousy of the new republic, alarmed the magistrates of Amphipolis, and obliged them to seek protection from the Olynthians, who readily admitted them into their confederacy. Emboldened by this alliance, they set at defiance the menaces of their neighbouring, as well as of their more distant, enemy; and their imprudent insolence readily furnished Philip with specious grounds of hostility. The Olynthians perceived that the indignation of this prince must soon break forth into action, and overwhelm the Amphipolitans; while they themselves might be involved in the ruin of their new confederate. To anticipate this danger, they sent ambassadors to Athens, requesting an alliance with that republic against the natural enemy of both states, and an enemy whose successful activity rendered him a just object of terror.

Amphipolis enters into the Olynthian confederacy.

This

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The in-
trigues of
Philip pre-
vent an alli-
ance between
Athens and
Olynthus.

This alliance, had it taken place, must have given a fatal blow to the rising greatness of Macedon, which as yet was incapable of contend with the united strength of Olynthus and Athens. The spies and emissaries of Philip (for he had already begun to employ those odious, but necessary, instruments of policy) immediately gave the alarm. The prince himself was deeply sensible of the danger, and determined to repel it with equal vigour and celerity. His agents reached Athens before any thing was concluded with the Olynthian deputies. The popular leaders and orators were bribed and gained; the magistrates and senate were flattered and deceived by the most plausible declarations and promises. A negotiation was immediately set on foot, by which Philip stipulated to conquer Amphipolis for the Athenians, on condition that they surrendered to him Pydna, a place of far less importance. He promised, besides, to confer many other advantages on the republic, which it was not proper at present to mention, but which time would reveal⁷³. Amused by the artifices of the Macedonian, deceived by the perfidy of their own magistrates, and elated with the hopes of recovering Amphipolis, the great object of their ambition, the senate of the Five Hundred (for the transaction was carried on with such haste as allowed not time for assembling the people) rejected with disdain the overtures of the Olynthians⁷⁴; who returned home disgusted and indignant.

Artifices by
which he
gained the
Olynthians.

They had scarcely time to communicate to their countrymen the angry passions which agitated their own breasts, when the ambassadors of Philip craved audience in the assembly of Olynthus. That artful prince affected to condole with the Olynthians on the affront which they had received from the insolence of Athens; but at the same time testified his surprise, that they should condescend to court

⁷³ Καὶ το ἀνέλλουμενον ποτε ἀπορρεντὶν ἐκείνο. Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 6, edit. Wolfii. It is strange that Wolfius has changed the order of the Olynthian orations, so distinctly marked by Dion. Halicarn. in his letter to Ammaus.

⁷⁴ Demosthenes expresses it in the strongest terms, as if they had driven the Olynthians from Athens: “ὅτι Ολυθῖαις ἀπελάνον τῆς αἰθέρης. Demosthen. *ibid.*

the distant protection of that proud republic, when they might find in Macedon an ally near at hand, who wished for nothing more earnestly than to enter into equal and lasting engagements with their confederacy. As a proof of his moderation and sincerity, he offered immediately to put them in possession of Anthemus, a town of some importance in their neighbourhood, the jurisdiction of which had long been claimed by the kings of Macedon⁷⁵; at the same time assuring them of his intentions to deserve their gratitude by still more important services, and particularly by employing his arms to reduce the cities of Pydna and Potidæa, commanding the opposite sides of the Thermaic gulph; places, therefore, of considerable value, which he wished to see dependent on Olynthus, rather than, as at present, subject to Athens.

The immediate offers of Philip, his professions and promises, in which, as they suited his interest, he doubtless was sincere, and still more, his secret practices with some powerful men of Olynthus, effectually prevailed with that republic to abandon the cause of Amphipolis, whose imprudent inhabitants had been at little pains to prevent those offences and complaints which naturally arise between the jealous members of an unequal confederacy. By these intrigues, the Macedonian not only removed all opposition to his views on the part of the Olynthians, but acquired the sincere friendship of that people, who were ready to assist his arms, and to second his most ambitious designs. He therefore prepared for action, because he might now act with safety; marched rapidly towards Amphipolis, and pressed that city with a vigorous siege. The inhabitants, deeply affected by the near prospect of a calamity which they had taken little care to prevent, had recourse, in their distress, to Athens. Thither they dispatched Hierax and Stratocles, two of their most distinguished citizens, to represent the danger of an alliance between Philip and Olynthus; to intreat the Athenians to accept the sincere

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Philip besieges Amphipolis.
Olymp.
cv. 4.
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⁷⁵ Demosthen. Philip. ii. 4.

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XXXIII.

Amuses the
Athenians.

repentance of their unfortunate colony, and once more to take Amphipolis under the protection of their fleet.

At that time the Athenians were deeply engaged in the social war; yet the hopes of recovering so important a settlement might have directed their attention to Macedon, had not the vigilant policy of Philip sent them a letter, renewing the assurances of his friendship, acknowledging their pretensions to the city which he actually besieged, and of which he artfully said, that, in terms of his recent engagement, he hoped shortly to put them in possession. Amused by these insinuating representations, the Athenians treated the deputies of Amphipolis with as little respect as they had lately done those of Olynthus. The besieged city was thus deprived of all hopes of relief; Philip pressed the attack with new vigour; a breach was made in the walls; and the Amphipolitans, after an obstinacy of defence which could have no other effect than to provoke the resentment of the conqueror, at length surrendered at discretion⁷⁶.

Amphipolis
surrenders.
Olymp.
cv. 4.
A. C. 357.

Is annexed to
Macedon.

The prudent Macedonian always preferred his own profit to the punishment of his enemies. It was his interest to preserve and to aggrandise, not to depopulate Amphipolis. He banished a few daring leaders, whose seditious or patriotic spirit might disturb the measures of his government. The bulk of the citizens were treated with sufficient mildness. Their territory was reunited to Macedon, from which Philip resolved that it should never be dismembered, notwithstanding his promises to the Athenians.

Philip puts
the Olynthians
in possession
of Pydna
and Potidæa.

That he might arm himself against the resentment of a people, whom, if he could not deceive, he was determined to defy, he cultivated, with great earnestness, the Olynthian confederacy; and having besieged and taken the towns of Pydna and Potidæa, he readily ceded them to the Olynthians, who had but feebly assisted him in making these conquests. In the whole transaction Philip

⁷⁶ Diodor. l. xvi. c. viii. Demosth. Olynth. iii. sect. 4—7.

affected to act merely as an auxiliary. The Athenian garrison in Potidea, who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war, he took under his immediate protection, and dismissed them without ransom, artfully lamenting that the necessity of his affairs, and his alliance with Olynthus, obliged him to oppose the interests of their republic, for which he entertained the most sincere respect⁷⁷.

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It is impossible that the Athenians, weak and credulous as they were, should have been the dupes of this gross artifice. But they could not immediately withdraw their exertions from the social war, the events of which grew continually more unprosperous. Philip, ever vigilant and active, profited of this favourable diversion, to pursue his conquests in Thrace, to which the possession of Amphipolis afforded him an opening. In the beginning of his reign, he had found it necessary to purchase a peace from Cotys, who still governed that country, but from whom Philip could not actually apprehend any formidable opposition. The late acquaintance of that Barbarian with the Grecian religion and manners, which he had adopted in consequence of his connection with Iphicrates and the Athenians, served only to deprave his faculties, and to cloud his reason. We should pronounce absolutely mad, the man who fancied himself enamoured of Minerva; but the ancients, who believed that the gods often appeared in a human form, regarded with more tenderness this frantic enthusiasm. Cotys was allowed to possess his freedom and his crown, whether, with his ambulatory court, he traversed the inhospitable mountains of Thrace, or pitched his tents on the fragrant banks of the Strymon or the Nessus, or to enjoy with more privacy the favours of his celestial mistress, penetrated into the deep recesses of the beautiful forests which adorned his kingdom.

Philip pursues his conquests in Thrace.

⁷⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. c. viii. & Demosth. Philipp. ii. & Olynth. i.

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Takes possession of the gold mines at Crenidæ, afterwards called Philippi. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

At the approach of the Macedonians, having abandoned the grove of Onocartis, the favourite scene of his wild and romantic enjoyments⁷⁵, he endeavoured to stop the progress of the enemy by a letter; but a letter from such a man could excite nothing but ridicule or pity. Philip penetrated eastward thirty miles beyond Amphipolis, to the town of Crenidæ, situated at the foot of Mount Pangæus, and distant ten miles from the sea. He admired the foliary beauty of the place, which being bounded on one side by the sea, and on the other by lofty mountains, was watered by many streams and rivulets, which, tempering the dryness of the soil, produced the finest and most delicious fruit and flowers, especially roses, of a peculiar hue and fragrantcy. But the attention of Philip was attracted by objects more important, by the gold mines in that neighbourhood, formerly wrought by colonies from Thasos and from Athens, but totally neglected since the ignorant Thracians had become masters of Crenidæ. Philip expelled those Barbarians from a possession which they seemed unworthy to hold. Having descended into the gold mines, he traced, by the help of torches, the decayed labours of the ancient proprietors. By his care the water was drained off; the canals, broken or choaked up, were repaired; and the bosom of the earth was again opened and ransacked⁷⁹ with eager avidity by a prince, who well knew the value of the precious metals. A Macedonian colony was planted at Crenidæ, which thenceforth assumed the name of Philippi⁸⁰, a name bestowed also on the golden coins struck by or-

⁷⁵ Theopomp. apud Athenæum, l. xii. p. 531.

⁷⁹ Senec. Natur. Quæst. l. v. p. 760, & Demosthen. in Leptin.

⁸⁰ The fatal defeat and death of Brutus and Cassius have eclipsed, in their melan-

choly splendour, all the preceding events which distinguish Philippi. There liberty expired, and virtue yielded to force.

Cum fracta virtus, & minaces
Turpe solum tetigere mento.

HORACE.

der of Philip ⁸¹, to the annual amount of nearly a thousand talents, or two hundred thousand pounds sterling ⁸².

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Having effected the main purpose of his Thracian expedition, the prudence of Philip set bounds to his conquests in that country, and carried his arms into Thessaly, which, by the murder of Alexander of Pheræ, had got three tyrants instead of one. These were, Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron, the brothers-in-law, the assassins, and the successors of Alexander. The resentment of the Thessalians, and the valour of the Macedonian troops, totally defeated those oppressors of their country, who were reduced to such humiliating terms as seemed sufficient to prevent them from being thenceforth formidable either to their own subjects, or to their ⁸³ neighbours. The Thessalians, who were susceptible of all impressions, but incapable of preserving any, concluded, in the first emotions of their gratitude, an agreement with their deliverer, by which they surrendered to him the revenues arising from their fairs and towns of commerce, as well as all the conveniencies of their harbours and shipping; and extraordinary as this cession was, Philip found means to render ⁸⁴ it effectual and permanent.

Philip settles
the affairs of
Thessaly.

Advantages
which he de-
rived from
that country.

He immediately contracted an alliance with Arybbas, king of Epirus, a small principality which skirted the western frontier of Thessaly. In his excursions from Thebes, Philip had early seen Olympias, the sister of that prince, whose wit and spirit, joined to the lively graces of her youth and beauty, had made a deep impression on his heart. They were initiated, at the same time, in the mysteries of Ceres, during the triennial festival in the isle of Samothrace, which had been long as much distinguished as ⁸⁵ Eleusis

Philip mar-
ries Olym-
pias.
Olymp.
cv. 4.
A. C. 357.

⁸¹ Regale numisma Philippos.

⁸² Diodor. l. xvi. c. ix. Justin. l. viii. c. iii. speaks differently; but the whole of that chapter bears evident marks of ignorance and error.

⁸³ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xiv. & Plut. in Pelopid.

⁸⁴ Demosth. Philip. I. 10. Polyæn. Strateg. l. iv. c. xix.

⁸⁵ See above, c. xxi. p. 34.

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itself, by the peculiar worship and protection of this bountiful goddess. But the active ambition which employed and engrossed the first years of Philip's reign, had probably banished the memory of his love, when his expedition into Thessaly recalled the image of Olympias. Their first interview naturally revived his tender passions; and, as the kings of Epirus were lineally descended from Achilles, the match appeared every way suitable; Arybbas readily yielded his consent, and the beautiful princess was conducted into Macedon⁸⁶.

During the solemnities of his nuptials, the neighbouring princes take arms.

The nuptials of Philip were solemnised at Pella with unusual pomp and splendour. Several months were destined to religious shows and processions, to gymnastic games and exercises, to musical and dramatic entertainments. The young and fortunate prince naturally took a principal share in all these scenes of festivity; and it is probable that, amidst the more elegant amusements of his court, Philip might discover that strong propensity to vicious indulgence, that delight in buffoons and flatterers, and other disgraceful ministers of his more criminal pleasures, which however counteracted and balanced by his ambition and magnanimity, disgraced and tarnished the succeeding glories of his reign. It is certain that the voluptuous inactivity in which he seemed sunk, encouraged the hopes of his enemies⁸⁷. The tributary princes of Pæonia and Illyria prepared to rebel; the king of Thrace engaged in their designs, which were concerted with more caution than is usual with Barbarians; and this general conspiracy of neighbouring states might have repressed for a while the fortune of Macedon, if Philip had not been seasonably informed of the danger by his faithful partisans and emissaries in those countries.

⁸⁶ Justin. l. vii. c. vi.

⁸⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxii.

Early in the ensuing spring he took the field with the flower of the Macedonian troops. Parmenio, the general in whom he had most confidence, crushed the rebellion in Illyria. Philip was equally successful in Pæonia and Thrace. While he returned from the latter, he was informed of the victory of Parmenio. A second messenger acquainted him that his horses had gained the prize in the chariot races at the Olympic games; a victory which he regarded as far more honourable, and which, as it proved him a legitimate son of Greece, he carefully commemorated, by impressing a chariot on his coins. Almost at the same time a third messenger arrived to tell him that Olympias had brought forth a prince at Pella; to whom, as born amidst such auspicious circumstances, the diviners announced the greatest prosperity⁸⁸ and glory.

Such a rapid tide of good fortune did not overset the wisdom of Philip, if we may judge by the first authentic transaction which immediately followed these events. This was the correspondence with Aristotle the philosopher, whose merit Philip had early discerned at Athens, when he still resided with his master Plato. The first letter (fortunately preserved) is written with a brevity which marks the king and the man of genius. "Know that a son is born to us. We thank the gods, not so much for their gift, as for bestowing it at a time when Aristotle lives. We assure ourselves that you will form him a prince worthy of his father, and worthy of Macedon," Aristotle commenced this illustrious employment about thirteen years afterwards⁸⁹, when the opening mind of Alexander might be supposed

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Philip
quashes their
conspiracy.
Olymp.
cvi 1.
A. C. 336.

Philip's letter to Aristotle, announcing the birth of Alexander.

⁸⁸ Plut. in Alexand.

⁸⁹ The chronology appears from Dionysius of Halicarnassus's letter to Ammaeus, who, in order to prove that Demosthenes had attained the highest perfection in the practice, before Aristotle had delivered the theory, of eloquence, marks, with great ex-

actness, the principal events in the lives of the philosopher and orator. Aristotle, a native of Stagira, came to Athens in his eighteenth year, 367 A. C. There he continued twenty years, as the scholar or assistant of Plato, who died 348 A. C. Aristotle left Athens on the death of his master, and spent

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posed capable of receiving the benefit of his instructions. The success of his labours will be explained in the sequel. The fortune of Alexander surpassed that of all other conquerors as much as his virtues surpassed his fortune. Yet the fame of the philosopher abundantly repays the honour reflected on him by his royal pupil, since sixteen centuries after the destruction of Alexander's empire, the writings of Aristotle still maintained an unexampled ascendant over the opinions, and even over the actions of men.

spent three years at Atarneus, and two at Mytlené. From thence he went to Macedonia, in the forty-third year of his age, and 323, and a year after the death of Alexander. He was employed eight years in the education of Alexander. He returned to Athens 335 A. C. taught twelve years in the Lycæum, and died the year following at Chalcis, ætat. sixty-three, A. C. 323, and a year after the death of Alexander. Dionysius ad Ammæum. He reckons by the archons of Athens; I have substituted the years before Christ.

C H A P. XXXIV.

Philip's Prosperity.—Imprudent Measures of the Amphictyonic Council.—The Phocian, or Sacred War.—Philomelus seizes the Temple of Delphi.—Takes the Field against the Thebans and their Allies.—Defeat and Death of Philomelus—Affairs of Thrace, Macedon, and Attica.—Onemarchus takes the Command of the Phocians.—Encounters Philip in Thessaly.—He is defeated and slain.—Philip's Designs against Olynthus and Byzantium.—Traversed by the Athenians.—Phayllus takes the Command of the Phocians.—Philip marches towards Thermopylæ.—Anticipated by the Athenians.—Demosthenes's first Philippic.—Philip's Occupations at Pella—His Vices—and Policy.

PHILIP had now reigned almost five years. He had greatly enlarged the boundaries, he had still more augmented the revenues of his kingdom. Pæonia, no longer the rival, was become an obsequious province of Macedon. At the expence of Thrace and Illyria, he had extended his frontier on the east to the sea of Thafos; on the west to the lake Lychnidus. He was master of Thessaly without having the trouble to govern it. He secured many commercial advantages by the possession of Amphipolis. His troops were numerous and well disciplined; his large finances were regulated with œconomy; and the mines of Philippi furnished him with an annual resource alike useful to his designs, whether he pursued the

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XXXIV.

Prosperity of
Philip in the
fifth year of
his reign.
Olymp.
c.ii. 1.
A. C. 356.

C H A P.
XXXIV.

His profound
and impene-
trable policy.

ambitious career of foreign conquest, or set himself to build up and consolidate the internal grandeur of his dominions.

The power of Philip was admired, and feared, by those who were unable to penetrate the deep principles of his policy, which alone rendered him really formidable. The first and most natural object of his desire was the territory of Olynthus, the most populous and fertile portion of the Macedonian coast. His second and far more arduous purpose was to obtain the sovereignty of Greece. But instead of discovering these designs, he had hitherto cultivated the Olynthians with a careful assiduity, and had deserved their gratitude by many solid and important services. His success had been complete, and, if elated by the many advantages which we have enumerated, he had already prepared to invade Greece, it is more than probable that the Olynthians would have consented to follow his standard. But Philip was sensible, that by snatching too eagerly at this glorious prize, he might destroy for ever his prospect of obtaining it. While the Athenians were occupied and harassed by the destructive war with their confederates, he had, indeed, embraced the opportunity to gain possession of several of their dependent settlements in Thrace and Macedon; colouring, however, these proceedings by the pretence of justice or necessity, and tempering even his hostilities by many partial acts of kindness and respect. Before the social war was ended, the seeds of dissention, so profusely scattered in Greece, were likely to ripen into a new quarrel far more general and important. Philip patiently waited their maturity. His hopes were founded on the domestic animosities of Greece; but the too early discovery of his system might have united an hundred thousand warriors against their common enemy; whereas, by the secret refinements of a slow

* The number is chosen as a very moderate medium between the two hundred and twenty thousand men, afterwards promised to Philip in the general convention of the States at Corinth for the service of the Persian expe-

dition, and the eighty thousand which the Greeks actually raised against Xerxes, and which Thucydides says, that the Peloponnesian confederacy alone could send into Attica.

and steady policy, he effected his vast purposes without being obliged, on any one occasion, to fight against thirty thousand men.

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The Amphiſtyons having recovered their authority in confequence of the events which have formerly been deſcribed, began early to diſplay thoſe dangerous paſſions with which the exerciſe of uncontrouled power too naturally corrupts the heart. They pretended, that during the decline of their juriſdiction, many unwarrantable abuſes had been introduced, which it became them to remedy. The rights of religion (they ſaid) which it was their firſt duty to maintain, had been materially violated by the Phocians, who, alike regardleſs of the deciſion of the oracle, and of an Amphiſtyonic decree, had ploughed lands conſecrated to Apollo, and therefore withdrawn from agriculture¹. Theſe lands, however, were confined to the narrow diſtrict between the river Cephiffus and Mount Thurium, on the weſtern frontier of Bœotia. The crime of the Phocians (if their uſeful labours deſerve the name of crime) was neither great nor unprecedented, ſince the Locrians of Amphiffa had long cultivated the Criſſæan plain; a more extenſive territory, and conſecrated to the god by far more awful ceremonies². But the proud tyranny of the Amphiſtyons, careleſs of ſuch diſtinctions, fulminated an angry decree againſt Phocis, commanding the ſacred lands to be laid waſte, and impoſing a heavy fine on that community.

He carefully watches the imprudent meaſures of the Amphiſtyonic council:

It is believed that the Thebans, the enemies and neighbours of Phocis, and whoſe influence at that time predominated in the council, were the principal abettors of this arbitrary meaſure³; a ſuppoſition rendered probable by the enſuing deliberations of the Amphiſtyons. Their next ſentence was directed againſt Sparta, to puniſh the injury of Phæbidas, who, in time of peace, had ſurprized and ſeized the Theban citadel. This breach of public faith, however criminal and flagrant, had been committed ſo many years be-

which are principally abetted by the Thebans;

¹ See vol. i. c. v. p. 165. ² See vol. i. c. v. p. 163. & ſeqq. ³ Juſtin. l. viii. c. i. & ſeqq.

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fore, that prudence required it to be for ever buried in obscurity. But, at the instigation of the Thebans, the Amphictyons brought it once more to light; commanded the Lacedæmonians to pay a fine of five hundred talents; decreed that the fine should be doubled, unless paid within an appointed time; and if the decree were finally disregarded, that the Lacedæmonians should be treated as public enemies to Greece ⁴.

who excite
the resent-
ment of the
Phocians.
Olymp.
cv. 4.
A. C. 357.

The Phocians, singled out as the first victims of oppression, were deeply affected by their danger. To pay the money demanded of them exceeded their faculties. It would be grievous to desolate the fields which their own hands had cultivated with so much toil. The commands of the Amphictyons were indeed peremptory; but that council had not on foot any sufficient force to render them ineffectual, should the devoted objects of their vengeance venture to dispute their authority. This measure, daring as it seemed, was strongly recommended by Philomelus, whose popular eloquence and valour gave him a powerful ascendant in Phocis. He possessed great hereditary wealth; contemned the national superstition; and being endowed with a bold ambitious spirit, he expected to rise, amidst the tumult of action and danger, to unrivalled pre-eminence in his republic. After repeated deliberations, in which he flattered the vanity, and tempted the avarice of his countrymen, by proving that to them, of right, belonged the guardianship of the Delphian temple, and the immense treasures contained within its sacred walls⁵, he brought the majority of the senate and assembly into his opinion. As the properest instrument to execute his own measures, Philomelus was named general: the Phocian youth flocked to his standard; and his private fortune, as well as the public revenues, were con-

⁴ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxiii. & seqq.

⁵ Philomelus cited the respectable authority of Homer:

Αὐτὰρ Φωκίων Σχιδίος καὶ Ἐπιστροφὸς ἦρχον
ἽΟι Κυπαρισσοὶ ἦρχον Πύθωνα τε Πιττηρῖσσαν

“But Schedius and Epistrophus led the Phocians, who inhabited Cyparissus, and the rocky Python,” the ancient name of Delphi.

fumed in purchasing the mercenary aid of those needy adventurers, who abounded in every province of Greece.

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The following year was employed by Philomelus in providing arms, in exercising his troops, and in an embassy which he undertook in person to Sparta. As that community had not discharged the fine imposed by the Amphictyons, the penalty was doubled, and the delinquents were condemned to pay a thousand talents. The exorbitance of this imposition might have justified the Spartans in following the example of Phocis, and setting the Amphictyons at defiance. But Archidamus, who possessed all the caution and address of his father Agefilaus, was unwilling to take a principal part in the first dangerous experiment, and to post himself in the front of battle, against the revered decrees of an assembly, considered as the legal guardian of national religion and liberty. He assured Philomelus that both himself and the Spartans fully approved his cause; that reasons of a temporary nature hindered their declaring themselves openly, but that he might depend on secret supplies of men and money⁶.

The Phocians under Philomelus prepare for war, and engage the Spartans in their cause. Olymp. cvi. 1. A. C. 356.

Encouraged by this assurance, and by a considerable sum⁷ immediately put into his hands, Philomelus, at his return, ventured on a measure not less audacious than unexpected. The temple of Delphi, so awefully guarded by superstition, was scarcely defended by any military force. Philomelus having prepared the imagination of his followers for this bold enterprise, immediately conducted them towards Delphi, defeated the feeble resistance of the Thracidæ, who inhabited the neighbouring district, and entered the sacred city with the calm intrepidity of a conqueror. The Delphians, who expected no mercy from a man devoid of respect for religion, prepared themselves in silent horror, for beholding the complicated guilt of sacrilege and murder. But the countenance of Philomelus re-assured them, and his discourse totally dispelled their ill-grounded fears.

Philomelus seizes the temple of Delphi. Olymp. cvi. 2. A. C. 355.

⁶ 'Ο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ἀποδίδωμι τοῖς Λατοῖς, φανερὰ. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 426.

⁷ Diodorus says, fifteen talents. Diodor. ibid.

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He declared that he had come to Delphi with no hostile disposition against the inhabitants, with no sacrilegious designs against the temple. His principal motive was to emancipate the one and the other from the arbitrary proceedings of the Amphictyons, and to assert the ancient and unalienable prerogative of Phocis to be the patron and protector of the Delphian shrine. To the same purpose he scattered declarations through the different republics of Greece; his emissaries acquainted the Spartans that he had destroyed the brazen tablets containing the unjust decrees against Sparta and Phocis; they inflamed the resentment of the Athenians, naturally hostile to Thebes; and both those republics came to the resolution of supporting the measures of Philomelus.

Employs the
sacred trea-
sure in rais-
ing mercena-
ries.

The Thebans, on the other hand, who *directed*, and the Locrians, Thessalians, with other states of less consideration, who tamely *obeyed* the decrees of the Amphictyons, determined to take the field in defence of their insulted religion and violated laws. Their operations were conducted with that extreme slowness natural to confederacies. Philomelus acted with more vigour. He received little assistance from his distant allies. But, first, by imposing a heavy tax on the Delphians, who had been enriched by the devotion of Greece, and then, notwithstanding his declaration, by taking very undue liberties with the treasure of Apollo^s, he collected above ten thousand mercenaries, men daring and profligate as himself, who sacrificed all scruples of religion to the hopes of dividing a rich spoil. Such at least was the general character of his followers. To the few who had more piety, or less avarice, he endeavoured to justify his measures by the authority of an oracle. The Pythia at first refused to mount the sacred tripod. Philomelus sternly commanded her. She obeyed with reluctance, observing, that being already master of Delphi, he might act without sanction or con-

^s Diodorus sometimes acknowledges, and sometimes denies, that Philomelus meddled with the sacred treasure.

troul⁹. Philomelus waited for no other answer, but gladly interpreted the words as an acknowledgment of his absolute authority; and, with the address suitable to his situation and character, confirmed the auspicious declaration of the priests by the report of many favourable omens¹⁰.

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Having obtained the supposed sanction of religion, Philomelus proceeded to fortify the temple and city of Delphi, in which he placed a strong garrison; and, with the remainder of his forces, boldly marched forth to repel the incursions of the enemy. During two years, hostilities were carried on with various fortune against the Locrians and Thebans. Victory for the most part inclined to the Phocians; but there happened not any decisive action, nor was the war memorable on any other account but that of the excessive cruelty mutually inflicted and suffered. The Phocian prisoners were uniformly condemned to death, as wretches convicted of the most abominable sacrilege and impiety; and the resentment of their countrymen retaliated with equal severity on the unhappy captives whom the chance of war frequently put into their hands¹¹.

Takes the
field against
the Thebans
and their al-
lies.
Olymp.
cvi. 2.
A. C. 355.

As both armies anxiously expected reinforcements, they were unwilling to risk a general engagement, till chance rendered that measure unavoidable. Entangled among the woods and mountains of Phocis, the conveniency of forage attracted them towards the same point. The vanguards met unexpectedly near the town of Neone, and began to skirmish. A general and fierce action followed, in which the Phocians were repelled by superior numbers. Pathless woods, abrupt rocks and precipices, obstructed their retreat. In vain Philomelus strove with his voice and arm to rally the fugitives. He himself was carried along by the torrent to the brow of a precipice, afflicted with wounds, and still more with anguish and despair.

Philomelus
defeated.
Olymp.
cvi. 4.
A. C. 353.

⁹ Αποφθεγγόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς πρὸς τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς
βιαζομένης “ὅτι ἐξίστην αὐτῷ πρᾶτίν οὐ βούλονται”
Diodor. p. 423.

¹⁰ Diodor. p. 429.

¹¹ Diodor. p. 530, & seqq.

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The enemy advanced; it seemed impossible to escape their vengeance; the resolution of Philomelus was prompt and terrible; with a vigorous bound he sprang from the rock, thus eluding the torment of his own guilty conscience, and the resentment of his pursuers¹². While the Thebans and their allies admired this spectacle, as a manifest indication of divine vengeance¹³, Onomarchus, the lieutenant and brother of the Phocian general, collected and drew off the scattered remains of the vanquished army towards Delphi. The confederates determined to expel them from that holy place, and to inflict on the enemies of Greece and Heaven a punishment similar to that to which the wrath of Apollo had driven the impious Philomelus¹⁴.

The Spartans attempt to recover their dominion in the Peloponnese. Olymp. cvi. 3. A. C. 353.

Different causes concurred to prevent Philip on the one hand, and Athens and Sparta on the other, from taking a principal or early part in the Phocian war. The interested policy of Archidamus, who directed with absolute authority the councils of Sparta, was less solicitous to support the arms of his distant confederates, than ambitious to recover the Lacedæmonian dominion in Peloponnesus. The opportunity seemed favourable for this purpose, the Thebans being deeply engaged in another contest, and the Athenians in strict alliance with Sparta. For several years, the arms and intrigues of Archidamus were employed against the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives. But the design failed of success; the inferior cities of Peloponnesus, roused by a common danger, confederated for their mutual defence; and Athens, though actually the ally of Sparta, was unwilling to abandon to the tyranny of that republic her more ancient and faithful allies, the Arcadians and Messenians¹⁵.

While

¹² Diodorus hints, that, had Philomelus been taken captive, his body would have been shockingly mangled: *φωδμήμενος τῆς ἐκ τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας αἰκίας*. p. 432.

καὶ τῶν τοῦ τροπῶν, δὲς τῷ δαίμονι δικῆς καταστρεφῆς τοῦ σώματος. Diodor. *ibid*.

¹⁴ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 432.

¹⁵ The question appears to have occasioned warm debates in the Athenian assembly:

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Thrace oc-
cupy Philip
and the A-
thenians.

While the politics of the Peloponnesus formed a system apart, the sacred war shook the centre of Greece, and the affairs of Thrace occupied Philip and the Athenians. Cotys was dead; his sons Kerfobleptes, Berisfades, and Amadocus, were all dissatisfied with the partition of his dominions. While their hostilities against each other exhibited the odious picture of fraternal discord, the prizes for which they contended were successively carried off by Philip. The encroachments of that prince at length engaged Kerfobleptes, the most powerful of the co-heirs, to cede the Thracian Chersonesus to the Athenians, who sent Chares with a numerous fleet to take possession of that peninsula. The town of Sestos alone made resistance. It was taken by storm, and treated with great severity by Chares; while Philip besieged and took the far more important city of Methoné in Pieria. In this siege he lost an eye, a loss which he is said to have borne with impatience¹⁶, as the circumstances attending it were alike dishonourable to his judgment and humanity¹⁷.

It appears extraordinary that the Thebans, after the defeat and death of Philomelus, should not have pursued their good fortune, without allowing the enemy time to breathe, and recover strength. They probably imagined that the fatal exit of that daring chief would deter a successor; and that the Phocians would crave peace,

Onomarchus
takes the
command of
the Phocians.
Olymp.
cvi. 4.
A. C. 355.

bly: the Spartan and Arcadian parties were animated with the utmost zeal; and, according to the lively observation of Demosthenes, the Athenian orators, had they not spoke the Attic dialect, would have appeared, the one half Spartans, the other Arcadians. Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 83.

¹⁶ Lucian de Scribend. Hist. p. 365.

¹⁷ These circumstances, however, rest on the authority of Suidas and Ulpian. It is said, that when the arrow was extracted, the following inscription appeared on it: "After to Philip's right eye." After, it seems, had offered his services to Philip, as an excellent marksman; to which Philip replied, that he would employ him when he waged war

with starlings. Philip caused the arrow to be shot back into the place, with a new inscription, "That he would hang up After;" a threat which was executed as soon as he was master of Methoné. Fictions still more incredible were related on this subject by the fabulous writers of the age of Alexander. Philip, it was said, lost his right eye by his unseasonable curiosity in prying into the amours of Olympias and Jupiter Ammon. This ridiculous flattery to Alexander has been so widely diffused, that it was supposed to be the subject represented on the celebrated vase, which is so much better explained by Mr. D'Hancarville. See Recherches sur les Arts de la Grèce, vol. ii.

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if not driven to despair. Such indeed was the resolution of the more respectable part of the Phocians. But the bold, impious, and needy, who composed the most numerous description of that people, were bent on continuing the war. An assembly was convened, when Onomarchus, in a set speech¹⁸, flattered their hopes, and encouraged them to persevere. His opinion prevailed; he was named general; and his conduct soon proved, that he equalled his brother in boldness and ambition, and surpassed him in activity and enterprise. None better knew the power of gold, or had more address in employing it. With the Delphic treasure he coined such a quantity of money as perhaps had never before circulated in Greece. The Phocian army was restored, and augmented; their allies were rendered more hearty in their cause; even their enemies were not proof against the temptations which continually assailed their fidelity. By seasonable bribes, Onomarchus distracted the councils of Thebes, and kept their arms inactive. The neighbouring states were persuaded to observe a neutrality; while the Thessalians, a people at all times noted for avarice and fraud¹⁹, and of whose country the proverb said, that it had never produced a bad horse or an honest man, openly embraced the cause of Phocis.

Success of his
arms.

These multiplied advantages were not allowed to languish in the hands of Onomarchus, who hoped to eclipse the unjust motives of his enterprise by the sudden splendor of victory. At the head of a numerous and well-appointed army, he poured down on Locris and Doris, ravaged the country, took Thronium by storm, laid several cities under contribution, pierced into Bœotia, and made himself master of Orchomenus. The Thebans assembled their forces

¹⁸ Περσισμῶν λόγον διελθών. Diodor. p. 432.

¹⁹ The Thessalians had the same character in Greece, as the Ligurians in Italy.

—— Vane Ligus

.Nequicquam patrias tantâs lubricas artes.

VIRG.

Euripides speaks of the slippery deceits of the Thessalians. Demosthenes (Olynth. i. p. 4. ex edit. Wolf.) says, ἡτα τα τῶν θητταλῶν ταυτα γὰρ ἀπὸ μὲν ἡ δὴ πύθοισι, καὶ ἀπὸ πᾶσι ἀδελφοποις. "Philip was farther distressed by the insurrections of the Thessalians, a people faithless by nature, at all times, to all men."

to stem the torrent. Onomarchus first met with a repulse before the walls of Chæronæa, and ventured not to renew the engagement, having weakened his forces by placing garrisons in the important places which he had taken, as well as by sending a detachment of seven thousand men, under his brother Phayllus, into Thessaly²⁰.

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In that country, the intrigues of Philip had counteracted the gold of Onomarchus. But Lycophron, who was the chief partisan of the latter, and whom Philip had formerly divested of his authority, had again established himself in Pheræ. Pegafæ, Magnesia, and several places of less note, declared for the tyrant, and for Phocis. The Macedonian interest prevailed elsewhere; and the factions were equally balanced, when Philip, with his usual diligence, entered Thessaly, defeated Phayllus, besieged and took Pegafæ, and drove the enemy with disgrace towards the frontier of Phocis. The fear of losing his newly-acquired interest among the Thessalians, made Onomarchus evacuate Bœotia, and advance against Philip with his whole army. The Macedonians, though less numerous, did not decline the engagement. At the first charge the Phocians gave way, and retreated towards the neighbouring mountains. Philip ordered his men to pursue in their ranks. It was then that the Phocians really began the battle. Onomarchus, foreseeing that the Macedonians would follow in close order, had posted a detachment on the summit of the precipice, who were ready, on a given signal, to roll down fragments of rock, and stones of an enormous size, on the embattled phalanx. This was the only mode of attack for which the Macedonians were not prepared. The line of march, in which the moment before they proceeded with such firmness and confidence, was converted into a dreadful scene of carnage and ruin. Before they recovered from their consternation, the flying Pho-

He encounters Philip in Thessaly, and obliges him to retire.

²⁰ Diodor. p. 434.

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Onomarchus
defeated and
slain.

cians, who had decoyed them into this ambush, returned to the charge. Philip, however, rallied his men; and while Onomarchus hesitated to advance, drew them off in good order, saying, that they did not retreat through fear, but retired like rams, in order to strike with the more impetuous vigour²¹.

This saying was finally justified, although the Phocians and Lycophron first enjoyed a short triumph. The tyrant established himself, as he thought, securely, in his native city; the Phocians, reinforced by their Thessalian allies, again invaded Bœotia, assaulted and took Coronæa, and dreadfully alarmed the Thebans, by the devastations committed in the very centre of their territory. But the time of vengeance arrived. Philip having recruited his army, returned into Thessaly. The unsteady partisans of Lycophron, had they determined to share his danger, would have proved unable to support his cause. A considerable portion of the Thessalians received the king of Macedon as their deliverer. Onomarchus, therefore, was obliged to withdraw his forces from Bœotia. At the head of twenty thousand foot, and five hundred horse, he marched to the defence of Lycophron, and was met by the enemy, still more numerous, on the level coast of Magnesia. To remind his soldiers that they fought in the cause of Delphi and of Heaven, Philip crowned their heads with the laurel consecrated to Apollo, and adorned his ensigns and standards with the emblems and attributes of that divinity²². Their onset was impetuous and fierce, and their valour, animated by enthusiasm, rendered them irresistible, though the enemy, conscious of guilt, fought with the fury of despair. Three thousand Thessalian cavalry, who had signally contributed to the victory of Philip, rendered the pursuit bloody and destructive; while the Phocians, having thrown away their armour, fled towards the sea, allured by the sight of the Athenian fleet under Chares,

²¹ Polyæn. Stratag. l. ii. c. xxviii. Diodor. l. xvi. 34, & seqq.

²² Justin. l. viii. 2.

which was returning from the Chersonesus. That commander seems not to have made any attempt to protect them. Above six thousand perished in the battle, or in the pursuit. The body of Onomarchus was found among the slain; Philip ordered it to be hung on a gibbet, as a mark of peculiar infamy; the rest were thrown into the sea, as unworthy, by their impious sacrilege, of the rites of funeral. Three thousand were taken alive; but it is not absolutely certain whether they were drowned, or reduced into captivity; though the latter opinion is the more probable²³.

It might be expected that such a decisive blow should have proved fatal to the Phocians. But Philip, who had conquered them in Thessaly, durst not pursue his advantages by invading Phocia; well knowing, that an attempt to pass the straits of Thermopylae would alarm not only his enemies but his allies. It was his interest to perpetuate dissensions in Greece. For that reason he fomented the discord that reigned among the states of Peloponnesus; and though he had punished the obnoxious Phocians, he was unwilling to terminate a war which diverted the public attention from watching too studiously his own ambitious designs. His victory over an odious enemy extended his just renown. He secured the dominion of Thessaly, by planting garrisons in Phæria, Pegæia, and Magnesia. His army was ready to march towards Greece on the first favourable opportunity; but till that should arrive, he rejoiced to see both divisions of that country involved in war, which allowed

Philip's designs against Olynthus and Byzantium.

²³ The leaving such a circumstance at all doubtful, is very dishonourable to the accuracy of the compiler Diodorus. His words are, τέλος δὲ, τῶν Φωκίων καὶ μισθοφόρων ἀντὶλεῖσαν μενύπαρ τῆς ἑξακισχίλις; ἐν οὗς ἦν καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁ στρατηγός. ἤλωσαν δὲ καὶ ἐκ ἐλατίης τῶν τρισχίλιων. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος τὴν μὲν Ονομάρχῳ ἐκρέμασεν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ὡς ἱεροσύναις κατεπεποιτίει. Literally, "At length above six thousand of the Phocians and mercenaries were, on the one hand, taken up dead, among whom was the general. Not less than three thousand were, on the other

hand, taken prisoners. Philip hung up Onomarchus, and threw the rest into the sea, as guilty of sacrilege." The learned reader will perceive, that I have given the full force of the word ἀντὶλεῖσαι: and from the precise and distinctive force of the particles μεν and δε, which separate the two first clauses of the text, I am of opinion that the τοὺς ἄλλους can apply only to the rest of those who were taken up dead. There is nothing determinate to be learned from the word κατεπεποιτίει, which signifies barely to plunge into the sea.

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him to accomplish, unmolested, the subordinate purposes of his reign. He had long deceived the Olynthians by good offices and promises, but now began to throw off the mask, and to show that he meant to be their master. He actually applied to Kerfobleptes, whom he detached from the interest of Athens; and having raised him on the ruins of the neighbouring chieftains of Thrace, thereby obtained his confidence, and waited an occasion to destroy him with security²⁴. The dominions of that prince opened the way to Byzantium, the possession of which must have early tempted the ambition of Philip, who knew so well to estimate the importance of its situation both in commerce and in war. He began to discover his designs against Byzantium by attacking the fortrefs of Heræum, a place so called from the neighbouring temple of Juno, which formed its principal ornament. The town of Heræum was small, and in itself unimportant; its harbour was dangerous and deceitful; but being situate contiguous to Byzantium, it served as an outwork and defence to that rich and populous city²⁵.

His measures
counteracted
by the Athe-
nians.

The Athenians had sufficient penetration to discern the drift of those enterprises. They formed an alliance with the republic of Olynthus; they warned Kerfobleptes of his danger; they voted a numerous fleet to sail to the defence of Heræum, or rather of Byzantium, with which, though rendered independent of Athens by the social war, they still carried on a lucrative commerce. But these spirited exertions were not of long continuance. Philip's wound at Methoné, together with the continual labour and fatigue to which he had afterwards submitted, threw him into a dangerous malady. The report of his sickness was, before it reached Athens, magnified into his death. The Athenians rejoiced in so seasonable a deliverance, and laying aside their naval preparations, bent their principal attention to the sacred war²⁶.

²⁴ Justin. l. viii. 3. Demost. Olynth. 2 & 3.

²⁵ Idem ibid.

²⁶ Idem, ubi supra.

That unhappy contest was renewed by Phayllus, the last surviving brother of Philomelus and Onomarchus. As his cause became more desperate, Phayllus availed himself to the utmost of the only resource which was left him. Having converted into ready money the most precious dedications of Delphi, he doubled the pay of his mercenaries. This extraordinary encouragement brought new adventurers to his standard, and soon rendered his army equal to that of either of his predecessors. The fugitive Thessalians, assembled in a body by Lycophron, entered into his pay. By means of the Delphic treasure, he acquired, likewise, the public assistance of a thousand Lacedæmonians, two thousand Achæans, five thousand Athenian foot, with four hundred cavalry. These powerful reinforcements enabled the Phocians to take the field with a good prospect of success, and rendered those who had so lately been the objects of pity, again formidable to their enemies²⁷.

Philip, meanwhile, had recovered from his indisposition. The votes and preparations of the Athenians had taught him that his designs could no longer be concealed. He was acquainted with the alliance formed between that republic and Olynthus. His emissaries gave him intelligence of the actual commotions in Greece, where the countenance and assistance of so many powerful states abetted the sacrilege of the Phocians. The occasion required that he should appear in favour of his allies, and in defence of the pious cause which he had formerly maintained with so much glory. His trophies gained over Onomarchus were still fresh and blooming; and not only the Thebans, Dorians, and Locrians, who were principals in the war, but the sincere votaries of Apollo in every quarter of Greece, secretly expected him as their deliverer; while his enemies admired his piety, and trembled at his valour; and as they had been lately amused with the news of his sickness and death, they would now view with religious terror his unexpected appearance at Ther-

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The Phocian, or sacred war, continued by Phayllus. Olymp. cviii. 1. A. C. 332.

Philip, in order to oppose him, marches towards Thermopylæ.

²⁷ Diodor. p. 436.

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mopylæ, to assert the violated rights of the Delphian temple. Such were the hopes and motives on which Philip, at the head of a numerous army, directed his march²⁸ towards those celebrated straits, which we have formerly described, and so often mentioned.

This measure
alarms the
Athenians ;

But the event shewed, that on this occasion he had made a false estimate of the superstition or timidity of the Greeks, and particularly had built too much on the patience and indolence of the Athenians. That people penetrated his designs, and determined to oppose them. Under the veil of religious zeal, they doubted not that he concealed a desire to invade and conquer their country ; and, on the first intelligence of his expedition, their foresight and patriotism represented the Macedonians, Thessalians, and Thebans, pouring down like a destructive inundation, on Attica and Peloponnesus. With an alacrity and ardour, of which there was no recent example in their councils, they flew to arms, launched their fleet, sailed to Thermopylæ, and took possession of the straits²⁹.

who sail to
Thermopy-
læ, and guard
the straits.

Philip re-
tires in dis-
appointment.

Never did Philip meet with a more cruel disappointment, than in being thus anticipated by a people whom he had so often deceived. He retired with deep regret, leaving the Phocian war to be carried on by the Thebans and their allies. Meanwhile, the Athenians placed a guard at Thermopylæ ; and, elated by the first instance of their success against the Macedonian, called an assembly to deliberate on measures proper to restrain his ambition.

Demosthe-
nes's first
appearance
against Phi-
lip.

This assembly is rendered memorable by the first appearance of Demosthenes against Philip, whose measures from this moment he ceased not to watch, and to counteract. Two years before, this illustrious orator, whose works have been more praised than read, and more read than understood, began, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, to appear on the theatre of public life. The Athenians were then involved in the sacred war ; their northern pos-

²⁸ Diodor. I. xvi. p. 437.

²⁹ Demosthen. de Falsa Legat. sect. 29.

essions were continually insulted, plundered, or conquered by Philip; yet in this situation of affairs, the mercenary partisans of that prince, in order to divert the public attention from his too aspiring designs, affected to extend their views to Asia, and to be alarmed by the motions of Artaxerxes Ochus, who was preparing to reduce the rebels of Cyprus, Egypt, and Phœnicia. In every assembly of the people, the creatures of Philip dwelt, with exaggerated terror, on the naval and military preparations of the great king, which they represented as certainly destined to revenge the recent injuries committed by the Athenian troops, under Chares, on the coast of Asia. The trophies of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon, were adorned with all the pomp of eloquence; and the Athenians were exhorted to imitate those memorable exploits of their ancestors in the Persian war, which shed a lustre on all the succeeding periods of their history.

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In this popular enthusiasm joined Isocrates the orator, together with the statesman and general Phocion, two men whose talents and virtues would have done honour to the most illustrious age of the republic. The unblemished integrity of Isocrates, the disinterested poverty of Phocion, afford sufficient proof that neither of these great men were corrupted by Macedonian gold. But they both perceived that the indolence and unsteadiness of Athens were incapable to contend with the unceasing activity of Philip, and both exhorted their countrymen to gain and cultivate the friendship of a prince, against whom they could not make war with any reasonable prospect of success.

Sentiments
of the wisest
Athenians
respecting
this prince.

Isocrates, from the most accurate and extensive survey of the political history of Greece, discovered that a foreign war alone could heal the domestic dissensions which reigned in every quarter of that divided country; and from a thorough knowledge of the inherent defects in the government of Thebes, Athens, and Sparta, he regarded Macedon as the state, and Philip as the general, best entitled;

Those of Isocrates in particular.

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titled, and best qualified, to assume the command of a military expedition into Asia, to revenge ancient wrongs, and to deliver the Grecian colonies from the actual oppression of Barbarians. On this important subject he addressed a discourse to Philip; he repeatedly insisted on the same topic with the Athenians; and it is obscurely related, that on one occasion he reconciled those hostile powers³⁰, and engaged them to concur in this extensive, yet rational scheme of conquest.

The peculiar
views of De-
mosthenes,

The sentiments and views of Demosthenes were equally different from those of Isocrates and Phocion on the one hand, and from those of the infamous hirelings of Philip on the other. None knew better than he did the corruption and degeneracy of his countrymen; but he hoped to rouse them from their lethargy, a design, arduous as it may seem, sometimes effected by his eloquence, the most powerful, glowing, and sublime, ever employed by man; and which, of all men, he had been at most pains to acquire and cultivate³¹. His imagination was filled with the ancient glory of the republic; in the ardour of patriotism he forgot the moderation of philosophy; and while he sternly maintained the prerogatives and pretensions of his country, he would rather have seen Athens defeated at the head of her allies, than victorious under the standard of the Macedonians, or any standard but her own. With such sentiments and character, he was naturally a favourite of the people, and a warm partisan of popular government; while Phocion, like most men of sense and worth in that age, preferred a moderate aristocracy; and Isocrates was inclined to regard a well-regulated monarchy as the best of all governments³².

appear in his
first public
orations.

In his first speeches before the assembly, Demosthenes announced himself as the minister of the people at large, whom he exhorted to awaken from their indolence, and at length to assume

³⁰ See the Life of Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of his works.

³¹ Dionys. Halicarn. & Plut. de Demost.

³² See his Nicocles, Evagoras, &c.

the direction of their own affairs. They had been too long governed by the incapacity of a few ambitious men, to the great detriment and disgrace of the community. First an orator at the head of all, under him a general, abetted by a faction of three or four hundred, availed themselves of the sloth and negligence of a people careless of every thing but pleasure, to domineer in the public councils, and to become masters of the state. From considerations of their present corruption and weakness, as well as of the designs and commotions of neighbouring powers, he advised them to forsake all distant and romantic schemes of ambition; and, instead of carrying their arms into remote countries, to prepare for repelling the attacks that might be made against their own dominions. He insisted earnestly on a better regulation of their finances, on the retrenching of many superfluous branches of expence, and especially on a more equitable repartition of public burdens, in proportion to the fortunes of individuals; which, though the income of the state had dwindled to four hundred talents, were actually more considerable than at any former period. While the rich cheerfully paid their contributions, the poor must be willing to forego the burdensome gratuities which they derived from the treasury; and all must be ready to take the field in person, that the public service might be no longer betrayed, or disgraced, by strangers and mercenaries³³.

C H A P.
XXXIV.

Subsequent events justified the opinions, and enforced the counsels of Demosthenes. The Athenians were delivered from their ill-grounded fears of Artaxerxes Ochus, when they beheld the preparations of that monarch directed against his rebellious subjects. The encroachments of Philip became continually more daring and more formidable; and his recent attempts to seize the straits of Thermopylæ shewed the necessity of opposing him with re-united vigilance and vigour.

His first Philip.
Philip.

³³ Vid. Oration. de Claëbus, & de Ordinand. Republic.

C H A P.
XXXIV.

In this juncture, so favourable to awakening the activity of Athens, Demosthenes mounted the rostrum³⁴ before any other orator, apologising for this forwardness in a man not yet thirty years of age, by observing, "That already the usual speakers had given their opinions on the subject of Philip; and that, had *their* advices been useful and practicable, they must have precluded the necessity of any farther deliberation. First of all, Athenians! you ought not to despair; no! not although your affairs seem indeed involved in equal confusion and danger. For the same circumstance which is the cause of your past misfortunes, ought to furnish the source of your present hope. What is that? Your own negligence and sloth, not the power of your enemies, have disordered the state. Had your distress arisen, notwithstanding your utmost care to prevent it, there would then be little hope of relief. But since it is occasioned by your own misconduct, you need only repair your errors, in order to retrieve your affairs. Considering the weakness of Athens, thus despoiled of her dominions, and the strength of Philip, which has increased immoderately at our expence, should you think him a formidable enemy, you doubtless think aright. Yet reflect, Athenians, that there was a time when we possessed Pydna, Potidæa, Methoné, and all the surrounding territory; that the nations in that neighbourhood, now subject to Philip, were then independent, and preferred the alliance of Athens to that of Macedon. In the infancy of his fortune, had Philip reasoned timidly, as we do now, 'How shall I, destitute of allies, attack the Athenians, whose garrisons command my frontier?' he would not have engaged in those enterprises which have been crowned with such signal success, nor raised his kingdom to such an unexampled pitch of grandeur. No, Athenians! he knew well, that towns and fortresses are but prizes of

³⁴ I have used that word, because adopted or gallery appropriated to the speakers in the in our language to express the βουλευτήριον, pulpit Athenian assembly.

skill and valour³⁵ proposed to the combatants, and belong of right to the conqueror; that the dominions of the absent are seized by those who take the field, and the possessions of the negligent and slothful by the vigilant and intrepid. Guided by these principles, he has subdued, and governs all; holding some communities by right of conquest, and others under the title of allies; for allies no prince nor state can want, who are not wanting to themselves. But should you, Athenians, imitate the example of Philip, and at length rousing from your lethargy, apply seriously to your interest, you would speedily recover those advantages which your negligence only has lost. Favourable occasions will yet occur; for you must not imagine that Philip, like a god, enjoys his prosperity for ever fixed and immutable³⁶. No, Athenians! there are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among those seemingly the most devoted to his cause. These are universal passions from which the allies of Macedon are not, surely, exempted. They have hitherto concealed them, finding no resource in you; but it depends on your councils to call them into action. When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigour? when roused by some event? when urged by some necessity? What can be more urgent than the present juncture? To freemen, the most necessary of all motives is the shame of misconduct. Or say, will it still be your sole business to saunter in the public place, enquiring after news? What can be more new, than that a Macedonian should conquer Athens, and enslave Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but in great danger. How are you concerned in these rumours? What matters

³⁵ Ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὡ ἀνδρες ἀθηναῖοι, τὸτο καλῶς ἐκεί-
νος, ὅτι ταῦτα μὴ εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ χρόνια ἀλλὰ τῇ
πόλει κερμενὰ ἐν μέσῳ. In ancient times the
figure had more force, as well as dignity;
because at the Olympic, and other sacred
games, the spectators were used to behold
the prizes proposed to the victors, κέρμενα ἐν
μέσῳ, exposed in the middle of the field, to

excite their emulation and ardour. See vol. i.
c. v.

³⁶ The original is inimitable: μὴ γὰρ ὥς
θεὸς νομίζεται ἐκείνῳ τὰ παρὸντα πειρησιαί πρῶτα
ἀβυσσάτα. Join the τὰ and the πρῶτα, the
article and the substantive, and the charm
will be dissolved.

C H A P.
XΛΛΙΥ.

Measures
proposed by
Demosthenes
for resisting
Philip.

it to you whether he is sick or dead, since, if you thus manage your affairs, your folly will soon raise up another Philip³⁷?"

After this animated remonstrance, Demosthenes proposes a plan of operations calculated chiefly for defence. The Athenians, he observes, were not yet prepared to meet Philip in the field. They must begin by protecting Olynthus, and the Chersonesus, from his incursions. For this purpose it was necessary, to raise a body of two thousand men light-armed, and an adequate proportion of cavalry, which were to be transported under a proper convoy (as Philip had his fleet), with all expedition to the isles of Lemnos, Thasos, and Sciathe, contiguous to the coast of Macedon. Conveniently posted in those islands, where they would enjoy necessaries in abundance, the Athenian troops might avail themselves of every favourable incident, to appear at the first summons of their allies, and either to repel the inroads of the Macedonians, or to harass the extended, and, in many parts, defenceless territory of that people. Meanwhile, preparations would be made at home for carrying on the war in due time, with more numerous forces, and with greater vigour. Such moderate proposals prove that Demosthenes well understood the genius of his countrymen. He required that only the fourth part of the troops should consist of Athenian citizens, and the immediate supplies were only to amount to ninety talents. He knew that higher demands would alarm their indolence and love of pleasure; and so fatally were they sunk in the dissipated amusements of the city, that it is probable the small armament proposed did not actually set sail; it is certain that no future preparations were made adequate to the public service.

Philip affects
to lay aside
his ambition.

The profound policy of Philip fostered the supine negligence of his enemies. For more than two years after his retreat from Ther-

³⁷ The sense indeed of that period, but neither its force nor its harmony, can be translated. Τὸντοι Φιλίππον; ἢ μὴ οὐ! ἀλλ' ἀσθενῶν τι δὲ ὕμιν διαφέρει; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς τι παῖδι,

ταχέως ὅμως ἵπτεον Φιλίππον ποιεῖται, αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀποτρέφει τῆς πράξεως. οὐκ οὐδ' ἂν γὰρ ὅτις παρὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ γῆρας τὸ σῶμα ἐκτείνεται, ὅσον παρὰ τὴν ὑμῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

mopyla, that crafty prince much confined himself to his dominions, and chiefly to his capital, anxious to dissipate the clamour occasioned by his too great precipitation to seize the gates of Greece. In that interval he indeed made an expedition to chastise the rebellious spirit of the Thessalians. But the greatest part of his time was spent at Pella, and addicted to the arts of peace, which he judged with skill, and encouraged with munificence. That favourite city was adorned with temples, theatres, and porticoes. The most ingenious artists of Greece were summoned, by liberal rewards, to the court of Macedonia³⁸; and men of talents³⁹ and genius, who were too often exposed to envy and persecution in the former country, were received with open arms by a prince, who, amidst the tumult of war, assiduously cultivated the studies of literature and eloquence. In his domestic government, Philip administered justice with impartiality, listened with condescension to the complaints of his meanest subjects, and disdaining the ceremonious and forbidding pomp of tyranny, maintained an intercourse of visits and entertainments with his courtiers and generals⁴⁰.

C H A P.
XXXIV.

His occupation during a long residence at Pella.
A. C. 330,
& 349.

In a prince so respectably employed, it is difficult to conceive the odious and detestable vices with which Philip is upbraided by Demosthenes⁴¹; yet the brief descriptions occasionally sketched by the orator, are filled up by an ancient historian, who represents the infamies of the life of Philip in language well fitted to arraign the horrors of Nero or Heliogabalus. Could we believe the acrimony of Theopompus, a writer who flourished in the age of Alexander, by whom he was rewarded and honoured, not perhaps the less willingly because he had exposed or exaggerated the vices of his father, Philip sullied his great actions by the most enormous and detestable crimes.

His vices;

³⁸ Justin. l. viii. c. 3.

³⁹ Among other Greeks, who lived at Philip's court were, Leosthenes the orator, Ncoptolemus the poet, Aridodemus and Syrus, celebrated players. *Ætchin. & Democrit. passim.*

⁴⁰ Plut. in Apophth. & in Demosthen. & Alexand.

⁴¹ Vid. Demosthen. ex edit. Wolf. pp. 5, 8, 48, 66, &c.

But in whatever manner Philip employed his private hours, he at no time lost sight of those great principles of policy which regulated his public administration. Under pretence of wanting money to supply the expence of his buildings, and other public works, he employed an expedient which is well known in latter times, and which has been carried to such excess as threatens the safety of those governments which it was intended to uphold. The letting loose of the Delphic treasures had diffused near a million sterling over Greece⁴³. The unsettled state of that country rendered those who had acquired wealth, very uncertain of enjoying it. With the rich and avaricious, Philip employed proper agents to take up ⁴⁴ money at high interest, which procured him two advantages of a very important kind, the attaching to his government and person a numerous and powerful band of creditors; and the enabling him to pay, under the title of debts, and therefore, without suspicion, the various pensions and gratuities by which he maintained his influence among the orators and leading men in the several republics.

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XXXIV.
and policy.

⁴³ The Sacred War lasted ten years, and cost the Phocians ten thousand talents, near two millions; it had already lasted five years, and may be supposed to have cost near the half of that sum. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 455. He says, that the gold and silver dedications (which were coined into money) ὑπερβαλλόντα

μυρία ταλάντων, "exceeded ten thousand talents;" a prodigious sum (considering the relative value of money in those days), of which the sudden diffusion could not fail to produce most important consequences.

⁴⁴ Justin. viii. 3.

C H A P. XXXV.

Negligence and Licentiousness of the Athenians.—Philip's Intrigues in Eubœa.—Phocion defeats the Macedonians and Eubœans.—Philip invades the Olynthian Territory.—Demosthenes's Orations in favour of the Olynthians.—Expedition of Chares.—Philip takes Olynthus.—Celebrates the Festival of the Muses at Dium.—Commits naval Depredations on Attica.—His Embassy to Athens.—The Athenian Embassy to Philip.—Character of the Ambassadors.—Their Conference with the King.—Differently reported to the Senate and Assembly.—Philip's Conquests in Thrace.—The Phocian War.—Negotiations.—Philip's Intrigues.—Decree of the Amphictyons against Phocis.—Executed by Philip.—Macedon acknowledged the principal Member of the Amphictyonic Council.

C H A P.
XXXV.

Negligence
and licen-
tiousness of
the Athe-
nians.
Olymp.
cvii. 4.
A. C. 349.

THE Athenians, deceived by the inactivity of the king of Macedon, indulged themselves, without reserve, in their favourite amusements. Their confederates, the Phocians, were abandoned; the war with Philip, in which they might well have considered themselves as principals, was neglected. Magistrates and people seemed only attentive to regulate public festivals and processions, and to ascertain the respective merit of dramatic poets and performers. The fund originally intended for the exigencies of

of war, had already been appropriated to the theatre; and a law was now enacted, on the motion of Eubulus, an artful flatterer of the multitude, rendering it a capital crime to propose altering this unexampled and most whimsical destination. It was in vain for Demosthenes to resist the popular torrent. He was opposed and overcome by Eubulus and Demades, the latter of whom, with talents that might have adorned his country, condescended to sell its interests to the public enemy.

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XXXV.

Born in the lowest condition of life, Demades retained the vices of his birth; and always discovered that sordid spirit, and weltered in those brutal excesses, which betray the want of early culture. Yet the acuteness of his apprehension, the strength of his reason and memory, and, above all, the bold and copious flow of his unpremeditated eloquence, in which he was allowed to excel even Demosthenes^{*} himself, raised him to a conspicuous rank in the assembly; and it being his business, as the hireling of Philip, to sail along with the stream of popular frenzy, which the patriotism of his rival endeavoured to struggle with, and to stem, he possessed a free and ample scope for exercising his abilities.

Justified by
Demades.

The people of Athens triumphed in the victory of perfidious demagogues over the wisest and best of their fellow-citizens, or rather over the laws and constitution of their country, when Philip began to play those batteries which he had patiently raised with such skill and secrecy. The island of Eubœa, which he called the fetters of Greece, was the first object of his attack. Since the expulsion of the Thebans, of which we have formerly taken notice, the Athenians had preserved their interest in the island, where they maintained a small body of troops. The different cities, however, enjoyed the independent government of their own laws; they appointed their own magistrates; they sometimes made war against

Philip's intrigues in
Eubœa.
Olymp.
cvii. 4.
A. C. 349.

^{*} Plutarch. in Demosthen.

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Danger to
which the
Athenian in-
terest in that
island was
exposed;

from which
they are ex-
tricated by
Phocion.

each other; and separately assumed the prerogatives of free and sovereign states, while they all collectively acknowledged their dependence on Athens. Such political arrangements made room for the intrigues of Philip. He fomented their civil discord; gained partisans in each city; and, at length, under colour of protecting his allies, landed several Macedonian battalions in the island².

Matters were soon disposed to his wish. The Macedonians were allowed to occupy the most advantageous posts. The Athenian party exclaimed and threatened; but Plutarch, the leader of that party, was gained to the interests of Philip, and demanded auxiliaries from Athens, only to betray them into the hands of their enemies. Demosthenes, who alone penetrated this dark scheme of villainy, entreated and conjured his countrymen to put no confidence in Plutarch. But he was single in his opinion. The confidants of Philip were true to their master, and therefore urged the expedition. The friends of their country were eager to save the isle of Eubœa, and the capricious multitude, ever in extremes, rushed with as much impetuosity to an enterprise intended for their ruin, as they had long shewn backwardness to engage in every other³. The promptitude and vigour of their preparations much exceeded the expectation, and even alarmed the fears, of the Macedonian faction. But the latter had gone too far to retreat; nor could they foresee the consequences that happened, so contrary to their hopes. The Athenians, in fact, obtained a decisive victory, not by the strength of their arms, which was inferior to the enemy's, but by the wise choice of a general.

The consummate prudence of Phocion, who, on his arrival in Eubœa, found things in a worse state than had been represented, risked no chance of defeat, and lost no opportunity of advantage⁴. Having chosen a favourable post, which was on all sides surrounded by broken and uneven ground, he despised the clamours of his men,

² Æschin. in Ctesiphont. & Demosth. de Falsa Legation. & de Pace.

³ Demosth. de Pace.

⁴ Plutarch. in Phocion.

and the insults of the enemy. The treacherous Plutarch was quickly defeated in a mock battle, in which he fell back on the Athenian cavalry, who fled in disorder to the camp of Phocion. The Eubœans and Macedonians pursued with a rash and intemperate ardour; and, elated with victory, and confident in their superior numbers, prepared to assail the camp. The general, meanwhile, performed a sacrifice, which he studiously prolonged, either from religion or policy, until he beheld the disorder of the assailants, embarrassed by the unequal ground, and by their own rashness. He then commanded his men to stand to their arms, and falling from his entrenchments with intrepid valour, increased the confusion of the enemy, who were repelled with great slaughter towards the plain which they had at first occupied. The activity of Cleophanes, who had rallied and formed the Athenian cavalry, rendered the victory complete. The remains of the vanquished took refuge in the fortress of Zeratra, in the northern corner of the island, which, being attacked, made a feeble resistance⁵. The garrison surrendered; but Phocion restored all the Eubœans to liberty, left the people of Athens, inflamed by their popular leaders, might treat them with that cruelty, which, on a similar occasion, they had inflicted on the rebellious citizens of Mitylené⁶. Having spent a few weeks in settling the affairs of the island, he returned in triumph to Athens, his ships drawn up in line of battle, their stems crowned with garlands, and the rowers keeping time to the sound of martial music. His fellow-citizens received him with acclamations of joy; but their imprudence did not allow them to reap the fruits of his success. Molossus, an obscure stranger, was appointed, by cabal, to command the troops left in the island; and Philip, having renewed his intrigues, carried them on with the same dexterity, and met with better success⁷.

He defeats
the Macedo-
nians and
Eubœans.

⁵ Plut. in Phocion.

⁷ Plut. in Phocion.

⁶ See above, vol. i. c. xvi. pp. 537, & seqq.

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XXXV.

Opposite be-
haviour of
Demosthenes
and Æschines
in the
bat. 16.

It is worthy of attention, that Demosthenes followed the standard of Phocion to Eubœa, though he had strongly disapproved the expedition. Both he and his rival Æschines, of whom we shall soon have occasion to speak more fully, served in the cavalry. Demosthenes was reproached with being the first who deserted his rank, and among the last who returned to the charge. Æschines behaved with distinguished gallantry, and had the honour of being appointed by Phocion to carry home the first intelligence of the victory⁷.

Philip in-
vades the ter-
ritory of
Olynthus.
Olymp.
cvi. 4.
A. C. 349.

Philip's disappointment in Eubœa only stimulated his activity. His toils were spread so widely all around him, that when one part failed he could catch his prey in another. The Olynthians, against whom he seemed to have long forgotten his resentment, were astonished to observe that several of their citizens grew rich and great in a manner equally sudden and unaccountable; that they enlarged their possessions, built stately palaces, and displayed a degree of magnificence and grandeur hitherto unknown in their frugal republic. The unexpected invasion of Philip revealed the mystery. A considerable party had grown wealthy by betraying the secrets, exposing the weakness, and fostering the ill-timed security of their country⁸. Their influence at home had recommended them to Philip, and the wages of their iniquity had increased that influence. It would not probably have been difficult to prove their treason, but it seemed dangerous to punish it; and the Olynthians were more immediately concerned to repel the open ravagers of their territory. In this emergency they trusted not to their domestic forces of ten thousand foot and one thousand horse⁹, but sent an embassy to Athens, inveighing in the strongest terms against Philip, who had first courted, then deceived, and at last invaded and attacked them; and craving assistance from the Athenians, in consequence of the al-

The Olyn-
thians im-
plore the aid
of Athens.

⁷ Æschin. de Falsa Legatione, & Demost. in Midiam.

⁸ Demosthen. Olynth. passim.

⁹ Demosth. de Falsa Legatione.

liance formerly concluded between the two republics, to defeat the designs of a tyrant equally daring and perfidious.

Had the people of Athens heartily undertaken the cause of Olynthus, Philip would have been exposed a second time to the danger which he had eluded with so much address in the beginning of his reign. Thebes was employed and exhausted in the Phocian war; the grandeur of Sparta had decayed as much as her principles had degenerated; the inferior states extended not their views of policy beyond their respective districts. But the Athenians, recently successful in Eubœa, and reinforced by the strength and resentment of such a republic as Olynthus, might have still rendered themselves formidable to the public enemy, especially as at this juncture the rebellious humours of the Thessalians broke out afresh, and led them capriciously to oppose, with as much eagerness as they had often helped to promote, the interest of Macedon. But to compensate these unpromising circumstances, Philip possessed strenuous abettors of his power within the walls of Athens and Olynthus; and his garrisons actually commanded the principal posts in Thessaly. Above all, the indolence and vices of his enemies were most favourable to his cause. The late success in Eubœa, which should have animated a brave and generous people to new exertions and dangers, only plunged the Athenians into a slothful security. While they enjoyed their theatrical entertainments, their shows and festivals, and all the ease and luxury of a city life, they were little inclined to engage in any enterprise, that might disturb the tranquil course of their pleasures. In this disposition they were encouraged by their perfidious orators, who strongly exhorted them to beware of involving themselves in the danger of Olynthus, or of provoking the resentment of a prince whose power they were unable to resist. The orator Demades particularly distinguished his zeal in the Macedonian interest; advising an absolute and total rejection of the demands of the Olynthian ambassadors.

State of
parties in
Athens.

Demosthenes

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First oration
of Demosthe-
nes in favour
of the
Olynthians.

Demosthenes at length arose, and as the design of calling the assembly had been already explained, entered immediately on the question under deliberation. "On¹⁰ many occasions, Athenians! have the gods declared their favour to this state, but never more manifestly than in the present juncture. That enemies should be raised to Philip, on the confines of his territory, enemies not contemptible in power, and, which is more important, so determined on the war, that they regard every accommodation with Macedon, first as insidious, next as the destruction of their country, can be ascribed to nothing less than the bountiful interposition of heaven. With every thing else on our side, let us not be wanting to ourselves; let us not be reproached with the unspeakable infamy of throwing away, not only those cities and territories which we inherited from our ancestors, but those occasions and alliances offered us by fortune and the gods. To insist on the power and greatness of Philip belongs not to the present subject. He has become great through your supine neglect, and the perfidy of traitors whom it becomes you to punish. Such topics are not honourable for you: I wave them as superfluous, having matter more material to urge. To call the king of Macedon perjured and perfidious, without proving my assertions, would be the language of insult and reproach. But his own actions, and not my resentment, shall name him; and of these I think it necessary to speak for two reasons; first, that he may appear, what he really is, a wicked man; and, secondly, that the weak minds who are intimidated by his power and resources, may perceive that the artifices to which he owes them are now all exhausted, and that his ruin is at hand. As to myself, Athenians! I should not only fear

¹⁰ I mean not a translation of Demosthenes. The inserting his speeches entire would destroy the humble uniformity of this historical work, with the design of which it would be inconsistent to transcribe what the orator found it necessary to say, repeat, and enforce so often. Besides, Demosthenes is

one of the few Greek writers that has been translated, as the late Mr. Harris says in his Philosophical Enquiries, by competent persons: Drs. Leland and Francis, in English; Mr. Tourneil and the Abbé Auger, in French; and the Abbé Cesaïotti, in Italian.

but admire Philip, had he attained his present height of grandeur by honourable and equitable means. But after the most serious examination I find, that at first he seduced our simplicity by the flattering promise of Amphipolis; that he next surpris'd the friendship of Olynthus by the deceitful gift of Potidæa; that, lastly, he enslaved the Theſſalians, under the specious pretence of delivering them from tyrants. In one word, with what community hath he treated which hath not experienced his fraud? Which of his confederates hath he not shamelessly betrayed? Can it be expected, then, that those who promoted his elevation, because they thought him *their* friend, will continue to support it, when they find him a friend to his own interest alone? Impossible! When confederacies are formed on the principles of common advantage and affection, each member shares the toils with alacrity; all persevere; such confederacies endure. But when worthlessness and lawless ambition have raised a single man, the slightest accident overthrows the unstable edifice of his grandeur. It is not, No! Athenians! it is not possible to found a lasting power on treachery, fraud, and perjury. These may succeed for a while; but time reveals their weakness. For, as in a house, a ship, and in structures of every kind, the foundation and lower parts should be firm and solid, so the grounds and principles of actions should be just and true. But such qualities belong not to the actions of Philip."

"I am of opinion, then, that fearless of consequences, you ought to assist Olynthus with the utmost celerity and vigour, and to dispatch an embassy to the Theſſalians, to inflame their hostility.

"The important, though trite proverb, that in public, as well as in private transactions, "honestly is the best policy," was never expressed, perhaps, with such dignity, as in the following words of Demosthenes:

ἵπαι μιν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνίκας τὰ πρᾶγματα οὐκ, καὶ πασι ταῦτα συμφέρει· ἢ μὴ τιχῶσι τὴ πόλιν, καὶ συμποιοῦν, καὶ φέρει τὰς συμφέρας, καὶ μὴ ἐβλάσκει δι' ἀλλήλους. οὐδὲ ἐκ πλεονεξίας τι, ἀλλὰ ἕως ἰσχυρὸν, ἢ πρώτη περὶ φασί, καὶ μικρὸν πταίσμα ἀτακτα ἀντιπρᾶσι, καὶ διαλύσει, ἢ γὰρ ἐστὶ, ὡ ἀλλοί, Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑποσχεῖσθαι καὶ ψευδόμενοι,

δεικνύν βίβλια κησασθαι· ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ μὴ ἀπαξ, καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον, αὐτεῖσι καὶ σφιδά γι' ἡβῶσι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἀν' ἑαυτῇ τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φασί, καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ καταρτίζονται, ὥστε γὰρ οἰκίας, οἰμαί, καὶ πλοῦς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰσχυρότητα εἶναι δι, ὅτι καὶ τὸν πρᾶξιν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀληθείας καὶ δικαίας εἶναι προσηνέ· τὸν δὲ ἐκ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐν ταῖς πεπραγμέναις Φιλίππῳ. Demosthen. Olynth. i. or Olynth. ii. p. 7th, in the common but incorrect edition of Wolfius.

But

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But take care, Athenians! that your ardour evaporate not in resolutions and decrees. Be ready to pay your contributions; prepare to take the field; show yourselves in earnest, and you will soon discover not only the hollow faith of the allies of Philip, but the internal and concealed infirmity of Macedon itself. That kingdom has emerged from obscurity amidst the contests of neighbouring states, during which the smallest weight, put into either scale, is sufficient to incline the balance. But, in itself, Macedon is inconsiderable and weak, and its real weakness is increased by the splendid, but ruinous expeditions of Philip. For the king and his subjects are actuated by very different sentiments. Domineered by ambition, he disregards ease and safety; but his subjects, who individually have little share in the glory of his conquests, are indignant, that, for the sake of one man, they should be harassed by continual warfare, and withdrawn from those occupations and pursuits, which afford the comforts and happiness of private life. On the great body of his people, Philip, therefore, can have no reliance; nor, whatever may be said of their valour and discipline, can he depend more on his mercenaries. For I am informed, by a man of undoubted veracity, who has just arrived from Macedon, that none of Philip's guards, even those whom he treats with the affectionate, but deceitful names of companions, and fellow-soldiers, can merit his esteem, without incurring his hatred and persecution. Such is the intolerable jealousy, such the malignant envy, which crowns the other odious vices of this monster, who, defying every sentiment of virtue and decency, drives from his presence all who shudder, all who are disgusted, at the most unnatural enormities, and whose court is continually crowded by buffoons, parasites, obscene poets, and drunkards; wretches who, when drunk, will dance, but such dances¹² as modesty dare not name. Slight and trivial as these matters may

¹² The πορδαρισμοί. Demosth. p. 8. Vid. it appears that Demosthenes's delicacy was Schol. ad Aristoph. in nubib. From the description above given of Athenian manners, merely complimentary.

to some appear, they exhibit the worthlessness of Philip, and announce the infelicity which awaits him. The dangerous defects of his character are hid in the blaze of prosperity¹³; but when misfortune happens, his native deformity will appear. For it is easy to prove that, as in the bodily frame, men, during the season of health, are insensible of what is weak and disordered in their constitutions, which imperfections are immediately felt on the first approach of sickness; so the glory of foreign conquest conceals the vices and defects of republics and monarchies; but let calamity happen, let the war be carried to their frontiers, and those hitherto latent evils immediately become manifest.

“If there is a man among you, Athenians! who thinks that Philip is a formidable enemy, because he is fortunate, I agree with that man. Fortune¹⁴ has a mighty influence, or rather Fortune alone domineers in human affairs. Yet could you be persuaded to do but the smallest part of your duty, I would greatly prefer your fortune to Philip’s; for *you*, surely, have better reason to trust in the assistance of Heaven. But we remain, I think, inactive, hesitating, delaying, and deliberating, while our enemy takes the field, braving seasons and dangers, and neglecting no opportunity of advantage. And if the indolent and careless are abandoned by their best friends, can we expect that the gods, however favourable, should assist us, if we will not help ourselves?”

The people of Athens, animated to their duty, on the one hand, by Demosthenes, and seduced, on the other, by the hirelings of Philip¹⁵ and their own deceitful passions, imprudently steered a middle course, which, in public affairs, is often the most dangerous. Convinced that the preservation of Olynthus was the best safeguard

The extravagant expedition of Chares.

¹³ Secundæ res mirè sunt vitii obtentui. the dispensations of Providence; and, by good Fortune, the Favour of Heaven.

¹⁴ From what is said below, it appears that, by Fortune, Demosthenes here means . monium.

¹⁵ Philochorus in Dionys. Epist. ad Am-

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of Attica, yet, unwilling to tear themselves from their beloved pleasures, they determined to send Chares, with a fleet and two thousand mercenaries, to the assistance of their allies. This commander, who was the idol of the multitude, but the disgrace of his country and of his profession¹⁶, shewed no solicitude to protect the dependencies of Olynthus, which successively submitted to the Macedonian arms. To gratify the rapacity of his troops, he made a descent on the fertile coast of Pallené, where, falling in with eight hundred men commanded by Audæus, called the friends of Philip, he obtained over those contemptible cowards an easy and ludicrous victory, which served only to amuse the comic poets of the times. Having gained this advantage, Chares became unwilling to try his fortune in any severer conflict; and disdainingly, as he affected, to follow the motions of Philip, returned home, and celebrated his triumph over the vain, boastful, and voluptuous Audæus¹⁷; not, however, with the spoils of the vanquished, but with the sum of sixty talents, which he had extorted from the Phocians, who were actually in alliance with Athens¹⁸.

Philip be-
sieves Olyn-
thus.

The thoughtless multitude, who judged of the expedition of Chares by the expensive pomp with which he entertained them at his return, talked extravagantly of invading Macedon, and chastising the insolence of Philip¹⁹, when a second embassy arrived from Olynthus. The inhabitants of this place had been shut up within their walls; they had lost Stagyra, Miciberna, Toroné, cities of considerable strength, besides many inferior towns, which, on the first appearance of Philip, were forward to receive his bribes, and to open their gates²⁰; and this shameful venality, in places well provided for defence, made the king of Macedon observe to his generals, that he would thenceforth consider no fortress as impregnable, which

¹⁶ Timotheus said of him, "that he was fitter to carry the baggage, than to command an army." Plut. in Apophth. nicknamed ἀλεκτρον, the cock. Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. ¹⁸ Athenæus, *ibid*.

¹⁷ Among his contemporaries, he was

¹⁹ Demosthen. Olynth. ii.
²⁰ Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 450.

could

could admit a mule laden with money²¹. Dejected by continual losses, the Olynthians turned their thoughts to negotiation, that they might at least amuse the invader till the arrival of the Athenian succours. Philip penetrated their design, and dexterously turned their arts against them; affecting to lend an ear to their proposals, but meanwhile continuing his approaches, till, having got within forty stadia of their walls, he declared that of two things one was necessary, either *they* must leave Olynthus, or *he* Macedon²². This explicit declaration from an enemy, who often flattered to destroy, but who might always be believed when he threatened, convinced the Olynthians of what they had long suspected, that their utter ruin was at hand. They endeavoured to retard the fatal moment by a vigorous sally, in which their cavalry, commanded by Apollonides, particularly signalised their valour²³. But they were repulsed by superior numbers, and obliged to take refuge in the city.

In this posture of affairs, the ambassadors sailed for Athens; and having arrived there, found, to their utter astonishment, the multitude still enjoying the imaginary triumph of Chares. This commander, who chiefly owed his credit to the ascendant of superficial qualities over the undiscerning folly of the people, was a warm and active partisan of democracy, and as such viewed, even by Demosthenes, with too partial eyes. The orator, besides, well knew that the irregular, useless, or destructive operations of the Athenian arms ought not always to be charged on the misconduct of the general. The troops were always ill paid; sometimes not paid at all; and therefore disobedient and mutinous. Instead of submitting to controul, they often controuled their leaders; their resolutions were prompt and ungovernable; when they could not persuade they

Second embassy to Athens.

²¹ Plutarch. Diodorus, p. 451, relates the matter somewhat differently. But he acknowledges that the king of Macedon boasted that he had augmented his dominions more by gold than by arms. Diodorus, p. 450.

²² Demosthen. Philipp. iii.

²³ Id. *ibid*.

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The demands of the Olynthians again enforced by Demosthenes.

threatened ; and compelled even prudent commanders to measures wild, ruinous, and dishonourable.

Demosthenes, therefore, who again undertook to second the demands of Olynthus, waved all accusation against particular persons. After endeavouring to repress the vain confidence of his countrymen, which had been excited by the supposed advantages of Chares, and the venal breath of corrupt orators, he describes the real danger of their allies, which he persuades them to regard as their own. The crisis was now arrived ; and if they neglected the present opportunity of fulfilling their engagements to Olynthus, they must soon be obliged to meet Philip in Attica. He reminds them of the various occasions, which they had already lost, of repelling this rapacious tyrant, this hostile barbarian, this mixture of perfidy and violence, for whom he cannot find any name sufficiently reproachful. “ But some perhaps will say, it is the business of a public speaker to advise, not to upbraid. We wish to assist the Olynthians, and we will assist them ; but inform us how our aid may be rendered most effectual. Appoint magistrates, Athenians ! for the inspection of your laws ; not to enact new laws ; they are already too numerous ; but to repeal those whose ill effects you daily experience ; I mean the laws relating to the theatrical funds (thus openly I declare it), and some about the soldiery. By the first the soldier’s pay is consumed, as theatrical expences, by the useless and inactive ; the second screen from justice the coward who declines the service, and damp the ardour of the brave who would be ready to take the field. Till these laws be repealed, expect not that any man will urge your true interest, since his honest zeal must be repaid with destruction.” After insisting still farther on this delicate and dangerous subject, Demosthenes probably observed displeasure and resentment in the countenances of his hearers, and then (as his custom was) artfully turning the discourse : “ I speak thus, not with a view to give offence,
for

for I am not so mad as without necessity to offend; but because I think it the duty of a public speaker to prefer your interest to your pleasure. Such were the maxims and conduct (you yourselves know it) of those ancient and illustrious orators whom all unite to praise, but none venture to imitate; of the virtuous Aristides, of Nicias, of Pericles, and of him whose name²⁴ I bear. But since ministers have appeared who dare not address the assembly, till they have first *consulted* you about the *counsels* which they ought to give, who ask, as it were, What shall I propose? What shall I advise? In what, Athenians! can I do you pleasure? the sweet draught of flattery has concealed a deadly poison; our strength is enervated, our glory tarnished, the public beggared and disgraced, while those smooth-tongued declaimers have acquired opulence and splendour²⁵. Consider, Athenians! how briefly the conduct of your ancestors may be contrasted with your own; for if you would pursue the road to glory and happiness, you need not foreign instructors: it will be sufficient to follow the example of those from whom you are descended. The Athenians of former times, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence to which you are accustomed, held, with general consent, the sovereignty of Greece for sixty-five years²⁶; deposited above ten thousand talents in the citadel; kept the king of Macedon in that subjection which a Barbarian owes to Greece; erected many and illustrious trophies of the exploits which their own valour had at-

²⁴ Demosthenes, who acted such a distinguished part in the Peloponnesian war. See above, vol. i. c. xvii. p. 577, & seqq.

²⁵ It is worthy of observation that, in this discourse throughout, Demosthenes insists that the people at large enjoyed much less authority in his time than in the days of Aristides, &c. All depends, he asserts, on the popular orators and magistrates, “οἱ πολιτευόμενοι.” Yet it is well known that, since the age of Aristides, the government had become more democratical. Demosthe-

nes himself allows this: the orators, he says, dare not address the people now with that freedom which they used formerly.—

This apparent contradiction shews the nature and tendency of that species of popular government which the Greeks called ochlogarchy.—The populace are the slaves of their demagogues, and the demagogues of the populace. Instead of liberty, there is an interchange of servitude.

²⁶ Demosthenes's chronology here is not accurate. See above, p. 64, in the note.

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chieved by land and sea: in a word, are the only people on record whose glorious actions place them above the reach of envy. Thus great in war, their civil administration was not less admirable. The stately edifices which they raised, the temples which they adorned, the dedications which they offered to the gods, will never be excelled in magnificence; but, in private life, so exemplary was their moderation, and so scrupulous their adherence to the frugal maxims of antiquity, that if any of you has examined the house of Aristides or Miltiades, he will find them undistinguished above the contiguous buildings by any superior elegance or grandeur. The ambition of those illustrious statesmen was to exalt the republic, not to enrich themselves²⁷; and this just moderation, accompanied by piety and patriotism, raised their country (and no wonder!) to the height of prosperity. Such was the condition of Athens under those sincere and honest men. Is it the same, or nearly the same, under the indulgence of our present ministers? I wave other topics on which I might enlarge. But you behold in what solitude we are left. The Lacedæmonians lost; the Thebans harassed by war; no other republic worthy of aspiring to the sovereignty. Yet at this period, when we might not only have defended our own possessions, but have become the arbiters and umpires of all around us, we have been stripped of whole provinces; we have expended fifteen hundred talents fruitlessly; we have lost, in time of peace, the alliances and advantages which the arms of our ancestors had acquired; and we have raised up and armed a most formidable enemy against ourselves. If not, let the man stand forth who can shew from what other cause Philip has derived his greatness. But the miserable condition of our foreign affairs is, perhaps, compensated by the happiness of our domestic state, and the splendid improvements of our capital. Roads

²⁷ Privatus illis census erat brevis

Commune magnum.

HOR. ode xv. l. ii.

repaired, walls whitened, *fountains*, and *follies*²⁸ ! And the ministers who have procured us those magnificent advantages, pass from poverty and meanness to opulence and dignity ; build private palaces which insult the edifices of the public ; grow greater as their country becomes less, and gradually rise on its ruins. What is the source of this disorder ? It is, Athenians ! that formerly the people did their duty, took the field in person, and thus kept the magistrates in awe."

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The assembly remained insensible to the motives of interest and honour. Instead of taking the field in person, they sent to Olynthus a body of foreign infantry, amounting to four thousand, with an hundred and fifty horse, under the command of Charidemus. This unworthy general, who was the slave of his mercenarics, and of his own detestable passions, gratified the rapacity of his troops by ravaging the Macedonian province of Bottizza, on the confines of Chalcis. At length, however, he threw his forces into Olynthus ; and the besieged, encouraged by this reinforcement, hazarded another sally, in which they were defeated and repelled with considerable loss. The Athenian mercenaries were rendered every day more contemptible by their cowardice, and more dangerous by their licentiousness. The beastly Charidemus had neither inclination nor ability to restrain their irregularities. According to his custom, he drank, at every meal, to a scandalous excess : his brutality insulted the women of Olynthus ; and such was his impudent and abandoned profligacy, that he demanded of the senate, as a reward for his pretended services, a beautiful Macedonian youth, then captive in the city²⁹.

Licentiousness of the Athenian troops under the profligate Charidemus.

In this state of affairs, the Olynthians a third time applied to Athens. On the present occasion, Æschines, who afterwards became

The cause of the Olynthians vigorously supported by Æschines and Demosthenes.

²⁸ Πηγαι και λυγες. Demosthenes disdained not such a jingle of words when it presented itself naturally ; but as it rarely

occurs in his works, it is plain that he never sought for it.

²⁹ Theopomp. apud Athen. l. x. p. 436.

such

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such an active partisan of the Macedonian interest, particularly distinguished his zeal and his patriotism. The speech of Demosthenes, to the same purpose, is still on record. He exhorts and conjures his countrymen to send to Olynthus an army of citizens, and at the same time to make a diversion, by invading the Macedonian coast. Unless both be done, the indefatigable industry of Philip would render either ineffectual. "Have you ever considered the rapid progress of this prince? He began by taking Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidæa, and Methoné; from thence he poured his troops into Thessaly, and became master of Pheræ, Pegææ, and Magnesia. Then turning towards Thrace, he over-ran provinces, conquered and divided kingdoms, and seated himself on the trophies of fallen crowns and broken sceptres. I speak not of his expedition against the Pæonians and Illyrians, into Epirus,—and where has not ambition conducted his arms? But why this long enumeration?—To prove the important opportunities which your negligence has lost, and the unextinguishable ardour of an adversary, whose successive conquests continually bring him nearer to your walls. For is there a man in this assembly, whose blindness perceives not that the sufferings of the Olynthians are the forerunners of our own? The present conjuncture calls you, as with a loud voice, at length to rouse from your lethargy, and to profit by this last testimony of the bountiful protection of the gods. Another is not to be expected, after the many which you have despised and forgotten: I say *forgotten*; for favourable conjunctures, like riches, and other gifts of heaven, are remembered with gratitude, only by those who have understanding to preserve and to enjoy them. The spendthrift dissipates his thankfulness with his wealth³⁰; and the same imprudent folly renders him both miserable and ungrateful." After these bold

³⁰ The observation is uncommon, but just: ἀλλὰ οἱ μὲν, παρομοίον ἐστι, ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τῆν χάριν. Demost. Olynth. iii. Olynth. i. τῶν χρημάτων κτισίως; ἀν μὲν γὰρ ἴσα αὖ τῆς λαοῦ καὶ σωτῆς μεγάλῃ ἔχει τῇ τελευτῇ τῆν χάριν. ἀν δὲ p. 2. ex edit. Wolf.

expostulations,

expostulations, or rather reproaches, he encourages them to relieve Olynthus, by observing, that Philip would never have undertaken the siege of that place if he had expected such a vigorous resistance; especially at a time when his allies were ready to revolt; when the Theſſalians wiſhed to throw off the yoke; when the Thracians and Illyrians longed to recover their freedom. Thus the power of Philip, lately repreſented as ſo formidable, is by no means real and ſolid; one vigorous effort might yet overwhelm him; and the paſſion of hope, as well as that of fear, is rendered ſubſervient to the purpoſe of the orator. He again touches on the article of ſupplies; but with ſuch caution as ſhews that his former more explicit obſervations had been heard impatiently. “As to money for the expences of the war (for without money nothing can be done), you poſſeſs, Athenians! a military fund exceeding that of any other people. But you have unfortunately withdrawn it from its original deſtination, to which were it reſtored, there could not be any neceſſity for extraordinary contributions. What! do you propoſe in form that the theatrical money ſhould be applied to the uſes of the ſoldiery? No, ſurely. But I affirm, that ſoldiers muſt be raiſed; that a fund has been allotted for their ſubſiſtence; and that in every well-regulated community, thoſe who are paid by the public, ought to ſerve the public. To profit of the preſent conjuncture, we muſt act with vigour and celerity, we muſt diſpatch ambaffadors, to animate the neighbouring ſtates againſt Philip; we muſt take the field in perſon. If war raged on the frontiers of this country, with what rapidity would the Macedonians march hither? Why will you throw away a ſimilar opportunity? Know, that but one alternative remains, to carry the war into Macedonia, or to receive it in Attica. If Olynthus reſiſts, we may ravage the territories of Philip; ſhould that republic be deſtroyed, who will hinder him from coming hither? The Thebans! to ſay nothing too ſevere, they would rather reinforce his arms. The Pho-

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cians ! those who, without our assistance, cannot defend themselves. O ! but he dares not come ! It is madness to think that the designs of which he already boasts with such bold imprudence, he will not venture to execute, when nothing opposes his success". I think it unnecessary to describe the difference between attacking Philip at home, and waiting for him here. Were you obliged, only for one month, to encamp without the walls, and to subsist an army in the country, your husbandmen would sustain more loss than has been incurred by all the former exigencies of the war. This would happen, although the enemy kept at a distance ; but at the approach and entrance of an invader, what devastation must be produced ! Add to this, the insult and disgrace, the most ruinous of all losses, to men capable of reflection."

Philip takes
Olynthus.
Olymp.
cvi. 1.
A. C. 348.

The arguments of Demosthenes prevailed ; an embassy was sent into Peloponnesus, to inflame the hostility of that country against Philip ; and it was determined to assist the Olynthians, with an army of Athenian citizens. But before this resolution could be carried into effect, Olynthus was no more. The cavalry belonging to that place had acted with great spirit against the besiegers. As the works were too extensive to be completely invested, the Olynthian horsemen made frequent incursions³¹ into the surrounding territory, where they not only supplied themselves with provisions and forage, but beat up the quarters, attacked the advanced posts, and intercepted the convoys of the enemy. These advantages were chiefly owing to the merit of one man. In the various skirmishes, as well as in the two general engagements which had happened since the commencement of the siege, Philip perceived that Apollonides, who commanded the enemy's horse, displayed such valour

³¹ With all his policy, Philip seems to have had the vanity of a Greek. The vigour of the original is not to be translated :

"Αν δὲ βούληται φιλῶντες λαβεῖν, τίς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ κοίτῃσι, διὰ τὴν βουλήν, ὀφείλουσιν ; μή τινα σικεῖν ἔστιν ; καὶ συνιστάμεν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς φεκοῖν ; ἢ τὴν αὐτῶν ἑξῆς τὴν αὐτῶν φεκοῖν, καὶ μὴ βουλομένους

ἐμῶν ; ἢ ἀλλοῖς τις ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν ἑμῶν. — βούλομαι τὰς ἀποστάτας μὲν αἰετὶς, ἢ αἰνεῖταις ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑμῶν, ἢ μὴ ἐκδοῦναι, τούτῳ δὲ μὴ μὴ πρὸς. I have used a little freedom with the "σικεῖν βούλομαι τῶν."

³² Diodorus, l. xvi. 53.

and abilities as might long retard, perhaps altogether defeat, the success of his undertaking. His secret emillaries were therefore set to work; perfidious clamours were sown among the populace of Olynthus; Apollonides was publicly accused; and, by the malignant practices of traitors, condemned to banishment on a suspicion of treason³³. The command of the cavalry was bestowed on Lasthenes and Euthycrates, two wretches who had sold their country to Philip. Having obtained some previous successes, which had been concerted the better to mask their designs, they advanced against a Macedonian post; carried it at the first onset; pursued the flying garrison; and betrayed their own troops into an ambush prepared by the enemy. Surrounded on all sides, the Olynthians surrendered their arms; and this fatal disaster encouraging the Macedonian partisans within the walls, soon opened the gates of Olynthus³⁴. The conqueror entered in triumph, plundered and demolished the city, and dragged the inhabitants into servitude³⁵. Lasthenes, Euthycrates, and their associates, shared the same, or even a worse fate. Philip is said to have abandoned them to the indignant rage of the Macedonian soldiers, who butchered them almost before his eyes. It is certain, that though his mean and blind ambition often employed treachery, his justice or his pride always detested the traitor³⁶.

The conquest of Olynthus put Philip in possession of the region of Chalcis, and the northern coast of the Ægean sea; an acquisition of territory, which rendered his dominions on that side round and complete. His kingdom was now bounded, on the north by the

This important conquest inspires Philip with the ambition to seize Thermopylæ and the Hellespont.

³³ Demosth. de Falsa Legatione.

³⁴ Demosth. ibid.

³⁵ Four reasons conspired to produce the severe treatment of the Olynthians: 1. Philip had lost a great many men in the siege; πολλὰν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς τοῦ Οὐλυνθοῦ πολέμου ἀπώλειαν. Diodor. p. 450. 2. The Olynthians had received his natural brothers, Aridæus and Menelaus, accused of treason. Justin. l. viii. c. iii. 3. Philip wanted money to

carry on his intrigues in other cities: διαξέειπεν αὐτῷ (scil. Οὐλυνθῷ) καὶ τὰς ἐνικνύσας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποδοῦναι, ἐλαφρὺς ἀπολλύσας· τὸ τοῦ διὰ πρᾶξαι, χρημάτων τε πολλῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ εὐτορῶν. 4. Diodorus immediately after adds the fourth reason, "That he might deter the neighbouring cities from opposing his measures." Diodor. p. 450.

³⁶ Demosth. Olynth. iii. sect. 3.

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Thracian possessions of Kerfobleptes, and on the south by the territory of Phocis, a province actually comprehending the straits of Thermopylæ, which had formerly belonged to a different division of Greece. Besides the general motives of interest, which prompted him to extend his dominions, he discerned the peculiar importance of acquiring the Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, since the former was emphatically styled the Gates of Greece, and the latter formed the only communication between that country and the fertile shores of the Euxine. Greece, exceeding in population the proportion of its extent and fertility, annually drew supplies of corn from those northern regions. The Athenians, in particular, had settlements even in the remote peninsula of Crim Tartary, anciently called the Taurica Chersonesus, by means of which they purchased and imported the superfluous productions of that remote climate³⁷. Their ships could only sail thither by the Hellespont; and should that important strait be reduced under the power of an enemy, they must be totally excluded from an useful, and even necessary, branch of commerce.

Philip celebrates the festival of the Muses at Dium. Olymp. cviii. 1.
A. C. 348.

Philip perceived these consequences. It was the general interest of all the Grecian republics to assist Kerfobleptes and the Phocians, which was, in other words, to defend the Hellespont and Thermopylæ. The interest of the Macedonian was diametrically opposite; nor could he expect to accomplish the great objects of his reign, unless he first rendered himself master of those important posts. This delicate situation furnished a proper exercise for the dexterity of Philip. After the destruction of Olynthus, he celebrated a public festival of gratitude and joy, at the neighbouring town of Dium; to which, as at the Olympian and other Grecian games, all the republics were promiscuously invited, whether friends or enemies³⁸. It appears that several Athenians assisted at these magnificent entertain-

³⁷ Demosthen. in Leptin.

³⁸ Demosth. de Falsa Legatione; & Diodor. p. 451.

ments, which lasted nine days, in honour of the Muses, and which wanted no object of elegance or splendor, that either art could produce, or wealth could purchase. The politeness and condescending affability of Philip obliterated the remembrance of his recent severity to Olynthus; and his liberal distribution of the spoils of that unfortunate city³⁹ gained him new friends, and confirmed the attachment of his old partisans.

Amidst these scenes of rejoicing and festivity, Philip seems not to have forgotten, one moment, that the most immediate object of his policy was to detach the Athenians from the cause of Phocis and Kerfobleptes, who were both their allies. For this purpose, while he courted individuals with peculiar address, he determined to make the public feel the inconvenience of the war, the better to prepare them for the insidious proposal of a separate peace. The bad conduct of Chares left the sea open to the Macedonians, who had silently acquired a considerable naval force. Philip begun to attack the Athenians on their favourite element. His fleet ravaged their tributary islands of Lemnos and Imbros; surprised and took a squadron of Athenian vessels, stationed on the southern coast of Eubœa; and, encouraged by these advantages, boldly sailed to Attica, made a descent on the shore of Marathon, repelled the Athenian cavalry, headed by Deotimus, ravaged the territory, and carried off the Sala-

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Philip unexpectedly commits naval depredations on Attica.

³⁹ Both Demosthenes and Diodorus mention an anecdote which does honour to Philip, and still more to Satyrus the player. After dinner, the king, according to his custom, was distributing his presents; amidst the general festivity, Satyrus alone wore a sad countenance. The king addressed him kindly, and, in the language of the times, desired him to ask a boon. Satyrus said, that such presents as others received (cups of gold, &c.) seemed to him of little value: That he had indeed something to ask, but feared a denial. Philip having encouraged him, he proceeded: "Apollophanes of

Pydna was my friend: at his death, his two daughters, both arrived at a marriageable age, were sent to Olynthus, taken captive, and subjected to all the calamities of servitude. These are the presents I request, not with any design unworthy of their father or myself, but that I may give them such portions as shall enable them to marry happily." Apollophanes had been an active opponent, and even the personal enemy, of Philip; yet this prince granted the request of Satyrus, and enabled him liberally to provide for the daughters of his friend.

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minian galley. From thence they proceeded to the isle of Salamis, and defeated a considerable detachment commanded by Charidemus. The illustrious trophies of Marathon and Salamis were effaced by the insults of the Macedonians, whose fleet returned home in triumph, adorned with hostile spoils, and with military and naval glory⁴⁰.

His intrigues
gave him pos-
session of Eu-
bœa.

The activity of Philip seconded his good fortune. His intrigues were renewed in Eubœa. Under pretence of delivering the island from the tyranny and extortions of Molossus, the Athenian commander, he landed such a body of troops there, as proved sufficient, with the assistance of his adherents, to expel the Athenians. Such a multiplication of calamities might have disgusted that people with the war against Philip, whose hostility, directed against them alone, seemed to have forgotten the Phocians and Kerfobleptes; when secret but zealous partisans of Macedon arrived at Athens, as ambassadors from Eubœa, commissioned to settle amicably all differences between the two countries. They observed, that Philip had left the island absolutely free and independent; and that, though constrained to take arms in defence of his allies, he was sincerely desirous of making peace with the Athenians. The representations of the Eubœan ambassadors were enforced by the influence of two Athenians, Aristodemus and Neoptolemus, the first distinguished as a player, the second as a player and poet, who having acquired fortunes in Macedon, returned to their own country, to forward the measures of their liberal protector. They affirmed that the king of Macedon earnestly wished to live on good terms with the republic; and the Athenians paid much regard to men, whose talents were then highly esteemed, and who had remit-

His deceit-
ful embassy
to Athens;

⁴⁰ In the chronology of these events, I have followed Dr. Leland. See his *Life of Philip*, vol. ii. p. 43. The events themselves are related in the oration of Demof- thenes commonly entitled the *First Philippic*, but which the Doctor, with great probability, considers as two distinct orations spoken at different times.

ted the riches amassed in a foreign country, to purchase lands in Attica, and to supply with alacrity the exigencies of the public service.

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Demosthenes saw through these dark and deep artifices⁴¹; but in vain endeavoured to alarm the unsuspecting credulity of his countrymen. On a future occasion, after the plot had become manifest, he upbraids their careless indifference and delusion at this important crisis. "Had you been spectators in the theatre, and not deliberating on matters of the highest moment, you could not have heard Neoptolemus with more indulgence, nor me with more resentment⁴²."

in vain exposed by Demosthenes.

Such was the disposition of the assembly, when Æschines returned from his Peloponnesian embassy. He had assembled the great council of the Arcadians; revealed to them the dangerous views of Philip, which threatened the liberty of Greece; and, notwithstanding the powerful opposition of Hieronymus, and other Macedonian partisans, had engaged that people to approve the patriot zeal of Athens, and to deliberate on taking arms in the common cause. In relating the success of his embassy, he inveighed with great severity against those mercenary traitors, who had sold the interests of their country to a cruel tyrant. The Greeks had full warning of their danger. The miserable fate of Olynthus ought ever to be before their eyes. At his return through Peloponnesus, he had beheld a sight sufficient to melt the most obdurate heart; thirty young Olynthians, of both sexes, driven like a herd of cattle, as a present from Philip to some of the unworthy instruments of his ambition⁴³.

Æschines returns from his embassy, and awakens the public resentment against Philip.

The susceptible and ever-varying temper of the multitude was deeply affected by the representations of Æschines; the pacific advices of Neoptolemus and his associates were forgotten; war and re-

⁴¹ Demosthenes, de Chersoneso, & de Pace.

⁴² Demosthen. de Chersoneso.

⁴³ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione, sect. 3.

venge

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venge again echoed through the assembly. At the requisition of Æschines, ambassadors were dispatched to confirm the hostile resolutions of the Arcadians, and to awaken the terror of the neighbouring republics. The Athenian youth were assembled in the temple of Agraulos to swear irreconcilable hatred against Philip and the Macedonians; and the most awful imprecations were denounced against the mercenary traitors who co-operated with the public enemy. This fermentation might at length have purified into strong and decisive measures; and had Philip possessed only an ordinary degree of vigilance, a confederacy might have been yet formed in Greece sufficient to repel the Macedonian arms. But that consummate politician thought nothing done while any thing was neglected; and, as he allowed not the slightest opportunity to pass unimproved, he often derived very important benefits from seemingly inconsiderable causes.

Dexterity of
that prince
in diverting
the storm.

An Athenian of the name of Phrynon, a man wealthy and powerful, had been attacked, robbed, and confined by some Macedonian foldiers, who obliged him to purchase his liberty by a very considerable ransom⁴⁴. As this violence had been committed during the fifteen days of truce that followed the celebration of the Olympic games, Phrynon very judiciously supposed that the king of Macedon, who had long been ambitious of obtaining a place in the Grecian confederacy, would not abet this act of injustice and impiety. He had therefore requested his countrymen, who at that time prepared to negotiate with Philip an exchange of prisoners, to join him in commission with Ctesiphon, a man of experience and capacity, who had been already named to that embassy; imagining that by appearing in a public character, he might the more easily recover the ransom and other monies that had been unjustly extorted from him. Having arrived in Macedon, the ambassadors were re-

⁴⁴ Æschines de Falsa Legatione.

ceived and treated by Philip with uncommon politeness and respect; their demands were most obligingly granted, or rather prevented; the king apologised to Phrynon for the ignorant rusticity of his soldiers, which had led them to act so unwarrantably; and he lamented both to Phrynon and Ctesiphon, the necessity of their present mission, since he had nothing more sincerely at heart than to live on good terms with their republic ⁴⁵. At their return to Athens, the representations of such men could not be without weight; nor could they fail being extremely favourable to the king of Macedon.

Another incident followed, which was improved with no less dexterity ⁴⁶. At the taking and sack of Olynthus, Stratocles and Eucrates, two Athenians of distinction, had been seized and carried into Macedon. By some accident these men had not been released with the other prisoners. Their relations were uneasy for their safety, and therefore applied to the Athenians, that a proper person might be sent to treat of their ransom. Aristodemus was employed in this commission, but was more attentive to paying his court than performing his duty; and, at his return home, neglected to give an account of his negotiation. Philip, meanwhile, whose vigilance never slept, and who well knew the hostile resolutions in agitation against him at Athens, released the prisoners without ransom, and dismissed them with the highest expressions of regard. Moved by gratitude, Stratocles appeared in the assembly, blazed forth the praises of the king of Macedon, and loudly complained against the careless indifference of Aristodemus, who had neglected to report his embassy ⁴⁷.

He improves every favourable incident.

The artful player, thus called upon to act his part, excused his omitting to relate *one* example of kindness, in a man who had recently given so many proofs of the most unbounded generosity. He expatiated on the candour and benevolence of Philip, and especially

The Athenians are persuaded to send an embassy to Philip.

⁴⁵ Æschines de Falsa Legatione.

⁴⁶ Id. *ibid*.

⁴⁷ Id. *ibid*.

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on his profound respect for the republic, with which, he assured them, the king of Macedon was earnest to conclude a peace, and even to enter into an alliance, on the most honourable and advantageous terms. He probably reminded them of the misfortunes which had attended their arms since they commenced war against this prince. Fifteen hundred talents expended with disgrace; seventy-five dependent cities, including these of the Chalcidic region, lost irrecoverably; Olynthus destroyed; Eubœa revolted; Athens dishonoured and exhausted; and Macedon more powerful and more respected than at any former period. This representation did not exceed the truth; and the calamities of the war had long inclined to peace the more moderate and judicious portion of the assembly. The artificial generosity of Philip, in his treatment of Phrynon and Stratocles, blazoned by the eloquence of Aristodemus, fixed the wavering irresolution of the multitude. The military preparations were suspended. Even Demosthenes and Æschines yielded to the torrent; and imagining that a bad peace was better than a bad war, (since it was impossible to expect success from the fluctuating councils of their country) supported a decree⁴⁸ of Philocrates for sending a herald and ambassadors to discover the real intentions of Philip, and to hearken to the terms of accommodation with which he had so long amused them.

Character of
the ambassa-
dors.

The ministers appointed to this commission seem to have been purposely chosen among men of opposite principles, who might mutually be checks on each other. Phrynon, Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, and Philocrates, who had uniformly testified their confidence in the king of Macedon, were opposed by Æschines and Demosthenes, who had long discovered their suspicions of that prince. To the embassy were added Nauficles and Dercyllus, men distinguished by the public offices which they had discharged with equal patriotism and

⁴⁸ The decree was attacked by one Lici- Demosthenes and Æschines, as appears from nus. Demosthenes defended it; and both the text, were on the embassy.

fidelity; Jatrocles, the chosen friend of Æschines; and Cimon, illustrious for the name he bore, which descended to him from the greatest and most fortunate of the Athenian commanders. The whole number amounted to ten, besides Agalocreon of Tenedos, who was sent on the part of the Greek islands, in alliance with Athens⁴⁹.

Thus far contemporary authors agree; but in describing the events which followed the departure of the ambassadors, all is inconsistency and contradiction. The quarrel that arose between Æschines and Demosthenes, the former of whom was impeached by the latter, furnish us, in the accusation and defence, with the fullest and most diffuse, but at the same time the least authentic, materials, that present themselves in any passage of Grecian history. The whole train of the negotiation, as well as the events connected with it, are represented in colours the most discordant; facts are asserted and denied; while both parties appeal to the memory of the assembly before which they spoke, to the testimony of witnesses, and even to the evidence of public decrees and records; circumstances that must appear very extraordinary, unless we consider that suborning of witnesses, perjury, and even the falsifying of laws and records, were crimes not unusual at Athens⁵⁰. Amidst this confusion, the discerning eye of criticism would vainly endeavour to penetrate the truth. Æschines was indeed acquitted by his countrymen. But nothing positive can be learned from a partial sentence, pronounced three years after the alleged crimes had been committed, when the power of Philip had increased to such an alarming degree, as gave his faction a decided ascendant even in the Athenian assembly.

Difficulties
occasioned by
the quarrel
between De-
mosthenes
and Æschi-
nes.

To disentangle such perplexity, we shall keep chiefly to those facts which are allowed on both sides, deducing from them such consequences

Account of
the negocia-
tion.
Olymp.
cvi. 1. cviii.
2.
A. C. 348
and 347.

⁴⁹ Demosthen. & Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.

Manners of the Athenians, prefixed to Lyfias and Isocrates.

⁵⁰ See my Discourse on the Character and

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as seem most natural and probable. In the course of one year, three embassies were sent to Philip; the first to propose a peace, the second to ratify it, the third to see the conditions of it observed; and in that space of time Kerfobleptes, being stripped of his dominions, was reduced into captivity, and Philip having seized Thermopylæ, invaded Phocis, and destroyed the twenty-two cities of that province in less than twenty-two days. Nor was this all: a foreign prince having made himself master of Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, the most valuable safeguards of Greece—having invaded and desolated the territory of a Grecian republic, the most respectable for its antiquity power and wealth, the seat of the Amphictyonic council, and of the revered oracle of Delphi—These daring measures tended so little to excite the displeasure of Greece, that the king of Macedon had no sooner accomplished them, than he threatened to attack Athens (who weakly lamented calamities which she had neither prudence nor courage to prevent) at the head of a general confederacy of the Amphictyonic states.

Dissention of
the ambassa-
dors.

Such extraordinary transactions, of which history scarcely offers another example for the instruction of posterity, Demosthenes ascribes entirely to the corruption and perfidy of the Athenian ambassadors. “The felicity of Philip,” he says, “consists chiefly in this; that having occasion for traitors, fortune has given him men treacherous and corrupt beyond his most sanguine hopes and prayers.” This, doubtless, is the exaggeration of an orator, desirous by every means to blacken the character of his colleagues in the embassy, and particularly that of his adversary Æschines. Yet it will appear, from the most careful survey of the events of those times, that the incapacity and neglect, if not the treason, of the Athenian ministers, greatly contributed to the success of the Macedonian arms.

“Subsequent writers have copied the *διαδύς τοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἐσχυσαι, πολλὰς ἐσχὺς* language of Demosthenes, *καὶ χρημάτων πλῆθος προδοτέας τῶν πατρίδων*. Diodorus, *ubi supra*.

From the first moment of their departure from Athens, the ambassadors began to betray their mutual jealousies and suspicions of each other's fidelity. The dangerous character of Philocrates was equally dreaded by Æschines and Demosthenes⁵²; and the latter, if we may believe his rival, so much disgusted the other ambassadors, by the morose severity of his temper, that they had almost excluded him their society; a circumstance rendered credible, not merely by the partial evidence of an adversary, but by the resentment and indignation always expressed by Demosthenes against the behaviour of his colleagues. Having arrived at Pella, they were introduced to an audience; and spoke, as had been agreed on, in the order of their seniority. The discourse of Æschines was the most copious and elaborate, but seemed rather calculated for gaining merit with the Athenian assembly, than for influencing the conduct of Philip. "He recalled to the memory of the king, the favours of the Athenians towards his ancestors; the distressed condition of the children of Amyntas; the solicitations of Euridicé; and the generous interpositions of Iphicrates, to whom the family of Philip owed the crown of Macedon. Having touched slightly on the ungrateful returns made by Ptolemy and Perdiccas, he dwelt on the injustice of those hostilities which Philip had committed against the republic, especially in taking Amphipolis, which his father Amyntas had acknowledged to be a dependent colony of Athens. He insisted on the impropriety of retaining this possession, which as it could not be claimed by any ancient title, neither could it be held by the right of conquest, not being gained in any war between the two states. In the time of profound peace between Athens and Macedon, Philip had taken from the Amphipolitans an Athenian city, which it concerned his justice and his honour to restore, without delay, to its lawful and acknowledged owners."

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Conference
of the am-
bassadors
with Philip.

Speech of
Æschines.

⁵² Demosthen. & Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.

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That of De-
mosthenes.

His embar-
rassment and
confusion.

Had Æschines wished to furnish Philip with a pretence for protracting the negotiation, he could not have done it more effectually than by such a demand. It could not possibly be expected, that a victorious monarch should set bounds to his own triumphs, in order to purchase peace by tamely surrendering one of the most important of his acquisitions. In this light the proposal appeared to Demosthenes, who thought that his colleague had totally forgotten the object of the embassy, the distressed state of Athens, how greatly the people had been harassed by the war, and how eagerly they wished for peace. It was now his own turn to speak before a prince whom he had often and highly offended, whose character and actions he had ever viewed and represented with the utmost severity; but whom, on the present occasion, it was his business to soothe rather than to irritate. The novelty of the situation might have disconcerted a man of less sensibility than Demosthenes. The envious jealousy of his colleagues was prepared to listen, with a malicious ear, to those irresistible arguments which the orator is said to have promised, with a very unbecoming confidence; the Macedonian courtiers expected some prodigy of eloquence from the perpetual opponent of their admired master. Amidst the silent suspense of an unfavourable audience, Demosthenes began to speak with ungrateful hesitation, and after uttering a few obscure and interrupted sentences, his memory totally forsook him. Philip endeavoured to remove his embarrassment with a mortifying politeness, telling him that he was not now in a theatre⁵³, where such an accident might be attended with disagreeable consequences; and exhorting him to take time for recollection, and to pursue his intended discourse. Demosthenes again began, but without better success. The assembly

⁵³ Notwithstanding the passion of the Athenians for dramatic entertainments, and their consideration for the character of players beyond that of any other nation, they were extremely severe against their negligences and faults on the theatre; as appears from various passages of the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Æschines.

beheld his confusion with a malignant pleasure ; and the ambassadors were ordered to withdraw.

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After a proper interval, they were summoned to the royal presence. Philip received them with great dignity, and answered with precision and elegance the arguments respectively used by the several speakers, particularly those of Æschines. The confused hints of Demosthenes he passed over with merited neglect ; thus proving to the world, that the man who had ever arraigned him with most severity in the tumultuous assemblies of Greece, had not dared to say any thing in his presence which deserved the smallest notice or reply. The ambassadors were then invited to an entertainment, where Demosthenes is said to have behaved with great weakness, and where Philip displayed such powers of merriment and festivity, as eclipsed his talents for negotiation and war. The ambassadors were persuaded of his candour and sincerity, and dismissed with a letter to the people of Athens, assuring them that his intentions were truly pacific, and that as soon as they consented to an alliance with him, he would endeavour to evince those sentiments of affection and respect which he had ever entertained for their republic.

Philip answers the ambassadors ;

invites them to an entertainment.

Their departure from Macedon.

The mortification which Demosthenes had received, made him at first vent his chagrin by condemning the conduct of his colleagues ; but when he reflected, that a fair representation of facts would greatly depreciate his character at Athens, policy prevailed over resentment. He began privately to tamper with his companions on the road, freely rallied the confusion into which he had been betrayed, extolled the ready genius and memory of Æschines ; and endeavoured, by promises and flattery, to ingratiate himself with those whom his recent behaviour had justly provoked and disgusted. In a conversation at Larissa in Thessaly, he acknowledged the masterly reasoning of the king of Macedon. The ambassadors all joined in the praises of this extraordinary man. Æschines admired the strength and perspicuity with which he had answered their respective discourses ; and

Artifices of Demosthenes.

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and Ctesiphon cried out in transport, that, in the course of a long life, he had never beheld a man of such a polite and engaging deportment. Demosthenes then artfully said, "he apprehended they would not venture to make such representations to the Athenian assembly; that their honour and safety required them to be consistent in their reports;" to which they all assented; and Æschines acknowledges, that he was prevailed on by the intreaties of his rival to promise, that he would give a favourable and false account of the behaviour of Demosthenes, and assure the people of Athens, that he had spoken with dignity and firmness on the affair of Amphipolis.

They report
their nego-
ciation to
the senate.

According to the forms of the republic, the ambassadors first reported the success of their negotiation, and delivered the letter of Philip, to the senate of the Five Hundred. They explained in order, what each had said in presence of the king; when Demosthenes rising up the last, affirmed with his usual oath of asseveration⁵⁴, "that the ambassadors had not spoken in the senate as they did before Philip; that they had spoken much better in Macedon:" he then moved, that they should be honoured with a crown of sacred olive⁵⁵, and invited next day to an entertainment in the Prytanæum⁵⁶.

The same
reported to
the assembly.

The day following, they made their report to the assembly of the people; when the ambassadors, finding the subject not disagreeable to their hearers, expatiated on the politeness, condescension, eloquence, and abilities of the prince, with whom their republic was ready not only to negotiate a peace, but to contract an alliance. Having allowed them to exhaust this fertile subject, Demosthenes at length arose, and, after those contortions of body, which, if we believe his adversary, were familiar to him, declared, that he was equally sur-

Extraordi-
nary beha-
viour of De-
mosthenes.

⁵⁴ Μα δὲ, indently explained "by Jove," since the expression is elliptical, and includes a short prayer, *ὑπομνηστέον δὲ καὶ τῷ θεῷ*; "my assertion is true, may Jove thus protect me."

⁵⁵ See the Discourse of Lysias on an accusation for cutting down a consecrated olive.

⁵⁶ Æschin. de falsa Legatione.

prised at those who, in a deliberation of such importance, could talk of such trifles, and at those who could endure to hear them. "The negotiation may be briefly reported. Here is the decree by which we are commissioned. We have executed this commission. Here is Philip's answer (pointing to the letter). You have only to examine its contents." A confused murmur arose in the assembly, some applauding the strength and precision of the speech, others condemning the asperity of the speaker. As soon as he could be heard, Demosthenes thus proceeded: "You shall see how I will lop off those superfluous matters. Æschines praises the memory and eloquence of Philip, in which, however, I find nothing extraordinary, since any other man, placed in the same advantageous circumstances of rank and fortune, would be equally attended to and admired. Ctesiphon praises the gracefulness and dignity of his person; my colleague Aristodemus does not yield to him in these particulars. Others admire his mirth and gaiety at table; yet in such qualities Philocrates excels him. But this is unreasonable. I shall therefore draw up a decree for convening an extraordinary assembly, to deliberate on the peace and the alliance³⁶."

The decree was proposed on the eighth of March, and the assembly was fixed for the seventeenth of the same month. In the interval, arrived, as ambassadors from Philip, Antipater, the most respected of his ministers; Parmenio, the bravest of his generals; and Eurylochus, who united, in an equal degree, the praise of eloquence and valour. Parmenio had been employed in the siege of Halus, a place filled with malcontents from Thessaly, who still resisted the Macedonian power in that country. That he might have leisure to join his colleagues, Parmenio ordered the siege to be converted into a blockade; and the merit of three such ambassadors sufficiently announced the important purposes which Philip wished to effect by the present negotiation. They were received with great distinction by the senate, and (what seems extraordinary) lodged in the

Philip sends
ambassadors
to Athens,

³⁶ Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.

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house of Demosthenes, who was careful to adorn their seats in the theatre, and to shew them every other mark of honour⁵⁷. Having been introduced, on the appointed day, into the assembly, they declared the object of their commission, to conclude in the name of their master a peace and alliance with the people of Athens. Demosthenes, in an elaborate speech, urged the expediency of listening to their demands; but without neglecting the interest of the Athenian allies. Æschines delivered the same opinion, and severely reproached Philocrates, who urged the necessity of precipitating the treaty. The two first days were spent in debate; but on the third, the influence of Philocrates prevailed, chiefly, if we believe Demosthenes, by the unexpected accession of Æschines to that party. He, who had hitherto been a strenuous defender of the interest of Kerfobleptes, declared that he had now altered his opinion. That peace was necessary for Athens, and ought not to be retarded by the slow deliberations of other powers. That the circumstances of the republic were changed; and that, in their actual situation, it was an idle vanity to attend to those who flattered them with pompous panegyrics of the magnanimity of their ancestors; that the weakness of Athens was no longer called on to undertake the protection of every state that could not defend its own cause⁵⁸."

who corrupt
Æschines.

During the
negotiation,
Philip con-
tinues to
make con-
quests in
Thrace.

Demosthenes had formerly suspected the treachery of Æschines; but this speech fully convinced him, that if his adversary had not before sold himself to Philip, he had then been tampered with, and gained by the Macedonian ambassadors. But Demosthenes, and the assembly in general, saw the necessity of immediately ratifying the peace with that prince, who had actually taken the field in Thrace, along the coast of which the Athenians still possessed Serrium, Doriscus, and several other tributary cities. A decree was proposed for this purpose, and ambassadors were named, who might, with all convenient speed, repair to Philip, in order mutually to give and

⁵⁷ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

⁵⁸ Demosthen. de Falsa Legation.

receive the oaths and ratifications of the treaty just concluded at Athens. The ambassadors were Eubulus, Æschines, Ctesiphon, Democrates, and Cleon; the principal of whom, being entirely devoted to the Macedonian interest, contrived various pretences to delay their departure. In this interval, Kerfobleptes met with the unhappy fate of which we have already taken notice; and Philip, encouraged by the success of his intrigues, ventured to attack the cities of Serrium and Doriscus, which readily submitted to his arms⁵⁹. Upon intelligence of the latter event, the Athenians dispatched Euclides to inform the king of Macedon, that the places which he had taken belonged to Athens; to which he coldly replied, that he had not been so instructed by his ambassadors, nor was there any mention of those cities in the treaty recently signed, but not yet ratified, between the two powers.

Æschines and his colleagues still delayed to set out, although the conduct of Philip continually urged the necessity of hastening their departure. They were finally ordered to begone, in consequence of a decree proposed by Demosthenes⁶⁰, who was unable to prevail on the Athenians, till it was too late, to pay due regard to the interest of Kerfobleptes. In twenty-five days the Athenian ministers arrived at Pella, a journey which they might have performed in six; and instead of directly proceeding to Philip, who was employed in reducing the cities on the Propontis, they patiently waited, above three weeks, the return of that monarch to his capital. During their residence in Pella, they were joined by Demosthenes, who, at his own request, had been added to this commission, under pretence of ransoming some Athenian captives, but in reality with a view to watch the conduct of his colleagues. Philip at length arrived: the ambassadors were called to an audience. On this occasion they spoke, not as formerly, according to their respective ages, but in an

Third embassy to Philip.

⁵⁹ Demosthen. Orat. v. in Philipp.

⁶⁰ Id. de Falsa Legatione.

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Speech of
Demosthe-
nes ;

order, if we believe Æschines, first established by the impudence of Demosthenes ; whose discourse, as represented by his adversary, must have appeared highly ridiculous, even in an age when the decent formality of public transactions was little known or regarded.

Anticipating his more experienced colleagues, he observed, " That they were unfortunately divided in their views and sentiments. That his own were strictly conformable to those of Philip. From the beginning he had advised a peace and alliance with Macedon. That he had procured all possible honours for the ambassadors of that country during their residence in Athens, and had afterwards escorted their journey as far as Thebes. He knew that his good intentions had been misrepresented to Philip, on account of some expressions that had dropped from him in the Athenian assembly. But if he had denied the superior excellence of that prince in beauty, in drinking, and in debate", it was because he believed such qualities to belong to a woman, a sponge, and a hireling rhetorician and sophist, rather than to a warlike monarch, and mighty conqueror." This extraordinary apology excited the derision of the Macedonian courtiers, and made the Athenian ambassadors hold down their heads in confusion⁶².

of Æschines. Æschines first recovered his composure ; and modestly addressing Philip, observed, " That the present was not a proper occasion for the Athenian ministers to praise or to defend their own conduct. They had been deemed worthy of their commission by the republic which employed them, and to which alone they were accountable⁶³. Their actual business was to receive Philip's oath in ratification of the treaty already concluded on the part of Athens. The military preparations carrying on in every part of Macedon could not but excite their fears for the unhappy Phocians. But he

⁶¹ See above, p. 474.

⁶² Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.

⁶³ The speech of Æschines, as reported by

himself, is inimitably graceful and dignified.

Λέγων' ὅτι περιφύειαν ἔμας; Ἀθηναῖοι περισβύει; &c.

Vid. p. 261, & seqq. edit. Wolf.

intreated

intreated Philip, that, if he was determined to gratify the Thebans by making war on that unfortunate people, he would make at least a proper distinction between the innocent and the guilty. The sacrilegious violators of the temple ought to be punished with due severity; the state itself must be spared; since the laws and institutions of Greece guard the safety of every Amphictyonic city. Æschines then spoke, in the severest terms, against the injustice and cruelty of the Thebans, who, he ventured to prophesy, would repay the partiality of Philip with the same falsehood and ingratitude with which they had been accustomed to requite their former allies and benefactors."

The discourse of Æschines, though it could not be expected to move the resolutions of the king, was well calculated to raise the credit of the speaker, when it should be reported in his own country. Philip confined himself to vague expressions of friendship and respect. The ambassadors of Thebes were already at Pella, a circumstance which furnished him with a pretence for declining to make an explicit declaration in favour of Phocis. But he hinted his compassionate concern for that republic; and requested the Athenians to accompany him to Thessaly, that he might make use of their abilities and experience to settle the affairs of that country, which required his immediate presence. Extraordinary as this demand was, the Athenians readily complied with it, notwithstanding the king, who had ordered his army to march, was attended in this expedition by the ambassadors of Thebes, who, as well as the Athenians, were daily entertained at his table, and whose views were diametrically opposite to the interests of Phocis and of Athens⁶⁴.

The unhappy and distracted situation of the former republic promised a speedy issue to the Sacred War, which, for more than two years, had been feebly carried on between the Phocians on one side,

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Philip's profound dissimulation in treaties with the Athenian ambassadors

⁶⁴ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

The Phocian war carried on with little activity on either side.
Olymp. cviii. 2.
A. C. 349.

and

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The Phocians condemn the plunderers of the temple.

The Spartans claim the superintendence of the temple.

Phaleucus and his mercenaries seize Nicæa.

and the Thebans and Locrians on the other, by such petty incursions and ravages as indicated the inveterate rancour of combatants, who still retained the desire of hurting, after they had lost the power⁶⁵. During the greater part of that time, the Athenians, amused by their negotiation with Philip, afforded no assistance to their unfortunate allies. The treasures of Delphi, immense as they were, at length began to fail. The Phocians, thus abandoned and exhausted, reflected with terror and remorse on their past conduct; and, in order to make atonement for their sacrilegious violations of the temple, instituted a judicial enquiry against Phaleucus, their general, and his accomplices, in plundering the dedications to Apollo⁶⁶. Several were condemned to death; Phaleucus was deposed; and the Phocians, having performed these substantial acts of justice which tended to remove the odium that had long adhered to their cause, solicited with better hopes of success the assistance of Sparta and Athens.

But the crafty Archidamus, who had long directed the Spartan councils, considered the distress of the Phocians as a favourable opportunity to urge the claim of his own republic to the superintendence of the Delphic temple; and actually sent ambassadors into Thessaly, to confer with the king of Macedon on that subject⁶⁷. The Athenians paid more attention to the request of their allies, who, as an inducement to excite their activity, offered to put them in possession of the towns of Nicæa, Alpenus, and Thronium, which commanded the straits of Thermopylæ. But this salutary plan, which might have retarded the fate of Greece, was defeated by Phaleucus, who commanding eight thousand mercenaries, that acknowledged no authority but that of their general, established his head-quarters at Nicæa, and despised the menaces both of Phocis and of Athens.

⁶⁵ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 454.
Æschin. ubi supra.

⁶⁶ Idem, l. xvi. p. 452.

⁶⁷ Demosthen. &

Mortifying as this disappointment must have been, it was followed by a disaster in another quarter still more terrible. The Phocians had fortified the city of Abæ, to defend their northern frontier against the depredations of the Locrians. The Thebans, reinforced by some auxiliaries of Macedon, marched against that place. The Phocians, with more courage than prudence, met them in the field; but were defeated with great slaughter, and pursued, in their disordered flight, through the surrounding territory. A party of above five hundred took refuge in the temple of Abæan Apollo, where they remained for several days, sleeping under the porticoes, on beds of dried herbs, straw, and other combustible materials. An accidental fire, that began in the night, was communicated to the whole edifice, part of which was consumed, while the unhappy Phocians were stifled, or burnt to ashes⁶⁸.

The Thebans failed not to represent this calamity as a judgment of heaven, against the daring impiety of wretches, who had ventured to take refuge in the temple of a god whom their sacrilege had long offended. They entreated Philip to assist them in destroying the remnant of the guilty race. This was the chief purpose of their embassy to that prince, whom the Athenians, as related above, entreated to spare the nation, while he punished the criminals; and the Lacedæmonians, regardless of the fate of Phocis, thought only of making good their ancient claim to the guardianship of the Delphic temple.

Philip treated the deputies of the three republics with apparent frankness and cordiality, under the veil of which he knew so well to disguise the interests of his policy and ambition. He assured the Thebans, that his arms should be employed to recover for them the towns of Orchomenus, Coronæa, and Tilphossæum, which, ever ready to rebel against a tyrannical capital, had readily submitted to

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Disaster of
the Phocians
in the temple
of Abæan
Apollo.

The The-
bans insti-
gate Philip
to desolate
Phocis.

Philip at-
tempts in
vain to cor-
rupt the
Theban am-
bassadors.

⁶⁸ Diodorus, p. 454.

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the Phocians, during their invasion of Bœotia. The Phocians, he said, had rendered themselves the objects of divine displeasure; it would be as meritorious to punish, as it was impious to protect them. He was determined that both they and their allies should suffer those calamities which their crimes so justly deserved. Thus far Philip was sincere; for, in these particulars, the views of Thebes were exactly conformable to his own. But in his mind he agitated other matters, in which the interest of Thebes interfered with that of Macedon. To accomplish those purposes, without offending his allies, it was necessary to gain the ambassadors. Caresses, flattery, and promises, were lavished in vain. Money was at length tendered with a profuse liberality; but, though no man ever possessed more address than Philip in rendering his bribes acceptable, the Theban deputies remained honest and uncorrupted, firmly maintaining to the end their patriotism and their honour. Philon, the chief of the embassy, answered for his colleagues: "We are already persuaded of your friendship for us, independent of your presents. Reserve your generosity for our country, on which it will be more profitably bestowed, since your favours, conferred on Thebes, will ever excite the gratitude both of that republic and its ministers⁶⁹."

Philip corrupts and deceives the Athenian ambassadors.

Demosthenes extols the dignity of this reply, as becoming rather the ambassadors of Athens. But these ministers, though one object of their commission was to save the Grecian state which the Thebans wished to destroy, discovered neither integrity nor spirit. All of them, but Demosthenes himself, accepted the presents of the king of Macedon, who found little difficulty in persuading men, thus prepossessed in his favour, that he pitied the Phocians; that he respected Athens; that he detested the insolence of Thebes; and that, should he ever proceed to the straits of Thermopylæ, his expedition would be more dangerous to that state than to its enemies. At pre-

⁶⁹ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

sent, however, he observed, that he had private reasons for managing the friendship of a people who set no bounds to their resentment. From such motives, he had hitherto declined ratifying the peace with Athens; but this measure he would no longer defer. He only entreated, that to save appearances with the Thebans, the name of the Phocians might be omitted in the treaty. This arduous work was at length brought to a conclusion; and, for the more secrecy, transacted in a place which Demosthenes calls a tavern, adjoining to the temple of Pollux, in the neighbourhood of Pheræ. The Athenian ambassadors took leave, affecting to be persuaded (perhaps persuaded in reality) of the good intentions of the king of Macedon. About the same time, the ambassadors of Sparta departed, but with far less satisfaction. They either perceived, from the beginning, the artifices of the prince with whom they came to treat, or at least made such a report to Archidamus, as convinced him that his republic had not any advantage to expect from the preponderance of the Macedonian interest, and the destruction of the Phocians; and that, should the Spartans persist in their claim to the superintendence of the Delphic temple, they must prepare to assert it by force of arms.

Archidamus raised an army for this purpose, and marched towards the straits. But the intrigues of Philip, as we shall have occasion to relate, rendered his hostility as impotent as his negotiations had been fruitless. From Thessaly that prince had already sent a letter to the Athenians, couched in the most artful terms. He expressed his profound respect for the state, and his high esteem for its ambassadors; declaring that he should omit no opportunity of proving how earnestly he desired to promote the prosperity and glory of Athens. He requested that the means might be pointed out to him, by which he could most effectually gratify the people. Of the conditions of the peace and alliance, he was careful to make no mention; but after many other general declarations of his good-will, he entreated them

Philip's flattering letter to the Athenians.

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“not to be offended at his detaining their ambassadors, of whose eloquence and abilities he wished to avail himself in settling the affairs of Thessaly.”

Æschines
gives an account of the
embassy to
the Athenian
assembly.

Soon afterwards these ambassadors returned home; and having given an account of their negotiation to the senate of the Five hundred, with very little satisfaction to that select body, they next appeared before the popular assembly. Æschines first mounted the rostrum, and in an elaborate and artful discourse, set forth the advantages resulting from his successful embassy, in which he had persuaded Philip to embrace precisely those measures which the interest of Athens required. That, now, the people had peace instead of war, and that, without harassing themselves by military expeditions, they had only to remain quietly at home, enjoying the amusements of the city, and in a few days they would learn that Philip had passed Thermopylæ, to take vengeance, not on the Phocians, but on the Thebans, who had been the real authors of the war, and who, having entertained a design of seizing the temple, were not the less culpable (as had been proved to Philip) because they had failed in this impious purpose. That the Boeotian allies of Thespizæ and Platæa, whose hatred to Thebes was as inveterate as their attachment to Athens was sincere, would be restored to their pristine strength and splendor. That the Thebans, not the Phocians, would be compelled to pay the fine imposed by the Amphictyonic council, and to repair the fatal effects of sacrilege and profanation. That the magistrates of Thebes foresaw the hostility of Philip, and well knew by whom it had been excited. “They have therefore,” said Æschines, “devoted me to destruction, and actually set a price upon my head. The people of Eubœa are equally alarmed by our accommodation with Philip, not doubting that their island will be restored to us, as an equivalent for Amphipolis. Nor are these the

70 Demosthen. & Æschin. ubi supra.

only advantages of the treaty : another point of still higher importance, a point of the most intimate concern to the public, has been secured. But of this I shall speak at another time, since at present I perceive the envy and malignity of certain persons ready to break forth." The advantage hinted at, with such significant obscurity, was the recovery of Oropus, a considerable city on the Athenian frontier, which had long been subject to Thebes.

This specious harangue, so flattering to the indolence and vain hopes of the multitude, was received with general approbation, notwithstanding the opposition of Demosthenes, who declared that he knew nothing of all those great advantages promised by his colleague ; and that he did not expect them. Æschines and Philocrates heard him with the supercilious contempt of men who possessed a secret with which he was unacquainted. But when he endeavoured to continue his discourse, and to expose their artifice and insincerity, all was clamour, indignation, and insult. Æschines bade him remember not to claim any share of the rewards due to the important services of his colleagues. Philocrates, with an air of pleasantry, said, it was no wonder that the hopes of Demosthenes were less sanguine than his own, " since he drinks water ; I wine." This insipid jest was received with loud bursts of laughter and applause, which prevented the assembly from attending to the spirited remonstrances of Demosthenes. A motion was made, and agreed to, for thanking Philip for his equitable and friendly intentions, as well as for ratifying a perpetual peace and alliance between Athens and Macedon. In the same decree, it was determined that the Phocians should submit to the Amphictyonic council, under pain of incurring the displeasure of the republic⁷¹.

These articles, together with the secret motives which produced them, were, by the emissaries of Philip, immediately communicated

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The suspicions of Demosthenes ridiculed by his colleagues.

The success of Philip's artifices with the Athenians deceives the

⁷¹ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

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Phocian am-
bassadors at
Athens;

which makes
the Phocians
reject the
assistance of
Sparta.

Philip nego-
tiates with
Phaleucus
the cession of
Nicæa.

Philip conti-
nues to veil
his designs in
obscurity.

to the Phocian ambassadors then residing at Athens; who, transported with joy at the prospect of averting the calamities which long threatened their country, lost no time in transmitting the agreeable intelligence to their fellow-citizens. They concluded, with a high degree of probability, that, however Philip might deceive the Phocians, the ministers of Athens could never be so bold as publicly to deceive the Athenians; and that, therefore, they could no longer entertain any reasonable doubt of the favourable disposition of the king of Macedon. This belief was so firmly established, that when Archidamus marched into Phocis at the head of an army in order to defend the temple against Philip, the Phocians rejected his assistance, observing, that they feared for Sparta much more than for themselves; upon which the Lacedæmonians returned into Peloponnesus⁷².

Philip was now prepared for executing his grand enterprise. Halus, long besieged, had submitted to the united arms of Parmenio and his own. Fresh troops had arrived from Macedon. The Athenians were appeased; the Lacedæmonians had retired; the Phocians were imposed on; the Thessalians, Thebans, and Locrians, were ready to follow his standard. One obstacle only remained, and that easy to be surmounted. Phaleucus, who commanded eight thousand mercenaries, still kept possession of Nicæa. But a man who had betrayed the interest of his own republic, could not be very obstinate in defending the cause of Greece. Philip entered into a negotiation with him, in order to get possession of Nicæa⁷³, without which it would have been impossible to pass the Thermopylæ; and while this transaction was going forward, wrote repeated letters to the Athenians, full of cordiality and affection.

He suspected the dangerous capriciousness of a people, whose security might yet be alarmed; and whose opposition might still

⁷² Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

⁷³ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 455.

prove fatal to his designs, should they either march forth to the straits, or command their admiral, Proxenus, who was stationed in the Opuntian gulph, between Locris and Eubœa, to intercept the Macedonian convoys; for the frontiers both of Phocis and Thesaly having long lain waste in consequence of the sacred war, Philip received his provisions chiefly by sea. The seasonable professions of friendship, contained in the letters, not only kept the Athenians from listening to the remonstrances of Demosthenes, but prevailed on them to depute that orator, together with Æschines, and several others, whose advice and assistance Philip affected to desire in settling the arduous business in which he was engaged. Demosthenes saw through the artifice of his enemies, for withdrawing him, at this important crisis, from his duty in the assembly: He therefore absolutely refused the commission. Æschines, on pretence of sickness, staid at home to watch and counteract the measures of his rival. The other ambassadors departed, in compliance with the request of Philip, and the orders of their republic, and in hopes of seeing a treaty fulfilled which, they had been taught to believe, would be attended with consequences equally advantageous and honourable⁷⁴.

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While the ambassadors travelled through Eubœa, in their way to join the king of Macedon, they learned, to their utter astonishment, the wonderful events that had been transacted. Phaleucus had been persuaded to evacuate Nicœa. He retired towards Peloponnesus, and embarked at Corinth, with a view to sail to Italy, where he expected to form an establishment. But the capricious and ungovernable temper of his followers compelled him to make a descent on the coast of Elis. After this they re-embarked, and sailed to Crete, where their invasion proved fatal to their general. Having returned to the Peloponnesus, they were defeated by the Elians and

Disasters of
Phaleucus
and his fol-
lowers.

⁷⁴ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

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Arcadians. The greater part of those who survived the battle, fell into the hands of the enemy, by whom they were shot with arrows, or precipitated from rocks. A feeble remnant escaped to their ships, but perished soon afterwards in an insurrection which they had excited, or fomented, in the isle of Sicily. The destruction of this numerous body of men is ascribed by ancient historians⁷⁵ to the divine vengeance which pursued their sacrilege and impiety. It is astonishing that those superstitious writers did not reflect on the swifter and more terrible destruction, that overtook the whole Phocian nation, by whom the wickedness of Phaleucus and his followers had been so recently condemned; and by whom, had not power been wanting, it would have been punished with an exemplary rigour.

Cruel decree
of the Am-
phiſtyons
againſt Pho-
cis;

Philip having passed the straits of Thermopylæ, was received by the Phocians as their deliverer. He had promised to plead their cause before the Amphictyonic council, to the decisions of which that credulous people consented to submit, well knowing that a prince who entered Greece at the head of a numerous army might easily controul the resolutions of the Amphictyons, and fondly believing that prince to be their friend. The deputies of Athens had not yet arrived; those of the southern republics had not even been summoned. The Locrians, Thebans, and Thessalians alone composed the assembly that was to decide the fate of Phocis; a country which they had persecuted with unrelenting hostility in a war of ten years. The sentence was such as might be expected from the cruel resentment of the judges. It was decreed that the Phocians should be excluded from the general confederacy of Greece, and for ever deprived of the right to send representatives to the council of Amphictyons: that their arms and horses should be sold for the benefit of Apollo; that they should be allowed to keep possession of their lands, but compelled to pay annually from their produce

⁷⁵ Diodorus, l. xvi. c. xx. gives this as the general opinion.

the value of sixty thousand talents, till they had completely indemnified the temple; that their cities should be disintegrated, and reduced to distinct villages, containing no more than sixty houses each, at the distance of a furlong from each other; and that the Corinthians, who had recently given them some assistance, should therefore be deprived of the presidency at the Pythian games; which important prerogative, together with the superintendence of the temple of Delphi, as well as the right of suffrage in the Amphictyonic council, lost by the Phocians, should thenceforth be transferred to the king of Macedon. It was decreed that the Amphictyons, having executed these regulations, should next proceed to procure all due repairs and expiations to the temple, and should exert their wisdom and their power to establish, on a solid foundation, the tranquillity and happiness of Greece⁷⁶.

This extraordinary decree, when communicated to the Phocians, filled that miserable people with such terror and dismay, as rendered them totally incapable of acting with vigour or with union. They took not any *common* measures for repelling the invader; a few cities only, more daring than the rest, endeavoured, with unequal strength, to defend their walls, their temples, and the revered tombs of their ancestors. Their feeble resistance was soon overcome; all opposition ceased; and the Macedonians proceeded to execute the will of the Amphictyonic council with inflexible cruelty, and with such undisturbed order and silence as seemed more dreadful than the tumultuary ravages of the fiercest war. Without dropping a tear, or heaving a sigh, since the smallest mark of regret was construed into an obstinacy of guilt, the wretched Phocians beheld the destruction of their ancient monuments and trophies, their proud walls levelled with the ground, the fertile banks of the divine Cephissus covered with ruin and desolation, and the venerable cities of Daulis, Penopeus, Lilæa, and Hyampolis, which had flourished

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which is
cruelly executed by the
Macedonians.
Olymp.
cvi. 2.
A. C. 347.

⁷⁶ Diodor. l. xvi. c. lix. & seqq.

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above nine centuries in splendour and prosperity, and which will ever flourish in the song of Homer, so totally burned or demolished as scarcely to leave a vestige of their existence". After this terrible havoc of whatever they possessed most valuable and respected, the inhabitants were driven like herds of cattle to the settlements allotted for them, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of stern and unrelenting masters. At the distance of three years, travellers, who passed through Phocis to visit the temple of Delphi, melted with compassion, or shuddered with horror, at the sight of such pitious and unexampled devastation. They turned their reluctant eyes from the shattered ruins of a country, and a people, once so illustrious; the youth, and men of full age, had either perished in the war, or been dragged into captivity; the populous cities were no more; and the villages were thinly inhabited by women, children, and wretched old men, whose silent but emphatic expressions of deep-rooted misery exceeded all power of words to describe⁷⁷.

The news of
these events
produce con-
sternation in
Athens.

The unexpected news of these melancholy events reached Athens in five days. The people were then assembled in the Piræus to examine the state of their harbours and shipping. The dreadful intelligence filled them with consternation. They imagined that they already beheld the destructive armies of Macedon and Thessaly, excited by the inveterate hostility of Thebes, pouring in upon their northern frontier, and overwhelming the whole country with havoc and desolation. A decree immediately passed, at the motion of Callisthenes, which marked the utmost danger and dismay. It was resolved, "that the Athenians, who usually resided in the country, should be summoned to the defence of the city; that those, within the distance of twelve miles round, should, along with their per-

⁷⁷ Pausanias in Phocic. & Diodor. l. xvi.
c. lix. & seqq.

⁷⁸ Demost. & Æschin. de Falsa Legat. &
de Coron.

sons, transport their most valuable effects into the city or the Piræus; that those at a greater distance should respectively convey themselves and their property to the nearest fortresses, particularly Eleusis, Phylé, Aphidna, and Sunium, the principal places of strength in the Attic territory ⁷⁹.

This decree shews, that terror was the first movement of the Athenians; but vengeance was the second. Reluctantly cooped up within their walls, they called aloud for arms: levies were prepared for the relief of Phocis; and their admiral Proxenus, who had lately returned from the neighbouring coast, was ordered again to direct his course towards that country. The king of Macedon was duly attentive to those transactions, of which he had been regularly informed by his emissaries. He therefore wrote a letter to the Athenians, in that style of superiority which the success of his policy, and of his arms, justly entitled him to assume. After acquainting them with his treatment of the Phocians, he mentions his being informed of their preparations for supporting that impious people, who were not included in the treaty of peace recently signed and ratified between Athens and Macedon. He exhorts them to lay aside this unwarrantable design, which could have no other effect than to show the iniquity and extravagance of their conduct, in arming against a prince, with whom they had so lately concluded an alliance. "But if you persist, know that we are prepared for repelling your hostilities with equal firmness and vigour."

This mortifying letter was received at the same time that the Athenian ambassadors returned from Lubœa, and brought such accounts of the destruction of the Phocians, that it appeared scarcely possible to afford them any relief. All that remained was to save, from the unrelenting vengeance of their enemies, the miserable wreck of that unfortunate community. The Athenians passed

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Philip writes the Athenians in a style very different from what he had formerly used.

The Athenians pass a decree for receiving the fugitive Phocians.

⁷⁹ Demosthen. de Falsa Legat. sect. 20.

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a decree for receiving the fugitives with kindness, and for providing them with settlements in Attica, or in the foreign dependencies of the republic; a resolution which, though it was founded on the most evident duties of gratitude and humanity towards ancient and faithful allies, gave great offence to the inexorable cruelty of the Thessalians and Thebans⁸⁰.

Philip protects the Phocians against the inhuman vengeance of their Grecian foes;

Amidst these transactions the Macedonian partisans, and especially Æschines and Philocrates, whose vain assurances had been attended with such fatal effects, had just cause to dread the resentment of their country. The former, who had been the principal agent in this disgraceful scene of intrigue and delusion, no longer affected sickness; he forgot the threatenings denounced against him by Thebes; he disregarded the Athenian decree, prohibiting any citizen to stir from the walls; and having waited for, and beheld, the destruction of the Phocians with as much indifference, if we may believe his adversary, as he would have seen the conclusion of any ordinary affair, which concerned merely his pecuniary interest, he repaired to Philip to receive the wages of his iniquity. Æschines accounts for his journey at this time by a more honourable, but less probable cause, the desire of saving the feeble and unhappy remnant of the Phocian nation, who were persecuted to extremity by the barbarous vengeance of their Grecian foes, and protected, at the intercession of the Athenian orator, by the clemency or compassion of the Macedonians. There is reason to believe that Æschines, in order to gain merit with his countrymen, whose resentment he had so highly provoked, opposed an inhuman resolution of precipitating from rocks all those of the Phocians who had attained the age of puberty. But the king of Macedon, whose character was not naturally flagitious, or cruel without necessity, must, of his own accord, have been inclined to avert such an atrocious and bloody sentence, which, without promoting his interest, would have for ever ruined his fame.

⁸⁰ Demosthenes & Æschines de Falsa Legat. sect. 20.

This conclusion appears the more probable, since, we are assured, that, upon the same principle, but with far less success, he assumed the protection of the oppressed Bœotians. Orchomenus, Coronæa, Hyampolis, with other cities of less note in Bœotia, were, in consequence of the ruin of their Phocian allies, again subjected to the dominion of Thebes; a republic, always haughty and unrelenting, who, on this occasion, prepared to treat the rebels with more than her usual insolence and cruelty. Philip espoused the cause of the injured with a generous ardour, extremely disagreeable to the Thebans. His humanity, whether real or affected, was loudly extolled by his partisans in most republics of Greece. It redounded, however, more to his own glory, than to the benefit of the afflicted Bœotians; who, being expelled from their own country by the intolerable oppression of Theban tyranny, sought refuge in the compassionate bosom of Athens⁵¹.

Having finished the sacred war in a manner so favourable to his own interest and ambition, Philip convened the members of the Amphictyonic council, to the number of two hundred, and assisted in the hymns, prayers, and sacrifices offered to Apollo, in acknowledgment of his divine protection of their councils and arms. The name of the pious king of Macedon, who had been the principal instrument of their success, resounded in the sacred Pœans, sung in honour of the God. The Amphictyons ratified all the transactions of that prince, erected his statue in the temple of Delphi, and acknowledged, by a solemn decree, the kingdom of Macedon as the principal member of the Hellenic body⁵². Philip at the same time appointed deputies to preside at the Pythian games, the celebration of which was nearly approaching, and to which most of the Grecian states had already sent their representatives. The Athenians, stung with indignation and regret, abstained from this festival. An embassy was therefore dispatched to them in the name of the Amphic-

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and the Bœotians against the cruelty of Thebes.

Macedon declared by the Amphictyons a member of the Hellenic body.
Olymp. cviii. 3.
A. C. 346.

⁵¹ Demosthen. & Æschines de Falsa Legat. sect. 20.

⁵² Diodor. l. xvi. c. 20.

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Even the
Athenians
admit this
pretension.

tyons, requiring their concurrence with measures recently embraced by the general council of Greece; and remonstrating against their displeasure at the aggrandisement of a prince with whom they had so lately contracted an alliance.

The deliberations of the Athenian assembly, on this occasion, shewed the full extent of their own folly, and evinced the consummate policy of Philip. They acknowledged, with dejection and anguish, that they had neglected the many opportunities presented them by the favour of heaven, for repressing the ambition of their rival; that the time of acting, with vigour and boldness, was now no more; that the cause of Greece was an empty name, since the Greeks surrendered their dignity to the king of Macedon; and that it became their own republic to consult rather its safety than its honour, and to maintain peace with a monarch against whom they were by no means prepared to wage war. Even Demosthenes⁸¹ recommended this resolution; lest, says he, we should offend those now assembled, who call themselves the Amphiçtyons, and thus excite a general war against ourselves. The Thebans, beside ancient causes of quarrel with us, are incensed at our harbouring their exiles; the Locrians and Thessalians resent our protecting the Phocians; the Argives, the Messenians, and Megalopolitans are displeased at our concurring with the views of Lacedæmon. If we refuse the demands of Philip and the Amphiçtyons, they may assault us with the combined arms of all those states, which we are totally unable to resist. One point, therefore, is necessary, the continuance of the present peace; not that it is so very excellent, or so worthy of you; but of what kind soever it may be, it were more for the interest of your affairs, that it never had been concluded, than that now, when it is concluded, you should infringe it. This opinion was universally approved; Macedon was acknowledged a member of the Grecian confederacy; and Isocrates, an Athenian of the highest merit

⁸¹ Demosthen. de Pace.

and reputation, addressed a discourse to Philip in which he exhorted him, to disdain inglorious victories over his countrymen and friends, to employ his authority to extinguish, for ever, the animosities of Greece, and to direct the united efforts of that country, of which Macedon now formed a part, against the wealth and effeminacy of Persia, its ancient and natural enemy⁸⁴.

Whether these exhortations proceeded from the virtuous simplicity which did not suspect, or from the insinuating and artful policy which, though it suspected, hoped to prevent, the hostile projects⁸⁵ of Macedon, the measures of Philip were, doubtless, taken with too much care, and his plans founded too deep and firm, to be shaken by the specious eloquence of a rhetorician. He had long meditated the invasion of Asia; the conquest of the Persian empire was an object that might well tempt his ambition; but neither his own passions, nor the arguments of other men, could hasten, retard, or vary his undeviating progress in a system which could only be completed by consolidating his ancient, before he attempted new conquests.

⁸⁴ Isocrat. Orat. Philipp.

⁸⁵ See the life of Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of his works.

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Foundation of Philippopolis and Cabyla.—Philip's Expedition to Illyria.—Alexander receives the Persian Ambassadors.—Affairs of Greece.—Demosthenes unmasks the Designs of Philip.—Philip's Expedition to the Peloponnesus—to Epirus—to Thrace.—Diopeithes opposes him with Vigour.—The Athenians recover Eubœa.—Siege of Perinthus.—Philip's Letter to the Athenians.—Expedition of Chares—of Phocion—who retrieves the Athenian Affairs in Thrace.—Philip's Scythian Expedition.—The Incendiary Antiphon.—Philip's Intrigues embroil the Affairs of Greece.—The third Sacred War.—Philip General of the Amphictyons.—Confederacy against that Prince.—He seizes Elatœa.—Battle of Charonœa.—His Moderation in Victory.—Demosthenes's Oration in Honour of the Slain.

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Philip e-
vacuates
Greece;
Olymp.
cviii. 4.
A. C. 345.

BY his intrigues Philip had obtained more important advantages, than he could have gained by a long series of victories. The conquest of Greece was his object; he had taken many preliminary measures towards effecting this purpose; while his conduct, so far from exciting the jealousy of those fierce republics, acquired their admiration and gratitude. Instead of rousing the dangerous resentment of a nation whom he was ambitious to subdue, Philip disarmed the

the

the hostility of Athens, and threatened with the vengeance of combined Greece the only republic that appeared forward to obstruct his designs. It seemed high time, therefore, to withdraw his army; to set bounds, for the present, to his own triumphs; nor to attempt, with danger, effecting by premature force, what might be safely accomplished by seasonable policy. Before evacuating Greece, he took care to place a strong garrison in Nicæa, which might thenceforth secure his free passage through the straits of Thermopylæ. Macedonian troops occupied the principal cities of Thessaly, and the strongest posts of Phocis. He conducted with him into Macedon eleven thousand Phocian captives; an acquisition which he regarded as not the least valuable fruits of his success; and of which, on his return home, he determined immediately to avail himself.

The warlike tribes of Thrace, though often vanquished, had never been thoroughly subdued. In order to bridle the dangerous fury of those northern barbarians, Philip built two cities, Philippopolis and Cabyla¹, the first at the western extremity of the country, on the confines of mount Rhodopé, the second towards the east, at the foot of mount Hæmus, above an hundred and fifty miles distant from each other, and almost equally remote from the Macedonian capital. The Phocian captives, blended with a due proportion of Macedonian subjects, well provided with arms for their defence, were sent to people and cultivate those new settlements, whose flourishing condition soon exceeded the expectation of their founder. At the same time, Philip planted a colony in the isle of Thasos, which had formerly belonged to the Athenians; but that people having already lost possession of the gold mines at Philippi, on the neighbouring coast of Thrace, seemed now so indifferent about the possession of Thasos, that their transports were employed in conveying the Macedonians thither².

found^s Philippopolis and Cabyla;

plants a colony in the isle of Thasos.

¹ Strabo, l. vii. p. 118.

² Demosth. de Haloneso.

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His expedi-
tion to Illy-
ria :
Olymp.
civ. 1.
A. C. 344.

In such occupations, chiefly, Philip employed the first year of the peace, not neglecting to complete the ornaments of his capital ; for which purpose he borrowed, as formerly, large sums of money from the richest citizens of Greece. The year following, he made an expedition into Illyria, and, at the expence of that country, extended his dominions from the lake Lychnidus to the Ionian sea. This district, about sixty miles in breadth, was barbarous and uncultivated, but contained valuable salt-mines, which had occasioned a bloody war between two neighbouring tribes. While Philip was absent in Illyria, an embassy arrived from Ochus king of Persia, who, alarmed by the magnificent reports of the growing greatness of Macedon, sent the most trusty of his ministers, who, under pretence of offering to Philip the friendship and alliance of the great king, might examine with their own eyes the strength and resources of a monarch, which were represented as so formidable.

during which
his son Alex-
ander re-
ceives the
Persian am-
bassadors.

In the absence of his father, the young Alexander did the honours of the court ; and it is said, that during an entertainment given to the Persian ambassadors, the prince, who had not yet reached his twelfth year, discovered such manly and premature wisdom, as already announced the dawn of a very extraordinary character³. Among other questions, that could not have been expected from his age, he enquired into the nature of the Persian government and art of war ; the genius and disposition of the reigning sovereign ; the distance of his capital from the coast, and the difficulty of the intervening roads⁴. Such inquiries, whatever talents they announced in the young prince, seem to prove that the conquest of Persia had been a fre-

³ Plutarch (in Alexand.) expresses himself strongly on this subject : “ *ἀνέβλεψε τοὶ ἀρχιστράταις οἱ Πέρσαι τὸν βασιλέα, καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα τοῦ κράτους, καὶ τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ κράτους, καὶ τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ κράτους, καὶ τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ κράτους.*”—Read *de Alex. vita*, and then the sentence may be literally explained ; “ So that the ambassadors wondered, and thought nothing of the famed

abilities of Philip, compared with the spirit and magnanimity of his son.” I recollect not having met with *ἀνέβλεψε* before in the writers of the Socratic age ; but it is a good word to mark the character of a person “ who bines him, as about great objects.”

⁴ Plutarch in Alexand.

quent subject of conversation between Alexander and his instructors; and that an unbounded ambition had already taken possession of his youthful mind. The ambassadors heard him with astonishment, and exclaimed with that freedom which so wonderfully distinguishes the public transactions of ancient, from those of modern times, "Ours is a rich and powerful, but this will be truly a wife and great king⁵."

Philip had no sooner returned from Illyria, than he made an excursion to Thessaly, and finally settled the affairs of that distracted country; having taken on himself the whole management of the revenue, and having divided the territory into four separate governments, in order to weaken the force of opposition, and to render the whole province more patient and submissive under the dominion of Macedon⁶. While Philip was thus employed in Thessaly, his agents were not less active in confirming the Macedonian authority in the isle of Eubœa. Nor was he satisfied with securing his former acquisitions; he aspired at new conquests. The barren and rocky territory of Megara, divided, by an extent of only ten miles, the frontier of Bœotia from the isthmus of Corinth. The industrious and frugal simplicity of this little republic could not defend its virtue against the corrupt influence of the Macedonian⁷. Philip gained a party in Megara, which he cultivated with peculiar care; because, being already master of Bœotia, Phocis, and Thessaly, the narrow territory of the Megarians formed the chief obstacle to his free passage into the Peloponnesus, the affairs of which, at this juncture, particularly deserved his attention.

The Lacedæmonians, repulsed by Philip, whom they had condescended to solicit, rejected by the Phocians, whom they offered to

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Philip's
transactions
in Thessaly,
Eubœa, and
Megara.
Olymp.
cix. 1.
A. C. 344.

⁵ I have used a little freedom with the words of Plutarch; ὅς ὁ πρῶτος ἔτις βασιλεὺς μεγάλος, ὁ δὲ ἡμετέρος πάλαιος. Plut. Orat. ii. de Fortun. Alexand.

⁶ Demosth. Philipp. iii.

⁷ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione, & Phi-

lipp. iii. In Philipp. iv. he speaks as if Philip had made some open attempt against Megara, in which he had failed: ταύτης (scil. Εὐβοίας) ἐπιλαβόμενος, Μεγάραν ὅλως παραμικρον, P. 54.

Philip prepares to protect the inferior communities of the Peloponnesus against the oppressions of Sparta.

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assist, and having lost all hopes of obtaining the guardianship of the Delphic temple, totally deserted a scene of action, in which they could expect neither profit nor honour, and confined their politics and their arms within the narrow circle of their own peninsula. For almost two years, Archidamus had laboured with undivided attention, and with his usual address and activity, to extend the pretensions and the power of Sparta over the territories of Messenæ, Argos, and Arcadia. His measures, planned with prudence, and conducted with vigour, were attended with success, though the inhabitants of the dependent provinces bore with much regret and indignation the yoke of a republic, which they had formerly spurned as oppressive and intolerable. Their murmurs and discontents were inflamed into hostility by the Thebans, the eternal enemies of Sparta, and, at that time, closely allied with the king of Macedon. To this monarch the Thebans applied, requesting him not to permit the destruction of their confederates in the Peloponnese. The intrigues and money of Philip had already gained him a considerable influence in that country, which he was glad of an opportunity to increase. To justify his proceedings for this purpose, he procured a decree of the Amphictyonic council, requiring him to check the insolence of Sparta, and to protect the defenceless communities which had so often been the victims of her tyranny and cruelty. Encouraged by this resolution of the Amphictyons, and impelled by his own ambition, Philip sent troops and money into the Peloponnese, and prepared to march thither in person, at the head of a powerful army^{*}.

The Corinthians prepare to interrupt his march.

These transactions excited new commotions and alarms throughout most countries of Greece. The Corinthians[†], jealous of the power of a prince, who, at the close of the Phocian war, deprived them of their ancient prerogatives and honours, and who, still more recently, had taken possession of Leucas, a city in Acarnania, and

^{*} Demosth. de Pace.

[†] Lucian de Conscriptib. Histor.

of Ambracia in Epirus, both colonies of Corinth, determined to oppose his passage into the Peloponnesus. Weapons and defensive armour were provided, the walls and fortifications were repaired, mercenary troops were levied, the citizens exercised in arms, the whole republic glowed with the ardour of military preparation; insomuch that Diogenes the Cynic, who lost no opportunity to deride the follies of his contemporaries, beholding with just contempt the hurry and vain bustle of the effeminate Corinthians, that seemed so ill calculated to contend with the active vigour of Philip, began to roll about his tub¹⁰, lest he should be the only person unemployed in so busy a city.

The Lacedæmonians, meanwhile, not less alarmed, but always better prepared for war, solicited the assistance of Athens. The latter state had received a considerable accession of strength, as well as of just honour and respect, from its hospitable reception of the distressed exiles from Phocis and Bœotia. It derived new consideration and lustre from the general congress of ambassadors from Sparta, Thebes, Macedon, Argos, Messenæ, and Arcadia, who, after a long interval of time, again condescended to assert their respective claims before the Athenian assembly. The Lacedæmonians represented the league, formed against themselves, as alike dangerous to Athens and to Sparta; that the ambition of Philip would not rest satisfied with a partial conquest; his imagination already grasped the dominion of Greece; and now was the only time for the two leading republics, who had ever mutually assisted each other, in seasons of calamity, to make a firm stand, and to exert their utmost vigour in defence of their own and the public safety, so shamefully abandoned by the Thebans, and by the mob of Peloponnesus¹¹. The Thebans joined with the ministers of Philip, in calling on the Athe-

Negotiations
in Athens.

¹⁰ Aust. apud Brucker. in Vit. Diogen. That learned writer has collected all that is written for and against the tub of Diogenes. Were authors less explicit, the moveable ha-

bitation of this philosopher would be sufficiently attested by ancient monuments. See Winckelmann, d'Hancarville, &c.

¹¹ Οἱ πολλοὶ Πελοποννησίου. Isocrat. in Archidam.

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nians to adhere strictly to their treaty of peace recently concluded with that prince ; they endeavoured, by art and sophistry, to varnish or to palliate such deeds of fraud or violence as could not be altogether denied ; and laboured with the utmost assiduity to separate the views and interests of Athens and Lacedæmon on this important emergency. The ambassadors of the inferior states of Peloponnesus loudly complained, that the Athenians, who affected to be the patrons of liberty, should favour the views of Sparta, which had so long been the scourge of Greece. They represented this conduct as not only unjust and cruel, but contradictory and absurd ; and used many plausible arguments to deter the people of Athens, who still strenuously asserted the freedom of Bœotia, from taking such a part in the present quarrel as might tend to rivet the chains of Peloponnesus.

Artful representations of the Macedonian partisans in Athens,

The Athenian orators, many of them creatures of Philip, exhorted their countrymen not to break too hastily with a prince with whom they had so recently concluded an alliance, nor imprudently renew a bloody and destructive war, out of which they had been lately extricated with so much difficulty. They observed, that although the measures of Philip, since the conclusion of the peace, had indeed been more agreeable to the Thebans than to the Athenians, he had considered himself as bound in justice to chastise the sacrilege of the Phocians. Nor was he altogether at liberty to follow his own inclinations ; surrounded by the Thessalian cavalry and Theban infantry, he was compelled to treat the enemies of those states with a severity which his own feelings disapproved. But the time was arrived when he might act with more independence and dignity ; and that, could any credit be given to report, he was already preparing to rebuild the ruined cities of Phocis, and to fortify Elatea, on the frontier of that territory, by which means he might thenceforth restrain and bridle the insolent cruelty of Thebes. These observations, however improbable, received great force from

the peaceful, or rather indolent disposition of the people, who, though they heard with pleasure those who magnified their ancient grandeur, and inveighed against the injustice and ambition of Philip, were averse to employ either their money, or their personal service, in such active measures as could alone set bounds to the Macedonian encroachments.

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Demosthenes, last, arose, and pronounced a discourse, which the king of Macedon is said to have read with a mixture of terror and admiration¹². “When you hear described, men of Athens! the continual hostilities by which Philip violates the peace, I observe that you approve the equity and patriotism of those who support the rights of the republic: but while nothing is done, on account of which it is worth while to listen to such speeches, our affairs are brought to such a pass, that the more clearly we convict Philip of perfidy towards you, and of hostile designs against Greece, the more difficult it is to propose any seasonable advice. The cause of this difficulty is, that the encroachments of ambition must be repelled, not by words, but by deeds. If speeches and reasonings sufficed, we should long ere now have prevailed over our adversary. But Philip excels in actions as much as we do in arguments; and both of us obtain the superiority in what forms respectively the chief object of our study and concern; we in our assemblies, Philip in the field.

Answered by
Demosthe-
nes.

“Immediately after the peace, the king of Macedon became master of Phocis and Thermopylæ, and made such an use of these acquisitions as suited the interest of Thebes, not of Athens. Upon what principle did he act thus? Because governed in all his proceedings, not by the love of peace or justice, but by an insatiable lust of power, he saw the impossibility of bending the Athenians to his selfish and tyrannical purposes. He knew that the loftiness of their

He explains
the measures,
and points
out the dan-
gerous de-
signs of Phi-
lip.

¹² Plut. in Vit. Demosth. in lib. de Dec. Orator.

character would never stoop to any private consideration, but prefer to any advantage that he might offer them, the dictates of justice and of honour; and that neither their penetration, nor their dignity, could ever be prevailed on to sacrifice to a partial and temporary interest, the general safety of Greece; but that they would fight for each member of the confederacy with the same ardour as for their own walls. The Thebans he judged (and he judged aright) to be more assailable; he knew their folly and their meanness to be such, that provided he heaped benefits on themselves, they would assist him to enslave their neighbours. Upon the same principle he now cultivates, in preference to yours, the friendship of the Messenians and Argives; a circumstance, Athenians! which highly redounds to your honour, since Philip thus declares his persuasion, that you alone have wisdom to understand, and virtue to oppose, his designs; that you foresee the drift of all his negotiations and wars, and are determined to be the incorruptible defenders of the common cause. Nor is it without good grounds that he entertains such an honourable opinion of you, and the contrary of the Thebans and Argives. When the liberties of Greece were threatened by Persia, as they now are by Macedon, the Thebans basely followed the standard of the invaders; the Argives did not oppose their arms; while the magnanimous patriots from whom you are descended spurned offers, highly advantageous, made them by Alexander of Macedon, the ancestor of Philip, who acted as the ambassador of Persia, and preferring the public interest to their own, provoked the devastation of their territory, and the destruction of their capital, and performed, in defence of Greece, those unrivalled exploits of heroism which can never be celebrated with due praise. For such reasons, Philip chooses for his allies, Thebes, Argos, and Messenë, rather than Athens and Sparta. The former states possess not greater strength, wealth, fleets, harbours, and armies; they have not more *power*, but less *virtue*. Nor can Philip plead
the

the merits of their cause; since, if Cheronæa and Orchomenus are justly subject to Thebes, Argos and Messenê are justly subject to Lacedæmon; nor could it be equitable to enslave the inferior cities of Bœotia, and at the same time to teach those of Peloponnesus to rebel.

“But Philip was compelled to this conduct (for this is the only remaining argument that can be alleged in his defence). Surrounded by the Thessalian cavalry and Theban infantry, he was obliged to assist allies whom he distrusted, and to concur with measures which he disapproved. Hence the severe treatment of Phocis, hence the cruel servitude of Orchomenus and Chæronæa. The king of Macedon, being now at liberty to consult the dictates of his own humanity and justice, is desirous to re-establish the republic of Phocis; and, in order to bridle the insolence of Thebes, actually meditates the fortifying of Elatæa. This, indeed, he meditates, and will meditate long. But he does not *meditate* the destruction of Lacedæmon. For this purpose he has remitted money, he has sent his mercenaries, he is prepared, himself, to march at the head of a powerful army. His present transactions sufficiently explain the motives of his past conduct. It is evident that he acts from system, and that his principal batteries are erected against Athens itself. How can it be otherwise? He is ambitious to rule Greece; you alone are capable to thwart his measures. He has long treated you unworthily; and he is conscious of his injustice. He is actually contriving your destruction, and he is sensible that you see through his designs. For all these reasons he knows that you detest him, and that should he not anticipate your hostility, he must fall a victim to your just vengeance. Hence he is ever active and alert, watching a favourable moment of assault, and practising on the stupidity and selfishness of the Thebans and Peloponnesians; for if they were not stupid and blind, they might perceive

ceive the fatal aim of the Macedonian policy. I once spoke" on this subject before the Messenians and Argives; my discourse, which was useless to them, may, perhaps, not unseasonably be repeated to you. "Men of Argos and Messenê! you remember the time when Philip caressed the Olynthians, as he now does you: how highly, do you think, that infatuated people would have been offended, had any man talked against the benefactor, who had generously bestowed on them Anthemus and Potidæa? Had any man warned them against the dangerous artifices of Philip, would they have listened to his advice? Yet, after enjoying for a moment the territories of their neighbours, they were for ever despoiled of their own. Inglorious was their fall; not conquered only, but betrayed and sold by one another. Turn your eyes to the Thessalians. When Philip expelled their tyrants, could the Thessalians ever conjecture that the same prince would subject them to the creatures of Macedon, still more tyrannical and oppressive? When he restored them to their seat and suffrage in the Amphictyonic council, could they have been persuaded that he would one day deprive them of the management of their own revenues? As to you, Messenians and Argives! you have beheld Philip smiling and deceiving; but beware! pray to Heaven, that you may never behold him insulting, threatening, and destroying. Various are the contrivances which communities have discovered for their defence; walls, ramparts, battlements, all of which are raised by the labour of man, and supported by continual expence and toil. But there is one common bulwark, which only the prudent employ, though alike useful to all, especially to free cities against tyrants. What is that? Distrust. Of this be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can befall you¹⁴."

¹³ During his embassy to Peloponnesus, mentioned above.

¹⁴ Demosthen. Orat. ii. in Philipp.

Demosthenes then read to the assembly the schedule of an answer, which he advised to be given to the ambassadors, and which was entirely favourable to the Lacedæmonians. At the same time he exhorted his countrymen to deliberate with firmness, yet with temper, on the means by which they might resist the common enemy; "an enemy with whom he had exhorted them to maintain peace, as long as *that* seemed possible; but peace was no longer in their power; Philip gradually carried on a vast system of hostile ambition, dismembering their possessions, debauching their allies, paring their dominions all around, that he might at length attack the centre, unguarded and defenceless." Had the orator stopped here, his advice might have been followed with some useful consequences. But in declaiming against the encroachments of Macedon, his resentment was naturally inflamed against Philocrates, Æschines, and their associates, whose perfidious intrigues and machinations had produced the public danger and disgrace. He strongly recommended to the injured people to impeach, condemn, and consign to due punishment those detestable traitors. This counsel was not given in vain to the litigious Athenians, who were better pleased to attend the courts of justice at home, than to march into the Peloponnesus. The city resounded with the noise of trials and accusations. Philocrates was banished¹⁵, and Æschines nearly escaped the same fate, by proving the profligate life of his accuser Timarchus¹⁶.

Philip, meanwhile, unopposed and unobserved by his enemies, was sailing with a powerful armament towards Cape Tenarus, the most southern promontory of Laconia. Having landed there without opposition, he was joined by the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives. The united army, after ravaging the most valuable part of the Lacedæmonian territories, besieged and took Trinasus, a maritime city of considerable strength and importance. The terror occasioned among the Spartans by these misfortunes, was heightened

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Impeachment of
Æschines
and Philo-
crates.

Philip settles
the affairs of
the Peloponnesus.

¹⁵ Æschin. in Ctesiphon.

¹⁶ Argum. in Æschin. Orat. in Timarch.

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by extraordinary meteors in the air, whose unusual redness seemed to presage some dreadful calamity¹⁷. The alarm was so general, that it has been thought worth while to record the saying of a Spartan youth, who remained unmoved amidst the public consternation. Being asked, "Whether he was not afraid of Philip?" "Why," replied the generous youth, "should I fear him? he cannot hinder us to die for our country¹⁸." But this manly resolution no longer animated the great body of the Spartan nation. Unable to meet the invader in the field, they sent Agis, the son of king Archidamus, to propose terms of accommodation, or rather to submit their whole fortune to the disposal of the Macedonians. The young prince coming alone and unattended, Philip expressed his surprise. "What, have the Spartans sent but one!" "Am I not sent to one?" was the manly reply of Agis¹⁹. This was the expiring voice of Spartan pride; for the king of Macedon, though unwilling to provoke the despair of a people, whose degenerate virtue might yet be animated by the institutions of Lycurgus, and the example of Leonidas, compelled them to resign their pretended authority over Argos, Messenë, and Arcadia; and settled the boundaries of those republics in a manner highly agreeable to the wishes of his confederates. Before leaving the Peloponnesus, he solemnly renewed his engagements to protect them; and, in return, only required, on their part, that the magistracy in Argos should be entrusted to Myrtis, Teledamus, and Mnasia; in Arcadia, to Cericidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas; in Messenë, to Neon and Thrafsylochus, the sons of Iphiades; men whose names would merit eternal oblivion, if Demosthenes justly branded them as traitors²⁰; but a more impartial, and not less judicious writer²¹, asserts, that by

¹⁷ Plin. Hist. Nat. l. ii. c. xxxvi.

¹⁸ Frontin. l. iv. c. v.

¹⁹ Plut. Apophth.

²⁰ Ποῦρα γὰρ τοῖς ἰλλοσσι, ὃ τισι, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως; φῶμαι πεδοῦτων καὶ δωροδοκῶν καὶ θύει; χυδῶν

αἰθιωπῶν, συνέβη γενέσθαι, ὅσων ὑδίας πῶ προτείνον μεμνηταὶ γεγονυῖαν. These traitors are named in Philipp. iii. & in Orat. de Corona.

²¹ Polyb. iii. 72.

early espousing the interest of Philip, they acquired many important advantages for their respective communities; that their sagacity having foreseen the final prevalence of the Macedonian power and policy over the weakness and folly of Greece, they acted wisely in courting the rising fortune of a prince, who was, at length, enabled to take complete vengeance on his enemies; a vengeance which the Peloponnesians escaped by their own wisdom and foresight, and from which the Athenians, after long provoking it, were finally delivered by the love of glory and magnanimity which regulated the conduct, and adorned the victory, of Philip.

Having settled the affairs of Peloponnesus, the king of Macedon marched through that country amidst the acclamations of the people, who vied with each other in bestowing crowns and statues, the usual marks of public gratitude and admiration, on a prince who had generously rescued them from the cruel yoke of Sparta. At Corinth he passed some days in the house of Demaratus, a man totally devoted to his service; and assisted at the games and spectacles, which were celebrated in that city, by an immense concourse of people from the neighbouring republics. The turbulent Corinthians, who, besides their innate hatred of kings, had particular causes of animosity against Philip, did not conceal their sentiments; and their inhospitable insolence was abetted by many Peloponnesians, who profited of the liberty of the place, and of the occasion, to testify their rooted aversion to the king of Macedon, and their unwillingness to owe their freedom and their safety to the interposition of a foreign tyrant. Philip was strongly urged by his courtiers to punish their ingratitude; but he knew how to digest an affront²², when forgiveness was more useful than vengeance; and repressed the unseasonable indignation of his attendants by observing, with admirable patience, "Were I to act with severity,

Philip publicly insulted at Corinth;

his moderation.

²² Longinus has preserved the expression of Theopompus. "that Philip could easily swallow affronts."

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what must I expect from men, who repay even kindness with insult²³?"

Philip extends the boundaries of Epirus, and seizes the Halonnesus. Olymp. cix. 1.
A. C. 344.

Philip proceeded from Corinth by the nearest route into Macedon, where he continued the remainder of that year, directing the improvements that were carrying on in his kingdom, and inspecting with particular care the education of his son Alexander, whose capacious and fervid mind, like a rich and luxuriant soil, producing promiscuously flowers and weeds, strongly required the hand of early culture²⁴. But these useful occupations did not divert his attention from the politics of neighbouring states. He extended the boundaries of Epirus, then governed by his brother-in-law Alexander, the most faithful and devoted of his vassals, by adding to that little principality the province of Cassiopaëa, which was chiefly inhabited by Elian colonies. At the same time he exercised his fleet by wrestling Halonnesus, an island near the coast of Thessaly, from the hands of corsairs, and kept possession of his conquest, without paying any regard to the claim of the Athenians, the ancient and lawful proprietors of the island²⁵.

Settles the commotions in Thrace, and protects the Cardians. Olymp. cix. 2.
A. C. 343.

Next year Philip was summoned into Upper Thrace by a rebellion of the petty princes in that country, fomented by Amadocus, king of the Odrysians. The warlike tribes of that great nation, acting with little concert or union, were successively subdued; and the dexterity of the king of Macedon seconding his usual good fortune, he soon ranked the most obstinate of his enemies in the number of his vassals or courtiers²⁶. At his return from the inhospitable wilds of Thrace, he took under his protection the city and republic of Cardia, occupying the neck of land which joins the Thracian Chersonesus to the continent. The rest of the peninsula had long been subject to the Athenians, whose authority the citizens of Cardia always set at defiance. The Athenians had lately strengthened the Chersonesites by a new colony,

²³ Plut. in Alexand.

²⁴ Plut. *ibid*.

²⁵ Demosth. Orat. de Halon.

²⁶ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 464.

which

which had continual disputes with the Cardians about the extent of their boundaries. Matters had actually come to a crisis, and the Cardians were ready to be overwhelmed by the strength and numbers of the enemy, when they were seasonably protected by the Macedonian arms ²⁷.

The seizing of Halonnesus, the conquering of Grecian colonies for the tyrant of Epirus, above all, the open assistance given to their inveterate enemies, the Cardians, once more roused the Athenians from their lethargy. These fresh insults brought back to their recollection the ancient grounds of animosity, and the manifold injuries which they had suffered since the conclusion of the peace with Macedon. But instead of opposing Philip with arms, the only means by which he might yet be resisted with any hope of success, they employed the impotent defence of speeches, resolutions, and embassies. Their complaints were loud and violent in every country of Greece. They called the attention of the whole confederacy to the formidable encroachments of a Barbarian, to which there seemed no end; and exhorted the Greeks to unite in repressing his insolent usurpation ²⁸.

Philip, who then agitated schemes from which he wished not to be diverted by a war with the Athenians, sent proper agents throughout Greece, to counteract the inflammatory remonstrances of that people; and dispatched to Athens itself, Python of Byzantium, a man of a daring and vigorous mind; but who concealed, under that passionate vehemence of language which seems to arise from conviction and sincerity, a mercenary spirit, and a perfidious heart. Python had long ago sold himself, and, as far as depended on himself, the interest of his country, to the king of Macedon, from whom he now conveyed a letter to the senate and people of Athens, written with that specious moderation and artful plausibility, which Philip knew so well to assume in all his transactions. “ He offered to make a pre-

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These measures rouse the Athenians from their lethargy.

Philip dispatches Python of Byzantium with a letter to that people.

Its contents.

²⁷ Demosthen. Orat. de Halon. p. 34. & Plut. in Vit. Eumen.

²⁸ Demosthen. de Chersoneso, p. 35, & seqq.

sent

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sent to the Athenians of the island of Halonneseus, and invited them to join with him in purging the sea of pirates: he intreated them to refer to impartial arbitrators all the differences that had long subsisted between the two nations, and to concert amicably together such commercial regulations as would tend greatly to the advantage of both. He denied that they could produce any proof of that duplicity on his part, of which they so loudly complained. That for himself, he was ready not only to terminate all disputes with them by a fair arbitration, but to compel the Cardians to abide by the award; and he concluded, by exhorting them to distrust those designing and turbulent demagogues, whose selfish ambition longed to embroil the two countries, and involve them in the horrors of war²⁹."

Diopceithes,
the Athenian
general in
Thrace, acts
rigorously
against Phi-
lip.

The subtle artifices of Philip, though supported on this occasion by the impetuous eloquence of Python, were overcome by Hegesippus and Demosthenes, who refuted the various articles of the letter with great strength and perspicuity, and unveiled the injustice of Philip with such force of evidence, that the Athenians resolved sending a considerable armament to the Chersonesus, to protect their subjects in that peninsula³⁰. Diopceithes, who commanded the expedition, was a determined enemy to the Macedonians, and a man of courage and enterprise. Before he arrived in the Chersonesus, Philip, trusting to the effect of his letter and intrigues, had returned into Upper Thrace. Diopceithes availed himself of this opportunity to act with vigour. Having provided for the defence of the Athenian settlements in Thrace, he made an incursion into the neighbouring country; stormed the Macedonian settlements at Crobylé and Tiristafis; and having carried off many prisoners, and a considerable booty, lodged them in the safe retreat of the Chersonesus. On this emergency Amphilocheus, a Macedonian of rank, was sent as Ambassador, to treat of the ransom of prisoners; but Diopceithes, regardless of

²⁹ Demosthen. seu Hegesipp. de Halon. p. 33, & seq.

³⁰ Idem, ibid.

this character, ever held sacred in Greece, cast him in prison, the more surely to widen the breach between Athens and Macedon; and, if possible, to render it irreparable. With equal severity he treated a herald, whom he had taken in his late excursion, charged with letters from Philip; which were sent to Athens, and read in full assembly³¹.

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The King of Macedon, when informed of these hostilities and insults, gave free scope to his complaints and threats; and his emissaries had an easier game at Athens, as Diopeithes had not only violated the peace with Macedon, but, in order to maintain his troops, which were very sparingly supplied by the republic, levied considerable contributions from the Greek settlements in Asia. The partisans of Macedon inveighed against this commander as a robber and pirate, the common enemy of Greeks and Barbarians; Philip's letters demanded vengeance from the justice of Athens, if not, he would be his own avenger; the personal enemies of Diopeithes joined in the outcry, and insisted, that such a daring offender ought immediately to be recalled, and punished for his misconduct³².

The partisans
of Philip cal-
bal to ruin
Diopeithes.

On this occasion Demosthenes undertook to defend the accused general, whose measures he warmly approved; and motives of private friendship heightening the ardour of patriotism, render his discourse on the affairs of the Chersonesus one of the most animated and interesting of his productions. The impeachment of Diopeithes he ascribes entirely to malice or perfidy, which had been too successfully employed to withdraw the attention of the Athenians from the main object of their concern, the continual encroachments of Philip, to unjust complaints and calumnies against their fellow-citizens. Diopeithes, if really criminal, might be recalled, and punished whenever they thought proper. A simple mandate from the republic could, at any time, reduce *him* to his duty.

He is power-
fully defend-
ed by De-
mosthenes.

³¹ Epistol. Philipp. & Liban. Argum. in Demosthen. Orat. de Chersoneso.

³² Demosthen. Orat. de Chersoneso.

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But Philip, the public enemy, who was continually infringing the peace, who, before the expedition of Diopceithes, had oppressed the Chersonesites, had stormed Serrium and Doriscus, how was Philip to be restrained, unless they repelled force by force? Instead of recalling their troops from the Chersonesus on the remonstrance of a crafty tyrant, who would not acknowledge himself at war with them, till he assaulted the walls of Athens, they ought to exert their utmost ability in augmenting the army in that quarter. Should their forces be withdrawn, Philip would wait the approach of winter, or the setting in of the Etesian winds, to fall on the Chersonesus. Will it then be sufficient to accuse Diopceithes? Or will this save our allies? "O, but we will sail to their relief." But if the winds will not permit you? Even should our enemy attack, not the Chersonesus, but Megara or Chalcis, as he lately did Oreum, would it not be better to oppose him in Thrace, than to carry the war to the frontiers of Attica? The exactions demanded by Diopceithes from the Asiatic Greeks are justified by the example of all his predecessors, who, according to the strength of their respective armaments, have always levied proportional contributions from the colonies; and the people who grant this money, whether more or less, do not give it for nothing. It is the price for which they are furnished with convoys to protect their trading vessels from rapine and piracy. If Diopceithes had not that resource, how could he subsist his troops, he who receives nothing from you, and who has nothing of his own. From the skies? No; but from what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. Who does not perceive that this pretended concern for the colonies, in men who have no concern for their country, is one of the many artifices employed to confine and fix you to the city, while the enemy keeps the field, and manages the war at pleasure? That such traitors should exist, is less surprising than that you should patiently receive from them such counsels, as Philip himself would dictate. For what else could the king of Macedon, who understands his own interest so well, advise, but that you should

should remain quietly at home, decline personal service in the war, deny pay to your soldiers, revile and insult your general. When a man, hired to betray you, rises up in the assembly, and declares Chares or Diopeithes to be the cause of your calamities, such an hypocrite is heard with satisfaction. You despise the voice of him, who, animated by a sincere love for his country, calls out, "Be not deceived, Athenians! Philip is the real cause of all your misfortunes and disgrace." The disagreeable truth renders the man who declares it odious; for the insidious discipline of certain ministers has so changed your principles and characters, that you are become fierce and formidable in your courts of justice, but tame and contemptible in the field. You rejoice, therefore, to hear your distresses charged on those whom you can punish at home; but are unwilling to believe that it proceeds from a public enemy, whom you must oppose with arms in your hands. Yet, Athenians, if the states of Greece should thus call you to account for your conduct: "Men of Athens, you are continually sending embassies to assure us, that Philip is projecting *our* ruin, and *that* of all the Greeks. But O, most wretched of mankind! when this common foe was detained six months abroad by sickness, the severity of winter, and the armies of his enemies, did you profit by that opportunity to recover your lost possessions? Did you restore even Eubœa to liberty, and expel those troops and tyrants who had been placed there in ambush, and directly opposite to Attica? No. You have remained insensible to your wrongs, and fully convinced us, that were Philip ten times to die, it would not inspire you with the least degree of vigour. Why then these embassies, these accusations, all this unnecessary ferment! If the Greeks should ask this, what could we answer? I know not.

"There are men who think to perplex a well-intentioned speaker by asking, What ought we to do? My answer is sincere, None of those things which you do at present. I explain my opinion at greater length, and may you be as ready to receive, as to ask, advice! First

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of all, you must hold it as matter of firm belief, that Philip has broken the peace, and is at war with your republic: that he is an enemy to your city, to the ground on which it stands, to all those who inhabit it, and not least to such as are most distinguished by his favours. The fate of Euthykrates and Lasthenes³¹, citizens of Olynthus, may teach *our* traitors the destruction that awaits them, after they have surrendered their country. But though an enemy to your city, your soil, and your people, Philip is chiefly hostile to your government, which, though ill fitted to acquire, or to maintain, dominion over others, is admirably adapted to defend both yourselves and them, to repel usurpation, and to humble tyrants. To your democracy, therefore, Philip is an unrelenting foe, a truth, of which you ought to be deeply persuaded; and next, that wherever you repress his encroachments, you act for the safety of Athens, against which, chiefly, all his batteries are erected. For who can be so foolish as to believe, that the cottages of Thrace (Drongila, Cabila, and Mastira), should form an object worthy of his ambition; that, in order to acquire them, he should submit to toils and dangers; that, for the sake of the rye and millet of Thrace, he should consent to spend so many months amidst winter snows and tempests; while, at the same time, he disregarded the riches and splendour of Athens, your harbours, arsenals, galleys, mines, and revenues? No, Athenians. It is to get possession of Athens, that he makes war in Thrace and elsewhere. What then ought we to do? Tear ourselves from our indolence, not only support, but augment the troops which are on foot, that, as Philip has an army ever ready to attack and conquer the Greeks, you also may be ready to succour and to save them³²."

Demosthenes
ventures not
to propose
the war in
form.

It is worthy of observation (because nothing betrays more evidently the tyrannical spirit of democracy), that Demosthenes does not propose the war in form, by bringing in a written bill or decree, to

³¹ See above, c. xxxv.

³² Demosthen. Orat. de Chersones. p. 35, & seqq.

be approved or rejected by the votes of his countrymen. This decree must have been recorded among the Athenian archives; and, if the war should prove unfortunate, might be produced at some future time for the destruction of its author, whose enemies would not fail to allege this instrument as a proof that he had occasioned the rupture with Philip, and all the calamities consequent on that measure. The party accused would, in that case, vainly endeavour to shelter himself under the votes of the assembly, since an ordinary court of justice could call him to account for misleading the people³⁵, and punish him with banishment or death. Demosthenes artfully glances at this disagreeable subject: "Rash, impudent, and audacious, I neither am, Athenians, nor wish ever to become; yet possess more true fortitude than the boldest of your demagogues, who capriciously distributing honours and largesses on the one hand, and as capriciously impeaching, condemning, and confiscating on the other, have, in either case, a sure pledge of impunity in the flattery and artifices by which they have long seduced the public. The courage of that minister is put to an easy trial, who is ever ready to sacrifice your permanent interest to your present pleasure. But he is truly courageous, who, for the sake of your safety and glory, opposes your most favourite inclinations, rouses you from your dream of pleasure, disdains to flatter you, and having the good of his country ever in view, assumes that post in the administration in which fortune often prevails over policy, knowing himself responsible for the issue. Such a minister am I, whose unpopular counsels tend to render, not myself, but my country great."

The arguments and remonstrances of Demosthenes not only saved Diopithes, but animated the Athenians with a degree of³⁶ vigour which they had been long unaccustomed to exert. A fleet was fitted out under the command of Callias, who seized all Macedonian ships

The Athenians oppose the common enemy with spirit by sea and land.

³⁵ By the *γραφὴ παρρημίου* .. Vide Demosth. de Ceron. passim.

³⁶ Vid. Epist. Philip.

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as lawful prize, and made a descent on the coast of Thessaly, after plundering the harbours in the Pelasgic gulph. A considerable body of forces was sent into Acarnania to repel the incursions of Philip, assisted by his kinsman and ally, Alexander of Epirus. The inhabitants of the island of Peperathus, trusting to the protection of Athens, expelled the Macedonian garrison from Halonnesus. Repeated embassies were dispatched to the Peloponnesians and Eubœans, exhorting them to throw off the ignominious yoke of Macedonia, and to unite with their Grecian brethren against the public enemy. Philip was not unattentive to these commotions, but his designs against the valuable cities on the Propontis and Thracian Bosphorus³⁷ being ripe for execution, he was unwilling to allow any secondary consideration to divert him from that important enterprise.

Philip attempts to get possession of Byzantium and Perinthus. Olymp. cix. 3. A. C. 342.

His intrigues and bribery had gained a considerable party in Byzantium, at the head of which was the perfidious Python, whose vehement eloquence gave him great influence with the multitude. A conspiracy was formed to surrender one of the gates of the city; the Macedonian army of thirty thousand men hovered round; but the design was suspected or discovered, and Philip, to screen his partisans from public vengeance, seasonably withdrew his army, and invested the neighbouring city of Perinthus. The news of these transactions not only increased the activity of Athens, but alarmed Ochus king of Persia, who being no stranger to Philip's design of invading his dominions, trembled at beholding that ambitious prince gradually approach his frontier. To prevent this danger Ochus adopted the same policy, which, in similar circumstances, had been successfully employed by his predecessors³⁸. The Persian gold was profusely scattered among the most eminent of the Grecian demagogues. Demosthenes, whose patriotism was not always proof

³⁷ Demosth. de Coron. & Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxii.

³⁸ Plut. in Alexand.

against

against an unworthy alliance³⁹ with interest, rejoiced at being paid for doing what he considered as his duty. At Athens his invectives were louder than ever against the king of Macedon; and the affairs of Eubœa gave him an opportunity of exerting himself with equal zeal in that island.

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The factious spirit of the Eubœans rendered them alike incapable of independence, and of remaining quietly under the government either of Athens or Macedon, to which they were alternately subject. The recent prevalence of the Macedonian party had been marked by many acts of violence and oppression. The cities of Chalcis, Oreum, and Eretria prepared to rebel, having previously solicited assistance from Peloponnesus, Acarnania, Attica, and every province of Greece, which they had any reason to deem favourable to their views. From other states they brought back promises and hopes; from Athens they obtained, chiefly by the influence of Demosthenes, a considerable body of troops commanded by the brave and virtuous Phocion. The orator accompanied the expedition; and being allowed to address the popular assemblies in most of the cities of Eubœa, he inflamed them with such animosity against Philip and his partisans, that little remained to be done by the valour of the Athenian general. The Eubœans every where took arms in defence of their freedom, the Macedonian garrisons were expelled from the principal cities, and driven from one post to another, till they were compelled entirely to evacuate the island. This event occasioned great joy at Athens; and the principal merit was ascribed to Demosthenes, who, at the motion of Aristonicus, a man of merit and eminence, was crowned by the senate and people with a golden crown; which honour was publicly proclaimed in the theatre of Bacchus, during the representation of the new tragedies, amidst an immense concourse of people, citizens and strangers⁴⁰.

The Athenians recover Eubœa.

The merit of Demosthenes acknowledged on this occasion.

³⁹ Plut. in Demosth.

⁴⁰ Demosth. de Coron. & Plut. in Demosth.

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Circumstances which enabled the Perinthians to make an obstinate defence.
Olymp.
civ. 4.

A. C. 341.

The loss of Eubœa was ill compensated to Philip by the military operations against Perinthus, in which he found an enemy worthy of his courage and perseverance. The town was situated on the sloping ridge of an isthmus, and strongly fortified both by art and nature, the houses and streets rising one above another like the seats of an amphitheatre, so that the higher edifices overlooked and defended the lower. Having scoured the neighbouring country with his cavalry, Philip exhausted, in the siege of Perinthus, all the military skill known to the ancients. He raised towers forty cubits high, which enabled his men to fight on equal ground with the besieged; his miners were busy at the foundation; at length the battering rams advanced to the wall, in which a considerable breach was made. During this time, however, the townsmen had not been idle. The superior discharge of darts, arrows, and every kind of missile weapon from the Macedonian towers, had indeed dislodged the Perinthians from those parts of the wall and battlements, against which the principal attack had been directed. But with incessant toil, the besieged built a new wall within the former, on which they appeared in battle array, prepared to repel the enemy who entered the breaches⁴¹. The Macedonians, who advanced with impetuous joy to reap the fruits of their labour, were infinitely mortified to find that their work must be begun anew. Philip employed rewards and punishments, and all the resources of his mind fertile in expedients, to restore their hopes, and to animate their activity. The siege recommenced with fresh ardour, and the Perinthians were thrice reduced to extremity, when they were unexpectedly saved, first by a large supply of arms and provisions from Byzantium, next by a strong reinforcement of men in Persian pay, commanded by Apollodorus, a citizen of Athens; and lastly by the advantageous situation of the town, which, being built in a conical form, presenting its apex or narrow

⁴¹ Diodor. p. 466, & seqq.

point to the besiegers, gradually rose and widened towards the remoter parts, from which it was easy to observe all the motions of the enemy, and to overwhelm them with missile weapons as they advanced to the charge. Philip, ever sparing of the lives of his men, was deterred by this circumstance from venturing an assault, though his machines had effected a breach in the new wall: he therefore determined to change the siege into a blockade. Perinthus was shut up as closely as possible by sea and land: part of the Macedonian troops who had become mutinous for want of pay (for Philip at this time owed above two hundred talents, or forty thousand pounds sterling), were indulged in plundering the rich territory of Byzantium, while the remainder were conducted to the siege of Selebria, and soon after of Byzantium itself, the taking of which places, it was hoped, might compensate their lost labour at Perinthus⁴².

During the military operations against the cities of the Propontis, Demosthenes did not cease exhorting his countrymen to undertake their defence, as essential to their own safety. The hostilities and devastations of Philip, he represented as the periodical returns of the pestilence and other contagious disorders, in which all men were alike threatened with their respective shares of calamity. He, who was actually sound and untainted, had an equal interest with the diseased and infirm, to root out the common evil, which, if allowed to lurk in any part, would speedily pervade and afflict the whole. The Macedonians now besieged Selebria and Byzantium; if successful in these enterprises, they would soon appear before Sparta, Thebes, and Athens. Yet he knew not by what fatality the Greeks looked on the successive encroachments of Philip, not as events which their vigorous and united opposition might ward off and repel, but as disasters inflicted by the hand of Providence; as a

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The Thracian cities, supported by numerous allies, resist the arms of Philip.

⁴² Diodorus, l. xvi. c. xxii.

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tempestuous cloud of hail, so destructive to the vines in autumn, which all beheld, with horror, hovering over them, but none took any other means to prevent, than by deprecating the gods that it might not fall on his own fields ⁴³. These animated and just representations of the common distress or danger, engaged the Athenians to enter into a close correspondence with the besieged cities ⁴⁴. Demosthenes undertook a journey to Byzantium; and Leon, a Byzantine orator and patriot, the friend and fellow-student of the virtuous Phocion, resided as ambassador in Athens. At the same time the principal cities of the Propontis maintained an uninterrupted intercourse of good offices with each other, as well as with their allies of Rhodes and Chios, from whom they received repeated supplies of arms and provisions.

Philip attacks and defeats Diopieithes, and justifies his conduct to the Athenians.

Philip, meanwhile, ceased not to assure the Athenians, by his letters and emissaries, that he was extremely desirous of maintaining peace with the republic, and gently chid them for their evident marks of partiality towards his enemies, which, however, he took care to ascribe, not to the general temper and disposition of the people, but to the prevalence of a dangerous faction, inflamed by seditious and selfish demagogues. By a rapid march he had recently surpris'd an Athenian detachment ravaging the territory of Cardia. Diopieithes, the Athenian general in the Chersonesus, commanded this predatory band, who, after a slight skirmish, were repelled with the loss of their leader, slain by a dart, while he rallied his men with his voice and arm. Philip failed not, by letter, to excuse this act of hostility, to which, he assured the Athenians, that he had been compelled, much against his inclination: he affected to con-

⁴³ Ἄλλα ἵμας ταύτ' ὄρνυται ἐν Ἑλλάδι αἰεὶ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, ὅστις ἐν τῇ χαλαραῖ, ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ὁμοῦν μὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς γινώσκοντες, πάλαι δὲ αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τῇ. Demost. in Philipp. iii. p. 48. In the country where I now write (the Pays de Vaud) the beauty and force of this comparison is too well un-

derstood. Lofty mountains covered with snow, sunny hills, and fertile vallies—Such too is the geography of Greece, which rendered the hail storms so alarming and so destructive.

⁴⁴ Demosthen. de Corona.

sider Diopceithes as the instrument of a malignant faction, headed by Demosthenes, rather than as the general of the republic; and as that commander had acted unwarrantably in plundering the Cardians, a people strictly allied with Macedon, Philip assured himself that the senate and people would not take it amiss that, provoked by repeated injuries, he had at length repelled violence, and defended the lives and fortunes of his long-injured confederates.

While the Athenians and Philip were on this footing of correspondence, the former sent twenty vessels laden with corn to the relief of the Selymbrians. Leodamas, who commanded this convoy, seems to have imagined that the treaty formerly subsisting between the two powers, would protect him from injury. But in this he was disappointed. His fleet was surrounded and taken by Amyntas, who commanded the naval force of Macedon, and who determined to retain his prize, without paying any regard to the complaints and remonstrances of Leodamas, who pretended that the convoy was not destined for Selymbria, but employed in conveying the superabundance of the fertile Chersonesus to the rocky and barren island of Lemnos.

The news of the capture of their ships occasioned much tumult and uneasiness among the Athenians. After frequent deliberations on this subject, a decree was framed for sending ambassadors to Philip, in order to redemand their property, and to require that Amyntas, if he had exceeded his instructions, should be punished with due severity. Cephisophon, Democritus, and Polycrates, who were named for this commission, repaired without delay to Philip in the Hellespont, who, at their request, immediately released the captured vessels, and dismissed the Athenians with the following letter: "Philip king of Macedon, to the senate and people of Athens, Health. I have received three of your citizens in quality of ambassadors, who have conferred with me about the release of certain ships, commanded by Leodamas. I cannot but admire their

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Philip's admiral seizes an Athenian convoy destined for the relief of Selymbria.

Philip releases the captured vessels, and writes an artful letter to the Athenians. Olynth. c. 1. A. C. 341.

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simplicity in thinking to persuade me that these ships were intended to convey corn from the Chersonesus to the isle of Lemnos, and not destined for the relief of the Selymbrians, actually besieged by me, and nowise included in the treaty of pacification between Athens and Macedon. This unjust commission Leodamas received, not from the people of Athens, but from certain magistrates, and others now in private stations, who are too busy in urging you to violate your engagements, and to commence hostilities against me; a matter which they have more at heart than the relief of Selymbria, fondly imagining that they may derive advantage from such a rupture. Deeply persuaded that our mutual interest requires us to frustrate their wicked schemes, I have given orders to release the captured vessels; and do you, in return, remove such pernicious counsellors from the administration of your affairs; and let them feel the severity of your justice. On my part, I shall endeavour to preserve inviolate the treaty, by which we stand mutually engaged ⁴⁵.”

Demothenes
persuades the
Athenians to
succour the
besieged ci-
ties in
Thrace.

The moderate and friendly sentiments expressed in this letter afforded great advantage to the Macedonian partisans at Athens. But Demothenes, and Leon of Byzantium, spared no pains to detect and expose the artifices and duplicity of Philip, who employed this humble and peaceful tone, during his operations against the cities of the Propontis, in order to stifle the resentment of the Athenians, at a crisis when they might act against him with peculiar advantage. In elaborate and powerful orations ⁴⁶, in which, without urging any new matter, Demothenes condensed, invigorated, and enlivened his former observations and reasonings, he convinced his countrymen of the expediency of being for once before-hand with their enemy, and of anticipating his designs against themselves by a speedy and effectual assistance to their distressed brethren of Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium. By his convincing eloquence the public councils were animated with a degree of energy and enthusiasm which had not ap-

⁴⁵ Epist. Philip, in Demosth.

⁴⁶ Orat. iv, in Philip. & Orat. de Epist. Philip.

peared in them during many years, and which produced the last transitory glimpse of success and splendor, before the glory of Athens was extinguished for ever.

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It was decreed by the senate and people, to fit out a fleet of an hundred and twenty galleys; but unfortunately the command was given to Chares, whose character rendered him as contemptible to the enemies, as he was formidable to the allies, of the republic. The Byzantines excluded him from their harbour, and he was defeated by Amyntas, the Macedonian admiral, off the opposite shore of Chalcedon. This disaster, which was chiefly occasioned by the incapacity of their commander, made the Athenians cast their eyes on Phocion⁴⁷, who, though ever ready to serve his country, was most frequently called for in times of danger and calamity.

Dishonour-
able expe-
dition of
Chares.
Olymp.
cx. 1.
A. C. 340.

Before Phocion reached the Propontis, Philip, flushed with his naval success, made an attempt to storm Byzantium. That city was environed on three sides by the sea, and defended on the fourth by a strong wall, and a large and deep trench, covered by lofty towers, separated at small intervals from each other. Confident in the strength of the place, and the abundance of their magazines, the inhabitants of Byzantium, without risking a fall, allowed Philip to carry on his works, and gradually to make his approaches to their walls. During this inaction of the townsmen, Philip carefully advanced his battering engines, and seemed determined to assault the walls; but, meanwhile, embraced proper measures for gaining the place by surprise. For executing this design, he chose the gloom of a tempestuous night; a determined band of Macedonians passed the ditch; the scaling-ladders were already fixed; when the centinels of Byzantium were alarmed by the barking of mastiffs, kept in the towers even in time of peace, to secure them in the night. The alarm spread with rapidity among the several guards, who rushing

Philip fails
in his at-
tempt to sur-
prise Byzan-
tium.

⁴⁷ Plutarch in Phocion.

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tumultuously from their respective stations, as if the enemy had been already masters of the town, were on the point of blindly assailing each other, when a bright meteor, or repeated flashes of lightning, enabled them to distinguish their friends, and to discern the danger. Having formed in some degree of order, they advanced against the Macedonians, who had already gained the rampart, from which they were with difficulty repulsed by superior numbers⁴³.

The Athenians, commanded by Phocion, save the Thracian cities; Olymp.
cx. 1.
A. C. 340.

The defeat of this bold and dangerous enterprise did not discourage Philip from carrying on his operations with indefatigable diligence and vigour. His perseverance must finally have prevailed over the obstinacy of the besieged, had not the Athenian fleet, under Phocion, arrived in the Thracian Bosphorus. The Byzantines received him with open arms, expecting that under such a commander, their auxiliaries would prove not less modest and inoffensive in their quarters, than active and intrepid in the field. Nor were their hopes disappointed; the arms of Philip were foiled in every encounter; his artifices were met and eluded by similar address; nor could he expect by force or fraud to gain any advantage over an opponent alike brave and vigilant⁴⁴. The king of Macedon, who had as much flexibility in varying his measures, as firmness in adhering to his purposes, was unwilling any farther to press his bad fortune. In the actual state of his affairs, he judged it necessary to raise the siege of Byzantium, to withdraw his forces from Selymbria and Perinthus, and to leave the Athenians in possession of the northern shore of the Propontis. These were humiliating resolutions, but fortunately for Philip, an event fell out, which prevented the execution of them from reflecting much discredit on his arms or policy.

and ravage the Macedonian territories.

Phocion, to whose conduct the safety of so many important cities was principally owing, failed from Byzantium amidst the

⁴³ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 468.

⁴⁴ Plut. in Phocion.

grateful vows and acclamations of innumerable spectators. In his voyage to the Chersonesus, he captured a fleet of victuallers and transports, carrying arms and provisions for the enemy. When he arrived in that peninsula, he repressed the insolence of the Cardians, who, reinforced by a Macedonian garrison, had recently undertaken an expedition against the city of Sestos. He recovered several places on the coast of Thrace, which had reluctantly submitted to the dominion of the Macedonians; and, in concert with the inhabitants, took such measures as seemed most proper to protect the Athenian allies in those parts, from future danger. Instead of burdening the confederates with the maintenance of his army, he plentifully supplied all the wants of his soldiers from the enemy's country. He commanded in person the parties that went out to forage and to plunder; and in one of those expeditions, received a dangerous wound, yet did not embark for his return, until he had spread the terror of the Athenian name, by ravaging with fire and sword the hereditary dominions of Philip⁵⁰.

The meritorious services of Phocion were deeply felt and acknowledged by the communities whom he had protected and relieved⁵¹. The deliverance and gratitude of the Chersonesus, of Perinthus, and of Byzantium, were testified by crowns, statues, inscriptions, and altars; and are still recorded in an oration of Demosthenes⁵², which has deservedly survived those solid and authentic monuments of gold and marble. The decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, after describing the ancient and recent benefits of Athens towards them, enacted, that, in return for those favours, the Athenians should be entitled to the right of intermarriage, the privilege of purchasing lands in their territories, the freedom of their respective cities, and the first and most honourable place in all their entertainments and assemblies: That whatever Athenians chose to reside with them should be exempted from all taxes: And that, further, three statues, each sixteen

Extraordinary honours conferred on the Athenians and Phocion, by the cities which they had relieved.

⁵⁰ Plut. in Phocion; & Diodor. ubi supra.

⁵¹ Idem. ibid.

⁵² Demosthen. de Corona.

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cubits high, should be erected in the port of Byzantium, representing the republic of Athens, crowned by the Byzantines and Perinthians: That this crown should be proclaimed at the four principal festivals of Greece, in order to commemorate the magnanimity of Athens, and the gratitude of the Byzantines and Perinthians." The inhabitants of the Chersonesus were not less forward in their acknowledgments and rewards. After a similar preamble, setting forth the manifold favours of their great and generous allies, they resolved to crown the senate and people of Athens with a golden crown worth sixty talents; and to consecrate an altar to Gratitude and the Athenians. These public and solemn honours afforded matter of equal triumph to Phocion, who had executed, and to Demosthenes, who had advised the measures, in consequence of which such just glory had been acquired. At the distance of several years, the orator still boasted of this important service. "You have frequently, Athenians! rewarded with crowns, the statesmen most successful in conducting your affairs. But name, if you can, any other counsellor, any other statesman, by whose means the state itself hath been thus honoured⁵³."

Athen king
of Scythia
invites Philip
to assist him
against the
Illyrians.

The circumstance which enabled Philip to elude the violence of the storm with which the hostility of Athens, Persia, and so many other powers, had been long preparing to overwhelm him, took its rise from an error of judgment, occasioned by that boundless ambition which formed the ruling passion of the Macedonian prince. Beyond the confines of Thrace, and beyond the northern frontier of the Lower Mœsia, dwelt a powerful Scythian tribe, in the valuable peninsula contained between the western waves of the Euxine, and the majestic stream of the Danube. The roving and unsettled life of the Scythians, like that of their descendants the Tartars, had led them into this country, from their native and proper territories, embracing the six mouths of the Danube or Ister, the banks of the Bo-

⁵³ Demosth. de Coron.

risthenes, and the shores of the Palus Mæotis, which districts in ancient times had the name of Little Scythia⁵⁴, and are still called Little Tary. A monarch less warlike, and less ambitious than Philip, might have observed, with indignation and regret, those fierce and rapacious Barbarians, extending themselves beyond their natural limits, and enjoying an establishment to the south of the Danube; which great river, as he was already master of Thrace, and counted the Triballi of Mœsia among the number of his tributaries, Philip's proud and usurping fancy had already grasped as the frontier of his empire, and the proper line of separation between barbarous and civilized nations. It was not, therefore, without such excess of joy as transported him beyond the bounds of sound policy, that, amidst his preparations against the cities on the Propontis, he received an invitation from Atheas⁵⁵, who styled himself king of the Scythians, to march to his assistance, and to defend his dominions, consisting in the peninsula above mentioned, against an invasion of the Istrians, which the domestic forces of Atheas was totally unable to resist. To this proposal was added a condition extremely alluring to the king of Macedon, that if his auxiliary arms enabled Atheas to vanquish and expel the invaders, Philip should be named heir to the *kingdom* of Scythia; for, according to the fashion of ancient times, Atheas dignified with the name of kingdom, a territory little larger than the principality of Wales.

In greedily snatching this bait laid for his ambition, Philip was not enough on his guard against the usual perfidy and levity of Barbarians; nor did he sufficiently consider, that by sending a powerful detachment into Scythia, he must greatly weaken his exertions against the cities of the Propontis. With an ardour and alacrity too rapid for reflection, he eagerly closed with the propositions of Atheas, sent a great body of forces to the north, and promised to

Perfidy and
insolence of
that Barba-
rian.

⁵⁴ Herodotus, & Strabo, *passim*.

⁵⁵ Justin. l. ix. c. ii.

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assist them in person at the head of his whole army, should they encounter any difficulty in the execution of their purpose. Meanwhile the warlike chief of the Istrians, whose courage alone animated, and whose conduct rendered successful, the arms of his followers, was cut off by sudden death: the dispirited Istrians were attacked, defeated, and repelled; and, without the assistance of Macedon, Atheas once more regained possession of his kingdom. This unexpected revolution served to display the crafty and faithless Barbarian in his genuine deformity. The Macedonian troops were received coldly, treated with contempt, and absolutely denied their stipulated pay and subsistence. Their just remonstrances and complaints Atheas heard with scorn, and totally disavowed the propositions and promises of those who styled themselves his ambassadors; observing "how unlikely it was, that he should have solicited the assistance of the Macedonians, who, brave as they were, could fight only with men, while the Scythians could combat cold and famine; and that it would have been still more unnatural to appoint Philip his successor, since he had a son of his own, worthy to inherit his crown and dignity."

Philip remonstrates with him in vain.

Upon receiving an account of the insolent behaviour of a prince who had so recently solicited his alliance, Philip, while still busily, but unsuccessfully, employed against the cities of the Propontis, sent an embassy to Scythia, requiring Atheas to satisfy the just demands of the Macedonian troops, and to indemnify himself for the expence incurred in his defence. The ambassadors found the king of Scythia in his stable, currying his horse. When they testified surprise at seeing him engaged in such an occupation, he asked them, Whether their master did not often employ himself in the same manner? adding, that for his own part, in time of peace, he made not any distinction between himself and his groom. When they opened their commission, and explained the demands of Philip, the subtle

⁵⁶ Justin. l. ix. c. ii.

Barbarian told them, that the poverty of Scythia could not furnish a present becoming the greatness of their master; and that, therefore, it seemed more eligible to offer nothing at all, than a present totally unworthy of his acceptance⁵⁷.

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This evasive and mortifying answer, being brought to the king of Macedon when foiled and harassed, yet not disheartened, by his unprosperous expedition against Byzantium, furnished him with a very honourable pretence for raising the siege of that place, and conducting a powerful army into Scythia, that he might chastise the treacherous ingratitude of a prince, who, after having overreached him by policy, now mocked him with insolence. Having advanced to the frontier of Atheas's dominions, Philip had recourse to his usual arts, and sent a herald with the ensigns of peace and friendship, to announce his arrival in Scythia, in order to perform a solemn vow which he had made during the siege of Byzantium, of erecting a brazen statue to Hercules on the banks of the Danube. The cunning Atheas was not the dupe of this artifice, which he knew how to encounter and elude with similar address. Without praising or blaming the pious intention of the king, he coolly desired him to forward the statue, which he himself would take care to erect in the appointed place; that should it be set up with his concurrence and direction, it would probably be allowed to stand; otherwise, he could give no assurance that the Scythians would not pull it down, and melt it, to make points for their weapons⁵⁸.

Philip determines to chastise his ingratitude and perfidy.

The return of the Macedonian herald was the signal for hostility. Philip entered the country with fire and sword, destroying the forests and pasturage, and seizing the slaves and cattle, which formed the principal wealth of the Scythians. He seems to have employed several weeks in an expedition, the circumstances of which, were they essential to the design of this work, could not be

Success of his Scythian expedition.

⁵⁷ Justin. l. ix. c. ii.

⁵⁸ Idem, *ibid*.

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related with any fulness or accuracy. Countries in a pastoral state are but thinly peopled; and Philip was obliged to divide his forces, in order to vanquish with greater rapidity the wandering hordes, separate from each other by wide intervals, according as a forest, a meadow, or a stream of fresh water, obtained their preference, and fixed their temporary abode. A party of Macedonian soldiers beat up the quarters of a numerous and warlike clan, by which they were repelled, with the loss of several slain or taken. Among the latter was Ismenias, an eminent musician, who had been invited by liberal rewards to reside at the court of Philip, after being long admired in Greece for his performance on the flute. This distinguished captive was sent as a present to Atheas, who was so little delighted with his accomplishments, that having heard him perform, he acknowledged the neighing of his horse to be to his ear far more agreeable music. The skirmish in which Ismenias was taken, seems to have been the principal advantage obtained by the Barbarians, whose constitutional courage, and impetuous ill-directed fury, was every-where overcome by the disciplined valour of the Macedonian phalanx⁵⁹.

The nature
and quantity
of the booty.

Philip reaped such fruits from his expedition, as might be expected by a victory over a people who had no king but their general, no god but their sword, and no cities but the ground on which they occasionally encamped with their herds and families. The spoil consisted in arms, chariots, twenty thousand robust captives, a greater number of mares, destined to replenish the studs of Pella⁶⁰. We are not informed whether Philip erected the promised statue to the great founder and protector of his family and kingdom. It is probable that he imposed a tribute on the Scythians, as a mark of their submission and dependence, purposing to reduce them more thoroughly, when he had effected his great designs in Greece, to

⁵⁹ Justin. l. ii. c. 5.

⁶⁰ Compar. Justin. l. ix. c. 2. & Strabo, p. 752.

which

which country the silent operation of his intrigues now summoned his return.

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But while he marched southward at the head of an army encumbered with baggage and spoil, a very unexpected event threatened to blast his laurels, and to terminate at once his glory and his life. Allured by the hopes of sharing the warlike plunder of the Scythians, the barbarous Triballi, who had been often conquered, but never thoroughly subdued, beset by ambush, and vigorously assaulted the Macedonians, entangled amidst the intricate windings of the mountains of Mœsia; hoping to cut off, by one stroke, the flower of a nation whose authority their own fierce spirit of independence had very reluctantly condescended to obey. The confusion and the danger was increased by a mercenary band of Greeks, who, harassed by the fatigues of war and travelling, always clamorous for pay, which was very irregularly paid them, and perhaps jealous of the Macedonians, seized the present opportunity to desert the standard of Philip, and to reinforce the arms of the Triballi⁶¹.

Philip, on his return, surprised by the Triballi.

The king of Macedon, too prudent to undertake superfluous danger, never acquired by valour, what might be obtained by stratagem; but when a necessary occasion solicited his courage and his prowess, he knew how to assume the hero, and (if we may transpose an ancient proverb), “to eke out the fox’s with the lion’s skin⁶².” The urgency of the present emergence summoned all the firmness of his mind. With his voice and example he encouraged the astonished and disheartened Macedonians; conducted his faithful guards to the heat of the battle, and fought with unexampled bravery, till the same weapon which pierced his horse, laid the rider senseless on the ground. The young Alexander, who fought near him, derived peculiar glory from saving the life of his father, whom he covered with his shield, and defended by his sword, until his attendants conveyed

Alexander saves the life of his father.

⁶¹ Justin. l. ix. c. iii. Plut. in Alexand.

⁶² Vid. Plut. in Lyfand.

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and defeats
the Triballi.

him to a place of safety⁶³; the son so worthily succeeding to the command, that the tumult was fortunately appeased, and the Barbarians routed and put to flight. Philip's wound was attended with an incurable lameness, which he bore with much impatience. His magnanimous son endeavoured to remove his anxiety by asking, how he could be chagrined at an accident, which continually reminded him of his valour⁶⁴?

Philip appointed general of the Amphictyons.
Olymp.
cx. 2.
A. C. 339.

To repair the effects of this unforeseen delay, the Macedonians hastened through Thrace, where Philip, as he had reason to expect, was met by deputies from the Amphictyonic council, appointing him general of their forces, and requesting him to march into Greece with all convenient speed. The secret practices and intrigues, which had been ripening during the Scythian expedition, produced this extraordinary message, the remote as well immediate causes of which deserve to be distinctly unravelled, being the last knot of a tragedy which involves the fate of Greece.

The situation of Philip's affairs encourages the Athenians to exert themselves with vigour.
Olymp.
cx. 2.
A. C. 339.

The spirited resistance of Selymbria and Byzantium, the successful expeditions of Phocion in the Hellespont and Propontis, the prodigal terrors of Ochus king of Persia, who thought it impossible to employ his wealth more usefully than in bridling the ambition of Philip; above all, the continual expostulations and remonstrances of Demosthenes, conspired to rouse the Athenians from the lethargy in which they had been long sunk, and animated them with a desire to carry on the war with activity and effect against the common enemy of Greece. In order to save the state, they consented (though probably not without a violent struggle) to abolish the very popular law, or rather abuse, introduced by Eubulus. The theatrical amusements, so passionately idolised by the multitude, were celebrated with less pomp and splendour; and the military fund was thenceforth applied to its original and proper destination. A fleet was

⁶³ Plut. de Fortun. Alexand. & Justin. l. ix. c. iii.

⁶⁴ Plut. in Alexand.

equipped

equipped far superior to the naval strength of Macedon⁶⁵. The troops and partisans of that kingdom were driven from their ambushes in Megara, and in the neighbouring territories, where they had long watched an opportunity of destroying the liberty of Athens. Demosthenes, and Hyperides an orator second only to Demosthenes, were dispatched into the Peloponnesus and other parts of Greece, to persuade the several republics to second the generous ardour of the Athenians, whose recent success under Phocion added great weight to the arguments and eloquence of those illustrious statesmen⁶⁶.

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Philip was accurately informed of all those transactions; and the alarm universally spread among his faithful emissaries, inclined them rather to exaggerate, than to conceal, the danger. Highly provoked against the Athenians, the continual opposers of his greatness, he was unable to retaliate their injuries. If he attacked them by land, he must march through the territories of the Thebans and Thessalians, who, ever selfish and capricious, would be ready to forsake him with his good fortune. His disgraceful expedition against the cities of the Propontis, rendered the present juncture extremely unfavourable to such a hazardous design. Nor could he attempt, with any prospect of success, to attack the enemy by sea, since the Athenian fleet so far exceeded his own, that it had interrupted, and almost totally destroyed, the commerce of Macedon.

Difficulties
with which
Philip had to
struggle.

Amidst this complication of difficulties, Philip shewed how well he understood the unsteady temper of the Greeks, by raising the siege of Byzantium, and burying himself in the wilds of Scythia, till the burning animosity of his adversaries had time to evaporate. Not venturing on open hostility, he, meanwhile, employed two secret engines, which were at work during his absence, and from which he had reason to expect very signal advantages before his return. There lived at Athens a man of the name of Antiphon, bold, loud, and

His intrigues
with the
incredibly
Antiphon.

⁶⁵ Demosthen. de Corona.

⁶⁶ Idem, ibid.

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loquacious in the popular assembly, in which, however, he had not a title to vote, much less to speak, his name not being recorded in the public register of the city. This defect passed long unobserved, through that supine negligence with which Demosthenes so frequently upbraids his countrymen. At length the treason of Antiphon (for the Athenians regarded an unqualified voter in the assembly as an usurper of sovereign power) was discovered, and arraigned by one of the many citizens to whom his insolence and calumny had justly rendered him obnoxious; in consequence of which impeachment, the supposititious Athenian was divested of his borrowed character, and driven with ignominy from a country, whose most august rights and honours he had usurped and disgraced. Stung with disappointment and rage, Antiphon had recourse to the king of Macedon, and offered himself for any enterprise, however bloody or desperate, by which, in serving the interest of Philip, he might gratify his own thirst for vengeance. The ambitious Macedonian kept his ends too steadily in view, and pursued them with too much ardour and perseverance, to be very delicate in choosing the means by which he might distress his adversaries. He greedily closed, therefore, with the proposal of Antiphon, in whom he rejoiced to find an instrument so fit for his service.

Who attempts to set fire to the Athenian docks.

The superiority of the Athenians by sea, which their actual diligence in their docks and arsenals shewed them determined to maintain and increase, formed the chief obstacle to the grandeur of Macedon. By whom the design was suggested, is unknown; but it was agreed between Philip and Antiphon, that the latter should return to Athens in disguise, insinuate himself into the Piræus, and lie there in concealment, until he found an opportunity to set fire to the Athenian docks, and thus destroy at once the main hope of the republic. While the artful king of Macedon eluded the storm of his enemies by wandering in the woods of Scythia, his peridious accomplice lurked, like a serpent, in the bosom of Athens, being longed without

suspicion

suspicion in the harbour, which glowed with the ardour of naval preparation, and into which were daily accumulated new masses of tar, timber, and other materials, alike proper for a fleet, and for the purpose of Antiphon.

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But the vigilance of Demosthenes discovered this desperate design, when on the point of execution. He immediately flew to the Piræus, dragged Antiphon from his concealment, divested him of his disguise, and produced him at the bar of the assembly. The capricious and deluded multitude, alike prone to anger and to compassion, were on this occasion very differently affected from what might be conjectured. Instead of execrating a wretch capable of such black deeds, they beheld, with pity, a man once regarded as their fellow-citizen, brought before them after a long absence, and accused, perhaps on vain presumptions, of such a horrid crime. They knew, besides, the wicked artifices of their orators, who, to encrease their own importance, often terrified the public with false alarms, and imaginary dangers. Alcibiades, and other partisans of Philip, were at hand to strengthen these impressions. They represented the whole transaction of Demosthenes as a complication of fraud and cruelty; loudly inveighed against his insolent triumph over the calamities of the unfortunate; and reproached his entering by force into the house where Antiphon was concealed, as a violation of freedom pregnant with the most dangerous consequences, and as trampling on the respected maxim of Athenian law and religion, that every man's house was his sanctuary⁶⁷. Such was the effect of these clamours, that Antiphon was dismissed without the formality of a trial, and might, perhaps, have resumed his purpose with more security than before, had not the senate of the Areopagus more carefully examined the information of Demosthenes. By the authority of that court, the traitor was again seized, and tried. Torture, which the institution of domestic slavery introduced and rendered familiar in Greece, ex-

The design
detected by
Demosthenes.

⁶⁷ Lyfias passim in Agorat. & Eratosth.

torted

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Philip's intrigues for embroiling the affairs of Greece.

torted from him a late and reluctant confession; and his enormous guilt was punished with as enormous severity⁶⁸.

Had the detestable enterprize of Antiphon been crowned with unmerited success, Philip would have attained his purpose of ruining Athens, by a rude stroke of vulgar perfidy. But the engines which he set in motion for gaining the same end, at a time when he was obliged to fly the awakened resentment of Greece, and to bury in the wilds of Scythia the disgrace sustained before the walls of Byzantium, will not be easily matched by any parallel transactions in history, whether we consider the profound artifice with which the plan was contrived and combined, the nice adaptation of the several parts, or the unwearied dexterity with which the whole was carried into execution. It is on this occasion that Demosthenes might justly exclaim, "In one circumstance, chiefly, is Philip distinguished above all his ambitious predecessors, the enemies of Grecian freedom. His measures required the co-operation of traitors, and traitors he has found more corrupt and dexterous than ever appeared in any former age; and, what is most worthy of remark, nourished the principal instruments of his ambition in the bosom of that state, whose public councils most openly opposed his greatness⁶⁹."

His partisans sent from Athens as deputies to the Amphictyons.

The time approached for convening at Delphi the vernal assembly of the Amphictyons. It was evidently the interest of the Athenians, and might have been expected from their just resentment against Philip, that they should send such deputies to the city of Apollo, as were most hostile to the Macedonian, and most zealous in the cause of liberty, and their country. But intrigue and cabal prevailed over every motive of public utility; and the negligent or factious multitude were persuaded, at a crisis which demanded the most faithful and incorrupt ministers, to employ, as their representatives in the Amphictyonic council, Æschines and Midias; the former of whom

⁶⁸ Demosthenes de Coron. who gives the honourable account of his own conduct described in the text. ⁶⁹ Idem, ibid.

had so often reproached, and the latter had, on one occasion, struck Demosthenes in the public theatre⁷⁰; and who were both not only the declared enemies of this illustrious patriot, but, as well as their colleagues Diognetus and Thraicles, the warm and active partisans of the king of Macedon. Soon after their arrival at Delphi, Midias and Diognetus⁷¹ pretended sickness, that they might allow Æschines to display, uncontrouled, his superior dexterity; and to act a part, which, requiring the deepest dissimulation, might be performed most successfully by a single traitor. The Amphictyons were employed in repairing the temple; the sacred offerings, which had been removed and sold by the impiety of the Phocians, were collected from every quarter of Greece; and new presents were made by several states, to supply the place of the old, which could not be recovered.

The Athenians particularly signalised their pious munificence, and sent, among other dedications, several golden shields, with the following inscription: "Taken from the Medes and Thebans, when they fought against Greece." This offering, highly offensive to the Theban deputies, was prematurely suspended in the temple; the Thebans murmured, the Amphictyons listened to their complaints, and it was whispered in the council, that the Athenians deserved punishment for presenting their gift to the god, before it had been regularly consecrated, together with the other offerings. Pretending high indignation at these murmurs, Æschines⁷² rushed into the assembly, and began a formal, yet spirited defence of his countrymen; when he was rudely interrupted by a Locrian, of Amphissa⁷³, a city eight miles

Who present a dedication to the temple highly offensive to the Thebans.

⁷⁰ Demosth. in Mid. & Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

⁷¹ Æschines says, *Διογνητον πυρεττει*; "That Diognetus was seized with a fever, and that the same misfortune happened to Midias," p. 290.

⁷² *Αεχόμεναι δὲ μὴ λέγειν, καὶ περιθυμωμένοι πως εἰσαγγελοῦσθαι εἰς τὸ συνέδριον.* Æschin. p. 290.

⁷³ Æschines varnishes the story with ini-

mitable address: *ἀνθρώποις τις τῶν Ἀμφισσιῶν, ἀνθρώπος ἀπείλημετος, καὶ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔφαικτο ἐδέμιας παιδείας μετισχυκῶς, ἰσως δὲ καὶ διανοητὸς ἐξαμαρτάνει αὐτὸν προαγορεύει.* "He was interrupted by the vociferation of a certain Amphissean, a man the most impudent, totally illiterate, and perhaps impelled to folly by some offended divinity."

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The Athenians reproached by the deputy of Amphissa.

Æschines inveighs against the Locrians for cultivating the Cirrhean plain;

distant from Delphi, which growing populous and powerful on the ruins of Crissa and Cirrha, had ventured to cultivate the Cirrhean plain, which, near three centuries before, had been desolated by the Amphiçtyons, solemnly consecrated to Apollo, and devoted to perpetual sterility⁷⁴.

The artful Locrian, affecting a religious zeal not less ardent than the patriotism of Æschines, clamorously interrupted that orator, calling aloud in the assembly, that it ill became the dignity of the Amphiçtyons to hear with patience the justification, much less the praises of Athens, a city impious and profane, which, in defiance of human and divine laws, had so recently abetted the execrable sacrilege of the Phocians; that if the Amphiçtyons followed his advice, or consulted the dictates of duty and honour, they would not allow the detested name of the Athenians to be mentioned in that august council⁷⁵.

Æschines thus obtained an opportunity of exciting such tumults in the assembly as suited the views of Philip⁷⁶. In the ardour of patriotic indignation, which he knew so well to assume, he poured forth a torrent of impetuous invective against the insolent Locrian, and his city Amphissa; not only justified the innocence, but displayed, with ostentation, the illustrious merit of the Athenians; and then addressing the Amphiçtyons with a look peculiarly earnest and expressive, "Say, ye Grecians! shall men who never knew the exalted pleasures of virtue and renown, be suffered to tear from us the inestimable rewards of glory so justly⁷⁷ earned? Shall men, themselves

⁷⁴ See these events particularly related, vol. i. c. v. p. 157.

⁷⁵ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

⁷⁶ Demosthen. de Corona.

⁷⁷ The persuasive energy with which Æschines defends his treachery, or rather displays his patriotism, on this occasion, is not excelled by any thing in Demosthenes himself. Had the works of the latter perished, the two orations of Æschines (de Falsa Le-

gatione, and in Ctesiphont.) would have justly been regarded as the most perfect models of eloquence produced by human genius. But the works, and even the name of Æschines, are eclipsed in the fame of his rival. So disproportionate are the rewards of acting a first and a second part, and so just the poet's advice to all candidates for fame:

Αἰὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ὀφείλει ὁ δεύτερος ἀνδρῶν.

polluted by sacrilege, and already devoted to destruction by the most awful imprecations, presume to call the Athenians profane and impious? Look down, ye reverend guardians of religion! look down on that plain (pointing to the Cirrhean plain, which might be seen from the temple), behold these lands anciently devoted to the god, but now appropriated and cultivated by the Amphisseans; behold the numerous buildings which they have erected there, and that accursed port of Cirrha, justly demolished by our ancestors, now rebuilt and fortified." Æschines here read the oracle of Apollo, which condemned that harbour and those lands to perpetual desolation. Then proceeding with increased vehemence: "For myself, ye Grecians! I swear, that I myself, my children, my country, will discharge our duty to heaven; and, with all the powers and faculties of mind and body, avenge the abominable violation of the consecrated territory. Do you, Amphictyons! determine as wisdom shall direct. Your offerings are prepared, your victims are brought to the altar; you are ready to offer solemn prayers for blessings on yourselves, and on the republics which you represent. But consider with what voice, with what heart, with what confidence, you can breathe out your petitions, while you suffer the profanation of the Amphisseans to pass unrevenged. Hear the words of the imprecation, not only against those who cultivate the consecrated ground, but against those who neglect to punish them: "May they never present an acceptable offering to Apollo, Diana, Latona, or Minerva the provident; but may all their sacrifices and religious rites be for ever rejected and abhorred!"

The warmth of Æschines occasioned the utmost tumult in the assembly. The golden shields, irregularly dedicated by the Athenians, were no longer the subject of discourse. This slight impropriety disappeared amidst the enormous impieties of the Amphisseans, which had been so forcibly painted to the superstitious fancies of the

which excites the third sacred war.

⁷⁸ Pausanias Phocic. & Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

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terrified multitude. It was determined, after violent contentions between those who accused, and those who defended this unhappy people, that the Amphiſtyons, having summoned the assistance of the citizens of Delphi, should next day repair to the Cirrhean plain, in order to burn, cut down, and destroy the houses and plantations, which had so long adorned and defiled that devoted territory. The ravagers met with little opposition in performing this pious devastation; but as they returned towards the temple, they were overtaken and assaulted by a numerous party of Amphiſſeans, who threw them into disorder, made several prisoners, and pursued the rest to Delphi. The signal of war was now raised; the insulted Amphiſtyons, in whose persons the sanctity of religion had been violated, complained to their respective republics, while the recent audacity of the Amphiſſeans aggravated their ancient crimes and enormities. But agreeably to the languor inherent in councils which possess only a delegated authority, the measures of the Amphiſtyons were extremely slow and irresolute; and when they at length raised an army under the command of Cottyphus, a Thessalian, and a creature of Philip's, their operations were ill conducted and unsuccessful⁷⁹.

The Am-
phiſtyons ap-
point Philip
their general.

Affairs were thus brought to the issue which had been expected by Æschines, and the accomplices who assisted him, in promoting the interest of the king of Macedon. They loudly declaimed in the council against the lukewarm indifference of the Grecian states in a war which so deeply concerned the national religion. "It became the Amphiſtyons, therefore, as the ministers of Apollo and the guardians of his temple, to seek out and employ some more powerful instrument of the divine vengeance. Philip of Macedon had formerly given proof of his pious zeal in the Phocian war. That prince was now returning in triumph from his Scythian expedition. His assistance must again be demanded (nor would it be demanded in

⁷⁹ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

vain) to defend the cause of Apollo and the sacred shrine." This proposal being approved, a deputation of the Amphiſtyons met Philip in Thrace. He received their welcome meſſage with well-affected ſurpriſe, but declared his veneration for the commands of the council, which he ſhould be ever ready to obey⁸⁰.

The vigilant prince had already taken proper meaſures for acting as general of the Amphiſtyons, and provided a ſufficient number of tranſports to convey his army into Greece. He underſtood that notwithſtanding the intrigues of *Æſchines* and his associates, the Athenians had been perſuaded by *Demofthenes* to oppoſe his deſign, and that their admirals *Chares* and *Proxenus* prepared to intercept his paſſage with a ſuperior naval force. To baffle this oppoſition, Philip employed a ſtratagem. A light brigantine was diſpatched to Macedon with letters of ſuch import as gave reaſon to believe that he purpoſed immediately returning into Thrace⁸¹. Beſides writing to *Antipater*, his principal confidant and miniſter, he took care to mask his artifice, by ſending letters to his queen *Olympias*. The brigantine purpoſely fell into the hands of the Athenians. The diſpatches were ſeized and read; but the letter of the queen was politely forwarded to its deſtination⁸². The Athenian admirals quitted their ſtation, and Philip arrived, without oppoſition, on the coaſt of *Locris*, from whence he proceeded to *Delphi*.

Though the Macedonians alone were far more numerous than ſeemed neceſſary for the reduction of *Amphiſſa*, the king, in the month of November, diſpatched circular letters through moſt parts of Greece, requiring from the Thebans, Peloponneſians, and other ſtates, the aſſiſtance of their combined arms to maintain the cauſe of the Amphiſtyons and Apollo. The Thebans, rather intimidated by a powerful army in their neighbourhood, than inclined to the Macedonians, of whoſe deſigns they had lately become extremely jealous, ſent a ſmall body of infantry to join the ſtandard of Philip. The

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Philip eludes
the Athenian
fleet by a
ſtratagem.

Philip defeats
the Athenian
mercenaries,
and takes
poſſeſſion of
Amphiſſa.

⁸⁰ *Æſchin.* in *Cteſiphont*.

⁸¹ *Polyæn.* l. iv. c. ii.

⁸² *Plut.* in *Demetr.*

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Lacedæmonians, long disgusted with the measures of Greece, and envying the power of Macedon, which they had not public spirit to oppose, beheld all recent transactions with a contemptuous disregard, and seemed firm in their purpose of preserving a sullen neutrality. The Athenians, awakened by the activity of Demosthenes to a sense of their danger, opposed Philip with ten thousand mercenaries, despising the threats of the oracle, against those who took part with the impious Amphisseans. The orator boldly accused the Pythian priests and her ministers of being bribed to Philippise, or to prophesy as might best suit the interest of Philip; while Æschines, on the other hand, accused his adversary of having received a thousand drachmas, and an annual pension of twenty minæ, to abet the impiety of Amphissa³³. The king of Macedon, without waiting for any farther reinforcement than that which he had received from the Thebans, besieged, took, and garrisoned that unfortunate city; and having routed and put to flight the Athenian mercenaries, spread the terror of his arms round all the neighbouring territory³⁴.

The Athenians, while they negotiate with Philip, raise a confederacy against that prince.

The news of these events occasioned dreadful consternation in Athens. The terrified citizens, who could not be persuaded to tear themselves from their beloved pleasures in order to defend Amphissa, believed the moment approaching when they must defend their own walls against the victorious invader. After less altercation and delay than usually prevailed in their councils, they sent an embassy to Philip, craving a suspension of hostilities, and, at the same time, dispatched their ablest orators to rouse the Greeks from their supine negligence, and to animate and unite them against a Barbarian, who, under pretence of avenging the offended divinity of Apollo, meditated the subjugation of their common country. Megara, Eubœa, Leucas, Corinth, Corcyra, and Achaia, favourably received the ambassadors, and readily entered into a league against Macedon. Thebes fluctuated in uncertainty, hating the Athenians

³³ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

³⁴ Demosthen. de Corona.

as rivals, and dreading Philip as a tyrant. The situation of the Theban territory, through which Philip must march before he could invade Attica, rendered the decision of that people peculiarly important⁸⁵. To gain or to retain their friendship, the intrigues of Philip, the eloquence of Athens had been employed with unwearied assiduity. The Thebans temporised, deliberated, resolved, and changed their resolutions. The partisans of Athens were most numerous, those of Macedon most active, while the great body of the Theban people heard the clamours and arguments of both parties with that stupid indifference, and took their measures with that lethargic slowness, which disgraced even the heavy character of the Bœotians⁸⁶.

To fix their wavering irresolution, and to awaken their sensibility, Philip at length had recourse to the strong impression of terror. From the general wreck of Phocis, his foresight and policy had spared the walls of Elatea, a city important by its situation between two ranges of mountains, which opened into Phocis and Bœotia. The citadel was built on an eminence, washed by the river Cephissus, which flowed in a winding course through Bœotia into the lake Copais; a broad expanse of water, which, by several navigable streams, communicated with Attica. This valuable post, conveniently situate for receiving reinforcements from Thessaly and Macedon, commanding the passage into Bœotia, distant only two days march from Attica, and which, being garrisoned by a powerful army, might continually alarm the safety of Thebes and Athens, Philip seized with equal boldness and celerity⁸⁷, drew the greater part of his troops thither, repaired and strengthened the walls of the place, and having thus secured himself from surprise, watched a favourable opportunity of inflicting punishment on the Athenians, who had given him sufficient ground to represent them as the ene-

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The Thebans fluctuate between the party of Philip and that of the Athenians.

Philip seizes
Elatea.
Olymp.
cx. 3.
A. C. 338.

⁸⁵ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 475.

⁸⁶ Demosthen. de Coroa.

⁸⁷ Diodor. & Demosthen. ubi supra.

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Alarm there-
by excited
in Athens.

mies of the Amphictyonic council⁸⁸, by whose authority the king of Macedon affected to be guided in all his operations.

We are not acquainted with the immediate effect of this vigorous measure over the minds of the Thebans; but the terror and consternation of the uncorrupt part of the citizens, may be conjectured by what happened on this occasion at Athens. It was late in the evening when a courier arrived with the melancholy tidings that Philip had taken possession of Elatæa. The people had retired to their houses; the magistrates supped in the Prytanæum; but in a moment all were abroad. Some hastened to the generals; others went in quest of the officer⁸⁹ whose business it was to summon the citizens to council; most flocked to the market-place; and, in order to make room for the assembly, pulled down or burned the temporary wooden edifices erected by the tradesmen and artificers who exposed their wares to sale in that spacious square. Before dawn the confusion ceased; the citizens were all assembled; the senators took their places; the president reported to them the alarming intelligence that had been received. The herald then proclaimed with a loud voice, "That he who had any thing to offer on the present emergency, should mount the rostrum, and propose his advice." The invitation, though frequently repeated, was received with silence and dismay. The magistrates, the generals, the demagogues, were all present; but none obeyed the summons of the herald, which Demosthenes calls the voice of their country imploring the assistance of her children⁹⁰.

Demosthenes
exhorts the
Athenians to
oppose Phi-
lip to the
utmost of
their power
by sea and
land.

At length that accomplished orator arose, and obtained the noblest triumph of patriotism; having proposed, amidst universal consternation, an advice equally prudent, generous, and successful. He began

⁸⁸ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

⁸⁹ Τον σαλπικτην ἐκάλει, p. 317.

⁹⁰ Καλλίας δὲ τῆς κοινῆς τῆς πατρίδος φωνῆς τῶν ἔσθια ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας· ἦν γὰρ ὁ κρυῖς κατὰ τῆς κοινῆς φωνῆς ἀφισσι, ταύτην κοινὴν τῆς πατρίδος

δικαίον ἐστὶ ἀγασθαι, p. 317. The passage that follows has been often cited, and can never be too much studied, as one of the finest examples of oratorical narration.

by darting a ray of hope into the desponding citizens, and assuring them that, were not the Thebans, the greater part at least of the Thebans, hostile to Philip, that prince would not be actually posted at Elatæa, but on the Athenian frontier. He exhorted his countrymen to shake off the unmanly terror which had surpris'd them; and, instead of fearing for themselves, to fear only for their neighbours, whose territories were more immediately threatened, and who must sustain the first shock of the invasion. "Let your forces," continued he, "immediately march to Eleusis, in order to show the Thebans, and all Greece, that as those who have sold their country, are supported by the Macedonian forces at Elatæa, so you are ready to defend with your hereditary courage and fortune those who fight for liberty. Let ambassadors at the same time be sent to Thebes, to remind that republic of the good offices conferred by your ancestors; to assure the Thebans, that you do not consider them as aliens; that the people of Athens have forgot all recent hostilities with the citizens of Greece, and will never forsake the cause of their common country, which is actually, in a peculiar manner, the cause of Thebes. To this community, therefore, offer your most disinterested services. To make any demand for yourselves, would be highly improper in the present juncture. Assure them that you are deeply affected by their danger, and prepared generously to defend them to the utmost of your power."

These proposals being received with general approbation, Demosthenes drew up a formal decree for carrying them into execution; a decree which may be considered as the expiring voice of a people, who, agreeably to the magnanimous counsel of Pericles, had determined, that when every thing mortal perished, the fame of Athens should remain⁹¹. Having painted, in the most odious colours, the perfidy

The decree
for that pur-
pose, dated
August.

⁹¹ See vol. i. c. xv. p. 147. In defending his own conduct, notwithstanding the unfortunate consequences with which it was attended, Demosthenes seems animated by the true

perfidy and violence of Philip; and having stigmatised with due severity the recent instances of his injustice and lust of power, the orator concludes, "For such reasons, the senate and people of Athens, emulating the glory of their ancestors, to whom the liberty of Greece was ever dearer than the interest of their particular republic, and humbly revering the gods and heroes, guardians of the Athenian city and territory, whose aid they now implore, have resolved to send to the coast of Bœotia a fleet of two hundred sail, to march to Eleusis with their whole military strength, to dispatch ambassadors to the several states of Greece, and particularly to the Thebans, encouraging them to remain unterrified amidst the dangers which threaten them, and to exert themselves manfully in defence of the common cause, with assurance that the people of Athens, unmindful of old or later differences which have prevailed between the two republics, are determined and ready to support them with all their faculties, their treasures, their navies, and their arms; well knowing, that to contend for pre-eminence with the Greeks is an

true spirit of Pericles. Βολύμεν τι καὶ σπουδάζομεν; καὶ μὴ πρὸς διὰ καὶ βίη! μέλλει τὴν ἐπεβολὴν θαυρασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μὲν ἑαυτοὶ ὁ λόγος θεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀπασὶ περὶ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολλοῦ γινώσκουσιν, καὶ προοῖσιν πάντες, καὶ σὺ πρῶτον ἀκούων, καὶ ὑμαρτέρας, βίαν καὶ κινέας, ὃ ἐπὶ φθιγῶν ἐπὶ ἑταῖς αἰστανεῖν τῇ πόλει τῶν πρὸς αὐτῇ ἡδίστης ἢ προσηύον ἢ τῇ μέλλουσας αἰῶνος ἔχει λόγον. The beauties of such passages, depending chiefly on collocation of words and sentiments, of which Demosthenes, of all writers, was the greatest master, cannot be translated. The meaning is, "I will venture to say what is contrary to common opinion, and, in the name of the Gods! regard not its extravagance, but examine it with indulgence. Had all of you foreseen what was going to happen, had the consequences of our conduct been manifest, and had you, Æschines, repeatedly proclaimed them with a loud voice, you, who then opened not your mouth, yet the Athenians ought not to have

forfaken the cause of Grecian freedom, unless they forsook their glory, their ancestors, and their renown with succeeding ages." The same thought is expressed in language still bolder, after the hearers are prepared for it, by a page of the most animated eloquence: Ἀλλὰ ἔκ ἐτι, ὅπως χρεῖσθαι, αἰεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπαντὸς ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κινῶν ἀγαθῶν! ἡ μὲν τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι περικλυστῆς τῶν προγόνων, &c. See the passage, p. 343. He swears by those who fell at Marathon, Platea, Salamis, and Artemisium, that the Athenians did not err in defending, with unequal fortune, and against superior force, the public safety and liberty. Such passages, when detached, may appear extravagant and gigantic; but, as in the church of St. Peter's, where all is arranged with such admirable symmetry, that no figure appears beyond the natural size, so, in the works of Demosthenes, nothing appears monstrous, because all is great.

honourable contest; but to be commanded by a foreigner, and to suffer a Barbarian to wrest the sovereignty from their hands, would tarnish their hereditary glory, and disgrace their country for ever."

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The same undaunted spirit which dictated this decree, attended the exertions of Demosthenes in his embassy to Thebes, in which he triumphed over the intrigues of Amyntas and Clearchus, and over the eloquence of Philon of Byzantium, the emissaries employed by Philip on this important occasion. The Thebans passed a decree for receiving with gratitude the proffered assistance of Athens; and the Athenian army having soon after taken the field, were admitted within the Theban walls, and treated with all the flattering distinctions of ancient hospitality⁹².

Demosthenes
persuades the
Thebans to
join the
standard of
Athens.

Meanwhile Philip having advanced towards the Bœotian frontier, his detached parties were foiled in two rencounters with the confederates. Regardless of these losses, to which, perhaps, he purposely submitted, as necessary stratagems to draw the enemy from their walls, he proceeded with his main body, thirty-two thousand strong, to the plain of Chæronæa. This place was considered by Philip as well adapted to the operations of the Macedonian phalanx; and the ground for his encampment, and afterwards the field of battle, were chosen with equal sagacity; having in view, on one side, a temple of Hercules, whom the Macedonians regarded as the author of their royal house, and the high protector of their fortune; and, on the other, the banks of the Thermodon, a small river flowing into the Cephissus, announced by the oracles of Greece as the destined scene of desolation and woe to their unhappy country⁹³. The generals of the confederate Greeks had been much less careful to avail them-

Preparations
on both sides
for the battle
of Chæronæa.

⁹² Demosthenes, who furnishes the above narrative, avoids dwelling on the following melancholy events, which are related by Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 475, & seqq. Plut. in Alexand. Strabo, l. ix. p. 414. Justin. l. ix. c. iii. & Pausanias Bœotic.

⁹³ Plut. in Vit. Demosth.

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selves of the powerful fictions of superstition. Unrestrained by inauspicious sacrifices, the Athenians had left their city at the exhortation of Demosthenes, to wait no other omen but the cause of their country. Regardless of oracles, they afterwards advanced to the ill-fated Thermodon, accompanied by the Thebans, and the scanty reinforcements raised by the islands, and states of Peloponnesus, which had joined their alliance. Their army amounted to thirty thousand men, animated by the noblest cause for which men can fight, but commanded by the Athenians Lyficles and Chares, the first but little, and the second unfavourably, known; and by Theagenes the Theban, a person strongly suspected of treachery; all three creatures of cabal, and tools of faction, slaves of interest or voluptuousness, whose characters (especially as they had been appointed to command the only states whose shame, rather than virtue, yet opposed the public enemy) are alone sufficient to prove that Greece was ripe for ruin.

Alexander
routs the
Thebans.

When the day approached for abolishing the tottering independence of those turbulent republics, which their own internal vices, and the arms and intrigues of Philip had been gradually undermining for twenty-two years, both armies formed in battle array before the rising of the sun. The right wing of the Macedonians was headed by Philip, who judged proper to oppose in person the dangerous fury of the Athenians. His son Alexander, only nineteen years of age, but surrounded by experienced officers, commanded the left wing, which faced the Sacred Band of the Thebans. The auxiliaries of either army were posted in the centre. In the beginning of the action, the Athenians charged with impetuosity, and repelled the opposing divisions of the enemy; but the youthful ardour of Alexander obliged the Thebans** to retire, the Sacred Band being cut down to a man. The activity of the young

** Plutarch, in Alexand.

prince completed their disorder, and pursued the scattered multitude with his Thessalian cavalry.

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Meantime the Athenian generals, too much elated by their first advantage, lost the opportunity to improve it; for, having repelled the centre and left wing of the Macedonians, except the phalanx, which was composed of chosen men, and immediately commanded by the king, they, instead of attempting to break this formidable body, by attacking it in flank, pressed forward against the fugitives, the insolent Lysicles exclaiming in vain triumph, "Pursue, my brave countrymen! let us drive the cowards to Macedon." Philip observed this rash folly with contempt, and saying to those around him, "our enemies know not how to conquer," commanded his phalanx, by a rapid evolution, to gain an adjacent eminence, from which they poured down, firm and collected, on the advancing Athenians, whose confidence of success had rendered them totally insensible to danger. But the irresistible shock of the Macedonian spear converted their fury into despair. Above a thousand fell, two thousand were taken prisoners; the rest escaped by a precipitate and shameful flight. Of the Thebans more were killed than taken. Few of the confederates perished, as they had little share in the action, and as Philip, perceiving his victory to be complete, gave orders to spare the vanquished, with a clemency unusual in that age, and not less honourable to his understanding than his heart; since his humanity thus subdued the minds, and gained the affections of his conquered enemies⁹⁵.

Philip de-
feats the
Athenians.

According to the Grecian custom, the battle was followed by an entertainment, at which the king, presiding in person, received the congratulations of his friends, and the humble supplications of the Athenian deputies, who craved the bodies of their slain. Their request, which served as an acknowledgment of their defeat, was readily granted; but before they availed themselves of the permission

Philip visits
the field of
battle.

⁹⁵ Polyæn. Stratagem, l. iv. c. ii.

⁹⁶ Pausan. Achaic. Dioct. & Justin, ubi supra.

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to carry off their dead, Philip, who with his natural intemperance had protracted the entertainment till morning, issued forth with his licentious companions to visit the field of battle ; their heads crowned with festive garlands, their minds intoxicated with the insolence of wine and victory ; yet the sight of the slaughtered Thebans, which first presented itself to their eyes, and particularly the sacred band of friends and lovers, who lay covered with honourable wounds, on the spot where they had been drawn up to fight, brought back these insolent spectators to the sentiments of reason and humanity. Philip beheld the awful scene with a mixture of admiration and pity ; and, after an affecting silence, denounced a solemn curse against those who basely suspected the friendship of such brave men to be tainted with criminal and infamous passions⁹⁷.

His levity reprimanded
by Demades.

But this serious temper of mind did not last long ; for having proceeded to that quarter of the field where the Athenians had fought and fallen, the king abandoned himself to all the levity and littleness of the most petulant joy. Instead of being impressed with a deep sense of his recent danger, and with dutiful gratitude to Heaven for the happiness of his escape, and the importance of his victory, Philip only compared the boastful pretensions, with the mean performances of his Athenian enemies ; and, struck by this contrast, rehearsed, with the insolent mockery of a buffoon, the pompous declaration of war lately drawn up by the ardent patriotism, and too sanguine hopes of Demosthenes. It was on this occasion that the orator Demades at once rebuked the folly, and flattered the ambition of Philip, by asking him, Why he assumed the character of Ther-sites, when fortune assigned him the part of Agamemnon⁹⁸ ?

The different treatment
of the Athenians and
Thebans.

Whatever might be the effect of this sharp reprimand⁹⁹, it is certain that the king of Macedon indulged not, on any future occasion, a vain triumph over the vanquished. When advised by his

⁹⁷ Plutarch in Pelopid.

⁹⁸ Idem in Demosthen.

⁹⁹ Plutarch ascribes to this smart observation the moderation of Philip's subsequent conduct.

generals

generals to advance into Attica, and to render himself master of Athens, he only replied, "Have I done so much for glory, and shall I destroy the theatre of that glory¹⁰⁰?" His subsequent conduct corresponded with the moderation of this sentiment. He restored, without ransom, the Athenian prisoners; who, at departing, having demanded their baggage, were also gratified in this particular; the king pleasantly observing, that the Athenians seemed to think he had not conquered¹⁰¹ them in earnest. Soon afterwards he dispatched his son Alexander, and Antipater, the most trusted of his ministers, to offer them peace on such favourable terms as they had little reason to expect. They were required to send deputies to the Isthmus of Corinth, where, to adjust their respective contingents of troops for the Persian expedition, Philip purposed assembling, early in the spring, a general convention of all the Grecian states; they were ordered to surrender the isle of Samos, which actually formed the principal station of their fleet, and the main bulwark and defence of all their maritime or insular possessions; but they were allowed to enjoy, unmolested, the Attic territory, with their hereditary form of government, and flattered by the acquisition of Oropus, for which they had so long contended with the unhappy Thebans¹⁰². It was not only in being deprived of this city, that the Thebans experienced the indignation of the conqueror; from the transactions between Macedon and Thebes, in the early part of his reign, Philip thought himself entitled to treat that people, not as open and generous enemies, whose struggle for freedom deserved his clemency, but as faithless and insidious rebels, who merited all the severity of his justice. He punished the republican party with unrelenting rigour; restored the traitors, whom they had banished, to the first

¹⁰⁰ Plutarch in Apophth.¹⁰¹ Idem, *ibid.*¹⁰² Pausanias *Bæotic.* Diodorus, *ubi supra.*

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Causes from
which it pro-
ceeded.

honours of the republic; and, in order to support their government, placed a Macedonian garrison in the Theban citadel¹⁰³.

In his opposite treatment of the two republics, Philip, it is probable, was swayed neither by affection nor hatred; his generosity and his rigour were alike artificial, and both directed by his interest. Besides the different characters of the Thebans and Athenians, which rendered the former as sensible to the impression of fear, as the latter were susceptible of gratitude and esteem, the Thebans had too long, and too early, abandoned the cause of Greece, and too strenuously exerted themselves in establishing the power of Macedon, to acquire much reputation by one unsuccessful attempt to resist Philip, to which they had been at length animated, less by their own public spirit or courage, than by the zeal and eloquence of Demosthenes. The Athenians, on the contrary, who from the beginning had opposed the views of this prince, though with far less prudence and activity than their situation required; who, through the whole course of his reign, had continued to traverse his measures, and to spurn his authority; and who, previously to the last fatal encounter at Chæronæa, had endeavoured to form a general confederacy, and when that proved impossible, had determined, almost unassisted and alone, to resist the common foe, seemed entitled to such gratitude and applause, as compassion bestows on ill-directed valour and unfortunate patriotism; and the rigorous treatment of such a people must have shocked the sentiments, and exasperated the hatred, of every citizen of Greece, who yet retained the faintest tincture of ancient principles, or who was still animated by the smallest spark of public spirit.

Daring mea-
sures of the
Athenians
after their
defeat.

Philip too well understood his interest, thus to tarnish the glory, and risk the fruits of victory, although the daring and imprudent behaviour of the Athenians, after the battle, might have served to

¹⁰³ Justin. l. ix. c. iv.

justify the harshest measures. The first news of their defeat filled the city with tumult or consternation. But when the disorder ceased, the people shewed themselves disposed to place their whole confidence in arms, none in the mercy of Philip. Upon the motion of Hyperides¹⁰⁴, a decree passed for sending to the Piræus their wives, children, and most valuable effects, together with the sacred images and ornaments of their gods. By the same decree, the rights and freedom of the city were bestowed on strangers and slaves, and restored to persons declared infamous, on this one condition, that they exerted themselves in the public defence. Demosthenes, with equal success, proposed a decree for repairing the walls and fortifications, a work which, being himself appointed to superintend, he generously accomplished at the expence of his private fortune¹⁰⁵. The orator Lycurgus undertook the more easy task of impeaching the worthless Lyficles, whose misconduct in the day of battle had been the immediate cause of the late fatal disaster. In a discourse calculated to revive the spirit of military enthusiasm, which had anciently animated the Athenians, the speaker thus warmly apostrophised the conscious guilt of the mute and trembling general: "The Athenians have been totally defeated in an engagement; the enemy have erected a trophy to the eternal dishonour of Athens; and Greece is now prepared to receive the detested yoke of servitude. You were our commander on that inglorious day; and shall you breathe the vital air, enjoy the light of the sun, and appear in our public places, a living monument of the disgrace and ruin of your country?" The quick resentment of the hearers supplied the consequence, and the criminal was dragged to execution¹⁰⁶.

Neither the inflammatory decrees, nor the hostile preparations, of Athens, could shake the moderation of Philip, or determine him to alter the favourable terms of accommodation, which he had already

Philip's moderation in victory.

¹⁰⁴ Plut. in Vita Hyperid.¹⁰⁵ Demosth. de Corona.¹⁰⁶ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 477.

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Extreme cor-
ruption of
the Athe-
nians.

propoſed by his ambaffadors. The patriotic or republican party, headed by the orators juſt mentioned, breathed hatred and revenge; but, at the interceſſion of the Arcopagus, which on this occaſion acted ſuitably to the ſame of its ancient wiſdom, the prudent and virtuous Phocion¹⁰⁷ was appointed to the chief command. The diſcernment of this ſtateſman and general, whoſe merit had been neglected while it was yet time to perform any eſſential ſervice, might eaſily perceive the vanity of attempting to recover the honour of a people, who, antecedently to their defeat by Philip, had been ſtill more fatally ſubdued by their own pernicious vices. Amidſt the important events of the Macedonian war, and amidſt the dreadful miſfortunes which, in conſequence of its melancholy iſſue, hung over their country, a ſet of Athenian citizens, diſtinguiſhed by their rank and fortune, and known by the appellation of the Sixty, from the accidental number of their original institution, daily aſſembled into a club, where all ſerious tranſactions were treated with levity and ridicule, and the time totally dedicated to feaſting, gaming, and the ſprightly exerciſes of wit and pleaſantry. This deteſtable ſociety ſaw¹⁰⁸, without emotion, their countrymen arming for battle; with the moſt careleſs indifference they received accounts of their captivity or death; nor did the public calamities in any degree diſturb their feſtivity, or interrupt, for a moment, the tranquil courſe of their pleaſures. Their ſame having reached Macedon, Philip ſent them a ſum of money, to ſupport the expence of an inſtitution ſo favourable to his views. But what opinion muſt Phocion have formed of ſuch an eſtabliſhment; or how was it poſſible for any diſpaſſionate man of ordinary prudence to expect, that a republic ſo totally degenerate, as to ſofter ſuch wretches within its boſom, could ſucceſsfully wage war againſt a vigilant and enterpriſing enemy?

¹⁰⁷ Plutarch in Phocion.

¹⁰⁸ Athenæus, l. xiv. p. 614.

The arguments of the wisest portion of the community for accepting the peace proffered by Philip, were strengthened and confirmed by the return of Demades with the Athenian prisoners taken at Chæronæa, who unanimously blazed forth the praises of their generous conqueror. Ambassadors were accordingly dispatched to the king of Macedon, to accept and ratify the treaty of peace, upon the terms which he had condescended to offer; and the only marks of deference shewn to the violent party, who still clamoured for war, were, that Demochares, who ostentatiously affected a rude boldness of speech against Philip, was named among the ambassadors; and that Demosthenes, the irreconcilable enemy of that prince, was appointed to pronounce the funeral oration in honour of those slain at Chæronæa.

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They determine to accept the terms of peace offered by Philip.

Demochares acquitted himself of his commission with that ridiculous petulance which naturally flowed from his character; and which, in the Grecian commonwealths, too frequently disgraced the decency of public transactions. At their audience of leave, Philip, with less sincerity than politeness, lavished on the ambassadors his usual professions of friendship, and obligingly asked them, if there was any thing farther in which he could gratify the Athenians? "Yes," said Demochares, "hang thyself." The just indignation of all present broke forth against this unprovoked insolence, when Philip, with admirable coolness, silenced the clamour, by saying, "Let this ridiculous brawler depart unmolested;" and then turning to the other ambassadors, "Go, tell your countrymen, that those who can utter such outrages are less just and moderate, than he who can pardon them.""

Insolence of Demochares.

The honourable employment conferred on Demosthenes, which shewed that, notwithstanding the unfortunate issue of his counsels, the Athenians still approved his principles and his patriotism, might have been expected to elevate his sentiments and his language to the

Oration of Demosthenes in honour of those slain at Chæronæa.

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highest strain of eloquence. But the complexion of the times no longer admitted those daring flights to which he had been accustomed to soar; and the genius of the orator seems to have fallen with the fortunes of his country. With too apparent caution he avoids the mention of all recent transactions, and dwells with tiresome minuteness on the ancient, and even fabulous parts, of the Athenian story. One transient flash of light breaks forth towards the end of his discourse, when, commemorating the glory of the slain, he says, that the removal of those zealous republicans from their country was like taking the sun from the world¹¹⁰; a figure bold, yet just; since, after the battle of Chæronæa, there remained no further hopes of resisting the conqueror—the dignity of freedom was for ever lost, and the gloom of night and tyranny descended and thickened over Greece¹¹¹.

¹¹⁰ Ὡςπερ γὰρ ἡ τις ἐκ τῆ καθήρητος κοσμοῦ το
φως εἶδοντο, δυσχερὲς καὶ χαλεπὸς ἀπὸς ὁ λιπο-
μῶνος ἡμῶν εἶναι; ἔτι τῶνδ' αὐτῶν ἀνιρῶνται, ἐν
σκοτῇ καὶ πολλῇ δεισνῶν πρὸς ὁ πρῶτος ξυλὸς τῶν
ἰλλῶνων γυμνασίου. p. 155. "For as if light
were taken from the world, the remaining
life of mortals would be involved in difficul-
ties and misery; so by the death of those

warriors, the original glory of Greece was
buried in darkness and ignominy."

¹¹¹ Hic dies universæ Græciæ, et gloriam
dominationis, et vetustissimam libertatem fini-
vit. Justin. l. ix. c. iii. Demosthenes, Dio-
dorus, Strabo, and Pausanias, all express
the same sentiments, and nearly in the same
words.

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Liberal Spirit of the Macedonian Government.—Philip appointed General of the Greeks.—Rebellion of Illyria.—Assassination of Philip.—His Character.—Accession of Alexander.—His Expedition against the Illyrians and Triballi.—He passes the Danube.—Rebellion in Greece.—Destruction of Thebes.—Heroism of Timoclea.—Alexander crosses the Hellespont.—State of the Persian Empire.—Battle of the Granicus.—Siege of Miletus and Halicarnassus.—Bold Adventure of two Macedonian Soldiers.—Alexander's judicious Plan of War.—Arts by which he secured his Conquests.—The Battle of Issus.—The Virtues of Alexander expand with his Prosperity.

THE Greeks acknowledged, with reluctance and sorrow, that by the decisive victory of Chæroneæ, Philip became master of their country'. But we should form a very erroneous notion of the Macedonian government, if we compared it with the despotism of the East, or the absolute dominion of many European monarchs. The authority of Philip, even in his hereditary realm, was modelled on that admirable system of power and liberty, which distinguished

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of the Macce-
donian go-
vernment.

¹ Demosth. Æschin. Diodor. Plutarch. Arrian, passim. I shall cite only the words of Strabo: "Χαίρωνεα δὲ ὅπου Φιλίππου ὁ Ἀρμένιοι μεγάλως νικῶντας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Κορινθίους κατέβη τῆς Ἑλλάδος κυρίως." And Chæ-

roneæ, where Philip, the son of Amyntas, having conquered the Athenians, Bœotians, and Corinthians, in a great battle, rendered himself master of Greece. Strab. Geograph. l. ix. p. 414.

and

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Nature and
extent of
Philip's au-
thority in
Greece.

and ennobled the *policies* of the heroic ages². He administered the religion, decided the differences, and commanded the valour, of soldiers and freemen³. Personal merit entitled him to hold the sceptre, which being derived from Jove, could not long be swayed by unworthy hands. The superiority of his abilities, the vigilant and impartial justice of his administration, formed the main pillars of his prerogative; since, according to the principles and feelings of the Macedonians, he who infringed the rights of his subjects⁴, ceased from that moment to be a king.

Having effected the conquest of Greece, the prudence of Philip could not be supposed ambitious of introducing into that country severer maxims of government than those which prevailed in Macedon. He affected, on the contrary, to preserve inviolate the ancient forms of the republican constitution, and determined to govern the Greeks by the same policy with which he had subdued them. While Macedonian garrisons kept possession of Thermopylæ and the other strong holds of Greece, the faithful and active partisans of Philip controuled the resolutions, and directed the measures, of each particular republic. The superintendence of the sacred games, as well as of the Delphi temple, rendered him the only visible head of the national religion: in consequence of the double right of presiding and voting in the Amphictyonic council, he appeared in the character of supreme civil magistrate of Greece; and his illustrious victory at Chæroneæ over the only communities that opposed his greatness, pointed him out as the general best entitled to conduct

² When Alexander, intoxicated with prosperity, claimed too exalted honours, he was told by Callisthenes the philosopher, “Ὁ περὶγονεὶς ἐξ Ἀργεῖς εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθοι, καὶ εἶπα ἄλλα νόμιμα Μακεδόνων ἀρχόντες διατελεσαν.” “Your ancestors came from Argos to Macedon, and continued there, governing the Macedonians, not by force, but by law.” Arrian, Exped. Alexand. p. 87.

³ In capital cases, says Curtius, the soldiers judged in time of war, the citizens in time of peace. He then adds, “Nihil potestas regum valebat nisi prius valuisset auctoritas;” scilicet populi. Curtius, l. vi. c. ix. p. 441.

⁴ A very mean subject literally told Philip, “If you refuse to do me justice, cease to be a king.” Plut. Apophth.

the military force of Greece and Macedon in the long projected invasion of Persia; an office which, as he might have assumed it without blame, he therefore solicited with applause from the impartial suffrages of the people⁵.

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That this condescension must have been highly flattering to the vanity of the Greeks, appears from the transactions at Corinth, where Philip, the year following the battle of Chæronæa, had assembled a general convention of the Amphiëtyonic states⁶. In this assembly Dius of Ephesus represented, with affecting energy, the vexations and oppression which the feeble colonies of Asia daily experienced from the rapacious cruelty of the Persian satraps. The general voice of the assembly approved his complaint, while they recollected, with indignation, the continual outrages of a people who had anciently invaded their country, insulted their religion, burned their temples, and, not satisfied with these acts of vengeance, had reduced and oppressed their colonies, and uninterruptedly excited and nourished those cruel animosities which had long filled every part of Greece with sedition and blood⁷. Philip had private wrongs to urge against the Persians, whose hatred and jealousy had, on several occasions, thwarted his measures, and disturbed his government. Yet he insisted chiefly on their public injuries, and notorious enmity to the whole Grecian name, the honour of which could only be redeemed by a successful expedition into Asia.

Philip named
general of
the Greeks.
Olymp.
cx. 4.
A. C. 337.

This expedition was determined with universal consent. Philip was appointed general of the confederacy; and (although the Lacedæmonians fully sent themselves from the convention) when the several states came to ascertain the contingent of troops which they could respectively raise, the whole, exclusive of the Macedonians, amounted to two hundred and twenty thousand foot, and

Amount of
their forces.

⁵ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 556. Τῶν Ἑλλήνων
ἐδοξάμενον αὐτὸν ἀρχαγῆναι, &c.

⁶ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 556.

⁷ Isocrat. Orat. ad Philip.

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fifteen thousand horse<sup>8</sup>; a prodigious force, of which the domestic dissensions of the Greeks had hitherto, perhaps, prevented them from forming an adequate notion. On no former occasion had the several republics appeared so thoroughly united in one common cause; never had they shewn themselves so sensible of their combined strength; never had they testified such general alacrity to take the field, or such unlimited confidence in the abilities of their commander.

The expedition retarded by a rebellion in Illyria, and domestic dissensions in Macedon.  
Olymp.  
ciii. 1.  
A. C. 336.

It belongs to the biographers of the king of Macedon, to examine the circumstances of the bloody transaction which clouded this glorious prospect. In the general history of Greece, it is sufficient to mention, that Philip, having dispatched Parmenio with a body of troops to protect the Asiatic colonies, was prevented from immediately following that commander by an insurrection of the Illyrian tribes<sup>9</sup>. This unseasonable diversion from the greatest enterprise of his reign, was rendered more formidable by the domestic discord which shook the palace of Philip. A spirit less proud and jealous than that of Olympias, mother of Alexander, might have been justly provoked by the continual infidelities of her husband, who, whether at home or abroad, in peace or in war, never ceased to augment the number of his wives or concubines<sup>10</sup>. The generous mind of Alexander must naturally have espoused the cause of his mother, although his own interest had not been deeply concerned in preventing Philip from continually giving him so many new rivals to the throne. The young prince defended the rights of Olympias and his own, with the impetuosity natural to his character; at the nuptials of Philip with Cassandra, the niece of Attalus, one of his generals and favourites, an open rupture broke out between the imperious father and his more haughty son<sup>11</sup>; and the latter, concluding all those to be his own friends who were

<sup>8</sup> Justin. l. ix. c. v.

<sup>9</sup> Diodor. ad Olymp.

<sup>10</sup> Athenæus, l. xiii.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch. in Alexand.

enemies to the former, sought refuge among the rebellious Illyrians, who were already in arms against their sovereign.

The dexterity of Philip extricated him from these difficulties. Having conquered the Illyrians, he softened Alexander by assuring him that his illustrious merit, which was alike admired in Greece and Macedon, had not escaped the anxious vigilance of a parent, who, by giving him many rivals to the throne, had only given him an opportunity of surpassing them all in glory and in the merited affection of the Macedonians<sup>12</sup>. Soothed by this condescension, Olympias and her son again appeared at court with the distinction due to their rank; and to announce and confirm this happy reconciliation with his family, Philip married his beloved daughter Cleopatra to the king of Epirus, maternal uncle of Alexander; and celebrated the nuptials by a magnificent festival which lasted several days, during which the Greeks and Macedonians vied with each other in shewing their obsequious respect towards their common general and master.

Amidst the tumultuous amusements of the festivity, Philip often appeared in public with unguarded confidence in the fidelity and attachment of all his subjects: but proceeding one day from the palace to the theatre, he was stabbed to the heart by Pausanias<sup>13</sup>, a Macedonian; whether the assassin was stimulated merely by private resentment, or prompted by the ill-appeased rage of Olympias, or instigated to commit this atrocity by the Persian satraps; which last is asserted by Alexander<sup>14</sup>, who alleged the assassination of his father among his reasons for invading the Persian empire.

Thus fell Philip of Macedon, in the forty-seventh year of his age and twenty-fourth of his reign; the first prince whose life and actions history hath described with such regular accuracy, and circumstantial fulness, as render his administration a matter of instruction to succeeding ages. With a reach of foresight and sagacity peculiar to

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Philip extricates himself from these difficulties. Olymp. cxi. 1. A.C. 336.

is assassinated in going to the theatre.

His character.

<sup>12</sup> Plut. Apophth.

<sup>13</sup> Diodor. & Justin. ubi supra.

<sup>14</sup> Arrian. l. ii. c. iii. & Curtius, l. iv.

c. i.



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himself, he united all the prominent features of the Grecian character; valour, eloquence, address, flexibility to vary his conduct without changing his purpose, the most extraordinary powers of application and perseverance, of cool combination and ardent execution. Intercepted in the middle of his career by the hand of an assassin, he was prevented from undertaking the justest and noblest design of his reign; a design which he had long meditated, and in which his near prospect of success promised to reward the labours and dangers of his toilsome life. Had not his days been shortened by a premature death, there is reason to believe that he would have subdued the Persian empire; an enterprise more dazzling, but less difficult, than the exploits which he had already achieved. Had that event taken place, the arduous undertakings of his long and successful reign would have been ennobled and illuminated by the splendour of extensive foreign conquest; Philip would have reached the height of such renown as is obtained by the habits of activity, vigilance, and fortitude in the pursuit of unbounded greatness; and, in the opinion of posterity, would perhaps have surpassed the glory of all kings and conquerors, who either preceded or followed him. Yet, even on this supposition, there is not any man of sense and probity, who, if he allows himself time for serious reflection, would purchase the imagined grandeur and prosperity of the king of Macedon, at the price of his artifices and crimes; and to a philosopher, who considered either the means by which he had obtained his triumphs, or the probable consequences of his dominion over Greece and Asia, the busy ambition of this mighty conqueror would appear but a deceitful scene of splendid misery.

Difficulties  
attending the  
accession of  
Alexander to  
the Macedo-  
nian throne.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 1.  
A. C. 336.

A prince who is his own minister, and almost the sole depositary of his own secrets, commonly leaves an arduous task for the labours of his successor. This difficulty presented itself to Alexander; but it was not the only circumstance that rendered his situation difficult. The regular order of succession had never been clearly established in

Macedon,

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Macedon, and was, in some measure, incompatible with the spirit of royal government, which, as then generally understood, required such qualities and accomplishments in the first magistrate, as could not be expected from a promiscuous line of hereditary princes. The numerous wives of Philip had, however, been most fruitful in female offspring. Nor had Alexander much to apprehend from the rivalry of his brothers, since Ptolemy, born of Arsinoë, and afterwards king of Egypt, was reputed to be the son of Lagos, to whom Philip had married Arsinoë, while she was with child by himself; and Aridæus, the son of Philina, who, for six years after the death of Alexander, held a pageant royalty in the East, by the terror of his brother's name, and through the discordant ambition of his lieutenants, possessed too feeble an understanding to dispute the succession. But Alexander's title was contested by Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, the elder brother of Philip, in whose name the last-mentioned prince originally administered the government, till the tender age of Amyntas being rejected by the Macedonians, Philip so little feared the revival of his pretensions to the throne, that he had given him his daughter Cyna in marriage. This new advantage strengthened the claim of Amyntas, which, it was probable, would be warmly supported by Attalus, a bold and enterprising commander, the personal enemy of Olympias and her son, of whom the former had recently put to death his kinswoman Cleopatra, with shocking circumstances of cruelty. Alexander privately took measures with his friends for crushing those dangerous enemies<sup>15</sup>; and being acknowledged king of Macedon, hastened into Greece to reap the fruits of his father's labours, which might be lost by delay.

In his journey thither, he experienced the perfidious inconstancy of the Thesalians, whom he chastised with proper severity; and having assembled the deputies of the states at Corinth, he was in-

He is acknowledged general of the Greeks in an assembly of the states at Corinth.

<sup>15</sup> Diodorus, l. xvii. 2. & seqq. & Justin. xi. 1. & seqq.

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His character  
displayed in  
his conversa-  
tion with  
Diogenes  
the cynic.

His expedi-  
tion against  
the Illyrians  
and Triballi.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 2.  
A. C. 335.

vested with the same honours<sup>16</sup> which had been conferred on his predecessor. During his residence in that city there happened an incident which more clearly displays the character of Alexander, than can be done by the most elaborate description. Curiosity led him to visit Diogenes the cynic, whose singular manners and mode of life have been mentioned on a former occasion. He found him basking in the sun<sup>17</sup>, and having made himself known as the master of Macedon and Greece, asked the philosopher what he could do to oblige him? "Stand from between me and the sun," was the answer of the cynic: upon which the king observed to his attendants, that he would choose to be Diogenes<sup>18</sup> if he were not Alexander. The observation was natural and sublime; since, under the most dissimilar veils of external circumstances and pursuits, their characters concealed a real resemblance. Both possessed that proud erect spirit which disdains authority, spurns controul, and aspires to domineer over fortune. But, by diminishing the number of his wants, Diogenes found, in his tub, that independence of mind, which Alexander, by the unbounded gratification of his desires, could not attain on the imperial throne of Persia.

Alexander, having returned to Macedon, prepared for his eastern expedition by diffusing the terror of his name among the northern Barbarians. The Illyrians and Triballi, mindful of the injuries of Philip, had hastily taken arms to oppose, ere it became too late, the youth and inexperience of his son. But the discernment of the young prince readily perceived the danger of leaving such formidable enemies on his frontier. With a well appointed army he marched from Amphipolis, and, leaving the city Philippi and Mount Orbelus on the left, arrived in ten days at the principal pass of Mount Hæmus, which led into the territory of the Triballi. There he found a

<sup>16</sup> Diodor. & Justin. xvii. 2. & seqq. & Justin. xi. 1. & seqq.

<sup>17</sup> Pausan. l. ii. p. 88.

<sup>18</sup> Laertius in Vit. Diogen.

new, and not less formidable enemy. The independent tribes of Thrace, having embraced the cause of the Triballi, had seized an eminence commanding the pass; and, instead of a breastwork, had fortified themselves with their carriages or waggons, which they purposed to roll down on the Macedonians. To elude this unusual attack, Alexander commanded such of his troops as could not conveniently open their ranks, and allow free issue to the intended violence, to fall flat on the ground, and carefully close their shields, that the descending waggons might harmless bound over them. In consequence of this contrivance, the hostile artillery was exhausted in vain. Alexander then attacked the Thracians with admirable order and celerity. Fifteen hundred fell; their swiftness and knowledge of the country saved the greater number. The prisoners, women, and booty, were sent for sale to the maritime cities on the Euxine<sup>19</sup>.

Alexander having intrusted this business to Lyfanius and Philotas, passed the mountains, and pursued the Triballi. By galling them with his bowmen and slingers, he gradually forced them from their fastnesses, and defeated a powerful body of their warriors encamped on the woody banks of the Lyginus, distant three days march from the Danube. The remainder of the nation, conducted by the valour of their chieftain Syrmus, and reinforced by a numerous band of Thracians, took refuge in Peucé, an island in the Danube, defended by abrupt and rugged banks, surrounded by deep and foaming streams. Alexander, though he had just received some ships of war from Byzantium, judged it too hazardous to assault the island; and the hostile appearance of the Getæ on the northern bank, furnished him with an honourable pretence for declining the siege of Peucé. On the margin of the Danube, that audacious people had drawn up four thousand horse, and above ten thousand foot, showing, by their countenance and demeanour, a determined resolution to oppose the landing of an enemy. Provoked by those signs of defiance, and

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He defeats  
the independent tribes  
of Thrace.

The Triballi  
take refuge  
in Peucé.

Alexander  
posses the  
Danube &c.

<sup>19</sup> Arrian. Alexand. Expedit. l. i. p. 2. & seqq.

animated.



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animated by the glory of passing the greatest of all European rivers, and that which was surrounded with the greatest and most warlike nations, Alexander filled the hides used in encampment with straw and other buoyant materials, and collected all the boats employed by the natives of those parts in fishing, commerce, or piracy. Amidst the darkness of the ensuing night, he thus transported fifteen hundred cavalry, and four thousand infantry, to that part of the opposite bank, which was covered with high and thick corn. At the dawn of day, he commanded his foot to march through those rich fields<sup>20</sup> with transversed spears; while they remained concealed in the corn, the cavalry followed them; but as soon as they emerged into the naked plain, the horse advanced to the front, and both suddenly presenting an irresistible object of terror, the Getæ abandoned their post, and fled to their city, which was four miles distant. There, they at first proposed to make a vigorous defence; but perceiving that Alexander cautiously skirted the river, to avoid the danger of an ambush, reflecting on his astonishing boldness in passing, without a bridge, the Danube in one night, and beholding the impenetrable firmness of his phalanx, and the irresistible impetuosity of his cavalry<sup>21</sup>, they regarded farther opposition as vain, forsook their habitations, and retired precipitately, with their wives and children, into the northern desert<sup>22</sup>.

receives the  
submission of  
the neigh-  
bouring na-  
tions.

The Macedonians entered, and sacked the town. The spoil was entrusted to Philip and Meleager; Alexander, mindful of so many favours, returned sacrifices of thanks to Jupiter, Hercules, and the

<sup>20</sup> Πλάγας τῶν σπάρτων ἐκκείμεναι τὴν σι-  
τον. The spears were transversed, not only  
for the purpose of concealment, "but to  
make a road through the corn."

<sup>21</sup> ὁπότε δὲ τὴν πελάγην ἡ βάρβαρος, ἔβαν  
ἐκ τῶν σπάρτων ἐκείνης, Arrian, p. 4. Al-  
xander knew the proper use of cavalry, which  
was so little understood in the last century,  
that the three ranks fired successively before

the charge; each, after firing, passing, by  
a caracol, behind the rest. Gustavus Adol-  
phus allowed only his first rank to fire; which  
was, doubtless, a great improvement, and  
paved the way for reducing the service of  
cavalry to its true principle, what Arrian  
calls "ἐκείνη ἡ τέχνη."

<sup>22</sup> Arrian, l. i. p. 5. & seqq.

god of the Danube; and, encamping on the northern bank of the river, received very submissive embassies from the surrounding nations. Even Syrmus, the intrepid leader of the Triballi, sent propitiatory presents, and readily obtained pardon from a prince, who could admire virtue in a Barbarian, and an enemy.<sup>23</sup>

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Necessity alone compelled Alexander to carry his arms into those inhospitable regions. Animated by an ambition to subdue the Asiatic plains, he turned with contempt from bleak heaths and barren mountains, not deigning to chastise the boastful arrogance of the Celtæ. The Boii and Senones, Celtic or German tribes (for those nations were often confounded by the Greeks), sent ambassadors to Alexander, who observing their lofty stature and haughty spirit, endeavoured to humble them by asking, "what, of all things, they most feared?" not doubting they would answer, "Yourself;" but they replied, "the fall of Heaven." The king declared them his friends and allies, but whispered to those around him, "the Celtæ are an arrogant people."<sup>24</sup> Could we admit the truth of this narrative, and believe that ambassadors were really sent to Alexander by the nations inhabiting the northern recesses of the Ionian gulph, it would be interesting to observe the early character and first proceedings of a people, who were destined to subdue the conquerors of the Macedonian empire.

Arrogance  
of the Celtæ.

In his return towards Pella, Alexander marched through the friendly country of the Pæonians, where he received the unpleasant intelligence that the Illyrian tribes were in arms, headed by Clitus, son of Bardyllis, the hereditary foe of Macedon. Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, prepared to join the arms of Clitus; the Autariadæ, likewise an Illyrian nation, had determined to obstruct the march of Alexander. Amidst these difficulties, he was encouraged by Langarus, chief of the Agrians, a warlike tribe inhabiting the ridges of

Alexander  
reduces the  
Taulantii,  
and other  
Illyrian  
tribes.

<sup>23</sup> Arrian, l. i. p. 3, & seqq.

<sup>24</sup> Idem, p. 5. & Strabo, l. vii. p. 208, & 209.

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Mount Hæmus. Even in the life-time of Philip, Langarus<sup>25</sup> had discerned the superior merit of his son, with whom he had early entered into a confidential correspondence. Conducted by the activity of Langarus, the Agrian targeteers, who thenceforth had an important share in all the Macedonian victories, invaded the country of the Autariadæ. Their ravages were equally rapid and destructive; the Autariadæ, broken by domestic calamity, or alarmed by private danger, abandoned the design of co-operating with the enemies of Alexander. That prince thus advanced without opposition to Pellion, the principal strong hold of the Illyrians. His army encamped on the banks of the Eordaicus. The enemy were posted on the adjacent mountains, and concealed among thick woods, purposing to attack the Macedonians by a sudden and united assault. But their courage failed them in the moment of execution. Not daring to wait the approach of the phalanx, they precipitately retreated to their city, leaving behind them the horrid vestiges of their bloody superstition, three boys, three maids, and as many black rams, which, having just sacrificed, they wanted time to remove<sup>26</sup>.

Meanwhile Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, approached with a great force<sup>27</sup> to relieve Pellion, and assist his ally. Alexander had dispatched Philotas to forage at the head of a strong body of cavalry. Glaucias attempted to intercept and cut off this detachment. Alexander, leaving part of his army to awe Pellion, marched to the assistance of Philotas; Clitus reinforced Glaucias; a decisive action thus seemed inevitable, if the thickness of lofty forests, and the intricacies of winding mountains, had afforded a proper scene for a general engagement. The Barbarians excelled in knowledge of the

<sup>25</sup> Λαγγαρις :: και Φιλίππου ζῶντος ἀσπαζομενος Ἀλεξάνδρῳ διηγεῖται, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιστολῇ παρ' αὐτοῦ. Arrian, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> Arrian, p. 5.

<sup>27</sup> Μετὰ πολλῶν δυνάμεως. Idem, p. 6. Nei-

ther Thrace nor Illyria were populous in those days; but as every man was a soldier, the princes of those countries often brought numerous armies into the field.

country; the Macedonians in skill and courage. The war was widely diffused, and ably supported. But the discipline of Alexander finally prevailed. By surprise, by stratagem, by the terror of his military engines, which destroyed at a distance, and by such prompt and skilful manœuvres<sup>28</sup> as had never been before seen, on the banks of the Apfus<sup>29</sup> and Erigonè, he totally dispersed this immense cloud of Barbarians. Many were slain, and many made captive; a remnant having burnt their city, which they despaired being able to defend, sought refuge among the Taulantian mountains<sup>30</sup>.

Meanwhile a report circulated in Greece, that Alexander had perished in Illyria; and, as men readily *believe* that which their interest makes them *wish*<sup>31</sup>, this vague rumour was greedily embraced by the partisans of Grecian independence. The Athenian demagogues resumed their usual boldness; the Lacedæmonians already fancied themselves heading the revolt<sup>32</sup>; but the first acts of rebellion were committed by the Thebans, who, having secretly recalled their exiles, treacherously<sup>33</sup> murdered Amyntas and Timolaus, commanders of the Cadmeæ, and prepared to expel the Macedonian garrison from that fortress.

Alexander, when apprised of these proceedings, relinquished the pursuit of the Barbarians, descended by rapid marches along the western frontier of Macedon, traversed Theffaly, entered Bœotia, and in the space of fourteen days after his receiving the first news of the rebellion, besieged and demolished Thebes. The decisive boldness of this measure has been highly extolled by historians, be-

Rebellion in  
Greece.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 2.  
A. C. 335.

Destruction  
of Thebes.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 2.  
A. C. 335.

<sup>28</sup> These are laboriously described by Arrian, p. 6. who, it must be acknowledged, appears sometimes too fond of displaying his skill in tactics.

<sup>29</sup> Otherwise called the Eordaicus.

<sup>30</sup> Arrian, p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> Οὐ γινώσκοντες τὰ ἀληθῆ, τὰ μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς

σβένεισαν. "Not knowing the truth, hope regulated their conjectures." Idem, p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> The Lacedæmonians, says Arrian, were γινώσκοντες ὁρμήσαντες, revolted in their minds.

<sup>33</sup> They seized them without the garrison, ἐὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατοῦ περιέμεναι, "suspecting no hostility."



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cause nothing could have a more direct tendency to quash the seditious spirit of the Greeks, than the rapid punishment of Thebes, which at once filled the neighbouring cities with pity and terror. A spectacle of that dreadful kind was necessary, it has been said, to secure the future tranquillity of Greece and Macedon, and to enable Alexander to undertake his Persian expedition, without the danger of being interrupted by rebellions in Europe<sup>34</sup>. But, notwithstanding this sagacious reflection, it appears that the destruction of Thebes was the effect, not of policy, but of obstinacy and accident. In approaching that unfortunate city, Alexander repeatedly halted, to allow the insurgents time to repent of their rashness. The wiser part of the Thebans proposed to embrace the opportunity of sending ambassadors to crave his pardon. But the exiles and authors of the sedition encouraged the multitude to persevere; and instead of shewing any remorse for their past crimes, sent forth their cavalry and light infantry, who assaulted and slew several of the Macedonian out-guards<sup>35</sup>.

The occasion  
and circum-  
stances of  
that event.

Exasperated by these insults, Perdiccas, commander of an advanced party, attacked the Theban wall, without waiting the orders of Alexander. A breach was speedily effected; the brigade of Perdiccas was followed by that of Amyntas, son of Andromenes; but both were so warmly received by the enemy, that Alexander saw the necessity of reinforcing them, lest they should be surrounded and cut off. The Thebans were then repelled in their turn; but, soon rallying, beat back the assailants, and pursued them with disordered ranks. Alexander then seized the decisive moment of advancing

<sup>34</sup> Plut. Diodor. Justin. Among the moderns, Mably sur les Græcs, and the learned author of the Examen des Historiens d'Alexandre, who says, p. 46, "Alexandre devoit assurer sa domination dans la Grèce par quelque coup d'éclat, avant que de passer en Asie; la revolte de Thebes lui presenta une occasion favorable à ses vues." Yet Arrian, whose narrative was copied from the relation

of eye-witnesses, expresses, thrice in the same page, the reluctance of Alexander to attack the Thebans. Εκδιδας ἐν τοῖς θεβαίοις τρέψας, καὶ μεταγυνοῦντες ἐν τοῖς κακῶς ἐργασμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς πάντας αὐτοὺς. And again, Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς θεβαίοις διὰ φίλιας εἶθην μάλλον τι ἢ διὰ κατὰ νόμον ἡθελον. And still to the same purpose, Αἰεὶ ἀπαθροῦς δὲ ἐπὶ ὧς τῇ πόλει περιστάσιν. Arrian, p. 8.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 8, & seqq.

with a close phalanx. His assault was irresistible. The Thebans fled amain: and such was their trepidation, that having entered their gates, they neglected to shut them against the pursuers. The Macedonians, and their Greek auxiliaries, thus rushed tumultuously into the place. A dreadful slaughter ensued. The Phocians, Orchomenians, and Platæans, rejoiced at gaining an opportunity to gratify their implacable resentment against Thebes. The greater part of the citizens, exceeding thirty thousand in number<sup>36</sup>, were either put to the sword, or dragged into captivity. A feeble remnant escaped to Athens. The ancient city of Cadmus was rased to the ground; but the citadel was still garrisoned by Macedonian troops, and long maintained as a convenient post for overawing the adjacent territory.

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Cruelty of  
the Greek  
auxiliaries.

The severities exercised against Thebes were reluctantly permitted by Alexander, at the instigation of his Grecian auxiliaries<sup>37</sup>. The few acts of forbearance or mercy, which appeared in this lamentable transaction, flowed from the humanity of his own nature. By his particular orders, the house and family of Pindar were saved from the general desolation. He commanded, likewise, that the sacred families should be spared, as well as those connected with Macedon by the ties of hospitality; and, as he is the only great conqueror who built many more towns than he destroyed, he took care that the demolition of Thebes should be immediately followed by the restoration of Orchomenus and Plataea. Even the gloomiest events of his reign were distinguished by some flashes of light, that displayed his magnanimity. It happened in the sack of Thebes, that a band of fierce Thracians broke into the house of Timoclea, an illustrious Theban matron, the ornament of her sex. The soldiers plundered her house; their brutal commander violated her person. Having

A few acts  
of mercy  
owing to  
Alexander.

Hercinism of  
Timoclea.

<sup>36</sup> According to the lowest computation, *ibid.* Ælian Var. Hist. l. xiii. c. vii. Agatharchid. apud Phot. Bibl. 1337.  
Thebes at that time contained above thirty thousand citizens. Comp. Diodor. Hist. l. xvii. p. 569.

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gratified his lust, he was next stimulated by avarice, and demanded her gold and silver. She conducted him to a garden, and shewed him a well, into which she pretended to have thrown her most valuable treasure. With blind avidity, he stooped to grasp it, while the woman, being behind, pushed him headlong into the cistern, and covered him with stones. Timoclea was seized by the soldiers, and carried in chains to Alexander. Her firm gait, and intrepid aspect, commanded the attention of the conqueror. Having learned her crime, Alexander asked her, "Who she was, that could venture to commit so bold a deed?" "I am," replied she, "the sister of Theagenes, who fell at Chæronæa, fighting against Philip in defence of Grecian freedom." Alexander admired both her action and her answer, and desired her to depart free with her children<sup>38</sup>.

Alexander  
receives the  
congratulatory  
embassies of the  
Greeks.

While Alexander returned towards Macedon, he received many congratulatory embassies from the Greeks. Those affected most friendship in their speeches, who had most enmity in their hearts. The Athenians sent to deprecate his wrath against themselves, and to excuse their compassionate treatment of the Theban fugitives. Alexander demanded the persons of Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hyperides, and five other orators, to whose inflammatory speeches he ascribed the seditious spirit that had recently prevailed in Athens. An assembly was immediately summoned to deliberate on this demand; and a decree unanimously passed for trying the orators accused by Alexander, and for inflicting on them such punishment as their offences should appear to merit. This pretended forwardness in the Athenians to avenge his quarrel, was highly agreeable to Alexander. The artful decree, which was immediately transmitted to him, was rendered still more acceptable, by being delivered by Demades, an avowed friend to Macedon, whom the party of De-

<sup>38</sup> Plut. de Vit. Alexand. p. 7.

mosthenes bribed with five talents to undertake this useful service<sup>39</sup>. Amidst the various embassies to the king, the Spartans alone preserved a sullen, or magnanimous silence. Alexander treated them with real, or well-affecting contempt; and without deigning to require their assistance, prepared for the greatest enterprize that ever was undertaken by any Grecian general.

The arrival of the army in Macedon was celebrated with all the pomp of Grecian superstition. A faithful image of the Olympic solemnity was exhibited in the ancient city of *Ægæ*. Continual games and sacrifices were performed in *Dium*, during the space of nine days, in honour of the Muses. Alexander entertained at his table the ambassadors of the Grecian states, together with the principal officers of his army, whether Greeks or Macedonians. In the interval of public representations, he discoursed with his confidential friends concerning the important expedition which chiefly occupied his thoughts. *Parmenio* and *Antipater*, the most respected of his father's counsellors, exhorted him not to march into the East, until by marriage, and the birth of a son, he had provided a successor to the monarchy. But the ardent patriotism of Alexander disdained such considerations. He remembered that he was elected general of the Greeks, and that he commanded the invincible troops of his father<sup>40</sup>.

Having entrusted to *Antipater* the affairs of Greece and Macedon, and committed to that general an army of above twenty thousand men<sup>41</sup>, to maintain domestic tranquillity in those countries, he departed early in the spring, at the head of above five thousand

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Transactions  
in Macedon,  
previous to  
Alexander's  
expedition to  
the East.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 1.  
A. C. 334.

Alexander  
crosses the  
Hellefpont  
with his  
army.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 3.  
A. C. 334.

<sup>39</sup> The circumstances of this transaction are differently related by all the authors who mention it. Compare *Diodorus*, l. xvii. p. 498. *Æschin.* in *Ctesiphont.* *Plut.* in *Vit. Alexand.* & *Arrian*, l. i. p. 11. In military affairs *Arrian's* authority stands unvalued; but *Æschines*, a contemporary ora-

tor, must have been better informed concerning the civil transactions of the Athenians.

<sup>40</sup> *Diodor.* l. xvii. p. 499.

<sup>41</sup> *Diodorus*, who enters into some detail on this subject, says, twelve thousand infantry, and eleven thousand five hundred cavalry.

horse,



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horse, and somewhat more than thirty thousand infantry<sup>42</sup>. In twenty days march, he arrived at Sestos, on the Hellespont. From thence the army was conveyed to Asia, in an hundred and sixty galleys, and probably a still greater number of transports. The armament landed without opposition on the Asiatic coast, the Persians, though long ago apprised of the intended invasion, having totally neglected the defence of their western frontier.

State of the  
Persian em-  
pire.

The causes of this negligence resulted, in some degree perhaps, from the character of the prince, but still more from that of the nation. Codomannus had been raised by assassinations and intrigues to the throne of Persia, about the same time that Alexander succeeded his father Philip. The first year of his reign had been employed in stifling domestic rebellion, in securing, and afterwards in displaying, the fruits of victory. This prince assumed the appellation of Darius, but could not recal the principles or manners which distinguished his countrymen, during the reign of the first monarch of that name. In the space of about two hundred and thirty years, the Persians had been continually degenerating from the virtues which characterise a poor and warlike nation, without acquiring any of those arts and improvements which usually attend peace and opulence. Their empire, as extended by Darius Hystaspes, still embraced the most valuable portion of Asia and Africa. The revenue paid in money was still estimated, as during the reign of that monarch, at fourteen thousand five hundred and sixty Eubœic talents. Immense treasures had been accumulated in Damascus, Arbela, Susa, Persæpolis, Ecbatan, and other great cities of the empire. The revenue paid in kind cannot be appreciated; but such was the extraordinary opulence of this great monarchy, that the conquests of Alexander are supposed to have given him an income of sixty millions sterling<sup>43</sup>; a sum which

<sup>42</sup> Arrian, p. 12.

<sup>43</sup> Justin. xiii. 1.

will admit allowance for exaggeration, and still appear sufficiently great.

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Although the extravagance and vices of Susa, Babylon, and other imperial cities, corresponded to the extent and wealth of the monarchy, yet the Persians were prepared for destruction rather by their ignorance of the arts of peace and war, than by their effeminacy and luxury. The provinces, moreover, had ceased to maintain any regular communication with the capital, or with each other. The standing military force proved insufficient to keep in awe the distant satraps, or viceroys. The ties of a common religion and language, or the sense of a public interest, had never united into one system this discordant mass of nations, which was ready to crumble into pieces at the touch of an invader. When to these unfavourable circumstances we join the reflection, that under the younger Cyrus, twelve thousand Greeks baffled the arms, and almost divided the empire of Persia, we shall not find much reason to admire the magnanimity of Alexander in undertaking his Eastern expedition; unless we are at the same time apprised, that Darius was deemed a brave and generous prince, beloved by his Persian subjects, and assisted by the valour of fifty thousand Greek mercenaries<sup>44</sup>.

Circumstances which prepared it for destruction.

Having arrived in Asia, Alexander, than whom none ever employed more successfully the power of superstition<sup>45</sup>, confirmed the confidence of his followers by many auspicious predictions and prodigies. While, with every military precaution, he pursued his march along the coast, Artines, Spithridates, Memnon, and other governors of the maritime provinces, assembled in the town of Zeleia, distant sixty miles from the Hellespont. They had neglected to oppose the invasion by their superior fleet; they had allowed the enemy to encamp, unmolested, on their coasts; fear now com-

Deliberation of the Persian satraps.

<sup>44</sup> Arrian, Diodorus, and Curtius.

<sup>45</sup> Plut. Curtius, and Arrian, passim.

pelled

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Judicious ad-  
vice of Mem-  
non

rejected.

Alexander  
prepares to  
pass the Gra-  
nicus.  
Olymp.  
xi. 3.  
A. C. 334.

pelled them to reluctant union, but jealousy made them reject the most reasonable plan of defence.

This was proposed by Memnon the Rhodian, the ablest general in the service of Darius. He observed the danger of resisting the Macedonian infantry, who were superior in number, and encouraged by the presence of their king. That the invaders, fiery and impetuous, were now animated by hope, but would lose courage on the first disappointment. Destitute of magazines and resources, their safety depended on sudden victory. It was the interest of the Persians, on the other hand, to protract the war, above all to avoid a general engagement. Without risking the event of a battle, they had other means to check the progress of the invaders. For this purpose, they ought to trample down the corn with their numerous cavalry, destroy all other fruits of the ground, and desolate the whole country, without sparing the towns and villages. Some rejected this advice, as unbecoming the dignity of Persia<sup>46</sup>; Arsites, governor of Lesser Phrygia, declared with indignation, that he would never permit the property of *his* subjects to be ravaged with impunity. These sentiments the more easily prevailed, because many suspected the motives of Memnon. It was determined, therefore, by this council of princes, to assemble their respective forces with all possible expedition, and to encamp on the eastern bank of the Granicus, a river (midway between Zeleia and the Hellespont), which issuing from Mount Ida, falls into the Propontis.

The scouts of Alexander having brought him intelligence of the enemy's design, he immediately advanced to give them battle. The phalanx marched by its flank in a double line<sup>47</sup>, the cavalry on the wings, the waggons and baggage in the rear. The advanced guard,

<sup>46</sup> *Ανδρίαν τῆς Περσῆς μεγαλοψυχίας*, "Unworthy the magnanimity of Persia." Diodor. p. 501.

<sup>47</sup> The *διπλὴ φάλαγξ*, is explained in this sense by Ælian and Arrian. In ordinary

cases the phalanx marched by its flank, that is, with a front of sixteen men. The *διπλὴ φάλαγξ*, therefore, contained a front of thirty-two men.

consisting

consisting of horsemen armed with pikes, and five hundred light infantry, the whole commanded by Hegelochus, were detached to examine the fords of the Granicus, and to observe the disposition of the enemy. They returned with great celerity, to acquaint Alexander, that the Persians were advantageously posted on the opposite bank, their horse amounting to twenty thousand, and their foreign mercenaries, drawn up on the slope of a rising ground, behind the cavalry, scarcely less numerous. Notwithstanding this alarming intelligence, the young prince determined to pass the river. Having advanced within sight of the hostile ranks, his horse spread to the right and left, the massy column of infantry opened, and the whole formed along the bank in order of battle. The phalanx, divided into eight sections, composed the main body, which occupied the centre; the Macedonian cavalry formed the right wing; the Grecian, the left.

While Alexander made these dispositions, the cautious Parmenio approached, and remonstrated against passing the Granicus in the face of an enemy. The river, he observed, was deep and full of eddies; its banks abrupt and craggy; "it would be impossible, therefore, to march the Macedonians in front, and if they advanced in columns, their flanks must be exposed naked and defenceless. To try such dangerous manœuvres seemed unnecessary in the present juncture, because the Barbarians would certainly quit their station in the night, rather than remain encamped in the neighbourhood of so formidable an army." These prudential considerations prevailed not with Alexander, who declared that, in the first conflict, the Macedonians must act with equal promptitude and vigour, and perform something worthy of the terror which they bore. Saying this, he sprung on his horse, assumed the command of the right wing, and committed the left to Parmenio.

Rejects the  
cautious  
counsels of  
Parmenio.

Animated by the hope of soon closing with the enemy, he determined to employ his military engines. The balistas and catapults,

Battle of the  
Granicus.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 3.  
A. C. 334.



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by which, in a similar situation, he had repelled the Taulantii, were rejected as tedious or ineffectual. Alexander distributed his orders; a dreadful silence ensued; the hostile armies beheld each other with resentment or terror. This solemn pause was interrupted by the Macedonian trumpet, which, on a signal given by Alexander, resounded from every part of the line. His brother Ptolemy, as had been previously regulated, then rode forth at the head of a squadron of cuirassiers<sup>48</sup>, followed by two bodies of light dragoons, and a battalion of infantry commanded by Amyntas. While these troops boldly entered the Granicus, Alexander likewise advanced with the chosen cavalry on the right wing, followed by the archers and Agrians. In passing the river, both Alexander and Ptolemy led their troops obliquely down the current, to prevent, as much as possible, the Persians from attacking them in flank, as they successively reached the shore. The Persian cavalry behaved with courage; the first squadrons of the Macedonians were driven back into the stream. But Alexander, who animated the *companions*<sup>49</sup> with his voice and arm, maintained his ground on the bank, and thought he had gained the battle, when he obtained an opportunity of fighting. In the equestrian engagement which followed, the Macedonians owed much to their skilful evolutions and discipline<sup>50</sup>; still more to their strength and courage; and not a little to the excellence of their weapons, which being made of the cornel-tree<sup>51</sup>, far surpassed the brittle javelins of the enemy.

<sup>48</sup> I have used this word to express those troops which the Greeks called *Cataphracts*, from the completeness of their defensive armour. Milton mentions them in Samson Agonistes,

“ Archers and slingers, Cataphracts and spears.”

<sup>49</sup> The eight squadrons of chosen cavalry, which were of that kind called Cataphracts, were honoured with the name of Companions and friends of the king. Arrian & Diodor. passim.

<sup>50</sup> They derived great advantages, particularly, from the light infantry intermixed with their squadrons. The targeteers and Agrians proved extremely useful in helping the Macedonians to keep off the Persian cavalry, which, when too near, hindered them from the proper use of their lances.

<sup>51</sup> At myrtus validis hastilibus & bona bello  
Cornus.

VIRG. GEORG. ii. v. 417.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile Parmenio crossed the Granicus, at the head of the left wing, with equal success, but unequal glory, because Alexander had already proved, by his example, that the difficulty might be overcome, which would have otherwise appeared unfurmountable. The attention of the enemy was so deeply engaged by the successive attacks of the cavalry, that they seem not to have made much opposition to the passage of the phalanx. But before this powerful body of infantry had crossed the river, the Macedonian horse had already reaped the fairest honours of the field. Alexander animated them by his presence, and, after performing all the duties of a great general, displayed such personal acts of prowess as will be more readily admired than believed by the modern reader. But in the close combats of antiquity, the forces, when once thoroughly engaged, might be safely abandoned to the direction of their own resentment and courage, while the commanders displayed the peculiar accomplishments to which they had been trained from their youth, in the more conspicuous parts of the field. Alexander was easily distinguished by the brightness of his armour, and the admirable alacrity of his attendants. The bravest of the Persian nobles impatiently waited his approach. He darted into the midst of them, and fought till he broke his spear. Having demanded a new weapon from Aretes, his master of horse, Aretes shewed him his own spear, which likewise was broken. Demaratus the Corinthian supplied the king with a weapon. Thus armed, he rode up, and assaulted Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, who exulted before the hostile ranks. While Alexander beat him to the ground, he was himself struck by Ræfæces with a hatchet. His helmet saved his life. He pierced the breast of Ræfæces; but a new danger threatened him from the scimitar of Spithridates. The instrument of death already descended on his head, when Clitus cut off the arm of Spithridates, which fell with the grasped weapon.

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The Persians  
defeated.

The heroism of Alexander animated the valour of the *companions*, and the enemy first fled, where the king commanded in person. In the left wing, the Grecian cavalry must have behaved with distinguished merit, since the Persians had begun on every side to give way before the Macedonian infantry had completely passed the river<sup>52</sup>. The stern aspect of the phalanx, shining in steel and bristling with spears, confirmed the victory. Above a thousand Persian horse were slain in the pursuit. The foot, consisting chiefly in Greek mercenaries, still continued in their first position, not firm, but inactive, petrified by astonishment, not steady through resolution<sup>53</sup>. While the phalanx attacked them in front, the victorious cavalry assailed their flanks. Surrounded on all sides, they fell an easy prey; two thousand surrendered prisoners; the rest all perished, unless a few stragglers perchance lurked among the slain.

Loss on both  
sides.

The battle of the Granicus proved fatal to most of the Persian commanders. Arsites, the chief adviser of the engagement, died in despair by his own hand. The generals Niphates and Petenes, Omars leader of the mercenaries, Spithridates satrap of Lydia, Mithrobuzanes governor of Cappadocia, Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, and Arbupales son of Artaxerxes, were numbered among the slain. Such illustrious names might lead us to suspect, that the

<sup>52</sup> Guischart, p. 208, says, " Aussitôt que la phalange fut en état d'agir contre l'ennemi, avec tout son front hérissé de piques, la victoire cessa d'être douteuse." It appears not, however, that the phalanx at all acted against the Persian cavalry. The battle of Granicus was entirely an equestrian engagement, as had been prophesied to Alexander by his namesake, a priest of Minerva in the Troade. See Diodor. l. xvii. p. 571.

<sup>53</sup> Εκατόν, πολλοὶ τι τε παραλογεῖ, πλοῖσμος, εἶσαν. Arrian. It might be suspected that the Greek mercenaries were not very hearty in the Persian cause, and had delayed de-

claring themselves till they beheld the issue of the equestrian engagement. This is conjectured by Guischart in his admirable *Memoires Militaires*, p. 208. But the fidelity of their countrymen to Darius on all subsequent occasions, as well as the severe treatment they met with in the present battle, seem sufficient to remove that dishonourable suspicion. Their conduct, seemingly unaccountable, is ascribed by Arrian, to their astonishment, that Alexander's cavalry should have passed the Granicus, and repelled the Persian horse, which was four times more numerous.

Persians

Persians were still more numerous than Arrian<sup>54</sup> represents them; and, notwithstanding the nature of ancient weapons and tactics, which rendered every battle a rout, and commonly prevented the retreat of the vanquished, it is scarcely to be believed, that in such an important engagement, Alexander should have lost only eighty-five horsemen, and thirty light infantry<sup>55</sup>. Of the former, twenty-five belonged to the royal band of Companions. By command of Alexander, their statues were formed by the art of his admired Lysippus<sup>56</sup>, and erected in the Macedonian city of Dium.

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This important victory enabled Alexander to display both his humanity and his prudence. He declared the parents and children of the deceased thenceforth exempted from every species of tribute<sup>57</sup>. He carefully visited the wounded, attentively asked how each of them had received harm, and heard with patience and commendation their much boasted exploits. The Persian commanders were interred; and the Greeks, both officers and soldiers. The Grecian captives were condemned to work in the Thracian mines, as a punishment for bearing arms against the cause of their country. But even this severity Alexander softened by a very seasonable compliment to the Athenians, whose city he preferred to be the repository of his trophies and renown. Immediately after the battle, he sent three hundred suits of Persian armour, as dedications to Minerva in the citadel. This magnificent present was inscribed with the following words: "Gained by Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks (except the Lacedæmonians) from the Barbarians of Asia." It is re-

Humanity  
and prudence  
of Alexander.

<sup>54</sup> Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 572, makes them amount to one hundred and ten thousand. Justin is quite extravagant. The Persians, he says, were six hundred thousand.

<sup>55</sup> Others diminished the loss to thirty-five horsemen and nine foot soldiers. Aristobol. apud Plut. in Vit. Alexand.

<sup>56</sup> Arrian says ὅτις καὶ ἀνδραγαθὸν μόνον πεποιθὸς ἔστιν. "Who was alone preferred to make the image of Alexander." This, doubt-


less, increased the honour conferred on the Companions. Arrian would have spoke more accurately, had he said, "to cast the figure of Alexander in bronze." Other artists represented him in marble, in gems, medals, &c. of which hereafter.

<sup>57</sup> Arrian distinguishes τῶν συμμάχων λειτουργίας, καὶ κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποφραγῶν, personal services, and contributions, in proportion to their property.

markable,



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Immediate  
consequence  
of the vic-  
tory.

markable, that on this occasion he omits mention of the Macedonians, whether because he wished them to be comprehended under the name of Greeks; or because, in the Persian war, he always affected rather to avenge the cause of Greece, than to gratify his own ambition; or, finally, that the Greeks being thus exclusively associated to his honours, might thenceforth continue zealous in making new levies for his service.

The battle of the Granicus opened to Alexander the conquest of Ionia, Caria, Phrygia; in a word, all the Asiatic provinces west of the river Halys, which had anciently formed the powerful monarchy of the Lydians. Many of the walled towns surrendered at his approach. Sardis, the splendid capital of Cræsus, opened its gates to a deliverer, and once more obtained the privilege of being governed by its ancient laws, after reluctantly enduring, above two centuries, the cruel yoke of Persia. The Grecian cities on the coast were delivered from the burden of tribute, and the oppression of garrisons; and, under the auspices of a prince, who admired their ancient glory in arts and arms, resumed the enjoyment of their hereditary freedom. During the Persian expedition of Alexander, the Ephesians were still employed in rebuilding their temple, which had been set on fire by Herostratus, twenty years before that period, and on the same night, it is said, which gave birth to the destined conqueror of the East. Alexander encouraged their pious and honourable undertaking; and, in order to accelerate its progress, commanded the tribute which had been paid to the Persians, to be appropriated to the temple of Diana<sup>58</sup>.

Siege of Mi-  
letus and  
Halicarnas-  
sus.

Miletus and Halicarnassus alone retarded the progress of the conqueror. The latter place, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian, made a memorable defence. Alexander had scarcely sat down before it, when the garrison, consisting of Greeks and Persians, sallied

<sup>58</sup> Comp. Arrian, p. 18. & Strab. p. 949.

forth,

forth, and maintained a desperate conflict. Having repelled them with much difficulty, he undertook the laborious work of filling up a ditch thirty cubits broad, and fifteen deep, which the besieged, with incredible diligence, had drawn round their wall. This being effected, he advanced wooden towers, on which the Macedonians erected their battering engines, and prepared to assault the enemy on equal ground. But a nocturnal fallly attacked these preparations; a second engagement was fought with still greater fury than the first; three hundred Macedonians were wounded, darkness preventing their usual precaution in guarding their bodies<sup>59</sup>.

A few days afterwards, Halicarnassus, which had so obstinately resisted skill and courage, was on the point of yielding to rashness and accident. The battalion of Perdiccas happened to be posted on that side of the wall, which looked towards Miletus. Two soldiers, belonging to this corps, while they supped together in their tent, boasted their military exploits; each, as usual, preferring his own. Wine heated their emulation. They rushed forth to assault the wall of Halicarnassus, animated less with the mad hope of victory, than with an ambition to display their respective prowess. The centinels perceived their audacity, and prepared to repel them; but they killed the first men who approached, and threw javelins at others who followed them. Before their boldness was overwhelmed by numbers, many soldiers belonging to the same battalion advanced to their relief. The Halicarnassians, also, hastened to the defence of their friends; a sharp conflict ensued; the garrison was repelled; the wall attacked; two towers and the intervening curtain thrown down; and had greater numbers joined in the assault, the town must have been taken by storm<sup>60</sup>.

The humanity of Alexander rendered him unwilling to come to that extremity. But the extraordinary success of such an unpremeditated en-

Bold adventure of two Macedonian soldiers.

Halicarnassus taken and reluctantly demolished. Olymp. cxi. 3. A. C. 334.

<sup>59</sup> *Arrian*, p. 20.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p. 22.

terprise,

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terprise, engaged him to ply the walls with new vigour. The defence was as obstinate as before; two desperate sallies were made, and repelled with consummate bravery. Alexander's tenderness for the Halicarnassians prevented him from entering the place with an enraged and licentious soldiery. He therefore recalled his troops in the moment of victory, hoping that the besieged would finally surrender, and thus save their lives and properties. From the various breaches in the walls, and the numbers who had perished, or been wounded, in repeated conflicts, Memnon and his colleagues perceived, that much longer resistance was impossible. In this emergency they displayed the same decisive boldness which had appeared in every part of their defence. Having summoned the bravest of their adherents, they, in the night-time, set fire to a wooden tower, which they had erected as a defence against the shocks of the enemy's engines, as well as to their arsenal and magazines, and escaped to two neighbouring castles of great strength. About midnight, Alexander perceived the raging flames, and immediately sent a detachment to punish those who had excited, or who fomented, the conflagration; but with strict orders to spare such of the townsmen as were found in their houses. Next day, he examined the castles, and perceived that they could not be taken without much loss of time; but that independent of the town, they were of themselves of little value; a circumstance which obliged him, reluctantly, to demolish Halicarnassus, that it might never thenceforth serve as a retreat to his enemies<sup>61</sup>.

Alexander  
commits the  
government  
of Caria to  
Ada.

The inactive season of the year was employed by Alexander in securing and improving his advantages. The inferior cities were committed to the discretion of his lieutenants; the king in person visited his more important conquests; and few places were honoured with his presence without experiencing his bounty. Before leaving Caria, where the siege of Halicarnassus long detained his impatient

<sup>61</sup> Arrian, p. 23.

activity, he committed the administration to Ada, the hereditary governess of that province. Ada was the sister, and the wife of Hirdrieus, on whose decease she was entitled to reign, both by the Carian laws and those of Upper Asia, where female succession had been established ever since the age of Semiramis. But the great king, with the usual caprice of a despot, had rejected the just claim of Ada, and seated a pretender on her tributary throne. The injured princess, however, still maintained possession of the strongly fortified city Alinda. When Alexander appeared in Caria, Ada hastened to meet him, addressed him by the name of son, and voluntarily surrendered to him Alinda. The king neither rejected her present, nor declined her friendship; and, as he always repaid favours with interest, he committed to her, at his departure, the government of the whole province, and left a body of three thousand foot, and two hundred horse, to support her authority.

The measures of Alexander were equally decisive and prudent. The Persian fleet, supplied by Egypt, Phœnicia, and the maritime provinces of Lower Asia, four times out-numbered his own, which, small as it was, still appeared too expensive for his treasury. Alexander determined to discharge it, declaring to his lieutenants, that, by conquering the land, he would render himself master of the sea, since every harbour that surrendered to him must diminish the naval resources of the enemy<sup>62</sup>. Agreeably to this judicious plan of conquest, he pursued his journey through the southern provinces of the Asiatic peninsula, while Parmenio traversed the central countries of Lydia and Phrygia. At the same time Cleander was dispatched into Greece to raise new levies; and such soldiers as had married shortly before the expedition, were sent home to winter with their wives; a measure which extremely endeared Alexander to the

His judicious  
plan of war.

<sup>62</sup> It will appear in the sequel how faithfully Alexander adhered to this plan of war, which kept open his communication with Greece and Macedon, and enabled him to pursue, with security, his conquests in the East.



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The arts by  
which he se-  
cured his  
conquests.

army, and ensured the utmost alacrity of his European subjects in furnishing supplies towards the ensuing campaign.

Accompanied by such winning arts, the valour and prudence of Alexander seemed worthy to govern the world. His conduct, perhaps, often proceeded from the immediate impulse of sentiment; but it could not have been more subservient to his ambition, had it been invariably directed by the deepest policy. After the decisive battle of the Granicus, he experienced little obstinacy of resistance from the numerous forts and garrisons in Lower Asia. The tributary princes and satraps readily submitted to a milder and more magnanimous master; and the Grecian colonies on the coast eagerly espoused the interest of a prince who, on all occasions, avowed his partiality for their favourite institutions. In every province or city which he conquered, he restored to the Asiatics their hereditary laws; to the Greeks, their beloved democracy. While he allowed them to assume the forms of independent government, he was careful to bridle the animosity of domestic faction. Into whatever country he marched, he encouraged useful industry, and alleviated public burdens. His taste and his piety alike prompted him to repair the sacred and venerable remains of antiquity. He considered the Barbarians, not as slaves, but as subjects; the Greeks, not as subjects, but allies; and both perceived in his government such moderation and equity as they had never experienced either from the despotism of Persia, or from the domineering ambition of Athens and Sparta<sup>61</sup>.

Singular felicity of Alexander's march from Phaselis to Perga.

Having received the submission of Xanthus, Patara, Phaselis, and above thirty other towns or sea-ports in Lycia, Alexander, probably for the sake of greater expedition, divided the corps under his immediate command. A considerable detachment traversed the Lycian and Pamphilian mountains, while the king in person pursued

<sup>61</sup> Compare Plut. in Alexand. Curtius & Arrian, passim; & Thucyd. Xenoph. Isocrat. & Diodor.

the still more dangerous track, leading along the sea-coast from Phælis to Perga. On this foaming shore, the sea commonly beats against the rocks, and renders the passage impracticable, unless when the waves are repelled by a strong north wind. When Alexander began his march, the wind blew from the south. Yet he advanced without fear, confiding in his fortune. His troops cheerfully followed him, encouraged by many artful prodigies<sup>64</sup> which announced success to his undertaking. The event, which next happened, was well fitted to strengthen their credulity, and confirm their implicit obedience. Before they had reached the main difficulties of the pass, the south wind gradually ceased; a brisk gale sprang up from the north; the sea retired; and their march thus became alike easy and expeditious. The authentic evidence of Arrian explains the marvellous in this occurrence, which Josephus, with no less indecency than folly, compares with the passage of the Israelites over the Red Sea. Yet even the philosophical Arrian acknowledges, that the many concurring instances of good fortune in the life of Alexander, seemed to be produced by the immediate interposition of divine power, which, in effecting an important revolution in the eastern world, rendered the operations of nature, and the volitions of men, subservient to the secret purposes of its providence.

In proceeding eastward from Perga, Alexander was met by ambassadors from Aspendus, the principal city and sea-port of Pamphylia. The Aspendians offered to surrender their city, but en-

<sup>64</sup> While Alexander deliberated whether he should march forwards to attack Darius, a measure which promised glory and plunder to his troops, or proceed along the sea-coast, and reduce the maritime cities, which would prevent the enemy from profiting of his absence in Upper Asia, to conquer Greece or Macedon with their fleet, a fountain near the city Xanthus in Lycia boiled up, and threw out a copper-plate, engraved with ancient characters, signifying that the time

was come when the Persian empire should be overthrown by the Greeks. Plutarch adds, *ταῦτος ὁ ἀνέβη, πρῶτον τὴν παρὰ τὴν ἀνακτοράδα*. "Encouraged by this prodigy, he hastened to subdue the coast." It would perhaps have been more worthy of an historian to say, "Encouraged by this prodigy, the Greeks and Macedonians readily obeyed the commands of their prudent, not less than valiant general."

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He punishes  
the treachery  
of Aspendus.

Alexander  
enters Phry-  
gia.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 4.  
A. C. 333.

treated, that they might not be burdened with a garrison. Alexander granted their request, on condition of their raising fifty talents to pay his soldiers, and delivering to him the horses which they reared as a tribute for Darius. The ambassadors accepted these terms; but their countrymen, who were distinguished by their ambition and rapacity, still more than by their commerce and their wealth, discovered no inclination to fulfil them. Alexander was informed of their treachery while he examined the walls of Syllius, another stronghold of Pamphylia. He immediately marched towards Aspendus, the greater part of which was situate on a high and steep rock, washed by the river Eurymedon. Several streets, however, were likewise built on the plain, surrounded only by a slight wall. At the approach of Alexander, the inhabitants of the lower part of the town ascended the mountain. Alexander entered the place, and encamped within the walls. The Aspendians, alarmed by the apprehension of a siege, intreated him to accept the former conditions. He commanded them to deliver the horses, as agreed on; to pay, instead of fifty, an hundred talents, and to surrender their principal citizens as securities, that they would thenceforth obey the governor set over them; pay an annual tribute to Macedon; and submit to arbitration a dispute concerning some lands, which they were accused of having unjustly wrested from their neighbours<sup>65</sup>.

Having chastised the insolence and treachery of Aspendus, Alexander determined to march into Phrygia, that he might join forces with Parmenio, whom he had commanded to meet him in that country. The new levies from Greece and Macedon were likewise ordered to assemble in the same province; from which it was intended, early in the spring, to proceed eastward, and achieve still more important conquests. To reach the southern frontier of Phrygia, Alexander was under a necessity of traversing the inhospitable

<sup>65</sup> Arrian, p. 26.

mountains of the warlike Pisidians. Amidst those rocks and fastnesses the Macedonians lost several brave men; but the undisciplined fury, and unarmed courage, of the Pisidians was unable to check the progress of Alexander. The city of Gordium in Phrygia was appointed for the general rendezvous. This place is distant about seventy-five miles from the Euxine, and two hundred and forty from the Cilician Sea; and was famous, in remote antiquity, as the principal residence of the Phrygian kings, and the chief seat of their opulence and grandeur<sup>66</sup>. Alexander had not long arrived in that place when a desire seized him of ascending to the ancient castle or palace of Gordius, and of beholding the famous knot on his chariot, which was believed to involve the fate of Asia. Gordius, as the story went, was a man of slender fortune among the ancient Phrygians, who had but a small piece of land, and two yokes of oxen, one of which he employed in the plough, and the other in the waggon. It happened to Gordius, while he was one day ploughing, that an eagle alighted on his yoke, and sat on it till evening. Alarmed by the prodigy, Gordius had recourse to the Telmessians, a people inhabiting the loftiest mountains<sup>67</sup> in Pisidia, and celebrated over all the neighbouring countries for their skill in augury. At the first village of the Telmessians, he met a virgin drawing water at a fountain, to whom, having communicated his errand, she ordered him to ascend the hill, and there sacrifice to Jupiter. Gordius intreated her to accompany him, that the sacrifice might be performed in due form. She obeyed. Gordius took her to wife. She bore him a son, Midas, who, when he arrived at manhood, was distinguished by his beauty and valour. It should seem that the father of Midas had, in consequence of his marriage, settled among the Telmessians, with whose arts his son would naturally become ac-

His adventure at Gordium.

<sup>66</sup> See vol. i. c. vii. p. 213.

<sup>67</sup> Arrian, p. 27, calls it *ὑπερῶνδος, και παντη απιστομεν*.

"Exceedingly high, and every where abrupt." But in Gordius's time,

at least, the Telmessians must have possessed some villages on the plain. See Arrian, p. 30.



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quainted. The Phrygians, at that time, were harassed by cruel seditions; they consulted an oracle, who told them, that a chariot should soon bring them a king, who would appease their tumults. While the assembly still deliberated on the answer given them by the oracle, Midas arrived in his chariot<sup>68</sup>, accompanied by his parents. The appearance of Midas justified the prediction, and announced him worthy of royalty. The Phrygians elected him king; their seditions ceased; and Midas, in gratitude to Jupiter, consecrated his father's chariot, and suspended it by a cord made of the inner rind of the cornel-tree, the knot of which was so nicely tied, that no eye could perceive where it began or ended. Whether Alexander untied, or cut the knot, is left uncertain by historians<sup>69</sup>; but all agree that his followers retired with complete conviction that he had fulfilled the oracle. A seasonable storm of thunder confirmed their credulity<sup>70</sup>; and the belief that their master was destined to be lord of Asia, could not fail to facilitate that event.

Treachery of  
Alexander,  
the son of  
Æropus.

The rapid progress of Alexander, and his continual exertions during that season of the year when armies are little accustomed to keep the field, tends to heighten our surprise at the inactivity of Darius, an ambitious prince, who had signalised his valour against the fiercest nations of Asia. But Darius, corrupted by the honours of royalty, employed very different weapons against Alexander, from those by which the champion of Ochus had defeated the warlike chief of the Cardusians<sup>71</sup>. Instead of opposing the invader in the field, he hoped to destroy him by the arm of an assassin.

<sup>68</sup> The Greek word *ἀμαξα* expresses either a chariot or a waggon. Perhaps neither the name, nor the thing, were then distinguished in Phrygia. Curtius tells us, this *ἀμαξα* was "cultu haud sane a vilioribus vulgatisque usu abhorrens," l. iii. c. i. p. 10.

<sup>69</sup> Curtius, l. iii. c. i. says, he cut it with his sword. Plutarch says he untied it. Vit. Alexand. p. 1236. Arrian gives both accounts; and the latter on the authority of

Aristobulus, which is therefore the more probable.

<sup>70</sup> Arrian, p. 31.

<sup>71</sup> Darius killed a warrior of that nation who challenged the bravest of the Persians to single combat. This exploit gained him the government of Armenia, and made him be afterwards deemed worthy of the Persian throne. Diodor. l. xvii. p. 565.

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Many traitors were suborned for this infamous purpose, but none with greater prospect of success than Alexander, the son of Æropus. This man owed his life to the clemency of the son of Philip, when his brothers Heromenes and Arrabæus were condemned as accessory to the murder of that prince. He was numbered among the companions of Alexander, and had recently been entrusted with the command of the Thessalian cavalry, after the nomination of Calas, who held that high office, to the government of Phrygia. The promise of ten thousand talents, and of the kingdom of Macedon, obliterated his gratitude, and seduced his allegiance. But his treason escaped not the vigilance of Parmenio<sup>72</sup>, who communicated the intelligence to his master, while encamped in the neighbourhood of Phaselis. By the same faithful minister, the unworthy son of Æropus was seized, and committed to safe custody.

Darius, without desisting from his intrigues, finally had recourse to arms. His troops were assembled in the plains of Babylon. They consisted of an hundred thousand Persians, of whom thirty thousand were cavalry. The Medes supplied almost half that number, and the Armenians almost as many as the Medes. The Barcani, the Hyrcanians, the inhabitants of the Caspian shores, and nations more obscure, or more remote, sent their due proportion of cavalry and infantry for this immense army, which, including thirty thousand Greek mercenaries in the Persian service, is said to have amounted to six hundred thousand men. The magnificence of the Persians had not diminished since the days of Xerxes; neither had their

The army  
of Darius  
marches  
from Upper  
Asia.

<sup>72</sup> According to Arrian, p. 25. a swallow shared the honour with Parmenio. While Alexander was asleep at mid-day, the swallow hovered around his head, perching sometimes on one side of his couch, and sometimes on another. Its incessant chattering roused the king from sleep: but being exceedingly fatigued, he gently removed the bird with his hand. Instead of endeavouring to escape, the swallow perched on his

head, and ceased not being extremely noisy and troublesome, till he thoroughly awoke. The prodigy was immediately communicated to Aristander the Telmessian soothsayer, who declared that a conspiracy was formed against the king by one of his domestics and friends; but that it would certainly be discovered, because the swallow is a domestic bird, a friend to man, and exceedingly loquacious.

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Alexander  
passes the  
northern  
Gate of  
Cilicia.

military knowledge increased. Their muster was taken by the same contrivance employed by that monarch<sup>73</sup>. Ten thousand men were separated from the rest, formed into a compact body, and surrounded by a pallisade. The whole army, passing successively into this enclosure, were rather measured, than numbered, by their generals. Nothing could exceed the splendor that surrounded Darius; the trappings of his horses, the rich materials and nice adjustment of his chariot, the profusion of jewels which covered his royal mantle, vest, and tiara. The dress, and even the armour of his guards, were adorned with gold, silver, and precious stones. He was attended by his family, his treasures, and his concubines, all escorted by numerous bands of horse and foot. His courtiers and generals copied, as usual, too faithfully, the effeminate manners of their master<sup>74</sup>.

While this pageant, for it deserves not the name of army, slowly advanced towards Lower Asia, Alexander left Gordium, and marched to Ancyra, a city of Galatia. In that place, he received an embassy from the Paphlagonians, who surrendered to him the sovereignty of their province, but intreated that his army might not enter their borders. He granted their request, and commanded them to obey Calas, satrap of Phrygia. Alexander then marched victorious through Cappadocia; and Sabictas being appointed to the administration of that extensive province, the army encamped at the distance of six miles from the Cilician frontier, at a place which, since the memorable expedition performed and described by Xenophon, retained the name of Cyrus's camp. Towards the south, the rich plain of Cilicia is washed by the sea, and surrounded on three sides by lofty and almost impervious mountains. Arsames, governor of that country, had sent a body of troops to guard a post called the Gates, and the only pass which leads from Cappadocia into Cilicia. Apprised of this measure, Alexander left Parmenio and the

<sup>73</sup> See vol. i. c. ix. p. 308, & seqq.

huic agmini proximæ. Q. Curtius, l. iii.

<sup>74</sup> Propinquorum, amicorumque, conjuges c. iii. & Diodor. l. xvii. p. 58.

heavy-armed

heavy-armed troops in the camp of Cyrus. At the first watch of the night, he led the Targeteers, Archers, and Agrians, to surprise the Persian forces stationed at the northern gate of Cilicia. The Barbarians fled on his approach; and the pusillanimous Arsames, to whom the whole province was entrusted by Darius, prepared to plunder, and then abandon, his own capital of Tarsus. But he had only time to save his person. The rapidity of Alexander prevented the destruction of that city, where the inhabitants received him as their deliverer.

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At Tarsus, Alexander was detained by a malady, occasioned by excessive fatigue; or, as others say, by imprudently bathing, when heated, in the cold waters of the Cydnus, which flows through that city, in a clear and rocky channel<sup>75</sup>. Philip the Acarnanian was the only person who despaired not of his life. While this skilful physician administered a draught to his royal patient, a letter came from Parmenio, warning Alexander to beware of Philip, who was bribed by Darius to poison him. Alexander took the potion, and gave Philip the letter; so that the physician read, while the king drank; a transaction which proved either his contempt of death, or his unshaken confidence in his friends; but which, by the admiration of his contemporaries and posterity<sup>76</sup>, has been construed into a proof of both.

Falls sick at  
Tarsus.

The sickness of Alexander interrupted not the operations of the army. Parmenio was dispatched to seize the only pass on Mount Amanus, which divides Cilicia from Assyria. The king soon followed, having in one day's march reached Anchialos, an ancient city of vast extent, and surrounded with walls of prodigious thickness. The greatest curiosity of Anchialos was the tomb of Sardanapalus,

Alexander  
marches to  
Mallos.

<sup>75</sup> Curtius gives another reason for its excessive coldness. "Frigidissimus quippe mullariparum amœnitatē inumbratus," l. iii. c. iv. His laboured description of this river seems as if he imagined *that* water must have possessed very extraordinary qualities, which proved hurtful to Alexander.

<sup>76</sup> See Arrian, p. 32. Curtius, l. iii. c. v.



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Alexander  
passes the  
Syrian straits;  
and Darius,  
in an oppo-  
site direction,  
the defiles  
of Amanus.

which was distinguished by the statue of that effeminate tyrant, in the attitude of clapping his hands; and, by an Assyrian inscription, breathing the true spirit of modern Epicurism. The original ran in verse to the following purpose: "Sardanapalus, son of Anacyndaraxas, built Anchialos and Tarsus in one day. As to you, stranger! eat, drink, and sport", for other human things are not worth *this*." Alluding to the clap of his hands<sup>78</sup>.

Having arrived at Mallos, an Argive colony at the eastern extremity of Cilicia, Alexander learned that Darius lay with his army in the extensive plain of Sochos, in the province of Comagene, distant only two days march from the Cilician frontier. The hostile armies were separated by the mountains which divide Cilicia and Syria. Alexander hastened to pass the straits called the Syrian Gates, proceeded southwards along the bay of Issus, and encamped before the city Mariandrus. At this place, he received a very extraordinary piece of intelligence. His delay in Cilicia, which had been occasioned by sickness, and by the many pious ceremonies<sup>79</sup> with which he gratefully thanked Heaven for his recovery, was ascribed to very different motives by Darius and his flatterers. That perfidious race, the eternal bane of kings<sup>80</sup>, easily persuaded the vain credulity of their master, that Alexander shunned his approach. The proud resentment of Darius was exasperated by the imagined fears of his adversary; with the impatience of a despot, he longed to come to action; and not suspecting that Alexander would traverse the Syrian

<sup>77</sup> The word translated "sport," is *παίζει* in Arrian, p. 32. But that author says, the Assyrian original had a more lascivious meaning. Plut. Orat. ii. de Fortun. Alexand. translates it *αφροδισιαζέ*, "veneri indulge."

<sup>78</sup> Mr. de Guignes, so deservedly celebrated for his Oriental learning, proves this inscription to be entirely conformable to the style and manners of the East. See Mem.

de l'Acad. des Inscrip. tom. xxxiv. p. 416, & seqq.

<sup>79</sup> Processions with lighted torches, sacrifices to Æsculapius, gymnastic and musical contests. Arrian, l. ii. p. 33.

<sup>80</sup> Arrian expresses this sentiment with more than his usual energy: *Τῶν κατὰ ἥδονην ζῶντων τὴ καὶ ἐπιτορμῇ ἐπὶ κακῇ τοῖς ἀνὴ βασιλευσιν.*

Gates in search of the enemy, he hastily determined to pass, in an opposite direction<sup>81</sup>, the straits of Amanus in quest of Alexander. This fatal measure was carried into immediate execution, notwithstanding the strong representations of Amyntas<sup>82</sup> the Macedonian, and of all Darius's Grecian counsellors<sup>83</sup>; who unanimously exhorted him to wait the enemy in his present advantageous position. In the language of antiquity<sup>84</sup>, an irresistible fate, which had determined that the Greeks should conquer the Persians, as the Persians had the Medes, and the Medes the Assyrians, impelled Darius to his ruin. Having passed the defiles of Amanus, he directed his march southward to the bay of Issus, and took the city of that name, which contained, under a feeble guard, the sick and wounded Macedonians, who had not been able to follow the army in its expeditious march across the mountains. The Persians put these unhappy men to death with shocking circumstances of cruelty<sup>85</sup>, little thinking that Alexander was now behind, prepared to avenge their fate.

That enlightened prince, who could scarcely believe the folly of Darius, sent a small flat-bottomed vessel to reconnoitre his motions. This vessel speedily returned to Alexander, and saluted him with the agreeable news, that his enemies were now in his hands. Having summoned an assembly, the king forgot none of those topics of encouragement which the occasion so naturally suggested, since the meanest Macedonian foldier could discern the injudicious movements of the Persians, who had quitted a spacious plain, to intangle themselves among intricate mountains, where their numerous cavalry, in which they chiefly excelled, could perform no essential service. In

Circumstances which encouraged the Macedonian army.

<sup>81</sup> These movements are explained only by Arrian. Diodorus, Plutarch, and Curtius, not attending to the geography of the country, are inconsistent and unintelligible.

<sup>82</sup> Amyntas, though an exile, was not a flatterer. He assured Darius, that Alexander would certainly come to any place where the Persians encamped. Arrian, p. 34.

<sup>83</sup> Aristomenes the Pheræan, Bianor the Acarnanian, Thymondas, the son of Mentor, the Rhodian; and others mentioned by Arrian, passim.

<sup>84</sup> Arrian. Plut. Diodor. Curt.

<sup>85</sup> Χαλεπὰς αἰσχρομενὸς ἀποκτενὲς, Arrian, p. 34. It is remarkable, that he ascribes this ferocity to Darius himself.

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proceeding to this important contest, the spirits of the Macedonians were elevated by a recollection of many fortunate occurrences. Ptolemy, as they had recently learned, had made himself master of the strong fortresses in Caria. The brave Memnon, indeed, had escaped; but that able commander, who, to pave the way for invading Macedon, had attacked the Grecian isles with his fleet, was since dead; and his successors in command, after irritating the islanders by their insolence and oppression, were defeated in all their designs by the vigilance of Antipater. The army of Alexander had lately increased, by many voluntary accessions of the Asiatics, who admired his courage, mildness, and uninterrupted good fortune; and the soldiers, who the preceding year had been sent to winter in Europe, had not only rejoined the camp, but brought with them numerous levies from Greece, Macedon, and all the adjoining countries. By men thus disposed to indulge the most sanguine hopes, the military harangue of their prince was received with a joyous ardour. They embraced each other; they embraced their admired commander; and his countenance confirming their alacrity, they entreated to be led to battle<sup>86</sup>.

Disposition  
of both  
armies.

Alexander commanded them first to refresh their bodies; but immediately dispatched some horse and archers to clear the road to Issus. In the evening he followed with his whole army, and about midnight took possession of the Syrian streights. The soldiers were then allowed a short repose, sufficient guards being posted on the surrounding eminences. At dawn, the army was in motion, marching by its flank while the passage continued narrow; and new columns being successively brought up, as the mountains gradually opened. Before reaching the river Pinarus, on the opposite bank of which the enemy were encamped, the Macedonians had thus formed in order of battle; Alexander leading the right wing, and

<sup>86</sup> Arrian, p. 33—36.

the left being commanded by Parmenio. They continued to advance, till their right was flanked by a mountain, and their left by the sea, from which Parmenio was ordered not to recede. Darius being apprised of the enemy's approach, detached a body of fifty thousand cavalry and light infantry across the Pinarus, that the remainder might have room to form without confusion. His Greek mercenaries, amounting to thirty thousand, he posted directly opposite to the Macedonian phalanx. The Greeks were flanked on both sides by double that number of Barbarians, also heavy armed. The nature of the ground admitted not more troops to be ranged in front; but as the mountain, on Alexander's left, sloped inwards, Darius placed on that sinuosity twenty thousand men, who could see the enemy's rear, though it appears not that they could advance against them. Behind the first line, the rest of the Barbarians were ranged, according to their various nations, in close and unserviceable ranks; Darius being every where encumbered by the vastness of a machine, which he had not skill to wield<sup>87</sup>.

His pusillanimity was more fatal than his ignorance. When he perceived the Macedonians advancing, he commanded his men to maintain their post on the Pinarus, the bank of which was in some places high and steep; where the access seemed easier, he gave orders to raise a rampart; precautions which shewed the enemy, that even before the battle began, the mind of Darius was already conquered<sup>88</sup>. Alexander, meanwhile, rode along the ranks, exhorting, by name, not only the commanders of the several brigades, but the tribunes and inferior officers, and even such captains of the auxiliaries as were distinguished by rank, or ennobled by merit. Perceiving it necessary to moderate the martial ardour that prevailed, he

The battle of  
Issus.  
Olymp.  
cxi. 4.  
A. C. 333.

<sup>87</sup> Arrian, p. 36.

<sup>88</sup> Καὶ ταύτη ἐνθυὸς τοῦ εὐνέτου τοῖς αὐτοῖς Ἀλεξ-  
άνδρῳ τῇ γνώμῃ δεικνύμενος. "And thence he  
immediately appeared to those about Alex-

ander to be already enslaved in his mind."  
In those times, slavery was the natural con-  
sequence of being conquered in battle.



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commanded his forces to advance with a regular and slow step, left the phalanx should fluctuate through too eager a contention. Their motion quickened as they proceeded within reach of the enemy's darts. Alexander, with those around him, then sprung into the river. Their impetuosity frightened the Barbarians, who scarcely waited the first shock<sup>89</sup>. But the Greek mercenaries perceiving that by the rapidity and success of Alexander's assault, the Macedonians were bent towards the right wing, which was separated from the centre, seized the decisive moment of rushing into the interval, where the phalanx was disjointed. A fierce engagement ensued, the Greeks eager to regain the honour of their name, the Macedonians ambitious to maintain the unfulfilled glory of the phalanx. This desperate action proved fatal to Ptolemy the son of Seleucus, and other officers of distinction, to the number of an hundred and twenty. Meanwhile, the Macedonian right wing having repelled the enemy with great slaughter, wheeled to the left, and, animated by recent victory, finally prevailed against the obstinacy of the Greeks. A body of Persian horse still maintained the battle against the Thessalian cavalry; nor did they quit the field, till informed that Darius had betaken himself to flight<sup>90</sup>.

Rout of the  
Persians.

The overthrow of the Persians was now manifest on all sides. Their cavalry and infantry suffered equally in the rout; for their horsemen were heavy-armed, and encumbered by the narrowness of the roads, and their own terror. Ptolemy, the son of Lagus<sup>91</sup>, says, that the pursuers filled up the ditches with dead bodies. The number of the slain was computed at an hundred and ten thousand, among whom were many satraps and nobles.

Escape of  
Darius.

The great king had discovered little obstinacy in defending the important objects at stake. His left wing was no sooner repelled by

<sup>89</sup> They did, however, wait it; for Arrian says, *εὐθὺς γὰρ ὡς ἐν χεῖρσι μάχῃ ἔστητο*. The “*μάχῃ ἐν χεῖρσι ἔστητο*.” When the darts and javelins ceased, and the contending parties

came to the use of manual, instead of missile weapons.

<sup>90</sup> Arrian, l. ii. p. 36. & seqq.

<sup>91</sup> Idem, *ibid*.

Alexander,

Alexander, than he drove away in his chariot, accompanied by his courtiers. When the road grew rough and mountainous, he continued his flight on horseback, leaving his shield, his mantle, and his bow, which were found by the Macedonians. Alexander, who had received a troublesome wound on the thigh<sup>92</sup>, judged it improper to pursue him, till the Greek mercenaries were dispersed; and the approach of night facilitated his escape.

The Persian camp afforded abundant proof of Asiatic luxury and opulence<sup>93</sup>. It contained however in money but three thousand talents; the magnificent treasures, which accompanied the great king, being deposited, previous to the battle, in the neighbouring city of Damascus. This inestimable booty was afterwards seized by order of Alexander, who found in the camp a booty more precious, the wife and daughters of Darius, his mother Syfigambis, and his infant son. In an age when prisoners of war were synonymous with slaves, Alexander behaved to his royal captives with the tenderness of a parent, blended with the respect of a son. In his chaste attention to Statira, the fairest beauty of the East, his conduct forms a remarkable contrast with that of his admired Achilles, whom he equalled in valour, but far surpassed in humanity. These illustrious princeesses bore their own misfortunes with patience, but burst into dreadful lamentations, when informed by an eunuch that he had seen the mantle of Darius in the hands of a Macedonian foldier. Alexander sent to assure them that Darius yet lived; and next day visited them in person, accompanied by Hephæstion, the most affectionate of his friends<sup>94</sup>.

The captives  
and booty.

<sup>92</sup> Chares, cited by Plutarch, says, that Alexander received this wound from the hand of Darius; but the silence of Alexander's letter to Antipater, in which he gave an account of the battle, and of his wound on the thigh, refutes that improbable assertion.

<sup>93</sup> Among other things of value in the tent of Darius, was found a casket of exquisite workmanship, adorned with jewels. It was employed to hold Darius's perfumes.—Alex-

ander said, "I use no perfumes, but shall put into it something more precious." This was the Iliad of Homer, corrected by Aristotle, and often mentioned by ancient writers; *ἡ ἐκ τῆς κασέτης*, "the Iliad of the casket," Strabo, l. xiii. p. 888. Plut. in Alexander.

<sup>94</sup> Alexander, with his usual discernment, characterised the affection of Hephæstion: "Craterus loves the prince; Hephæstion loves Alexander," Plut. in Alexander.

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Syfigambis approached to prostrate<sup>95</sup> herself before the conqueror, according to the custom of the East; but not knowing the king, as their dress was alike, she turned to Hephestion. Hephestion suddenly stepping back, Syfigambis saw her mistake, and was covered with confusion. "You mistook not, Madam!" said the king, "Hephestion is likewise Alexander<sup>96</sup>."

The virtues  
of Alexander  
expand with  
his prosper-  
ity.

The virtues of Alexander long continued to expand with his prosperity; but he was never more inimitably great, than after the battle of Issus. The city of Soli, in Cilicia, though inhabited by a Grecian colony, had discovered uncommon zeal in the cause of Darius. To punish this unnatural apostacy from Greece, Alexander demanded a heavy contribution from Soli; but, after the victory, he remitted this fine. Impelled by the same generous magnanimity, he released the Athenian captives taken at the battle of the Granicus; a favour which he had sternly refused, in the dawn of his fortune. In Damascus, several Grecian ambassadors were found among the captives. Alexander ordered them to be brought into his presence. Theſſalifcus and Dionysodorus, the Thebans, he instantly declared free, observing, that the misfortunes of their country justly entitled the Thebans to apply to Darius, and to every prince from whom they might derive relief. Iphicrates, the Athenian, he treated with the respect which appeared due both to his country and to his father. Euthycles the Spartan, alone, he detained in safe custody, because Sparta sullenly rejected the friendship of Macedon. But as his forgiveness still increased with his power<sup>97</sup>, he afterwards released Euthycles.

<sup>95</sup> Προσέκλινεν καὶ προσκυνῆσαι. Arrian, l. ii. p. 39.

<sup>96</sup> Curtius, l. iii. c. xii. Arrian, p. 39.

<sup>97</sup> Arrian, p. 42.

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*Siege of Tyre.—Desperate Resistance of Gaza.—Easy Conquest of Egypt.—Foundation of Alexandria.—Alexander visits the Temple of Jupiter Ammon.—Marches into Assyria.—Battle of Gaugamela.—Darius betrayed and slain.—Alexander pursues the Murderers of Darius.—Bactrian and Scythian War.—Siege of the Sogdian Fortrefs.—Surrender of Cho-rienes.—Commotions in Greece—Checked by Antipa-ter.—The Cause of Ctesiphon and Demosthenes.—Æschines banished.—State of Greece during Alexan-der's Reign.*

IN his precipitate flight across the ridges of Amanus, Darius was gradually joined by about four thousand men, chiefly Greeks. Under this feeble escort, he departed hastily from Sochos, pursued his march eastward, and crossed the Euphrates at 'Thapsacus, eager to interpose that deep and rapid stream between himself and the conqueror'. Alexander's inclination to seize the person of his adversary could not divert him from the judicious plan of war, to which he immoveably adhered. In a council of his friends, he declared his opinion, that it would be highly imprudent to attempt the conquest of Babylon, until he had thoroughly subdued the maritime provinces; because, should he be carried by an unseasonable celerity into Upper Asia, while the enemy commanded the sea, the war

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Alexander  
receives an  
embassy from  
Tyre.  
Olymp.  
c. i. 4.  
A. C. 333.

\* 'Οι ταχιστα μισοι αυτη τε και τη Αλεξανδρου τον Ευφρατην ποταμον. Arrian, p. 40.



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Description  
and state of  
Tyre.

might be removed to Europe, where the Lacedæmonians were open enemies, and the Athenians suspicious friends. Having appointed governors of Cilicia and Cælo-Syria, he therefore directed his march southward along the Phœnician coast. Aradus, Marathus, and Sidon<sup>2</sup>, readily opened their gates. The Tyrians sent a submissive embassy of their most illustrious citizens, among whom was the son of Azelmicus, their king, who had himself embarked with Autophradates in the Persian fleet. They humbly informed Alexander, that the community<sup>3</sup> from which they came, was prepared to obey his commands. Having complimented the city and the ambassadors, he desired them to acquaint their countrymen, that he intended shortly to enter Tyre, and to perform sacrifice there to Hercules<sup>4</sup>.

Upon this alarming intelligence, the Tyrians discovered equal firmness and prudence. A second embassy assured Alexander of their unalterable respect, but at the same time communicated to him their determined resolution, that neither the Persians nor the Macedonians should ever enter their walls. This boldness appears remarkable in a nation of merchants, long unaccustomed to war<sup>5</sup>. But the resources of their wealth and commerce seem to have elevated the courage, instead of softening the character, of the Tyrians. Their city, which, in the language of the East, was styled the eldest daughter of Sidon<sup>6</sup>, had long reigned queen of the sea. The *purple*

<sup>2</sup> I omit the story of Abdelerminus, whom Alexander raised from the humble condition of a gardener to the throne of Sidon. Vid. Curt. l. iv. c. i. Diodorus, l. xvii. relates the same story as happening in Tyre. Plutarch, de Fortun. Alexand. translates the scene to Paphos. Amidst such inconsistencies, the silence of Arrian seemed worthy of imitation.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian says, that these ambassadors were *απὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐξεδίκαρον*. It should seem that the king of Tyre was a very limited prince, and the government rather republican than monarchical.

<sup>4</sup> The reader may recollect, that Philip

sent a similar message to Atheas, king of the Scythians. Such pious pretences were often employed by antiquity to justify very unwarrantable transactions.

<sup>5</sup> Old Tyre was built on the continent, by the Sidonians, 1252 B. C. It was besieged by Salmaneser, 719 B. C.; and by Nebuchadnezzar, 572 B. C. The latter took the place after a siege of thirteen years; but the greater part of the inhabitants had previously fled with their effects to a neighbouring island, and founded the city described in the text. Vid. Joseph. l. viii. cap. ii. l. ix. cap. xiv. & l. x. cap. xi.

<sup>6</sup> Isaiah, xxiii. 12.

shell-fish,

shell-fish, which is found in great abundance on their coast<sup>7</sup>, early gave them possession of that lucrative trade, and confined chiefly to the Tyrians the advantage of clothing the princes and nobles in most countries of antiquity<sup>8</sup>. Tyre was separated from the continent by a frith half a mile broad; its walls exceeded an hundred feet<sup>9</sup> in height, and extended eighteen miles in circumference. The convenience of its situation, the capaciousness of its harbours, and the industrious ingenuity of its inhabitants, rendered it the commercial capital of the world. Its magazines were plentifully provided with military and naval stores, and it was peopled by numerous and skilful artificers in stone, wood, and iron<sup>10</sup>.

Notwithstanding the strength of the city, Alexander determined to form the siege of Tyre; and the difficulty of an undertaking, which seemed necessary in itself, and essential to the success of still more important enterprises, only stimulated the activity of a prince, who knew that, on many emergencies, boldness is the greatest prudence. The first operation which he directed, was to run a mole from the continent to the walls of Tyre, where the sea was about three fathom deep. The necessity of this measure arose from the imperfection of the battering engines of antiquity, which had little power, except at small distances. On the side of the continent, the work was carried on with great alacrity; but when the Macedonians approached the city, they were much incommoded by the depth of water, and exceedingly galled by darts and missile weapons from the battlements. The Tyrians, likewise, having the command of the sea, annoyed the workmen from their galleys, and retarded the completion of their labours. To resist these assaults, Alexander erected, on the furthest projecture of the mole, two wooden towers, on which he placed his engines, and which he covered with leather and raw hides to resist

Alexander  
besieges  
Tyre.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 1.  
A. C. 332.

Throws a  
mole across  
the Frith;

<sup>7</sup> Strabo, l. vi. p. 521.

<sup>9</sup> Arrian says one hundred and fifty feet.

<sup>8</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, &c. *passim*. See likewise Vol. i. p. 247.

The copies probably are erroneous.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch. Curtius. *Strabo*.

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which is de-  
stroyed by the  
Tyrians.

the ignited darts and fire-ships of the enemy. This contrivance, however, the ingenuity of his adversaries soon rendered ineffectual. Having procured a huge hulk, they filled it with dry twigs, pitch, sulphur, and other combustibles. Toward the prow, they raised two masts, each of which was armed with a double yard, from whose extremities were suspended vast caldrons, filled with whatever might add to the violence of the conflagration. Having prepared this uncommon instrument of destruction, they patiently waited a favourable wind. The hulk was then towed into the sea by two gallees. As she approached the mole, the rowers set her on fire, and escaped by swimming. The works of the Macedonians were soon thrown into a blaze. The enemy, sailing forth in boats, prevented them from extinguishing the flames; and the labour of many weeks was thus in one day reduced to ruins<sup>11</sup>.

Alexander  
raises a new  
mole.

The perseverance of Alexander was proof against such accidents. He immediately commanded new engines to be made, and a new mole to be raised, stronger and broader than the preceding. The orders of a prince, who directed every operation in person, and whose bodily toils exceeded those of the meanest soldier, were always obeyed with alacrity. The ruins of old Tyre afforded abundance of stone; wood was brought from Anti-Libanus<sup>12</sup>; and it should seem that the Arabians having disturbed the Macedonian workmen, were repelled by Alexander, which gave rise to the improbable fiction of his having conquered Arabia. By incredible exertions, the mole

<sup>11</sup> Arrian, p. 44, & seqq.

<sup>12</sup> Curtius confounds Anti-Libanus with Mount Libanus. It would be endless to notice his errors, exaggerations, and fictions in the account of this siege, which is one of the most romantic passages in his history. Curtius writes to the fancy, not to the judgment; and to readers of a certain taste the picturesque beauties of his style will atone for errors in matter of fact. He may be allowed to raise an imaginary storm, who can describe it like

Curtius. "Tum inhorrescens mare paulatim levare, deinde acriori vento concitatum, fluctus cedere, & inter se navigia collidere. Jamque scindi cœperant vincula, quibus connexæ quadriremes erant, ruere tabulata, & cum ingenti fragore in profundum secum milites trahere." It is Alexander, whose actions he disfigures and renders incredible, not the reader, whose fancy he amuses, that is entitled to condemn Curtius.

was at length built, and the battering engines were erected. The arrival of four thousand Peloponnesian forces seasonably reinforced Alexander, and revived the courage of his troops, exhausted by fatigue, and dejected by defeat. At the same time the fleets of the maritime provinces, which he had subdued, came to offer their assistance in an undertaking, which could scarcely have proved successful, while the Tyrians commanded the sea. The squadrons of Lower Asia were joined by the naval force of Rhodes and Cyprus. The whole armament of Alexander amounted to two hundred and twenty-four vessels<sup>13</sup>, so that the Tyrians, who hitherto confided in their fleet, now retired behind the defences of their ports for safety.

But these persevering islanders, though they prudently declined an unequal combat, were forsaken neither by their activity nor their courage. The hulk and gallies<sup>14</sup>, destined to advance the battering engines against their walls were assailed with continual showers of ignited arrows<sup>15</sup>, and other missile weapons, which came with peculiar effect from wooden towers newly raised on their lofty battlements. This distant hostility retarded, but could not prevent, the approaches of the enemy. The purpose of the Tyrians was better effected by casting down huge stones into the sea, which hindered access to the walls. To clear these incumbrances required the perseverance of the Macedonians, and the animating presence of Alexander. Before the work could be accomplished, the enemy advanced in covered vessels, and cut the cables of the hulks employed in that laborious service. Alexander commanded a squadron to advance and repel the Tyrians. Yet even this did not facilitate the removal of the bar; for the islanders, being expert divers, plunged under water,

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His military  
and naval  
reinforce-  
ments.

Singular operations of the  
siege.

<sup>13</sup> Curtius, l. iv. c. iii. says, that it consisted of one hundred and eighty sail. Plutarch, in Alexand. says, that the haven of Tyre was blocked up with two hundred triremes. Arrian distinctly mentions the number and species of ships sent by each city or province. From Macedon there came, he

says, a vessel of fifty oars, πεντακιστόρος; a circumstance which proves that, on this emergency, Alexander had taken pains to collect ships from all quarters.

<sup>14</sup> Such vessels were used for this purpose, as were the stoutest sailors. Arrian, p. 46.

<sup>15</sup> Περσφοῖς οὐραῖς.

and



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The Tyrians  
defeated at  
sea.

and again cutting the cables, set the Macedonian vessels adrift. It thus became necessary to prepare chains, which were used instead of ropes; by which contrivance the hulks were secured in firm anchorage, the bank of stones was removed, and the battering engines advanced to the walls.

In this extremity the Tyrians, still trusting to their courage, determined to attack the Cyprian squadron, stationed at the mouth of the harbour which looked towards Sidon. The boldness of this design could only be surpassed by the deliberate valour with which it was carried into execution. The mouth of the haven they had previously covered with spread sails, to conceal their operations from the enemy. The hour of attack was fixed at mid-day, at which time the Greeks and Macedonians were usually employed in private affairs, or the care of their bodies, and Alexander commonly retired to his pavilion, erected near the harbour which looked towards Egypt. The best sailing vessels were carefully selected from the whole fleet<sup>16</sup>, and manned with the most expert rowers, and the most resolute soldiers, all enured to the sea, and well armed for fight. At first they came forth in a line, slowly and silently; but having proceeded within sight of the Cyprians, they at once clashed their oars, raised a shout, and advanced abreast of each other to the attack. Several of the enemy's ships were sunk at the first shock; others were dashed in pieces against the shore. Alexander, who had fortunately that day tarried but a short time in his pavilion, was no sooner informed of this desperate sally, than, with admirable presence of mind, he immediately ordered such vessels as were ready, to block up the mouth of the haven, and thereby prevent the remainder of the Tyrian fleet from joining their victorious companions. Meanwhile, with several quinquereme, and five trireme, gallees, hastily prepared, he sailed round to attack the Tyrians. The

<sup>16</sup> They consisted, says Arrian, in five and seven triremes. See note, vol. i. p. choice quinqueremes, as many quadriremes, 153.

besieged observing from their walls the approach of Alexander, endeavoured, by shouts and signals, to recal their ships. They had scarcely changed their course, when the enemy assailed, and soon rendered them, unserviceable. The men saved themselves by swimming; few vessels escaped; two were taken at the very entrance of the harbour.

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The issue of these naval operations decided the fate of Tyre. Unawed by the hostile fleet, the Macedonians now fearlessly advanced their engines on all sides. Amidst repeated assaults during two days, the besiegers displayed the ardour of enthusiasm<sup>17</sup>, the besieged the fury of despair. From towers equal in height to the walls, the Greeks and Macedonians fought hand to hand with the enemy. By throwing spontoons across, the bravest sometimes passed over, even to the battlements. In other parts, the Tyrians successfully employed hooks and grappling irons to remove the assailants. On those who attempted scaling-ladders, they poured vessels of burning sand, which penetrated to the bone. The vigour of the attack was opposed by as vigorous a resistance. The shock of the battering engines was deadened by green hides and coverlets of wool, and whenever an opening was effected, the bravest combatants advanced to defend the breach. But time and fatigue, which exhausted the vigour of the enemy, only confirmed the perseverance of Alexander. On the third day, the engines assailed the walls; and the fleet, divided into two squadrons, attacked the opposite

Tyre taken  
by assault.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 1.  
A. C. 332.  
July.

<sup>17</sup> From the beginning, the difficulties of the siege had appeared almost unfurmountable to the soldiers. "But Alexander," says Curtius "*haudquaquam rudis tractandi militares animos, speciem sibi Herculis in somno oblatam esse pronunciat, dextram porrigentis.*" The diviners thence concluded, as Arrian tells us, that Tyre would be taken, but that it would be an Herculean labour. Alexander continued throughout the siege to employ the aids of superstition.

At one time it was said, that Apollo was about to leave Tyre, and that the Tyrians had fastened him with golden chains to prevent his elopement. At another, Alexander dreamed that a satyr playing before him, long eluded his grasp, but finally allowed himself to be caught. The augurs divided the word *Σατύρος*, a Satyr, into two syllables, *Σατύρος*, Tyre is thine. By such coarse artifices did Alexander conquer the world.

harbours.

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harbours. A wide breach being effected, Alexander commanded the hulks, which carried the engines, to retire, and others, bearing the scaling ladders, to advance, that his soldiers might enter the town over the ruins. The targeteers, headed by Admetus, first mounted the breach. This gallant commander was slain by a spear; but Alexander, who was present wherever danger called, immediately followed with the royal band of *Companions*. At the same time the Phenician fleet broke into the harbour of Egypt, and the Cyprians into that of Sidon. After their walls were taken, the townsmen still rallied, and prepared for defence. The length of the siege, and still more the cruelty of the Tyrians, who having taken some Grecian vessels from Sidon, butchered their crews on the top of their wall, and threw their bodies into the sea, in sight of the whole Macedonian army, provoked the indignation of Alexander, and exasperated the fury of the victors. Eight thousand Tyrians were slain; thirty thousand were reduced to servitude<sup>18</sup>. The principal magistrates, together with some Carthaginians who had come to worship the Gods of their mother-country, took refuge in the temple of Tyrian Hercules. They were saved by the clemency or piety of Alexander, who had lost four hundred men, in this obstinate siege of seven months<sup>19</sup>.

Submission  
of Judæa.

The conquest of Phœnicia was followed by the submission of the neighbouring province of Judæa<sup>20</sup>. But in the road leading to Egypt

<sup>18</sup> Curtius, l. iv. c. iv. says, that fifteen thousand Tyrians were saved by their Sidonian brethren, who clandestinely embarked them in their ships, and transported them to Sidon. This circumstance, omitted by Arrian, derives some probability from the vigorous resistance which, nineteen years afterwards, Tyre again made to the arms of Antigonus. Vid. Diodor. Sicul. p. 702—704.

<sup>19</sup> Arrian, l. ii. p. 44—50.

<sup>20</sup> All the historians of Alexander are silent concerning his journey to Jerusalem, and his

extraordinary transactions there, described by Josephus, l. xi. c. viii. This story, invented by the patriotic vanity of the Jews, is totally inconsistent with the narrative of Arrian, copied in the text. As all Palestine, except Gaza, had submitted to his arms, “Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῆς Παλαιστίνης προσεχρησμένα ἦν.” Alexander had no occasion to march against Jerusalem. The conversation between Alexander, Parmenio, and the high priest Jadduah, as related by Josephus, is likewise contradictory to the best authenticated events

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resistance of  
Gaza.

Egypt, the progress of the conqueror was interrupted by the strong city of Gaza, situate on a high hill, near the confines of the Arabian desert<sup>21</sup>. This place, distant about two miles from the sea, and surrounded by marshes or a deep sand, which rendered it extremely difficult of access, was held for Darius by the loyalty of Batis<sup>22</sup>, an eunuch, who had prepared to resist Alexander by hiring Arabian troops, and by providing copious magazines. The Macedonian engineers<sup>23</sup> declared their opinion that Gaza was impregnable. But Alexander, unwilling to incur the disgrace and danger of leaving a strong fortress behind him, commanded a rampart to be raised on the south side of the wall, which seemed least secure against an attack. His engines were scarcely erected, when the garriſon made a furious sally, and threw them into flames. It required the presence of the king to save the rampart, and to prevent the total defeat of the Macedonians. Warned by a heavenly admonition<sup>24</sup>, he had hitherto kept beyond the reach of the enemy's darts; and when the danger of his troops made him forget the divine omen, a weapon, thrown from a catapult, pierced his shield and breast-plate, and wounded him in the shoulder. Soon after-

events in the reign of Alexander. When the high-priest approached to implore the clemency of the conqueror, Alexander, says the Jewish historian, prostrated himself before that venerable old man; an action which so much surprised Parmenio, that he immediately asked his master "Why he, whom all the world adored, should himself adore the high priest of the Jews!" It will appear in the sequel, that Alexander did not require this mark of respect (the *προσκύνησις*), till long after the period alluded to by Josephus; neither could he be accompanied by the Chaldeans, as that writer alleges; much less could the high-priest, with propriety, have requested Alexander to permit the Jews, settled in Babylon and Medea, the free exercise of their religion, before that prince had conquered those countries, or even

passed the Euphrates. See this subject farther examined in Moyle's Letters, vol. ii. p. 415. and in l'Examen Critique des Histoires d'Alexandre, p. 65—69.

<sup>21</sup> Εσχάτη δὲ ὠκυτό ὡς ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου ἐκ Φοινίκης ἵστωι, ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐρήμου. "It is the last inhabited place on the road from Phœnicia to Egypt, on the skirts of the desert."

<sup>22</sup> Curtius, l. iv. c. vi. calls him Belis; Josephus, l. xi. c. viii. Bahamefes.

<sup>23</sup> Οἱ μηχανιστοὶ, the engine-makers; it should seem that the same persons who made the engines, directed the application of them.

<sup>24</sup> While Alexander was sacrificing, a bird of prey let fall a stone on his head. According to Aristander, the soothsayer, this prodigy portended that the city should be taken, but that Alexander would be exposed to danger in the siege.



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Easy con-  
quest of  
Egypt.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 1.  
A. C. 332.

towards the engines, which had been used in the siege of Tyre, arrived by sea. A wall of incredible height and breadth<sup>25</sup> was run entirely round the city; the Macedonians raised their batteries; the miners<sup>26</sup> were busy at the foundation; breaches were effected; and, after repeated assaults, the city was taken by storm. When their wall was undermined, and their gates in possession of the enemy, the inhabitants still fought desperately, and, without losing ground<sup>27</sup>, perished to a man. Their wives and children were enslaved; and Gaza, being repopled from the neighbouring territory, served as a place of arms to restrain the incursions of the Arabs.

The obstinate resistance of the obscure fortress of Gaza, was contrasted by the ready submission of the celebrated kingdom of Egypt. In seven days march, Alexander reached the maritime city of Pelusium, to which he had previously sent the fleet, with an injunction carefully to examine the neighbouring coasts, lakes, and rivers. His decisive victory at Issus, the shameful flight of Darius, the recent subjugation of Syria and Phœnicia, together with the actually defenceless state of Egypt (Mazaces the satrap of that large province having no Persian, and scarcely any regular troops), opened a ready passage to the wealthy capital of Memphis. There, Alexander was received as sovereign, and immediately afterwards acknowledged by the whole nation; a nation long accustomed to fluctuate between one servitude and another, always ready to obey the first summons of an invader, and ever willing to betray him for a new master. Grateful for his unexampled success, Alexander sacrificed at Memphis to the Egyptian gods, and celebrated in that city gymnastic and musical games, which were adorned by Grecian artists, accompanying

<sup>25</sup> Ευρος μὲν ἐς δύο σταδίους, ὕψος δὲ ἐς πένδε πνικτοῦ καὶ διακοσίους. "Two furlongs in breadth, two hundred and fifty feet in height;" but the text is absurdly erroneous.

<sup>26</sup> Ὑποκρυβάν τε ἀλλή τε ἀλλή οὐρυσσόμενοι. Arrian, p. 51. This was an uncommon ex-

pedient, and used only on great emergencies.

<sup>27</sup> Καὶ ἀπέθανον πάντες αὐτῇ μαχόμενοι, ὡς ἑκάστῃ ἐταχθέντων. The highest panegyric, being the very words applied by Lycias Herodotus, &c. to those who fell at Thermopylae.

him

him for that purpose. Having placed sufficient garrisons both in Memphis and Pelusium, he embarked with the remainder of his forces, and sailed down the Nile to Canopus<sup>28</sup>.

At this place, Alexander found abundant occupation for his policy, in a country where there was no opportunity for exercising his valour. Continually occupied with the thoughts, not only of extending, but of improving, his conquests, the first glance of his discerning eye perceived, what the boasted wisdom of Egypt had never been able to discover. The inspection of the Mediterranean coast, of the Red Sea, of the Lake Maræotis, and of the various branches of the Nile, suggested the design of founding a city, which should derive, from nature only, more permanent advantages than the favour of the greatest princes can bestow. Fired with this idea, he not only fixed the situation<sup>29</sup>, but traced the plan of his intended capital, described the circuit of the walls, and assigned the ground for its squares, market-places, and temples<sup>30</sup>. Such was the sagacity of his choice, that within the space of twenty years, Alexandria rose to distinguished eminence among the cities of Egypt and the East, and continued, through all subsequent ages of antiquity, the principal bond of union, the seat of correspondence and commerce, among the civilised nations of the earth.

In Egypt, an inclination seized Alexander to traverse the southern coast of the Mediterranean, that he might visit the revered temple and oracle of Jupiter Ammon. This venerable shrine was situate in a cultivated spot of five miles in diameter, distant about fifty leagues from the sea, and rising with the most attractive beauty amidst the

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Foundation  
of Alexan-  
dria.

Alexander  
visits the  
temple of  
Ammon.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 1.  
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<sup>28</sup> Arrian, p. 51. & seqq.

<sup>29</sup> Egypt, says Baron Tott, who lately surveyed that country with the eye of an engineer and a statesman, was formed to reunite the commerce of Europe, Africa, and the Indies. It stood in need of a harbour, vast, and of easy access. The mouths of the Nile afford neither of these advantages; the only proper situation was distant twelve leagues from the river, and in the heart of a desert. On this spot, which none but a

great genius could have discovered, Alexander built a city, which being joined to the Nile by a navigable canal, became the capital of nations, the metropolis of commerce. The trading nations of the earth still respect its ruins, heaped up by barbarism, and which require but the operation of a beneficent hand, to restore the boldest edifice which the human mind ever dared to conceive. Mem. du Baron de Tott, t. ii. p. 179.

<sup>30</sup> Arrian, l. iii. sub init.

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sandy deserts of Lybia. Among the African and Asiatic nations, the oracle of Ammon enjoyed a similar authority to that which Delphi had long held in Greece; and, perhaps, the conquest of the East could not have been so easily accomplished by Alexander, had he not previously obtained the sanction of this venerated shrine. Guided by prudence, or impelled by curiosity, he first proceeded two hundred miles westward, along the coast to Parætonius, through a desolate country, but not destitute of water. He then boldly penetrated towards the south, into the midland territory, despising the danger of traversing an ocean of sand, unmarked by trees, mountains, or any other object that might direct his course, or vary this gloomy scene of uniform sterility<sup>21</sup>. The superstition of the ancients believed him to have been conducted by ravens, or serpents; which, without supposing a miracle, may, agreeably to the natural instinct of animals, have sometimes bent their course, through the desert, towards a well-watered and fertile spot, covered with palms and olives. The fountain, which was the source of this fertility, formed not the least curiosity of the place. It was exceedingly cool at mid-day, and warm at mid-night; and, in the intervening time, regularly, every day, underwent all the intermediate degrees of temperature. The adjacent territory produced a fossil salt, which was often dug out in large oblong pieces, clear as crystal. The priests of Ammon inclosed it in boxes of palm-tree, and bestowed it, in presents, on kings and other illustrious personages; such salt being regarded as purer than that procured from seawater, and therefore preferred for the purpose of sacrifice, by persons curious in their worship<sup>22</sup>.

Alexander  
settles the  
government  
of Egypt.

Alexander admired the nature of the place, consulted the oracle concerning the success of his expedition, and received, as was universally reported, a very favourable answer<sup>23</sup>. Having thus effected

his

<sup>21</sup> Arrian, p. 53. & seqq. & Curtius, l. iv. c. vii.

<sup>22</sup> Arrian, *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Vid. Plut. Alexand. p. 680. The priest, or prophet, meant to address Alexander by the affectionate title of *παῖς*, child, son;

his purpose at the temple of Ammon, he returned to Memphis, in order finally to settle the affairs of Egypt. The inhabitants of that country were re-instated in the enjoyment of their ancient religion and laws. Two Egyptians were appointed to administer the civil government; but the principal garrisons, Alexander prudently entrusted to the command of his most confidential friends<sup>34</sup>; a policy alike recommended by the strength and importance of the country, and by the restless temper of its inhabitants.

The Macedonians had now extended their arms over Anatolia, Carmania, Syria, and Egypt; countries which anciently formed the seat of arts and empire, and which actually compose the strength and centre of the Turkish power. But Darius (after all hopes of accommodation had vanished with a conqueror who demanded unconditional submission to his clemency<sup>35</sup>) still found resources in his eastern provinces, Schirvan, Gilan, Korosan, and the wide extent of territory between the Caspian and the Jaxartes. Not only the subjects of the empire, but the independent tribes in those remote regions, which in ancient and modern times have ever been the abode of courage and barbarity, rejoiced in an opportunity to signalise their restless valour. At the first summons, they poured down into the fertile plains of Assyria, and increased the army of Darius far beyond any proportion of force which he had hitherto collected.

Meanwhile, Alexander having received considerable reinforcements from Greece, Macedon, and Thrace, pursued his journey eastward

Darius collects an army from his eastern provinces.

Alexander marches into Assyria. Olymp. cxvii. 2. A. C. 351.

son; but not being sufficiently acquainted with the Greek tongue, he said, *παιδες*, son of Jupiter. On this wretched blunder were founded Alexander's pretensions to divinity. Plut. *ibid.* & Zonar. *Annal.* i. p. 134. The fictions of Curtius are inconsistent with Arrian, and with Strabo, l. xvii. p. 1168.

<sup>34</sup> Arrian observes, that the Romans seem to have imitated the jealousy of Alexander respecting Egypt. Sensible of the tempta-

tions of the governors of that province to revolt, they appointed, not senators, but men of the equestrian order, to be proconsuls of Egypt. Arrian, p. 55.

<sup>35</sup> In this, Arrian and Curtius agree. The letters between Alexander and Darius are differently expressed by these writers. In both their accounts, which are totally inconsistent with each other, there are internal marks of falsehood,

from



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from Phœnicia, passed the Euphrates at Thapsacus<sup>36</sup>, boldly stemmed the rapid stream of the Tigris, and hastened to meet the enemy in Assyria. Darius had pitched his tents on the level banks of the Bumadus, near the obscure village of Gaugamela; but the famous battle, which finally decided the empire of the East, derived its name from Arbela, a town in the same province, sixty miles distant from the former, better known, and of easier pronunciation<sup>37</sup>.

Approaches  
the enemy.

The fourth day after passing the Tigris, Alexander was informed by his scouts, that they had seen some bodies of the enemy's horse, but could not discover their numbers. Upon this intelligence he marched forward in order of battle; but had not proceeded far, when he was met by other scouts, who having penetrated deeper into the country, or examined with greater accuracy, acquainted him that the hostile cavalry scarcely exceeded a thousand. This news made him alter his measures. The heavy-armed troops were commanded to slacken their pace. At the head of the royal cohort, the Pœonians, and auxiliaries, Alexander advanced with such celerity, that several of the Barbarians fell into his hands. These prisoners gave him very alarming accounts of the strength of Darius, who was encamped within a few hours march. Some made it amount to a million of foot, forty thousand horse, two hundred armed chariots, and fifteen elephants from the eastern banks of the Indus<sup>38</sup>. Others exaggerated (if indeed it was an exaggeration) with more method and probability, reducing the infantry to six hundred thousand, and raising the cavalry to an hundred and forty-five thousand<sup>39</sup>. But all agreed that the present army was greatly more numerous, and

Their num-  
bers.

<sup>36</sup> Darius had entrusted the defence of the pass to Mazacus, with a body of cavalry, of which two thousand were Greeks. But on the first intelligence of Alexander's approach, Mazacus abandoned his post, and drew off his forces. Arrian, p. 56.

could scarcely have appeared valid to any but a Greek. Vid. Arrian, p. 131.

<sup>38</sup> Arrian, p. 57.

<sup>39</sup> Curtius, l. iv. c. xii. xiii. Edit. Genev. The numbers are different in the other editions.

<sup>37</sup> This reason, which is given by Arrian,

composed of more warlike nations, than that which had fought at Issus <sup>40</sup>.

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Examines  
the field of  
battle.

Alexander received this information without testifying the smallest surprise. Having commanded a halt, he encamped four days, to give his men rest and refreshment. His camp being fortified by a good intrenchment, he left in it the sick and infirm, together with all the baggage; and, on the evening of the fourth day, prepared to march against the enemy, with the effective part of his army, which was said to consist of forty thousand infantry, and seven thousand horse, unincumbered with any thing but their provisions and armour. The march was undertaken at the second watch of the night, that the Macedonians, by joining battle in the morning, might enjoy the important advantage of having an entire day before them, to reap the fruits of their expected victory. About half way between the hostile camps, some eminences intercepted the view of either army. Having ascended the rising ground, Alexander first beheld the Barbarians, drawn up in battle array, and perhaps more skilfully marshalled than he had reason to apprehend. Their appearance, at least, immediately determined him to change his first resolution. He again commanded a halt, summoned a council of war, and different measures being proposed, acceded to the single opinion of Parmenio, who advised that the foot should remain stationary, until a detachment of horse had explored the field of battle <sup>41</sup>, and carefully examined the disposition of the enemy. Alexander, whose conduct was equalled by his courage, and both surpassed by his activity, performed those important duties in person, at the head of his light horse, and royal cohort. Having returned with unexampled celerity, he again assembled his captains, and encouraged them by a short speech. Their ardour corresponded with his own; and the fol-

<sup>40</sup> Arrian & Curtius, loc. citat. Justin, l. xi. c. xii. Diodorus, l. xvii. c. xxxix. & <sup>41</sup> Τὸν χρόνον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ ἐχθρῷ πρὸς τὴν μάχην.  
"The whole scene of the future action." lili. Orosius, l. iii. c. xvii. Plut. in Alexand. Arrian, p. 58.

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Disposition  
of the enemy;

diers, confident of victory, were commanded to take rest and refreshment <sup>42</sup>.

Meanwhile, Darius perceiving the enemy's approach, kept his men prepared for action. Notwithstanding the great length of the plain, he was obliged to contract his front, and form in two lines, each of which was extremely deep. According to the Persian custom, the king occupied the centre of the first line, surrounded by the princes of the blood, and the great officers of his court, and defended by his horse and foot guards, amounting to fifteen thousand chosen men. These splendid troops, who seemed fitter for parade than battle, were flanked, on either side, by the Greek mercenaries, and other warlike battalions, carefully selected from the whole army. The right wing consisted of the Medes, Parthians, Hyrcanians, and Sacæ; the left was chiefly occupied by the Bactrians, Persians, and Cardusians. The various nations composing this immense host were differently armed, with swords, spears, clubs, and hatchets; while the horse and foot of each division were promiscuously blended, rather from the result of accident, than by the direction of design. The armed chariots fronted the first line, whose centre was farther defended by the elephants. Chosen squadrons of Scythian, Bactrian, and Cappadocian cavalry advanced before either wing, prepared to bring on the action, or after it began, to attack the enemy in flank and rear.

who remain  
all night un-  
der arms,

The unexpected approach of Alexander within sight of his tents, prevented Darius from fortifying the wide extent of his camp; and, as he dreaded a nocturnal assault, from enemies who often veiled

<sup>42</sup> Διπποποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι ἐκέλευε τὸν στρατὸν. "He commanded his army to sup and rest." Arrian, p. 58. This does not well agree with what is said, p. 57. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅτι μὴ ἔπλαθον φεμεσι, "That the soldiers carried nothing but their armour." I have therefore supplied the word "provisions." Both Arrian (loc. citat.), and Curtius, l. iv. c. xiii.

say, that Parmenio exhorted Alexander to attack the enemy in the night; to which the king answered, that he disdained κλεῖψαι τὴν νικην, "to steal the victory:" an answer worthy of his magnanimity and his prudence; since the day and the light were more favourable to the full exertion and display of his superior skill and courage.

their

their designs in darkness, he commanded his men to remain all night under arms. This unusual measure, the gloomy silence, the long and anxious expectation, together with the fatigue of a restless night, discouraged the whole army, but inspired double terror into those who had witnessed the miserable disasters on the banks of the Granicus and the Illus.

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At day-break, Alexander disposed his troops in a manner suggested by the superior numbers and deep order of the enemy. His main body consisted in two heavy-armed phalanxes, each amounting to above sixteen thousand men. Of these, the greater part formed into one line; behind which, he placed the heavy-armed men, reinforced by his targeteers, with orders, that when the out-spreading wings of the enemy prepared to attack the flanks and rear of his first line, the second should immediately wheel to receive them<sup>41</sup>. The cavalry and light infantry were so disposed on the wings, that while one part resisted the shock of the Persians in front, another, by only facing to the right or left, might take them in flank. Skilful archers and darters were posted at proper intervals, as affording the best defence against the armed chariots, which (as Alexander well knew) must immediately become useless, whenever their conductors or horses were wounded.

Alexander's  
order of  
battle;

Having thus arranged the several parts, Alexander with equal judgment led the whole in an oblique direction towards the enemy's left; a manœuvre which enabled the Macedonians to avoid contending at once with superior numbers. When his advanced battalions, notwithstanding their nearness to the enemy, still stretched towards the right, Darius also extended his left, till, fearing that by continuing this movement his men should be drawn gradually off the plain, he commanded the Scythian squadrons to advance, and prevent the further extension of the hostile line. Alexander im-

and mode of  
attack.

<sup>41</sup> Επιταλῆς δὲ καὶ δειλῶσαν τάξιν ὡς κινεῖται τὴν λαγὴ ἀμφοτέρωθεν is explained by Ælian, as describing the manœuvre. Arrian, p. 60. The phrase is described in the text.



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Battle of  
Gaugamela.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 2.  
A. C. 331.  
October.

mediately detached a body of horse to oppose them. An equestrian combat ensued, in which both parties were reinforced, and the Barbarians finally repelled. The armed chariots then issued forth with impetuous violence; but their appearance only was formidable; for the precautions taken by Alexander, rendered their assault harmless. Darius next moved his main body, but with so little order, that the horse, mixed with the infantry, advanced, and left a vacuity in the line, which his generals wanted time or vigilance to supply. Alexander seized the decisive moment, and penetrated into the void with a wedge of squadrons. He was followed by the nearest sections of the phalanx, who rushed forward with loud shouts, as if they had already pursued the enemy. In this part of the field, the victory was not long doubtful; after a feeble resistance, the Barbarians gave way; and the pusillanimous Darius was foremost in the flight<sup>44</sup>.

The battle, however, was not yet decided. The more remote divisions of the phalanx, upon receiving intelligence that the left wing, commanded by Parmenio, was in danger, had not immediately followed Alexander. A vacant space was thus left in the Macedonian line, through which some squadrons of Persian and Indian horse penetrated with celerity, and advanced to the hostile camp<sup>45</sup>. It was then

<sup>44</sup> Εφύγη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις αἰσχυρῶς. "He fled shamefully among the foremost." Arrian, p. 69.

<sup>45</sup> The words of Arrian are, ἅλλ' ἐπιστησάντες τῆς τριφυλίας (viz. the sections on the left), πρὸς τὴν μάχην, ὅτι τοῦ ἐναντίου πρὸς τὴν μάχην. Καὶ ταύτην παραβραβεύσαντες αὐτοὺς τῆς τάξεως, κατὰ τὸ δόξαν, διακταίναντες τὴν τε Ἰνδὴν τοῖς, καὶ τῆς Περσικῆς ἵππου, ὡς ἐπὶ τῇ σκευήφωρῃ τῶν Μακεδόνων, &c. The learned Guifhardt's commentary is ingenious, but scarcely warranted by the text. "Les sections de la droite de la phalange ayant donné en même temps que les Pelastes, les autres sections, qui étoient par

l'oblique plus ou moins en arrière, tacherent aussi de marcher en avant, & de charger l'ennemi. Mais les troupes de la droite des Perses, voyant le fort de combat au centre, se pressèrent toutes vers cet endroit de la ligne, en se poussant mutuellement, & la foule embaraça tellement les soldats de la phalange, qu'il leur fut alors impossible de s'avancer. Sur ces entre faites, Alexandre, pour se faire jour, se jeta sur les derrières de ces ennemis. En même temps la nouvelle de la fuite de Darius, & de la deroute de toute sa gauche s'étant répandue, la consternation devint générale. L'effet en fut singulier; les Perses se voyant coupés,

then that Alexander derived signal and well-earned advantages from his judicious order of battle. The heavy-armed troops and targeteers, which he had skilfully posted behind the phalanx, speedily faced about, advanced with a rapid step, and attacked the Barbarian cavalry, already entangled among the baggage. The enemy, thus surprised, were destroyed, or put to flight. Meanwhile, the danger of his left wing recalled Alexander from the pursuit of Darius. In advancing against the enemy's right, he was met by the Parthian, Indian, and Persian horse, who maintained a sharp conflict. Sixty of the *Companions* fell; Hephæstion, Cœnus, and Menidas were wounded. Having at length dissipated this cloud of cavalry, Alexander prepared to attack the foot in that wing. But the business was already done, chiefly by the Thessalian horse; and nothing remained for Alexander, but to pursue the fugitives, and to render the victory as decisive as possible <sup>46</sup>.

coupés, dans leur retraite, par les escadrons d'Alexandre, qu'ils avoient à dos, chercherent à se sauver, même à travers la phalange. Ils se jetterent à corps perdu sur elle. Quoique de vingt quatre de hauteur, elle ne put résister au poids de cette masse. Sa gauche étant alors plus chargée que sa droite, les sections, de celle-ci poussèrent en avant, & n'observerent pas que, depuis la troisième section, la gauche restoit en arrière. Il en resulta que la phalange se separa, que sa droite s'avança à la poursuite de l'ennemi, & que des corps nombreux de cavalerie & d'infanterie, qui avoient été au centre Persan, entrèrent tout-à-coup par la crevasse, & poussèrent jusques derrière la ligne des Macédoïens." See *Mémoires Militaires*, c. xv. p. 221.

<sup>46</sup> Soldiers, better acquainted with the practice than with the theory of their art, have often testified a just surprise, that the battles of the ancients should be described with an order, perspicuity, and circumstantial minuteness, which are not to be found in the military writers of modern times. Scholars have endeavoured to explain this

difference, by observing the immense disproportion, in point of dignity and abilities, between the military historians of modern Europe, and those of Greece and Rome. But the difficulty will be better solved, by reflecting on the changes introduced into the art of war by the change of arms; which, in military operations, form the pivot on which the whole turns. 1. From the nature of fire-arms, modern battles are involved in smoke and confusion. 2. From the same cause, modern armies occupy a much greater extent of ground, and begin to act at much greater distances; which renders it more difficult to observe and ascertain their manœuvres. 3. The immense train of artillery, ammunition, &c. required in the practice of modern war, gives a certain immobility to our armies, which renders it impossible to perform, without great danger, those rapid evolutions in sight of an enemy, which so often decided the battles of the ancients. With us, almost every thing depends on the judicious choice of ground, a matter requiring great military genius, but not admitting the embellishments of historical description.

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XXXVIII.Conse-  
quences of  
the victory.

According to the least extravagant accounts, with the loss of five hundred men, he destroyed forty thousand of the Barbarians<sup>47</sup>, who never thenceforth assembled in sufficient numbers to dispute his dominion in the East. The invaluable provinces of Babylonia, Susiana, and Persis, with their respective capitals of Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis<sup>48</sup>, formed the prize of his skill and valour. Alexander had not yet attained the summit of his fortune, but he had already reached the height of his renown<sup>49</sup>. The burning of the royal palace of Persepolis<sup>50</sup>, to retaliate the ravages of Xerxes in Greece,

<sup>47</sup> In the battles of the Greeks and Romans, the extraordinary disproportion between the numbers slain on the side of the victors and of the vanquished, necessarily resulted from the nature of their arms. Their principal weapons being not missile, but manual, armies could not begin to act till they had approached so nearly to each other, that the conquered found themselves cut off from all possibility of retreat. In modern times, the use of fire-arms (which often renders the action itself more bloody) furnishes the defeated party with various means of retreating with considerable safety. The sphere of military action is so widely extended in modern times, that before the victors can run over the space which separates them from the vanquished, the latter may fall back, and proceed with little loss beyond their reach; and should any village, hedge, ravine, &c. be found in their way, may often check the ardour of the pursuers. Upon these considerations, the invention of gunpowder may be said to have saved the effusion of human blood. Equestrian engagements (since the principles on which cavalry act remain nearly the same in every age) are still distinguished by similar circumstances to those which appear so extraordinary in the battles of antiquity.

<sup>48</sup> The gold and silver found in those cities amounted to thirty millions sterling; the jewels and other precious spoil, belonging to Darius, sufficed, according to Plutarch,

to load twenty thousand mules, and five thousand camels. Plut. in Alexand.

<sup>49</sup> After the battle of Arbela, many of Alexander's actions, as will appear in the text, deserve the highest praise; but, before that period, few of them can be justly blamed.

<sup>50</sup> Arrian, l. iii. p. 66. Plut. in Alexand. & Strabo, l. xv. p. 502, agree with Arrian in confining the conflagration to the palace. Plutarch tells us, that only a part of that edifice was consumed. Diodorus says inaccurately, *ὁ περὶ τὴν ἑσθλὴν τοῦτο*, "the place around the palace;" and Curtius, l. v. c. vii. with his usual extravagance, burns the whole city of Persepolis so completely, that not a vestige of it remained. The learned author of the *Examen Critique des Historiens d'Alexandre*, is at pains to prove that Persepolis existed under the successors of Alexander, and continued to exist till the first ages of Mahometanism, when the inhabitants of Persepolis, having violated their treaty with the Mussulmen, were butchered without mercy, and their city totally demolished. See *Examen Critique*, p. 125, & seqq. Mr. D'Hankerville, however, alleges reasons for believing that there were two cities called Persepolis by the Greeks, situate at a considerable distance from each other, one of which was burnt by Alexander, and the other destroyed by the Mussulmen. See his *Supplement* to his *Recherches sur les Arts, &c. de la Grèce*.

afforded

afforded the first indication of his being overcome by too much prosperity. To speak the most favourably of this transaction, an undistinguishing repentment made him forget that he destroyed his own palace, not that of his adversary.

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Measures of  
Darius.

The settlement of his important and extensive conquests, and the reduction of the warlike Uxii, those independent mountaineers, who, inhabiting the western frontier of Persia, had ever defied the Persian power, restrained Alexander from urging the pursuit of Darius. After his defeat, that unfortunate prince escaped by a precipitate and obscure<sup>51</sup> flight across the Armenian mountains into Media. Being gradually joined by the scattered remnant of his army, amounting to several thousand Barbarians, and fifteen hundred Greek mercenaries, he purposed to establish his court in Media, should Alexander remain at Susa or Babylon<sup>52</sup>; but in case he were still pursued by the conqueror, his resolution was to proceed eastward, through Parthia and Hyrcania, into the valuable province of Bactria, laying waste the intermediate country, that he might thus interpose a desert between himself and the Macedonians. In this design, he dispatched to the Caspian Gates the waggons conveying his women, and such instruments of convenience or luxury as still softened his misfortunes; and remained in person at Ecbatana with his army. Alexander, when apprised of these measures, hastened into Media. In his way he subdued the Paritacæ; and having reached within three days march of the Median capital, was met by

<sup>51</sup> Arrian observes, that Darius shewed great judgment in his flight, having left the populous and well-frequented roads leading to Susa and Babylon, towards which he justly suspected that Alexander would march his army, and directing his course over the Armenian mountains into Media. Arrian, p. 63. Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 538, agrees with Arrian. The errors of Curtius, l. v.

c. i. are too absurd to merit refutation.

<sup>52</sup> The foundation of this hope was, that a revolt might break out in the Macedonian army; since the more and the richer provinces Alexander acquired, his lieutenants would have the greater temptation to aspire at independence. Subsequent events will justify the reasonable expectation of Darius, which was on this occasion disappointed.



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XXXVIII.

Alexander  
pursues  
Darius;

Bisthanes, the son of Ochus, Darius's predecessor<sup>53</sup>. This prince informed him, that Darius had fled from thence five days before, attended by three thousand horsemen, and six thousand foot.

Animated by this intelligence, Alexander proceeded to Ecbatana, in which place he left his treasures, and posted a strong garrison. In this city he likewise dismissed the Thessalian cavalry, and several auxiliary squadrons; paying them, besides their arrears, a gratuity of two thousand talents. Such as preferred the glory of accompanying his standard to the joy of revisiting their respective countries, were allowed again to enlist; a permission which many embraced. A strong detachment under Parmenio was sent into Hyrcania; Cænus, who had been left sick at Susa, was commanded to march with all convenient speed into Parthia; while the king, with a well-appointed army, advanced with incredible expedition<sup>54</sup> in pursuit of Darius. Having passed the Caspian Straits, he was met by Bagistanes, a Babylonian of distinction, who acquainted him that Bessus, governor of Bactria, in conjunction with Nabarzanes, an officer in Darius's cavalry, and Barzaentes, satrap of the barbarous Drangæ and Arachoti, had thrown aside all respect for a prince who was no longer an object of fear. Upon this intelligence, Alexander declared expedition to be more necessary than ever. Having, therefore, left the heavy-armed troops and baggage under the command of Craterus, he hastened forward with a few select bands, encumbered only with their arms, and two days provisions. In that space of time, he reached the camp from which Bagistanes had deserted; and finding some parties of the enemy there, learned that Darius being seized and bound, was actually carried prisoner in his cha-

<sup>53</sup> Arrian, p. 66, speaks as if Ochus had been Darius's immediate predecessor, neglecting the short reign of Arses the son of Ochus, who was poisoned soon after his father by the eunuch Bagoas. Diodor. xvii. 5. Ælian. Var. Hist. vi. 8.

<sup>54</sup> His marches were thirty-eight and forty miles a day; sometimes more. Xenophon's expedition of Cyrus, and Arrian's expedition of Alexander, mutually illustrate and confirm each other.

riot; that Bessus, in whose province this treason had been committed, had assumed the imperial honours; that all the Barbarians (Artabazus only and his sons excepted) already acknowledged the usurper; that the Greek mercenaries preserved their fidelity inviolate; but finding themselves unable to prevent the flagitious scenes that were transacting, had quitted the public road, and retired to the mountains, disdaining not only to participate in the designs, but even to share the same camp with the traitors. Alexander farther learned, that should he pursue Bessus and his associates, it was their intention to make peace with him by delivering up Darius; but should he cease from the pursuit, that they had determined to collect forces, and to divide the eastern provinces of the empire.

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XXXVIII.

Having received this information, Alexander marched all night, and next day till noon, with the utmost speed, but without overtaking the enemy. He therefore dismounted five hundred of his cavalry, placed the bravest of his foot, completely armed, on horseback; and commanding Attalus and Nicanor to pursue the great road which Bessus had followed, advanced in person with his chosen band by a nearer way, which was almost desert, and entirely destitute of water. The natives of the country were his guides. From the close of evening till day-break he had rode near fifty miles, when he first discovered the enemy flying in disorder, and unarmed. Probably to facilitate their own escape, Satibarzanes and Barzaentes stabbed Darius, and then rode away with Bessus, accompanied by six hundred horse. Notwithstanding the celerity of Alexander, the unhappy Darius expired before the conqueror beheld him<sup>55</sup>. Darius was the last king of the house of Hytaspes, and the tenth in succession to the monarchy of Cyrus. That he was neither brave nor

who is treacherously  
slain.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 3.  
A. C. 330.

<sup>55</sup> Such is the simple narration of Arrian. The fictions related by Plutarch in *Alexand.* & Curtius, l. v. c. xii. & Justin. l. xi. c. xv. are inconsistent with each other, and all of them betray the desire to contrast the exaltation and depression of the fortune of Darius.

“He was chained,” says Curtius, “with golden fetters; but laid in a dirty cart, covered with raw hides.” His harangue in praise of Alexander would be moral and affecting, were it not totally improbable.

C H A P.  
XXXVIII.

Alexander  
pursues the  
murderers  
of Darius.

prudent, his conduct sufficiently evinces; but the uninterrupted chain of his calamities would have prevented him (had he been otherwise inclined) from imitating the injustice and cruelty of too many of his predecessors<sup>56</sup>.

In this important stage of his fortune, Alexander displayed tender sympathy with affliction, warm esteem of fidelity, and just hatred of treason. He gave orders that the body of Darius should be transported to Persia, and interred in the royal mausoleum. The children of the deceased prince were uniformly treated with those distinctions which belonged to their birth; and Barciné<sup>57</sup>, his eldest daughter, was finally espoused by Alexander. The pardon of the Greek mercenaries, who were admitted into the Macedonian service, and the honourable reception of Artabazus and his sons, well became the character of a prince, who could discern and reward the merit of his enemies. Alexander then pursued the murderers of Darius through the inhospitable territories of the Arii and Zarangæi, and in two days accomplished a journey of six hundred furlongs. Having received the submission of Aornos<sup>58</sup> and Bactra, he passed the deep and rapid Oxus, and learned, on the eastern banks of this river, that Bessus, who had betrayed his master, had been betrayed in his turn by Spitamenes. The former was surprised by the Macedonians, and treated with a barbarity<sup>59</sup> better merited by his own crimes, than becoming the character of Alexander.

The Bactrian  
and Scythian  
war.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 4.  
cxiii. 1.  
A. C. 328,  
329.

Spitamenes succeeded to his ambition and danger. In pursuit of this daring rebel, the resentment of Alexander hurried him through

<sup>56</sup> Arrian makes this judicious observation, which proves the futility of the Oriental traditions representing Darius as a monster of tyranny and cruelty. See D'Herbelot. Bibl. Orientale, art. Darab. p. 285. Should the fashionable scepticism of the times hesitate between these authorities, the reader has only to ask, what Oriental historian has related the transactions of Darius with the fulness and accuracy so conspicuous in Arrian?

<sup>57</sup> Called by some writers Statira.

<sup>58</sup> We shall meet with another place of this name, between the Suakus and the Indus.

<sup>59</sup> He was stripped naked, whipped, shamefully mutilated, &c. Arrian arraigns those cruelties, as unworthy of the Grecian character: but he warmly approves the punishing of Bessus, and the other murderers of Darius.

the vast but undescribed<sup>60</sup> provinces of Aria, Bactria, Sogdiana, and other less considerable divisions of the southern region of Tartary. The more northern and independent tribes of that immense country, whose pastoral life formed an admirable preparation for war, ventured to take arms against a conqueror who hovered on the frontier of their plains, and whose camp tempted them with the prospect of a rich plunder. The policy of Spitamenes inflamed their courage, and animated their hopes. These rude nations, and this obscure leader, proved the most dangerous enemies with whom Alexander ever had to contend. Sometimes they faced him in the field, and after obstinately resisting, retreated skilfully. Though never vanquished, Alexander obtained many dear-bought victories. The Scythians, on several occasions, surprised his advanced parties, and interrupted his convoys. The abruptness of their attack was only equalled by the quickness of their retreat; their numbers, their courage, and their stratagems, all rendered them formidable<sup>61</sup>. But the enlightened intrepidity, and inimitable discipline of the Greeks and Macedonians, finally prevailed over Barbarian craft, and desultory fury. Not contented with repelling his enemies, Alexander crossed the Jaxartes, and defeated the Scythians<sup>62</sup> on the northern bank of that river. This victory was sufficient for his renown; and the exigency of his affairs soon recalled him from an inhospitable desert.

The

<sup>60</sup> The erroneous geography of the ancients is laboriously compared with subsequent discoveries, in the learned work entitled, *Examen des Anciens Historiens d'Alexandre*; and may be seen at one glance, by comparing the maps, usually prefixed to Quintus Curtius, with the admirable maps of Danville.

<sup>61</sup> In one action, Arrian tells us, that only forty Macedonian horsemen, and three hundred foot, escaped. Arrian, l. iv. Curtius mentions another, after which it was made death to divulge the number of the slain.

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Curtius, l. vii. c. vii. Alexander was not present in either of these engagements; but in a third battle, related by Arrian, the Macedonians were at first repelled, many of them wounded, and the king struck with an arrow, which broke the fibula, or lesser bone of his leg. The Macedonians, however, rallied, and totally defeated the enemy. Arrian, l. iii. sub fin.

<sup>62</sup> Before Alexander passed the Jaxartes, he received an embassy probably from the Abiau Scythians. Their oration, omitted by all the Greek writers, is preserved in Curtius,

l. vii.



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XXXVIII.

Alexander  
finally re-  
duces the  
provinces  
between the  
Caspian and  
the Jaxartes.  
Olymp.  
cxlii. 2.  
A. C. 327.

The provinces between the Caspian and the Jaxartes twice rebelled, and twice were reduced to submission. The Barbarians fighting singly were successively subdued; their bravest troops were gradually intermixed in the Macedonian ranks; and Alexander, thus continually reinforced by new numbers, was enabled to overawe those extensive countries, by dividing his army into five formidable brigades, commanded by Hephæstion, Ptolemy, Perdicas, Cænus<sup>63</sup>, and himself. Near Gabæ, a fortress of Sogdiana, Cænus attacked and defeated Spitamenes. The Sogdians and Bactrians deserted their unfortunate general, and surrendered their arms to the conqueror. The Massagetæ and other Scythians, having plundered the camp of their allies, fled with Spitamenes to the desert; but being apprised, that the Macedonians prepared to pursue them, they flew this active and daring chief, whose courage deserved a better fate; and, in hopes of making their own peace, sent his head to the conqueror.

Siege of the  
Sogdian  
fortress;  
Olymp.  
cxlii. 2.  
A. C. 327.

After the death of Spitamenes, the enemy feebly resisted Alexander in the open country; but in the provinces of Sogdiana and Parætā-

I. vii. c. viii. It is remarkable for the bold elevated style, in which these Barbarians display their own advantages, and describe the destructive ambition of the invader. In both respects, it agrees with the admirable harangue of the Caledonian chieftain Galgacus, in Tacitus's Life of Agricola. But the glowing sentiments of those independent and high-minded nations are invigorated by the brevity of Tacitus, and weakened by the diffusiveness of Curtius. Both orations abound in metaphors. "Great trees," say the Scythians to Alexander, "require long time to grow: the labour of a few hours levels them with the ground. Take care, lest, in climbing to the top, you should fall with the branches which you have seized. Grasp Fortune with both your hands; she is slippery, and cannot be confined. Our countrymen describe her without feet, with hands only, and wings. Those to whom she stretches

out her hand, she allows not to touch her wings. Rein your prosperity, that you may more easily manage it. Our poverty will be swifter than your army loaded with spoil. We range the plain and the forest; we disdain to serve, and desire not to command." The figurative style of the Scythians is sufficiently consonant to the manners of barbarous nations. See *Principii di Scienza nuova*, vol. i. p. 156, & seqq. See likewise Chapters fifth and sixth of the present History. Le Clerc, therefore, speaks with equal ignorance and severity, when, in arraigning the fidelity of Curtius, he says, "Scythæ ipsi, omnium literarum rudes, rhetoricæ calamitose inusti, in medium prodeunt." Judic. Curt. p. 326.

<sup>63</sup> Artabazus, the faithful attendant of Darius, and afterwards the friend of Alexander, was joined in the command with Cænus. Arrian.

cene,

crane, two important fortresses, long deemed impregnable, still bade defiance to the invader. Into the former, Oxyartes, the Bactrian, who headed the *rebellion* (for so the Macedonians termed the brave defence of the Bactrians) had placed his wife and children. The rock was steep, rugged, almost inaccessible, and provided with corn for a long siege. The deep snow, by which it was surrounded, increased the difficulty of assaulting it, and supplied the garrison with water. Alexander having summoned the Bactrians to surrender, was asked in derision, Whether he had furnished himself with winged soldiers? This insolence piqued his pride; and he determined to make himself master of the place, with whatever difficulties and dangers his undertaking might be attended. This resolution was consonant to his character. His success in arms, owing to the resources of his active and comprehensive mind, sometimes encouraged him to enterprises, neither justified by necessity, nor warranted by prudence. Fond of war, not only as an instrument of ambition, but as an art in which he gloried to excel, he began to regard the means as more valuable than the end, and sacrificed the lives of his men to military experiments, alike hazardous and useless: Yet, on the present occasion, sound policy seems to have directed his measures. Having determined soon to depart from those provinces, he might judge it imprudent to leave an enemy behind: it might seem necessary to destroy the seeds of future rebellion; and, by exploits unexampled and almost incredible, to impress such terror of his name, as would astonish and overawe his most distant and warlike dependencies.

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Alexander carefully examined the Sogdian fortress, and proposed a reward of twelve talents<sup>66</sup> to the man who should first mount the top of the rock on which it was situated. The second and third were to be proportionably rewarded, and even the last of ten was to be grati-

which is  
taken by a  
contrivance  
equally in-  
genious and  
daring.

<sup>66</sup> Above £. 2000, equal in value to near £. 20,000 in the present age.

fied with the sum of three hundred daries. The hopes of this recompence, which, in the conception of the Greeks and Macedonians, was equally honourable and lucrative, stimulated the love of adventure, so conspicuous in both nations. Three hundred men, carefully selected from the whole army, were furnished with ropes made of the strongest flax, and with iron pins used in pitching tents. They were likewise provided with small pieces of linen, which being joined together, might serve as a signal. Thus equipped, they proceeded at the close of evening towards the most abrupt side of the rock, and therefore the most likely to be unguarded. By driving the iron pins into congealed snow, and then fastening to them the ropes, they gradually hoisted themselves up the mountain. In this extraordinary enterprise, thirty men perished, whose bodies were so profoundly buried in the snow, that, notwithstanding the most diligent search, they could never afterwards be recovered. By this simple contrivance, those daring adventurers gained the summit of the rock, which overlooked the fortress; and waving their signal in the morning, were discovered by Alexander. At this joyous sight, he summoned the besieged to surrender to his winged soldiers. The Barbarians beheld and trembled; terror multiplied the number of their enemies, and represented them as completely armed; Alexander was invited to take possession of the fortress<sup>65</sup>.

Alexander's  
generous  
treatment of  
Roxana.

This obscure and even nameless castle contained Roxana, daughter of Oxyartes, and deemed, next to the spouse of Darius, the greatest beauty in the East. Alexander admired her form and her accomplishments; but even in the fervour of youth, and the intoxication of prosperity, his generous mind disdained the cruel rights of a conqueror, as justified by the maxims and example of his age and country. With a moderation and self-command, worthy the scholar of Aristotle, he declined the embraces of his captive, till his condescending affection raised her to the throne, choosing rather to offend

<sup>65</sup> Arrian, p. 91. & seqq.

the prejudices of the Macedonians, than to transgress the laws of humanity<sup>66</sup>.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

In Bactria, Alexander learned that the Parætacæ were in arms, and that many of his most dangerous enemies had shut themselves up in the fortress or rock of Choriènes. Upon this intelligence, he hastened to the Parætacæne. The height of the rock, which was everywhere steep and craggy, he found to be near three miles, and its circumference above seven. It was surrounded by a broad and deep ditch, at such distance from the base as placed the garrison beyond the reach of missile weapons. Alexander gave orders that the fir trees, of extraordinary height, which surrounded the mountain, should be cut down, and formed into ladders, by means of which, his men descending the ditch, drove huge piles into the bottom. These, being placed at proper distances, were covered with hurdles of osier consolidated with earth. In this occupation his whole army were employed by turns, night and day. The Barbarians at first derided this seemingly useless labour. But their insults were soon answered by Macedonian arrows. By these, and other missile weapons, the Macedonians, who were carefully protected by their coverings, so much annoyed the besieged, that the latter became desirous to capitulate. For this purpose, Choriènes, from whom the place derived its name, desired to converse with Oxyartes, the Bactrian, who, since the taking of his wife and children, had submitted to Alexander. His request being granted, Oxyartes strongly exhorted him to surrender his fortress and himself, assuring him of Alexander's goodness, of which his own treatment furnished an eminent example, and declaring that no place was impregnable to such troops and such a general. Choriènes prudently followed this advice; and, by his speedy submission, not only obtained pardon,

The fortress  
of Choriènes  
surrenders.  
Olymp.  
cxiii. 2.  
A. C. 327.

<sup>66</sup> Arrian, p. 91. & seqq.

but



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but gained the friendship of Alexander, who again entrusted him with the command of his fortress, and the government of his province. The vast magazines of corn, meat, and wine, collected by the Parætacæ for a long siege, afforded a seasonable supply to the Macedonian army, especially during the severity of winter, in a country covered with snow many feet deep<sup>67</sup>.

The virtues  
displayed by  
Alexander in  
making and  
regulating  
his conquests.

By such memorable achievements, Alexander subdued the nations between the Caspian sea, the river Jaxartes, and the lofty chain of mountains, which supply the sources of the Indus and the Ganges. In the conduct of this remote and dangerous war, the great abilities of the general were conspicuously distinguished. His example taught the troops to despise hunger, fatigue, cold, and danger; neither rugged mountains, nor deep and rapid rivers, nor wounds, nor sickness, could interrupt his progress, or abate his activity: his courage exposed him to difficulties, from which he was extricated by new efforts of courage, which, in any other commander, would have passed for temerity. Amidst the hardships of a military life, obstinate sieges, bloody battles, and dear-bought victories, he still respected the rights of mankind, and practised the mild virtues of humanity. The conquered nations enjoyed their ancient laws and privileges; the rigours of despotism were softened; arts and industry encouraged; and the proudest Macedonian governors compelled by the authority and example of Alexander, to observe the rules of justice towards their meanest subjects<sup>68</sup>. To bridle the fierce inhabitants of the Scythian plains, he founded cities, and established colonies on the banks of the Jaxartes and the Oxus; and those destructive campaigns, usually ascribed to his restless activity and blind ambition, appeared to the discernment of this extraordinary man, not only essential to the security of the conquests which he had al-

<sup>67</sup> Arrian, p. 97.

<sup>68</sup> Plutarch, Arrian, & Curtius, *passim*.

ready made, but necessary preparations for more remote and splendid expeditions which he still purposed to undertake; and which, as will appear in the succeeding chapter, he performed with singular boldness and unexampled success.

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During the three first years that the invincible heroism of Alexander triumphed in the East, the firm vigilance of Antipater repressed rebellion in Greece. But the attention of that general being diverted, by a revolt in Thrace, from the affairs of the southern provinces, the Lacedæmonians, instigated by the warlike ambition of their king Agis, ventured to exert that hostility against Macedon, which they had long felt and expressed. Reinforced by some communities of the Peloponnesus, which imprudently listened to their counsels, the allied army amounted to twenty-two thousand men. Antipater having checked the insurrection in Thrace, hastened into the Grecian peninsula with a superior force, and defeated the confederates in a battle, which proved fatal to king Agis, and three thousand Peloponnesian troops. The vanquished were allowed to send ambassadors to implore the clemency of Alexander. From that generous prince, the rebellious republics received promise of pardon, on condition that they punished with due severity the authors of an unprovoked and ill-judged revolt<sup>69</sup>.

Commotion  
in Greece  
checked by  
Antipater.  
Olymp.  
cxiii. 3.  
A. C. 330.

From this period, till the death of Alexander, Greece enjoyed, above eight years, an unusual degree of tranquillity and happiness. The suspicious and severe temper of Antipater was restrained by the commands of his master, who, provided the several republics sent him their appointed contingents of men to reinforce his armies, was unwilling to exact from them any farther mark of submission. Under the protection of this indulgent sovereign, to the glory of whose conquests they were associated, the Greeks still preserved the forms, and displayed the image of that free

Tranquillity  
of that coun-  
try during  
the space of  
eight years  
of Alexander's reign.

<sup>69</sup> Diodorus, l. xii. p. 537. Curtius, l. vi. c. i.

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Ctesiphon  
accused by  
Æschines,  
and defended  
by Demos-  
thenes.  
Olymp.  
cxii. 3.  
A. C. 330.

constitution of government, whose spirit had animated their an-  
cestors.

While Alexander pursued the murderers of Darius, Athens was crowded with spectators from the neighbouring republics, to behold that intellectual conflict between Æschines and Demosthenes, whose rivalry in power and fame had long divided the affections of their countrymen. In consequence of a decree proposed by Ctesiphon, Demosthenes, as above-mentioned, had been honoured with a golden crown, as the reward of his political merit. His adversary had, even before the death of Philip, denounced the author of this decree as a violator of the laws of his country. 1. Because he had decreed public honours to a man actually entrusted with the public money, and who had not yet passed his accounts. 2. Because he had advised, that the crown conferred on Demosthenes, should be proclaimed in the theatre. 3. Because the boasted services of Demosthenes had ended in public disgrace and ruin; and that, instead of being rewarded with a crown, he ought to be punished as a traitor. Various circumstances, which it is now impossible to explain, prevented this important cause from being heard by the Athenians, till the sixth year of the reign of Alexander. The triumph of the Macedonians seemed to promise every advantage to Æschines, who had long been the partisan of Philip, and of his magnanimous son; and who, by a stroke aimed at Ctesiphon, meant chiefly to wound Demosthenes, the avowed enemy of both.

Æschines ba-  
nished for  
calumny.

In the oration of Æschines, we find the united powers of reason and argument, combined with the most splendid eloquence. Yet the persuasive vehemence of Demosthenes prevailed in the contest. The unexampled exertions<sup>70</sup>, by which he obtained this victory, will be admired to the latest ages of the world. To what an exalted pitch of enthusiasm must the orator have raised himself and his au-

<sup>70</sup> See the Orat. de Coron. throughout.

dience, when, to justify his advising the fatal battle of Chæronæa, he exclaimed, "No, my fellow-citizens, you have not erred; No! I swear it by the manes of those heroes who fought in the same cause at Marathon and Platæa." What sublime art was required to arrive, by just degrees, at this extraordinary sentiment, which in any other light than the inimitable blaze of eloquence with which it was surrounded, would appear altogether excessive and gigantic.

The orator not only justified Ctesiphon and himself, but procured the banishment of his adversary, as the author of a malignant and calumnious accusation. Honourable as this triumph was, Demosthenes derived more solid glory from the generous treatment of his vanquished rival. Before Æschines set sail, he carried to him a purse of money, which he kindly compelled him to accept; a generosity which made the banished man feel severely the weight of his punishment, and affectingly observe, "How deeply must I regret the loss of a country, in which enemies are more generous than friends elsewhere!" Æschines retired to the isle of Rhodes, and instituted a school of eloquence, which flourished several centuries. It is recorded, that having read to his scholars the oration which occasioned his banishment, it was received with extraordinary applause. But when this applause was redoubled on his reading the answer of Demosthenes, he was so far from testifying envy, that he exclaimed to his audience, "What would have been your admiration, had you heard the orator himself!"

Generosity  
of Demos-  
thenes.

Demosthenes survived Alexander, whose magnanimity disdained to punish an enemy whom he scarcely regarded as dangerous. But this illustrious Athenian patriot fell a prey to the more suspicious policy of Antipater. At the desire of that prince, he was banished Athens, and being pursued by Macedonian assassins to the little island Calauria, he ended his life by poison<sup>71</sup>.

His death.  
Olymp.  
cxiv. 3.  
A. C. 322.

<sup>71</sup> Plut. in Demosthen. & Lucian. Demosthen. Encom.



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The sentence of the Athenians in favour of Demosthenes, honourable to the moderation of Alexander.

It may be thought, that the conqueror of the Persian empire would have little leisure, or inclination, to attend to a personal dispute between two Athenian orators; and that neither the impeachment nor the defence of Demosthenes could affect his pride or his interest. It deserves to be considered, however, that this orator was the inveterate, and long the successful, opponent of the greatness of his family; and in the beginning of his own reign, had attempted, with more courage, indeed, than prudence, to overturn the yet unconsolidated pillar of his fortune. But whatever indifference Alexander, who was carefully informed of the transactions of Greece, might testify amidst the honours of Demosthenes, it cannot be believed that he heard with total unconcern the sentence of the Athenian people; a sentence which reversed the decision of fortune, and arraigned the cruel and melancholy triumph of Philip over the liberties of Greece. That he never repented the indignity, is a proof of his moderation; and that the Athenians could venture on a measure so offensive, is a proof of the freedom and security which they enjoyed under the Macedonian government.

State of Greece during the latter years of the reign of Alexander.

Deprived indeed of the honour, but also delivered from the cares, of independent sovereignty, and undisturbed by those continual and often bloody dissensions, which deform the annals of their tumultuous liberty, the Greeks indulged their natural propensity to the social embellishments of life; a propensity by which they were honourably distinguished above all other nations of antiquity. Their innumerable shows, festivals, and dramatic entertainments, were exhibited with more pomp than at any former period. The schools of philosophers and rhetoricians were frequented by all descriptions of men. Painting and statuary were cultivated with equal ardour and success. Many improvements were made in the sciences; and, as will appear more fully hereafter, the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, still rivalled the taste and genius, though not the spirit and virtue, of their ancestors.

cestors. Yet even in this degenerate state, when patriotism and true valour were extinct, and those vanquished republicans had neither liberties to love, nor country to defend, their martial honours were revived and brightened by an association with the renown of their conqueror. Under Alexander, their exploits, though directed to very different purposes, equalled, perhaps excelled, the boasted trophies of Marathon and Platæa. By a singularity peculiar to their fortune, the æra of their political disgrace, coincides with the most splendid period of their military glory. Alexander was himself a Greek; his kingdom had been founded by a Grecian colony; and, to revenge the wrongs of his nation, he undertook and accomplished the most extraordinary enterprises recorded in the history of the world.

## C H A P. XXXIX.

*Alexander's Indian Expedition.—Route pursued by the Army.—Aornos taken.—Nyssa and Mount Meros.—Alexander passes the Indus and Hydaspes.—Defeats Porus.—Founds Nicæa and Bucephalia.—Passes the Acesines and Hydraotes.—Sangala taken.—Eastern Boundary of Alexander's Conquests.—He sails down the Hydaspes.—Takes the Mallian Forts.—His March through the Gedrosian Desert.—Voyage of Nearchus.—Alexander improves the internal State of his Conquests.—Incorporates the Barbarian Levies with the Greeks and Macedonians.—Intermarriages of the Europeans and Asiatics.—Artifices to prevent Alexander's Return to Babylon.—His Death, and Character.—Division of his Conquests.—Subsequent History of Egypt and Syria.—The Western Division of Alexander's Empire conquered by the Romans.—State of Greece after the Age of Alexander.*

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XXXIX.  
Alexander  
undertakes  
his Indian  
expedition.  
Olymp.  
cxliii. 2.  
A. C. 327.

**B**Y just views of policy, rather than the madness of ambition, Alexander was carried to the rugged banks of the Oxus and the Iaxartes. The fierce nations of those inhospitable regions had, in ancient times, repeatedly over-run the more wealthy and more civilized provinces of Asia. Without diffusing through the Scythian

Scythian plains the terror of his name, the conqueror would not have securely enjoyed the splendor of Susa and Babylon; nor without the assistance of numerous and warlike levies, raised in those barbarous countries, could he have prudently undertaken his Indian expedition. For this remote and dangerous enterprise, he prepared early in the spring; Amyntas being appointed governor of Bactria, and entrusted with a sufficient strength to overawe the surrounding provinces.

With all the remainder of his forces, Alexander hastened southwards, and in ten days march traversed the Paropamisus, a link of that immense chain of mountains, reaching from the coast of Cilicia to the sea of China. This southern belt, distinguished in different portions of its length by the various names of Taurus, Paropamisus, Imaus, and Edmodus, the Greeks confounded<sup>1</sup> with the northern chain, of which Scythian Caucasus is a part, and whose remote branches extend from the shores of the Euxine to the eastern extremity of Tartary. Such is the strong frame which supports the ponderous mass of Asia. The intermediate space, especially towards the central country of Bukaria, is far more elevated than any other portion of the Eastern continent; and the towering heights of Paropamisus had hitherto defended (if we except the obscure expedition of Darius) the feeble majesty of India against the ravagers of the earth. The difficulties of this celebrated journey have, perhaps, been rather exaggerated than described, by the historians of Alexander. Yet our indulgence may pardon the fanciful<sup>2</sup> expressions of antiquity, when we read in the work of a modern writer of acknowledged veracity, "Those mountains are covered with ice; the cold which I suffered was extreme; the country presents a melancholy image of death and horror<sup>3</sup>."

Traverses  
the Paro-  
pamisus.

<sup>1</sup> The errors of Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 553. and of Curtius, l. vii. c. iii. are avoided by Arrian, l. v. p. 107. and by Strabo, l. xv. p. 724.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, l. vii. c. iii.

<sup>3</sup> See "le Voyage du Pere Desideri." It was performed in the year 1715. Lettres Edifiantes, xv. 185.



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Difficulty of  
penetrating  
into India by  
land.

But the rugged nature of the country was not the only difficulty with which the Macedonians had to struggle. The northern regions of India were inhabited in ancient, as they are still in modern times, by men of superior strength and courage<sup>+</sup>; and the vigorous resistance made by the natives of those parts, rendered it as difficult for Alexander to penetrate into the Indian peninsula by land, as it has always been found easy by the maritime powers of Europe, to invade and subdue the unwarlike inhabitants of its coasts.

Route pur-  
sued by  
Alexander.

The experienced leader seems to have conducted his army by the route of Candahar, well known to the caravans of Agra and Ispahan. Having reached the banks of the Cophenes, he divided his forces; the greater part he retained under his immediate command; the remainder were detached, under Hephæstion and Perdikkas, to clear the road to the Indus, and to make all necessary preparations for crossing that river. After many severe conflicts, he subdued the Aspij, Thyræi, Arasaci, and Assaceni; scoured the banks of the Choas and Cophenes; expelled the Barbarians from their fastnesses; and drove them towards the northern mountains, which supply the sources of the Oxus and the Indus.

Aornos  
taken.

Near the western margin of the latter, one place, defended by the Baziri, still defied his assaults. This place, called by the Greeks Aornos, afforded refuge not only to the Baziri, but to the most warlike of their neighbours, after their other strongholds had surrendered. From its description, it appears to have been admirably adapted to the purpose of a long and vigorous defence. Mount Aornos was two hundred furlongs in circuit; eleven in height, where lowest; accessible by only one dangerous path cut in the rock by art; containing, near the top, a plentiful spring of water, a thick and lofty wood, together with a sufficient quantity of arable land to employ the labour of a thousand men. An emulation of glory prompted Alexander to make himself master of a place, which fable described

<sup>+</sup> Arrian, p. 97. & seqq.

as impregnable to the greatest heroes of antiquity<sup>1</sup>. By the voluntary assistance and direction of some neighbouring tribes, hostile to the Baziri, Ptolemy ascended part of the rock unperceived; Alexander with his usual diligence raised a mount, erected his engines, and prepared to annoy the enemy. But, before he had an opportunity to employ the resources of his genius, by which he had taken places still stronger than Aornos, the garrison sent a herald, under pretence of surrendering on terms, but in reality with a view to spin out the negotiation during the whole day, and in the night to effect their escape. Alexander, who suspected this intention, met their art with similar address. Patiently waiting till the Indians descended the mountain, he took possession of the strong-hold which they had abandoned, having previously posted a proper detachment to intercept the fugitives, and punish their perfidy.

The Macedonians proceeded southward from Aornos, into the country between the Cophenes and the Indus. In this fertile district, the army, as it advanced towards Mount Meros and the celebrated Nyfa, was met by a deputation from the citizens of that place, which (could we believe historic flattery) had been founded in the heroic, or rather in the fabulous ages, by a Grecian colony established by Bacchus at the eastern extremity of his conquests. These wandering *Greeks*, might we indulge for a moment the supposition that the inhabitants of Nyfa were really entitled to that name, appear in this Indian soil to have degenerated from the courage, while they preserved the policy, the eloquence, and the artifices of their European brethren. Being immediately conducted to Alexander, who had just sat down in his tent, covered with sweat and dust, and still armed with his casque and lance, they testified great horror at

Alexander  
marches to  
Nyfa and  
mount Me-  
ros.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, p. 98, who supplies the particulars in the text, says, that he knows not whether it was the Grecian, Tyrian, or Egyptian Hercules, who laid siege unsuccessfully to Aornos. He doubts whether

any of them ever penetrated to India; adding, that the name of Hercules appears to him to have been employed, on this occasion, as on many others, “*ἐν κεντρῷ τοῦ λόγου*,” “as an ostentatious fiction.”

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his aspect, and threw themselves prostrate on the ground. The king having raised them from this humiliating posture, and addressed them with his usual condescension, they recovered sufficient boldness to entreat him to spare their country and their liberties for the sake of Bacchus their founder. In proof of this allegation, they insisted on the name Nyssa, derived from the nurse<sup>6</sup> of Bacchus, and on the abundance not only of vines and laurel, but of ivy, which grew in their territory, and in no other part of India. Alexander willing to admit a pretension, which might attest to succeeding ages that he had carried his conquests still farther than Bacchus<sup>7</sup>, readily granted their request. Having understood that Nyssa was governed by an aristocracy, he demanded, as hostages, an hundred of their principal ci-

<sup>6</sup> The respect shewn by the Greeks to their nurses is well known, and is attested by the tragedians. In this respect, the modern Greeks still imitate their ancestors. The word employed to signify a nurse, properly denotes "a second mother." See Mr. Guy's *Voyage Littéraire de la Grèce*.

<sup>7</sup> Eratosthenes the Cyrenean, and many other ancient writers, asserted, that the fictions concerning Bacchus's expedition to the East, were invented by the flatterers of Alexander. But Strabo justly observes, that the belief of that expedition long preceded the age of the son of Philip. To justify this observation, he cites the verses of Sophocles and Euripides. The latter of these poets, in the prologue to his *Bacchæ*, introduces Bacchus, saying, that he had come to Thebes, and adorned with vines the temple of Semele.

Λιπών δὲ Λυδῶν τὰς πολυχρύσους γῆας  
Φρυγίαν τε Περσῶν θ' ἡμιβλήτους πλάκας,  
Βακτρίαν τε τειχῇ, τὴν περ δυσχερῶς χθονά  
Μηδῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν Ἀγαθῶν τ' εὐδαιμονίᾳ  
Λοισαί τε πᾶσαι, ἣ παρ' ἀλμυρῶν ἄλσας,  
Κεῖνται, μύσαςιν Ἑλλοσι Βακχέωρος θ' ὄρεσιν  
Πληρεῖς ἰχθύσας καλλιπύργους πόλεις.

"Leaving the golden fields of the Lydians, the sun-beat plains of Phrygia and Persia, the Bactrian fortresses, and the wintry storms of the Medes—having over-run happy Ara-

bia, and the maritime provinces of Asia, crowned with fair-turreted cities, inhabited by mingled Greeks and Barbarians." Sophocles mentions Nyssa in particular. Βρυττοῖσι κλεινὴ Νύσσα. Vide Strabo, l. xv. p. 687. Notwithstanding such respectable authorities for the vulgar tradition, both Strabo and Arrian treat the expedition of Bacchus to India as a fable; the geographer on the following grounds, 1. Because the relations of authors on this subject are totally inconsistent. 2. Because many of the writers who accompanied Alexander are altogether silent concerning this matter. 3. Because the intermediate countries, between Greece and India, possess no monuments of this pretended expedition. Strabo, p. 688. The philosopher and historian discovers his sentiments to be the same with Strabo's, but expresses himself with more tenderness for the popular superstition, concluding, "ἐκ ἀκριβοῦς ἐξέτασιν χρεῖται τῶν περ τὰ βίαι, ἐκ παλαιοῦ, μεμνημένων;" "that the traditions of the ancients concerning the Gods ought not to be too carefully sifted." Arrian, p. 101. An observation which might have merited the attention of those who, in later times, have ventured to explain historically, or to analyse, the Grecian mythology.

tizens,

tizens, and three hundred of their cavalry. This demand excited the smile of Acuphis, who headed the embassy. Alexander asked him, "At what he smiled?" He replied, "O king! you are welcome to three hundred of our horsemen, and more, should you think proper. But can you believe it possible that any city should long continue safe, after losing an hundred of its most virtuous citizens? Instead of one hundred of the best, should you be contented with two hundred of the worst, men in Nyssa, be assured that, at your return, you will find this country in as flourishing a condition as when you left it." Pleased with his address, Alexander remitted his demand of the magistrates; he was accompanied by the cavalry, and by the son and nephew of Acuphis, who were ambitious to learn the art of war under such an accomplished general.

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The transactions which we have described, and a march of sixteen days from the Oxus to the Indus, allowed time for Hephæstion and Perdicas to make the preparations necessary for passing the latter river, most probably by a bridge of boats<sup>8</sup>. On the eastern bank, Alexander received the submission of the neighbouring princes. Of these Taxiles, who was the most considerable, brought, besides other valuable presents, the assistance of seven thousand Indian horse, and surrendered his capital, Taxila, the most wealthy and populous city between the Indus and Hydaspes. But the king, who never al-

Alexander  
passes the  
Indus, and  
receives the  
submission of  
Taxiles.

<sup>8</sup> Arrian, p. 100 & 103, leaves it uncertain in what manner the bridge was constructed. Neither that accurate writer, nor the other careless describers of the exploits of Alexander, ascertain the pass of the Indus, at which the Macedonians crossed that river. Major Rennel, late surveyor-general of Bengal, has the following observations in his excellent memoir on the map of Hindostan: "I take it for granted, that Alexander crossed the Indus at the place where the city of Attock now stands; as it appears to have been

in all ages the pass on the Indus leading from the countries of Cabul and Candahar into India . . . Attock must then stand on the site of the Taxila of Alexander. From thence, as his intention seems to have been to penetrate by the shortest way to the Ganges, he would proceed by the ordinary road to that part of the bank of the Hydaspes (or Behat) where the fortress of Rotas now stands; and here he put in execution his stratagem for crossing the river, whilst the opposite shore was possessed by Porus." Of which more in the text.



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Prepares to  
pass the Hy-  
daspes, not-  
withstanding  
the opposi-  
tion of Porus.

lowed himself to be outdone in generosity, restored and augmented the dominions of Taxiles.

The army crossed the Indus about the time of the summer solstice, at which season the Indian rivers are swelled by heavy rains, as well as by the melted snow, which descends in torrents from Paropamisus. Trusting to this circumstance, Porus, a powerful and warlike prince, had encamped on the Shantrou, or Hydaspes, with thirty thousand foot, four thousand horse, three hundred armed chariots, and two hundred elephants. At an inconsiderable distance from the main body, his son commanded a detachment, consisting of the same kind of forces, which were all well accoutred, and excellently disciplined. Alexander perceived the difficulty of passing the Hydaspes in the face of this formidable host; a difficulty which must be greatly increased by the elephants, whose noise, and smell, and aspect, were alike terrible to cavalry. He therefore collected provisions on the opposite bank, and industriously gave out that he purposed to delay passing the river till a more favourable season. This artifice deluded not the Indians; and Porus kept his post. The king next had recourse to a different stratagem. Having posted his cavalry in separate detachments along the river, he commanded them to raise in the night loud shouts of war, and to fill the bank with agitation and tumult, as if they had determined at all hazards to effect their passage. The noise roused the enemy, and Porus conducted his elephants wherever the danger threatened. This scene was repeated several successive nights; during which the Barbarians were fatigued and harassed by perpetual alarms. Porus discovering, as he fondly believed, that nothing was intended by this vain noise, but merely to disturb his repose, at length desisted from following the motions of the Macedonian cavalry, and remained quiet in his encampment, having stationed proper guards on the bank.

\* Arrian, l. v. p. 107, & seqq.

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XXXIX.Dispositions  
for that par-  
pose.

The false security of Porus enabled Alexander to effect his long-meditated purpose. At the distance of about eighteen miles from his camp, and at the principal winding of the Hydaspes, there stood a lofty rock, thickly covered with trees; and near to this rock, an island, likewise over-run with wood, and uninhabited. Such objects were favourable for concealment: they immediately suggested to Alexander the design of passing the river with a strong detachment, which he resolved to command in person, as he seldom did by others what he could himself perform; and, amidst the variety of operations, always claimed for his own, the task of importance or danger. The Macedonian phalanx, the new levies from Paropamisus, together with the Indian auxiliaries, and one division of the cavalry, remained under the command of Craterus. They had orders to amuse the enemy by making fires in the night, and by preparing openly during day-time to cross the Hydaspes. While these operations were carrying on by Craterus, Alexander, having collected hides and boats, marched up the country with a choice body of light infantry, the archers and Agrians, the Bactrian, Scythian, and Parthian<sup>10</sup> cavalry, together with a due proportion of heavy-armed troops; the whole a well-affected brigade, adapted to every mode of war required by the nature of the ground, the arms or disposition of the enemy. Having receded from the bank to a distance sufficiently remote for eluding the observation of Porus, he advanced towards the rock and island; and in this secure post, prepared to embark, after taking such precautions against the vicissitudes of war and fortune, as could be suggested only by the most profound military genius. The orders given to Craterus were precise: should the Indians perceive, and endeavour to interrupt the passage to the rock and island, he was in that case to hasten over with his cavalry; otherwise not to stir from his post, until he observed Porus advancing against Alexander, or flying from the

<sup>10</sup> Arrian calls them the Dahæ; they were ἰπποπόδες, "archers on horseback." Arrian, 1. v. p. 109.

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The passage  
effected.

field. At an equal distance between the bank, where Alexander meant to pass, and the camp where Craterus lay, Attalus and Meleager were posted with a powerful body of mercenaries, chiefly consisting of Indian mountaineers, who had been defeated by the Macedonians, and taken into the pay of the conqueror. To provide for any unforeseen accident, sentinels were placed along the bank, at convenient distances, to observe and repeat signals.

Fortune favoured these judicious dispositions. A violent tempest concealed from the enemy's out-guards the tumult of preparation; the clash of armour and the voice of command being overpowered by the complicated crash of rain and thunder. When the storm somewhat abated, the horse and infantry in such proportions as both the boats and hides could convey, passed over, unperceived, into the island. Alexander led the line, accompanied in his vessel of thirty oars by Seleucus, Ptolemy, Perdikkas, and Lyfimachus; names destined to fill the ancient world, when their renown was no longer repressed by the irresistible diffusion of their master's glory.

The king first reached the opposite bank, in sight of the enemy's out-guards, who hastened, in trepidation, to convey the unwelcome intelligence to Porus. The Macedonians meanwhile formed in order of battle; but before meeting their enemies, they had to struggle with an unforeseen difficulty. The coast on which they landed was the shore of another island, disjoined from the continent by a river commonly fordable, but actually so much swelled by the rains of the preceding night, that the water reached the breasts of the men, and the necks of the horses. Having passed this dangerous stream with his cavalry and targeteers, Alexander advanced with all possible expedition, considering, that should Porus offer battle, these forces would resist till joined by the heavy infantry; but should the Indians be struck with panic at his unexpected passage of the Hydaspes, the light-armed troops would thus arrive in time to attack and pursue them with advantage.

Upon

Upon the first alarm given by his out-guards, Porus detached his son to oppose the landing of the enemy with two thousand horse, and one hundred and twenty armed chariots. These forces, arriving too late to defend the bank, were speedily broken and put to flight by the equestrian archers; their leader and four hundred horsemen were slain; most of the chariots were taken; the slime of the river, which rendered them unserviceable in the action, likewise interrupting their flight.

The sad news of this discomfiture deeply afflicted Porus; but his immediate danger allowed not time for reflection. Craterus visibly prepared to pass the river, and attack him in front; his flanks were threatened with the shock of the Macedonian horse, elated by recent victory. In this emergency the Indian appears to have acted with equal prudence and firmness. Unable to oppose this complicated assault, he left part of the elephants under a small guard, to frighten rather than resist, Craterus's cavalry; while, at the head of his whole army, he marched in person to meet the more formidable division of the enemy, commanded by their king. His horse amounted to four, and his foot to thirty thousand; but the part of his strength in which he seemed most to confide, consisted of three hundred armed chariots, and two hundred elephants. With these forces, Porus advanced, until he found a plain sufficiently dry and firm for his chariots to wheel. He then arranged his elephants at intervals of an hundred feet; in these intervals he placed his infantry, a little behind the line. By this order of battle, he expected to intimidate the enemy, since their horse, he thought, would be deterred from advancing at sight of the elephants; and their infantry, he imagined, would not venture to attack the Indians in front, while they must be themselves exposed to be attacked in flank, and trampled under foot by those terrible animals. At either extremity of the line, the elephants bore huge wooden towers, filled with armed men. The cavalry formed the wings, covered in front with the armed chariots.

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Porus's son  
defeated and  
slain.

Dispositions  
made by Po-  
rus for resist-  
ing the ene-  
my.

Alexander



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Skilful manœuvres of the Macedonian army.

Alexander by this time appeared at the head of the royal cohort and equestrian archers. Perceiving that the enemy had already prepared for battle, he commanded a halt, until the heavy-armed troops should join. This being effected, he allowed them time to rest and recover strength, carefully encircling them with the cavalry; and meanwhile examined, with his usual diligence, the disposition of the Indians. Upon observing their order of battle, he immediately determined, not to attack them in front, in order to avoid encountering the difficulties which Porus had artfully thrown in his way; and at once resolved on an operation, which, with such troops as those whom he commanded, could scarcely fail to prove decisive. By intricate and skilful manœuvres, altogether unintelligible to the Indians, he moved imperceptibly towards their left wing with the flower of his cavalry. The remainder, conducted by Cænus, stretched towards the right, having orders to wheel at a given distance, that they might attack the Indians in rear, should they wait to receive the shock of Alexander's squadrons. A thousand equestrian archers directed their rapid course towards the same wing; while the Macedonian foot remained firm in their posts, waiting the event of this complicated assault, which appears to have been conducted with the most precise observance of time and distance.

The battle of the Hydaspes.

The Indian horse, harassed by the Equestrian archers, and exposed to the danger of being surrounded, were obliged to form into two divisions, of which one prepared to resist Alexander, and the other faced about to meet Cænus. But this evolution so much disordered their ranks, and dejected their courage, that they were totally unable to stand the shock of the Macedonian cavalry, which surpassed them as much in strength, as it excelled them in discipline. The fugitives took refuge, as behind a line of friendly towers, in the intervals that had been left between the elephants. These fierce animals were then conducted against the enemy's horse; which movement was no sooner observed by the infantry, than they seasonably advanced,

and galled the assailants with darts and arrows. Wherever the elephants turned, the Macedonians opened their ranks, finding it dangerous to resist them with a close and deep phalanx. Meanwhile, the Indian cavalry rallied, and were repelled with greater loss than before. They again sought the same friendly retreat; but their flight was now intercepted, and themselves almost intirely surrounded, by the Macedonian horse; at the same time that the elephants, having lost their riders, enraged at being pent up within a narrow space, and furious, through their wounds, proved more formidable to friends than foes, because the Macedonians, having the advantage of an open ground, could every where give vent to their fury".

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The battle was decided before the division, under Craterus, passed the river. But the arrival of these fresh troops rendered the pursuit peculiarly destructive. The unfortunate Porus lost both his sons, all his captains, twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse. The elephants, spent with fatigue, were slain or taken; even the armed chariots were hacked in pieces, having proved less formidable in reality than appearance, could we believe that little more than three hundred men perished on the side of Alexander. An obvious inconsistency too often appears in the historians of that conqueror<sup>12</sup>. With a view to enhance his merit, they describe and exaggerate the valour and resistance of his enemies; but, in computing the numbers of the slain, they become averse to allow this valour and resistance to have produced any adequate effects.

The Indians  
defeated,

The Indian king having behaved with great gallantry in the engagement, was the last to leave the field. His flight being retarded by his wounds, he was overtaken by Taxiles, whom Alexander entrusted with the care of seizing him alive. But Porus, perceiving the approach of a man, who was his ancient and inveterate enemy,

Courage and  
magnanimity  
of Porus.

<sup>11</sup> Arrian, p. 112.

<sup>12</sup> See Arrian, p. 113. The observation applies not, however, to that historian, but rather to Ptolemy and Aribolubus, from

whom he derived his materials; nor could it be expected that those generals should preserve perfect impartiality in relating the exploits of a master whom they admired.

turned

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XXXIX.

Rewarded by  
Alexander.

Foundation  
of Nicæa and  
Bucephalia.

turned his elephant, and prepared to renew the combat. Alexander then dispatched to him Meroë, an Indian of distinction, who, he understood, had formerly lived with Porus in habits of friendship. By the entreaties of Meroë, the high-minded prince, spent with thirst and fatigue, was finally persuaded to surrender; and being refreshed with drink and repose, was conducted to the presence of the conqueror. Alexander admired his stature (for he was above seven feet high) and the majesty of his person; but he admired still more his courage and magnanimity. Having asked in what he could oblige him? Porus answered, By acting like a king. "That," said Alexander with a smile, "I should do for my own sake, but what can I do for your's? Porus replied, "All my wishes are contained in that one request<sup>13</sup>." None ever admired virtue more than Alexander. Struck with the firmness of Porus, he declared him reinstated on his throne; acknowledged him for his ally and his friend; and having soon afterwards received the submission of the Glaucæ, who possessed thirty-seven cities on his eastern frontier, the least of which contained five thousand, and many of the greatest above ten thousand inhabitants, he added this populous province to the dominions of his new confederate. Immediately after the battle, he interred the slain, performed the accustomed sacrifices, and exhibited gymnastic and equestrian games on the banks of the Hydaspes. Before leaving that river, he founded two cities, Nicæa and Bucephalia; the former was so called, to commemorate the victory gained near the place where it stood; the latter, situate on the opposite bank, was named in honour of his horse Bucephalus<sup>14</sup>, who died there,

<sup>13</sup> The modern histories of Alexander universally misrepresent this conference. All of them, as far as I know, make Porus say, "that he desires to be treated like a king:" an explanation which cannot be reconciled with Alexander's reply, *Τὸ το μὲν ἔγωγε σοὶ Πῶρος ἐπέθυκα, σὲ δὲ σὺ βασιλεὺς εἶναι θέλω*. "I will act towards you, O Porus! as becomes a

king, on my own account: but what do you desire that I should do on your's?"

<sup>14</sup> This generous animal, who had so long shared the toils and dangers of his master, had formerly received signal marks of royal regard. Having disappeared in the country of the Uxii, Alexander issued a proclamation, commanding his horse to be retreived, otherwise

there, worn out by age and fatigue. A large division of the army remained under the command of Craterus, to build and fortify these new cities.

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In promoting the success of Alexander, the fame of his generosity conspired with the power of his arms. Without encountering any memorable resistance, he reduced the dominions of another prince named Porus, and the valuable country between the Acesines and the Hydraotes. In effecting this conquest, the obstacles of nature were the principal, or rather the only, enemies, with whom he had to contend. The river Acesines, fifteen furlongs broad, is deep and rapid; many parts of its channel are filled with large and sharp rocks, which, opposing the rapidity of the stream, occasion loud and foaming billows, mixed with boiling eddies and whirlpools, equally formidable, and still more dangerous. Of the Macedonians, who attempted to pass in boats, many drove against the rocks, and perished; but such as employed hides, reached the opposite shore in safety. The Hydraotes is of the same breadth with the Acesines, but flows with a gentle current. On its eastern bank, Alexander learned that the Cathaei, Malli, and other independent Indian tribes, prepared to resist his progress. They had encamped on the side of the hill, near the city Sangala, two days march from the Hydraotes; and, instead of a breast-work, had fortified themselves with a triple row of carriages. Alexander advanced with his cavalry; the Indians stirred not from their post, but, mounting their carriages, poured forth a shower of missile weapons. Alexander perceiving the cavalry unfit for such an attack, immediately dismounted, and conducted a battalion of foot against the enemy. The lines were attacked, where weakest; some passages were opened; the Macedonians rushed in; and the Indians, being successively driven from their triple barrier, fled in precipitation to Sangala.

Alexander  
passes the  
Acesines and  
Hydraotes.

otherwise he would ravage the whole country with fire and sword. This command was immediately obeyed. "So dear," says Arrian, "was Ducephalus to Alexander, and so terrible was Alexander to the Barbarians." Arrian, p. 114.



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XXXIX.

Sangala be-  
sieged and  
taken.

The walls of that place were too extensive to be completely invested. On one side, the town was skirted by a lake, long and broad, but not deep. Alexander suspecting that the Indians, intimidated by their former defeat, would attempt to escape in the night, caused the lake to be surrounded with his cavalry. This precaution was attended with success. The foremost of the Indians were cut to pieces by the advanced guards of the Macedonian horse; the rest escaped with difficulty to Sangala. Alexander then invested the greatest part of the town with a rampart and a ditch, and prepared to advance his engines to batter the walls, when he was informed by some deserters, that the enemy still resolved, that very night, to steal, if possible, through the lake; if not, to force their way with their whole strength. Upon this intelligence Alexander posted Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, with three thousand targeteers, one troop of archers, and all the Agrians, upon the spot where he sagaciously conjectured that the besieged would attempt to force their passage. At the first sound of the trumpet, the other commanders were to advance to the assistance of Ptolemy. Alexander declared his intention to share the common danger. By this judicious disposition, the enemy were successfully repelled, after leaving five hundred men on the place. Meanwhile Porus, Alexander's principal ally in those parts, arrived in the camp with five thousand Indians, and a considerable number of elephants. Encouraged by this reinforcement, the Macedonians prepared to terminate the siege. The engines were got ready; the wall, built of brick, was undermined; the scaling ladders were fixed; several breaches were made; and the town was taken by assault. Seventeen thousand Indians are said to have perished in the sack of Sangala; above seventy thousand were taken prisoners; Sangala was razed; its confederates submitted or fled. Above an hundred Macedonians fell in the siege or assault; twelve hundred were wounded.

The

CHAP.  
XXIX.Eastern  
bank of  
Alexander's  
conquests.

The persevering intrepidity of Alexander thus rendered him master of the valuable country, now called the Punjab, watered by the five great streams whose confluence forms the Indus". The banks of the Hyphasis, the most eastern of these rivers, which he actually intended to cross, allured by the flattering description of the adjoining territory, were adorned by twelve Macedonian altars, equal in height, and exceeding in bulk, the greatest towers in that country. These monuments, erected midway between Delhi and Lahor", marked the extremity

"The annals of the Gentoos distinguish Alexander by the epithets of Mhaahah, Dukkoyt, and Kooneah, "the great robber and assassin;" but most of the Oriental traditions are highly honourable to that prince, and extol his humanity not less than his prowess. The high idea entertained of him by the Indians, appears from their ascribing to his taste and magnificence, the most remarkable monuments scattered over their immense country. See l'Examen Critique, p. 143, & seqq. M. Anquetil Zend-Avesta, t. i. p. 392. and Mr. Howell's Religion of the Gentoos, P. ii. p. 5.

"Probably near the place where the great western road passes between those cities. See D'Anville Geogr. Ancienne, and Gibbon's Hist. vol. i. c. ii. Major Rennel, however, in his excellent Memoir on the new Map of Hindostan, assigns reasons for believing that Alexander was not so high up the river. "After crossing," says he, "the Acesines, or Jenaub, and the Hydrates or Ravee, which latter he may be supposed to cross at the place where Lahor now stands, he appears to be drawn out of the direct route towards the Ganges, to attack the city of Sangala, most probably lying between Lahor and Moultan. From Sangala he proceeded to the Hyphasis, or Setlege, most probably between Adjodin and Debalpour, by the circumstance of the deserts lying between him and the Ganges; for the country between the Beath and the Ganges is fertile and well inhabited, but that between the lower parts

of the Setlege and the Ganges, has really a desert in it, as Timur experienced in his march from Adjodin to Balnir. The distance between Alexander's position on the Hyphasis and the Jumma, as given by Pliny, accords with this opinion. He gives it as three hundred and thirty-six Roman miles, which, by a proper proportional scale, formed from his distances in known places, reaches from the banks of the Jumma to a point a little below the conflux of the Beath and Setlege. But had Alexander been as high up the river as the place where the great western road crosses from Lahor to Delhi, he would have been only two hundred and fifty such miles from the Jumma. This opinion is strengthened by the account of what happened immediately after; I mean his recrossing the Hydrates, and then encamping on the bank of the Acesines, in a low situation, and where the whole country was flooded on the coming on of the periodical rains; which circumstance obliged him to move his camp higher up the river, into a more elevated country. This agrees perfectly with the description of the country. The lower parts of the courses of the Jenaub and Ravee are really through a low country; and these are also the parts nearest to Adjodin and Debalpour, between which places, I suppose, Alexander's altars were erected." It is rather unfortunate for this ingenious conjecture, that the desert on the eastern bank of the Hyphasis, between Alexander and the Ganges, is to be found only

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Alexander  
falls down  
the Hydaspes,  
accompanied by  
his army.  
Olymp.  
cxiii. 3.  
A. C. 326.

extremity of Alexander's empire; an empire thus limited, not by the difficulties of the country, or the opposition of enemies, but by the immoveable and unanimous resolution of his European troops.

Invincible by his enemies, Alexander submitted to his friends, at whose desire he set bounds to his trophies in the East. But his restless curiosity prepared new toils and dangers for the army and himself. Having returned to the cities Nicæa and Bucephalia, he divided his forces, for the sake of exploring more carefully the unknown regions of India. Two divisions, respectively commanded by Craterus and Hephæstion (for Cænus was now dead), had orders to march southward along the opposite banks of the Hydaspes. Philip, to whom he had committed the government of the provinces adjacent to Bactria, was recalled with the troops under his command; and the whole Macedonian conquests in India, including seven nations and above two thousand cities, were subjected to the dominion of Porus. Meanwhile the Ionians, Cyprians, Phœnicians, and other maritime nations, who followed the standard of Alexander, industriously built, or collected, above two thousand vessels",  
for

in the inaccurate compilation of Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 612. (whose narrative of Alexander's expedition is as much inferior to Arrian's, as his imperfect and inconsistent account of the expedition of the younger Cyrus, and the retreat of the ten thousand, is inferior to the admired Anabasis of Xenophon), and in the romantic description of Curtius, l. ix. c. ii. The existence of such a desert, at the extremity of Alexander's conquests, is contradicted by the circumstantial and satisfactory narrative of Arrian, l. v. p. 119. who says, "that the country beyond the Hyphasis was rich and fertile, the inhabitants industrious and brave; governed by a moderate aristocracy; flourishing in peace and plenty; possessing a great number of elephants, and those of superior strength and stature."

"It may appear extraordinary," says

Mr. Rennel, "that Alexander should, in the course of a few months, prepare so vast a fleet for his voyage down the Indus; especially as it is said to be the work of his army. But the Punjab country, like that of Bengal, is full of navigable rivers, which communicating with the Indus, form an uninterrupted navigation from Cashmere to Tatta, and no doubt abounded with boats and vessels ready constructed to the conqueror's hands. I think it probable too, that the vessels in which Nearchus performed his coasting voyage to the Gulph of Persia, were found in the Indus. Vessels of one hundred and eighty tons burden are sometimes used in the Ganges; and those of one hundred not unfrequently." It is worthy of observation, that this judicious conjecture of Mr. Rennel is justified by the words of Arrian. In speaking of the number of vessels,

for sailing down the Hydaspes till its junction with the Indus, and thence along that majestic stream to the Indian ocean. On board this fleet, the king embarked in person with the third division of his forces. His navigation employed several months, being frequently retarded by hostilities with the natives, particularly the warlike tribe of the Malli. These Barbarians were driven from the open country; their cities were successively besieged and taken; but, at the storm of their capital, a scene was transacted, which would have indicated madness in any other general, and which betrayed temerity even in Alexander.

When their fleets were filled with the enemy, the Malli took refuge in their citadel. This fortress was defended by a thick wall, which being thrown around the declivity of a mountain, was extremely lofty without, but towards the inner circumference of an inconsiderable height. Alexander, provoked by the obstinacy of the Indians, commanded the scaling-ladders to be applied with all possible expedition. But this service being performed more tardily than usual, the king, in his anger, snatched a ladder from one who carried it, and having fastened it to the wall, mounted with rapidity in defiance of the enemy's weapons. The Macedonians, alarmed by the danger of their general, followed in such numbers, that the ladder broke as Alexander reached the summit; the same accident happened to other ladders which were hastily applied,

Extraordinary adventure in besieging the Mallian fortrefs.

vessels, he says, και ὅσα ἄλλα ποταμῶν, ἢ τῶν παλαιῶν πλοίων κατὰ τῆς τοῦ ποταμοῦ, ἢ ἢ τῶν τότε ποιῶντων, p. 124. The vessels employed by Alexander appear, therefore, to have been partly collected on the Indian rivers, and partly constructed for the occasion. They were, 1. Long ships, for the purpose of war; 2. Round ships, for carrying provisions, baggage, &c.; and, 3. ἱσπαρώνα πλοῖα, vessels for transporting horses. Mr. Rennel's conjecture can only relate to the ships of burden. That the two other kinds were built by the Ionians and islanders, appears from Arrian, p. 124 & 181. The account of

Alexander's embarkation, given in Arrian's expedition of Alexander, as well as in his Indian history, is inconsistent with the relation of Curtius, l. ix. c. iii. with that of Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 563. and that of Justin. l. xii. c. ix. The narrative of Arrian is, however, confirmed by Strabo, l. xv. p. 1023. That accurate geographer informs us, that the fleet was constructed near the cities which Alexander had built on each side the Hydaspes; and that the timber, chiefly pine, fir, and cedar, was brought from a wood near to Mount Emodus.



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and injudiciously crowded. For some moments, the king thus remained alone on the wall, conspicuous by the brightness of his arms and the extravagance<sup>18</sup> of his valour, exposed to thick volleys of hostile darts from the adjacent towers. His resolution was more than daring. At one bound, he sprang into the place, and posting himself at the wall, slew the chief of the Malli and three others who ventured to assault him. Meanwhile Abreas, Leonnatus, and Peucestas, the only Macedonians who had got safe to the top of the wall, imitated the example of Alexander. Abreas was wounded and fell; his companions regardless of their own safety, defended the king, whose breast had been pierced with an arrow. They were soon covered with wounds, and Alexander seemed ready to expire. By this time, the Macedonians had burst through the gates of the place. Their first concern was to carry off the king; the second to revenge his death, for they believed the wound to be mortal, as breath issued forth with his blood. Some report that the weapon was extracted by Critodemus of Cos, others, that no surgeon being near, Perdicas, of the life-guards, opened the wound with his sword, by his master's command. The great effusion of blood threatened his immediate dissolution; but a seasonable swooning retarded the circulation of the fluids, stopped the discharge of blood, and saved the life of Alexander. The affectionate admiration in which he was held by his troops, appeared in their gloomy sadness during his danger, and their immoderate joy at his recovery<sup>19</sup>.

Having performed his intended voyage to the ocean, and provided necessaries for a long march, Alexander determined to proceed towards Persepolis, through the barren solitudes of Gedrosia. This

Marches  
through the  
Gedrosian  
desert.  
Olymp.  
cxliii. 4.  
A. C. 325.

<sup>18</sup> Τῷ ἀτοπῶν τῆς πολυμίας; literally, "the absurdity of his valour," could our idiom admit such an expression; ἀτοπος properly signifies "what has no place in nature." It is commonly translated *absurd*, but may here mean *supernatural*.

<sup>19</sup> The extraordinary adventure related in

the text, is said by Curtius, l. ix. c. iv. to have happened in storming a city of the Oxydracæ. Lucian. (Dial. mort.) & Pausan. (Attic.) agree with Curtius. But these are feeble authorities, compared with Arrian, l. vi. p. 127, & seqq. & Strabo, l. xvii. p. 1026.

arduous

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XXXIX.Voyage of  
Nearchus.

arduous design was not inspired by an idle ambition to surpass the exploits of Cyrus and Semiramis, whose armies were said to have perished in those deserts, but prompted by the necessity of supplying with water the first European fleet which navigated the Indian sea, explored the Persian gulph, and examined the mouths of the Euphrates and the Tigris. This important voyage was performed, and afterwards related, by Nearchus<sup>20</sup>, whose enterprising genius was worthy of the master whom he served. In discovering the sea and the land, the fleet and army of Alexander mutually assisted each other. By the example of the king, both were taught to despise toil and danger. On foot, and encumbered with his armour, he traversed the tempestuous sands of the Persian coast, sharing the hunger, thirst, and fatigue of the meanest soldier<sup>21</sup>; nor was it till after a march of two months, distinguished by unexampled hardships, that the army emerged into the cultivated province of Carmania.

In this country Alexander was met by a division of his forces, which he had sent under the command of Craterus through the territories of the Arij and Drangæ. Stafanor and Phrataphernes, governors of those warlike nations, and of the more northern provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania, brought a seasonable supply of camels and

Alexander is  
joined in  
Carmania by  
various divi-  
sions of his  
army.

<sup>20</sup> Nearchus was a native of Crete, but had long resided in Amphipolis. The journal of his celebrated voyage from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, is preserved in Arrian's Indian history, from c. xx. to c. xli. inclusively. Seven months were employed in this voyage, during three of which the fleet kept the sea. Nearchus sailed in the month of September, and arrived in April in the Euphrates. Plin. Nat. Hist. l. vi. c. xviii. The relation of this illustrious admiral has been called in question by Dodwell, Hardouin, and others: but its authenticity is confirmed by the incomparable D'Anville. See *Recherch. Geog. sur le Golfe*

*Perfique*, Acad. des Inscrip. t. xxx. p. 133.

<sup>21</sup> Parties were continually employed, on all sides, in searching for water. On one occasion, they were more unfortunate than usual; the heat of the sun was excessive, and reflected by the scorching sand; Alexander marched on foot, parched with thirst, exhausted by fatigue, and oppressed by care. Amidst these distressful circumstances, some soldiers discovering a small quantity of turbid water, brought it in great haste to the king. He received the present with thanks, then poured it on the ground; and the water, thus spilt, refreshed not only Alexander, but the whole army. Arrian, p. 141.

other

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He punishes  
the miscon-  
duct of his  
generals.

other beasts of burthen, to relieve the exigencies of an army enfeebled by disease, and exhausted by fatigue. The waste of men, occasioned by this destructive expedition<sup>22</sup>, was repaired by the arrival of numerous battalions from Media, which rendered the standard of Alexander sufficiently respectable. Cleander and Sitalus, the commanders of those forces, were accused by the Medes of despoiling their temples, ransacking their tombs, and committing other detestable deeds of avarice and cruelty. Their own soldiers confirmed the accusation; and their crimes were punished with death. This prompt justice gave immediate satisfaction, and served as a salutary example in future; for, of all the rules of government, practised by this illustrious conqueror, none had a stronger tendency to confirm his authority, and consolidate his empire, than his vigilance to restrain the rapacity of his lieutenants, and to defend his subjects from oppression<sup>23</sup>.

Improbable  
account of  
the march  
through Car-  
mania.

Among the fables which give the air of romance to the memorable exploits of Alexander, we may reckon the triumphant procession through Carmania. In imitation of Bacchus, Alexander is said to have traversed this province, amidst dancing and music, crowned with flowers, intoxicated with wine, and allowing the utmost extravagance of disorder and folly to himself and his followers<sup>24</sup>. The revel continued seven days, during which a small body of sober men might have overwhelmed this army of bacchanals, and avenged the

<sup>22</sup> Plutarch says, that the march through Gedrosia cost Alexander near one hundred thousand men; a palpable exaggeration, since he supposes the whole army, at their departure from India, to have amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; of which one division embarked with Nearchus, and another marched, under the command of Craterus, through the territories of the Arii and Drangæ; little more than a third part of the whole number entered the Gedrosian deserts.

<sup>23</sup> Καὶ τότε, ὡς τι ἄλλῃ, κατισχύει ἐν κόσμῳ ταῖς ἰσὺς τὰς ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου δειμαλῆτας, ἢ ἰκοῦντα προσχρησάμεντα, τὰς αὐτὰς μὲν πληθύνοντα, τοσοῦτοι δὲ ἀλλήλων ἀφιστηκότα· οἱ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῇ Ἀλεξάνδρου Βασιλείᾳ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων. Arrian, l. vi. p. 143. "This, especially, kept in awe the nations that were either subdued by Alexander, or that voluntarily submitted to him (numerous and remote as they were); that, under the reign of this prince, the governors durst not injure the governed."

<sup>24</sup> Plut. in Alexand. Diodor. p. 573.

cause

cause of Darius and of Asia<sup>25</sup>. Were not this improbable fiction discountenanced by the silence of contemporary writers<sup>26</sup>, it would be refuted by its own absurdity. Instead of yielding to the transports of mad joy, Alexander, whose heart was extremely susceptible of compassion, must have been deeply afflicted by the recent loss so many brave men; nor did the necessity of his affairs, to which he was ever duly attentive, admit of unseasonable delay.

Encouraged by the long absence of their master, and the perils to which his too adventurous character continually exposed his life, Harpalus Orfines and Abulites, who were respectively governors of Babylon, Persopolis, and Susa, began to despise his orders, and to act as independent princes, rather than accountable ministers. In such emergencies, Alexander knew by experience the advantage of celerity. He therefore divided his army. The greater part of the heavy-armed troops were entrusted to Hephæstion, with orders to proceed along the sea-coast, and to attend the motions of the fleet commanded by Nearchus. With the remainder, the king hastened to Pasargadaë. Orfines was convicted of many enormous crimes, which were punished with as enormous severity<sup>27</sup>. Baryaxes, a Mede, who had assumed the royal tiara, suffered death; his numerous adherents shared the same fate. The return of Alexander from the East proved fatal to Abulites, and his son Oxathres, who, during the absence of their master, had cruelly oppressed the wealthy province of Susiana, and particularly the inhabitants of the capital. Harpalus, whose conduct at Babylon had been no less flagitious, escaped with his treasures to Athens: the avarice of the Athenians engaged them to receive this wealthy fugitive; but their fears forbade them to harbour the enemy of Alexander. By a decree of the

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Punishment  
of the gover-  
nors of Ba-  
bylon, Persi-  
polis, and  
Susa.

<sup>25</sup> Curtius, l. iv. c. x.

<sup>26</sup> Arrian informs us, that neither Ptolemy nor Aristobolus make the least mention of this extraordinary transaction, which he treats with proper contempt. Vid. Arrian, p. 143.

<sup>27</sup> Arrian, who excuses Alexander's adopting the Persian manners, repeatedly blames him for imitating the Barbarian punishments.



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Peucestas re-  
warded.

people, he was expelled from Attica, and this traitor to the most generous of princes seems himself to have been soon afterwards treacherously slain<sup>25</sup>. The brave Peucestas, who had saved Alexander's life at the assault of the Mallian fortrefs, was promoted to the government of Persia. In this important command, he proved his wisdom to be equal to his valour. By conforming to the customs, adopting the manners, and using the language of the vanquished, he acquired the affectionate respect of the people committed to his care. His pliant condescension, directed by sound policy, was highly approved by the discernment of Alexander; but his affectation of foreign manners greatly offended the pride of his Macedonian countrymen.

Alexander  
improves the  
internal state  
of his con-  
quests.  
Olymp.  
cxiii. 4.  
A. C. 325.

In the central provinces of his empire, which from time immemorial had been the seat of Asiatic pomp and luxury, Alexander spent the last, and not the least glorious, year of his reign. In the nervous language of antiquity, the world was silent in his presence; and his only remaining care was to improve and consolidate his conquests. For these important purposes, he carefully examined the course of the Eulæus, the Tigris, and the Euphrates; and the indefatigable industry of his troops was judiciously employed in removing the weirs, or dams, by which the timid ignorance of the Assyrian and Persian kings had obstructed the navigation of those great rivers. But Alexander, having no reason to dread fleets of war, wished to invite those of commerce. The harbours were repaired; arsenals were constructed;

<sup>25</sup> Comp. Curtius, l. x. c. ii. Plut. in Demosthen. Diodor. l. xviii. p. 19. Strabo, l. xvii. p. 576. But all these writers omit the first crime of Harpalus, mentioned by Arrian, the pardon of which does great honour to the clemency of Alexander. Harpalus, even in the life-time of Philip, had gained the friendship of his illustrious son, who, soon after mounting the throne, employed him as his treasurer. But, before the battle of Issus, this unworthy minister be-

trayed his trust, and fled to Megara. Alexander, unwilling hastily to condemn an old friend, who had for his sake incurred the resentment of Philip, ascribed the misconduct of Harpalus to the bad counsels of Tauriscus, a daring villain, who had accompanied his flight. After the death of Tauriscus, he prevailed on Harpalus again to return to his service, and again entrusted him with the custody of his treasures. Arrian, l. iii. c. vi.

a bafon was formed at Babylon fufficient to contain a thoufand galleys. By thefe and fimilar improvements, he expected to facilitate internal intercourfe among his central provinces, while, by opening new channels of communication, he hoped to unite the wealthy countries of Egypt and the Eaft, with the moft remote regions of the earth. His fhips were fent to explore the Perfian and Arabian gulphs. Archias brought him fuch accounts of the former, that he determined to plant its fhores with Grecian colonies. Hieron of Soli proceeded fartheft in examining the Arabian coaft; but he found it impoffible to double the fouthern extremity of that immense peninsula, and ftill more to remount (as he had been commanded by Alexander) to the city Hieropolis, in Egypt. This daring enterprife feemed to be referved for the king in perfon. It is certain, that, fhortly before his death, he took meafures for examining this great fouthern gulph, as well as for difcovering the fhores of the Cafpian Sea, which was then believed to communicate with the Northern Ocean<sup>29</sup>.

Sends veffels to explore the Perfian and Arabian gulphs.

But objects, lefs remote, demanded his more immediate attention. In the winter feafon, the waters of the Euphrates, which produce the extraordinary fertility of Affyria<sup>30</sup>, are confined within their lofty channel. But in fpring and fummer, and efpecially towards the fummer folftice, they overflow their banks, and, inftead of watering, would totally deluge the adjacent territory, unlefs the fuperfluous fluid were difcharged into the great canal of Pallacopas. This artificial river, formed, it is faid, by Nebuchadnezzar, commences an hundred miles below Babylon. It is not fed by fprings, nor replenifhed from mountain fnows, but branching from the great trunk of the Euphrates, moderates its too impetuous ftream, by diverting it into the fea, through lakes and marfhes, by various, and, for the moft

Refrains the inundations of the Euphrates.

<sup>29</sup> Arrian, l. vii. p. 158.

it is faid, three hundred fold." Strabo,

<sup>30</sup> "This country," according to Strabo, p. 1077.

"is more fertile than any other; producing,

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part, invisible outlets. But this useful contrivance finally defeated its own purpose. The Pallacopas gradually sunk into its soft and oozy bed, and the Euphrates, which even originally was much higher than this canal, continued to flow into the new channel, even after the season when its waters cease to rise by the melting of the Armenian snows. This diminution of the river rendered it insufficient to water the fields of Assyria; an inconvenience severely felt in a country almost unacquainted with rain. The governors of Babylon attempted unsuccessfully to remedy the evil, whose magnitude justly excited the attention of Alexander. From war, the mother of arts, he had learned to improve the benefits of peace. While preparations were making for more distant expeditions, he sailed down the Euphrates; carefully examined the nature of the soil; and having discovered, at the distance of about four miles from the inosculation of the Euphrates and Pallacopas, a hard and rocky bottom, he commanded a canal to be cut there, which served to moderate the inundations at one season, without too much draining the waters at another. Having performed this essential service to Assyria, he followed the course of the Pallacopas, and surveyed the lakes and marshes, which guard the Arabian frontiers. In the neighbourhood of his new canal, he observed a convenient situation for a city, which, being built and fortified, was peopled with those superannuated Greeks, who seemed no longer capable of military service, and with such others of their countrymen as thought proper to settle in this fertile, though remote country<sup>30</sup>.

Builds a city  
near the ca-  
nal of Palla-  
copas.

Incorporates  
the Barba-  
rian levies  
with the  
Greeks and  
Macedo-  
nians.

Animated by a zeal for public happiness, Alexander thus traversed the populous provinces of the East, and successively visited the imperial cities of Persepolis, Susa, Ecbatana, and Babylon. These places, and others of inferior note, were adorned with signal marks of his taste, and respectively distinguished by transactions which discover the boldest, yet most enlightened views of policy. The important design of uniting, by laws and manners, the subjects of his

<sup>30</sup> Arrian, ubi supra.

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extensive monarchy, was ever present to his mind. For this purpose, he took care to incorporate in his Barbarian armies the Greeks and Macedonians. In each company, or rather in each division of sixteen, he joined four Europeans to twelve Asiatics. In the Macedonian squadrons and battalions, he intermixed, on the other hand, such of the Barbarians as were most distinguished by their strength, their activity, and their merit. Soon after the battle of Arbela, he had given orders to raise new levies in the conquered provinces. The Barbarian youth delighted in the Grecian exercise and discipline, and rejoiced at being associated to the glory of their victors. On the banks of the Tigris, Alexander was joined by a powerful body of those recruits, whose improvements in arts and arms fully answered his expectations, and justly rewarded his foresight. The arrival of such numerous auxiliaries enabled him to discharge at Opis, a city on the Tigris, such Greeks and Macedonians as were tired of the service, worn out with age, or enfeebled by sickness. After an interesting scene, which we shall have occasion to describe, he dismissed those respectable veterans, loaded with wealth and honours. They were conducted by Craterus, whom he appointed to succeed Antipater in the administration of his European dominions; and Antipater, who had long executed that important trust, with equal prudence and fidelity, was commanded to join his master with new levies from Greece, Thrace, and Macedon<sup>31</sup>.

At Susa, Alexander learned that his soldiers, indulging the extravagance too natural to their profession, had contracted immense debts, which they had neither ability nor inclination to pay. Upon this intelligence, he issued orders that each man should give an exact account of what he owed, with the names of his creditors, declaring, that he was determined to satisfy them at his own expence. The troops suspected an intention, merely to discover their characters, and to learn their œconomy or profusion. At first, therefore, many denied, and all diminished, their debts. But Alexander issued a se-

Pays the  
debts of his  
soldiers.

<sup>31</sup> Arrian, ubi supra.



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Intermarri-  
ages of the  
Europeans  
and Asiatics.

Alexander  
prepares to  
exhibit dra-  
matic enter-  
tainments at  
Ecbatana.  
Olymp.  
cxiv. 1.  
A. C. 324.

cond declaration, "That it became not a prince to deceive his people, nor a people to suppose their prince capable of deceit." Faithful lists were immediately presented, and the whole debts discharged, to the amount, it is said, of four millions sterling.

This event was accompanied by a transaction of a different kind, which discovers, however, the same spirit, and which equally endeared Alexander to his Asiatic subjects. In the royal palace of Susa, he publicly espoused Barsine<sup>21</sup>, the daughter of Darius; and bestowed her sister Drypetis on his friend Hephæstion, saying, that he wished their children to be kinsmen. By the advice of their master, Perdicas, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and other generals, intermarried with the most illustrious of the vanquished Barbarians. The soldiers were encouraged by presents, and by the hope of royal favour, to follow the example of their leaders; and it appeared from the catalogue of their names, presented to the king, that above ten thousand Greeks and Macedonians married Asiatic women<sup>22</sup>.

In all the cities, which he visited, he was careful to celebrate the musical and gymnastic games; those distinguishing fruits of Grecian culture, which being adapted to gratify the senses, as well as to please the fancy, were beheld with delight even by the most ignorant Barbarians. Convinced that nothing has a more direct tendency, to unite and harmonise the minds and manners of men, than public entertainments and common pleasures, Alexander determined to introduce and diffuse the amusements of the theatre. For this purpose above three thousand players and musicians, collected from

<sup>21</sup> Called Statira by Curtius, Justin, and Plutarch.

<sup>22</sup> Plutarch, seizing the true spirit of these regulations, exclaims, Ω δαῖμον Εὐρώπης, καὶ ἀσυχίας καὶ μακρὰ πάλιν τῶν ἰνδικῶν ποταμῶν ὡς γὰρ εἶπεν, ὅτις ἡμεῖς ἐκείνῃ Ἀσίᾳ Εὐρώπην συνάπτουσιν, ἢ ἕλκω, ὅτε σφύζαντο, ὅτε ἀδύρῃς καὶ ἀσυντάκτοις ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἡρώς τῆς πόλεως, καὶ γυναικὶς ἀνδρῶν, καὶ κενεῖσι παῖδιν, ὅτε πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς

τοῖς. "O! barbarous and foolish Xerxes, thou who labouredst in vain to throw a bridge over the Hellespont, it is thus that wife kings join Asia to Europe, not by boards, ships, lifeless and insensible bonds, but by lawful love, chaste nuptials, and the indissoluble tie of common progeny." Plut. Orat. i. de Fortun. Alexand. See likewise above, vol. i. c. ix. p. 303.

all parts of Greece, assembled in Ecbatana, the capital of Media, which was chosen for the scene of those theatrical exhibitions<sup>33</sup>. But the sickness, and death of Hephæstion, changed this magnificent spectacle, into melancholy obsequies. In the moment of his triumph, the king was deprived of his dearest friend<sup>34</sup>. This irreparable loss, he felt and expressed with an affectionate ardour congenial to his character, and justified his immediate sorrow by the inconsolable<sup>35</sup> grief of Achilles for the fate of his beloved Patroclus. During three days and nights after the death of Hephæstion, Alexander neither changed his apparel, nor tasted food. A public mourning was observed throughout the empire. Funeral games were celebrated in the great cities; the royal cohort was commanded thenceforward to retain the name and banner of Hephæstion<sup>36</sup>; and the lofty genius of Stasistrates erected at Ecbatana a monument worthy of *him*, whom the obsequious oracle of Ammon declared deserving of *heroic* worship. To appease the grief of Alexander, his lieutenants dedicated their armour at the tomb of his friend. The example was given by Eumenes, the king's secretary, who, shortly before Hephæstion's

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Death of  
Hephæstion.

His obse-  
quies and  
honours.

<sup>33</sup> It should seem from Plutarch, that the entertainments of the theatre were soon diffused through other parts of Asia. *Αλεξάνδρῳ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐξημερεύοντι, Ὅμηρος πρὸ ἀναγνώσματος, καὶ Περσῶν καὶ Συσσιανῶν καὶ Γεδροσίων παιδῶν τὰς Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σοφοκλέους τραγωδίας ᾔδει.* "Alexander, having tamed Asia, Homer was read in the East; the children of the Persians, Sufians, and Gedrosi, recited the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides." Plut. *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Next to Hephæstion, Craterus seems to have enjoyed the greatest share of Alexander's confidence; yet he often said, "Craterus loves the king, Hephæstion loves Alexander." Plutarch. in *Alexand.* In passing through the Troade, Alexander crowned the tomb of Achilles, and Hephæstion that of Patroclus. *Ælian*, Var. *Hist.* xii. 7.

<sup>35</sup> If, in the melancholy shades below,  
The flames of friends and lovers cease  
to glow, [cay'd,  
Yet mine shall sacred last; and, unde-  
Burn on through death, and animate  
my shade. Pope's *Iliad*.

<sup>36</sup> According to Plutarch, Stasistrates proposed to form Mount Athos into a statue of Alexander, grasping a city with one hand, and with the other discharging a river into the sea. Plut. in *Alexand.* Vitruvius, l. ii. in *Proem.* & Lucian, t. ii. p. 489, ascribe this design to Dinocrates. Alexander extolled the boldness of the artist, but added, *Εὰν δὲ μὲν τὸν Ἄθω κατὰ χάριν* ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἓως βασιλεὺς τοῦ βιζαντίου εἶναι μνημεῖον. "Let alone Mount Athos; it is enough that it is the monument of one king's folly already;" alluding to the event related above, vol. i. c. ix. p. 309.

death,

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death, had offended this illustrious favourite ; a man who long and uninterruptedly enjoyed, without abusing in any one instance, the confidence of his master ; who exercised power without pride, and enforced discipline without severity ; whose conduct merited at once public respect and royal favour, and whose virtues disarmed envy<sup>37</sup>.

Alexander  
reduces and  
chastises the  
Cossæans.

To moderate and divert his sorrow, Alexander, who in the practice of war found at once business and amusement, undertook an expedition in person, which perhaps would otherwise have been committed to the valour of his lieutenants. The Cossæans, a fierce and untractable nation, inhabited the southern frontier of Media. Secure amidst their rocks and fastnesses, they had ever defied the arms of the Persians ; and the degenerate successors of Cyrus had judged it more prudent to purchase their friendship than to repel their hostility. In their annual journey from Babylon to Ecbatana, the pride of these magnificent but pusillanimous princes condescended to bestow presents on the Cossæans, that they might procure an undisturbed passage for themselves and their train ; and this impolitic meanness only increased the audacity of the mountaineers, who often ravaged the Susian plains, and often retired to their fastnesses, loaded with the richest spoils of Media. Alexander was not of a temper patiently to endure the repetition of such indignities. In forty days, he attacked, defeated, and totally subdued this rapacious and warlike tribe. The Cossæans were driven from their last retreats, and compelled to surrender their territory. After obtaining sufficient pledges of their fidelity, the conqueror allowed them to ransom their prisoners, and at his departure from their country, took

Glory of  
Alexander.

<sup>37</sup> Arrian, p. 156, tells us, that concerning the funeral honours of Hephæstion, innumerable and absurd fictions were invented by the friends and by the enemies of Alexander ; nay, what is extraordinary, the same

falsehoods were sometimes authorized by both ; the former intending thereby to extol the warmth of his friendship, the latter to expose his extravagance and folly.

care to erect such fortresses as seemed necessary for bridling, in future, the dangerous fury of this headstrong people<sup>38</sup>.

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In returning from this successful expedition towards the banks of the Euphrates, Alexander was met by ambassadors from Carthage, Spain, and Italy, as well as from many inland countries of Asia and Africa, extending from Mount Imaus to the southern extremity of Æthiopia. It was then, says his historian, that he appeared master of the world, both to his followers, and to himself; and, as if the known parts of it had been insufficient to satisfy his ambition, he gave orders to cut timber in the Hyrcanian forest, with a design to build ships, and explore the undiscovered shores of the Caspian and Arabian seas. But neither these lofty designs, nor the glory of war, nor the pomp of royalty, which, of all princes, Alexander enjoyed in the greatest splendour<sup>39</sup>, could appease his grief for the loss of Hephæstion. The death of his beloved friend is said, by Arrian, to have hastened his own. It certainly tinged his character with a deep melancholy, which rendered him susceptible of such impressions as the firmness of his manly soul would otherwise have resisted and repelled.

His melan-  
choly.

<sup>38</sup> Such is the account of this expedition given by Arrian, l. vii. p. 157.; and confirmed by Strabo, l. xi. p. 795. and by Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 577. Plutarch, on the other hand, most unwarrantably and absurdly tells us, that Alexander, to divert his grief, took the amusement of *man-hunting*, and massacred the whole Cossæan nation, without distinction of age or sex. Plut. p. 94.

<sup>39</sup> Vid. Athen. l. x. p. 436. & l. xii. p. 537—541. We may believe that Alexander's tent contained an hundred couches; that the pillars which supported it were incrustured with gold; that he gave audience, surrounded with guards, and seated on a golden throne. In the language of antiquity, "the master of both continents" found it necessary to unite the pomp of the

East with the arts of Greece. But when Athenæus tells us of the precious essences, the fragrant wines, the effeminacy, and vices, of Alexander, we discover the credulous, or rather criminal sophist, who has collected into one work all the vices and impurities which disgraced his country and human nature. To the unwarranted assertions of the obscure writers cited by an Ælian (l. iv. c. iii.), and an Athenæus, we can oppose the authority of an Arrian and a Plutarch.—Could he who so severely censured the effeminate and luxurious life of Agnon and Philotas, be himself effeminate and luxurious? "Of all men," says Arrian, "Alexander was the most economical in what regarded his private pleasures," Arrian, l. vii. p. 167.



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Artifices to  
prevent his  
return to  
Babylon.

He, who had so often employed superstition as an instrument of policy, began himself to fall a prey to that miserable passion. The servants of princes, ever quick in discerning, and dexterous in turning to their own profit the foibles of their masters, soon discovered and abused the weakness of Alexander. Alarmed at the severe treatment of several of his colleagues, Apollodorus, a citizen of Amphipolis, who had been entrusted with the government of Babylon, practised with his brother Pythagoras, a diviner; and the latter, ambitious to promote the greatness of his family, pretended to perceive in the victims evident marks of divine displeasure against the king, should he enter the gates of Babylon. Notwithstanding this menace, Alexander, after reducing the Cossæans, approached towards that city with his army. He was met by a long train of Chaldæan priests, who conjured him to change his resolution, because they had received an oracle from Belus, declaring that his journey thither would prove fatal. The interest of the Chaldæans conspired with the views of Apollodorus. The temple of Belus, a stupendous edifice, situate in the heart of Babylon, had been very richly endowed by the Assyrian kings. But the produce of the consecrated ground, instead of being applied to its original destination of repairing the temple, and offering sacrifices to the Gods, had, ever since the impious reign of Xerxes, been appropriated by the Chaldæan priests. Alexander, it was well known, intended to reform this abuse; and, although his mind was not altogether unmoved by the admonition of the priests, he discerned their interested motives, and answered them by a verse of Euripides, "He's the best prophet that conjectures best." Foiled in their first attempt, the Chaldæans had recourse to another artifice. Since the king had determined at every hazard to visit Babylon, they entreated him at least not to enter it on the eastern side, but to fetch a compass round, and to march with his face towards the rising sun. He prepared to comply with this advice; but the marshiness  
of

of the soil rendered his design impracticable; and he was thus reluctantly compelled to enter the city by the forbidden road.

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During his short stay at Babylon, his mind was disturbed by superstitious fears<sup>40</sup>, awakened by the intrigues of Apollodorus, or the artifices of the Chaldeans, and confirmed by a circumstance well fitted to operate on a disordered fancy. In his Indian expedition, he had conversed with the Gymnosophists, or Brachmans, men who *practised* the philosophy which Plato *taught*, and whose contempt for the pomp, and pleasures, of the present life, was founded on the firm belief of a better, and more permanent state of existence. To those sages, the fortunate ambition of Alexander appeared an object of derision or pity. At sight of the conqueror, they stamped their feet with vehemence on the ground; indicating, by an expressive action, more eloquent than words, that he, whose name now filled the world, must soon be confined within the narrow grave. The flatterers of the king rebuked them for insulting the son of Jupiter, who had the power to reward or punish them. They replied, by saying, "that all were the sons of Jupiter; that the rewards of Alexander they disdained, and set at defiance his punishments, which at last could only relieve them from the load of frail mortality." Yet Calanus, one of their number, allured by curiosity, or irresistibly captivated by the soothing condescension of the king, agreed to accompany him; for which inconstancy he was much blamed by his companions. Alexander treated this eastern sage with great respect, and when Calanus, who had passed his seventy-second year without experiencing any bodily infirmity, fell sick in Persia, the affectionate prince earnestly entreated him not to anticipate fate by a voluntary death. But finding him inflexibly bent on this purpose, he allowed a pyre to be constructed, to which the Indian (being too feeble to walk or ride on

His short stay  
in that city  
disturbed by  
superstitious  
fears.

Tenets of the  
Indian  
Brachmans.

Prophecy  
and death  
of Calanus.

<sup>40</sup> He became, says Plutarch, δυσίππις; πρὸς τὸ θάνατον.

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horseback) was conveyed in a litter. In sight of the Macedonian army, who had been ordered to assist at this uncommon solemnity, Calanus composed himself decently on the pyre; the music struck up; the soldiers raised a shout of war; and the Indian, with a serene countenance, expired amidst the flames, singing a hymn to the Gods of his country.

The curiosity of Alexander was unbounded; but his humanity likewise was great. This principle, which is too often a stranger to the breast of conquerors, made him decline witnessing the extraordinary death of a friend, who, for his sake, had abandoned his native land. But before Calanus was carried to the funeral pile, the king affectionately paid him the last visit. Calanus having embraced all present, refused to take leave of Alexander, saying, that "he should again see him in Babylon." The words of a dying man were considered by the Greeks as prophetic. Those of Calanus sunk deep into the mind of Alexander; and the painful impression which they made, hastened his departure from a city, in which so many concurring circumstances forbade him to reside.

Death of  
Alexander at  
Babylon.  
Olymp.  
cxiv. 1.  
A. C. 324.  
May 28th.

His superstitious terrors, however, seem to have been diverted by the voyage down the Euphrates, and by directing the improvements in the canal of Pallacopas. Having resumed his courage, he ventured to return to Babylon, gave audience to some Grecian ambassadors, who presented him with golden crowns from the submissive flattery of their several republics; and having reviewed his troops and galleys, prepared to execute the enterprises which he had so long meditated. But his designs and his life were now drawing to a close. Whether to conquer his melancholy, or to triumph in the victory which he had already gained over it, he indulged, without moderation, in that banqueting and festivity to which, after the fatigues of war, he had often shewn himself too much addicted; and a fever, occasioned, or at least increased, by an excessive abuse of wine, the vice of his nation and of his family, put  
a period

a period to his life in the thirty-third year of his age, and in the thirteenth of his reign. After the first days of the disorder, he had been conveyed to the cool verdure of a beautiful garden; but the malady increasing, he was soon brought back to the palace. The last remains of strength, he spent in assisting at daily sacrifices to the Gods. During his illness he spoke but little, and that only concerning his intended expeditions. The temples were crowded by his friends; the generals waited in the hall, the soldiers surrounded the gates. Such was the grief of many, and the respectful admiration of all, that none ventured to announce to him his approaching dissolution, none ventured to demand his last orders. When all hopes of recovery had vanished, his favourite troops were admitted to behold him. He was speechless, but had still strength to stretch forth his hand<sup>41</sup>.

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Such was the reign of Alexander, whose character, being unexampled and inimitable, can only be explained by relating his actions. He was of a low stature, and somewhat deformed; but the activity and elevation of his mind animated and ennobled his frame. By a life of continual labour, and by an early and habitual practice of the gymnastic exercises, he had hardened his body against the impressions of cold and heat, hunger and thirst<sup>42</sup>, and prepared his robust constitution for bearing such exertions of strength and activity, as have appeared incredible to the undisciplined softness of modern times. In generosity and in prowess, he rivalled the greatest heroes of antiquity; and in the race of glory, having finally outstripped all competitors, became ambitious to surpass himself. His superior skill in war gave uninterrupted success to his arms;

His character.

<sup>41</sup> Arrian says, that many reports were spread concerning the death of Alexander, such as, that he had been poisoned by the emissaries of Antipater, whom, as mentioned above in the text, he had recently deprived of the government of Greece and Macedon; that when asked to whom he bequeathed the empire, he had answered, to the "strong-

est;" and that he had foretold his obsequies would be celebrated by bloody wars among his lieutenants. But these rumours receive not the least countenance from the royal diary, which seems to have been carefully copied by Arrian, nor from the histories of Ptolemy and Arrian.

<sup>42</sup> Plut. Orat. i. & ii. de Fortun. Alexand.



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and his natural humanity, enlightened by the philosophy of Greece, taught him to improve his conquests to the best interests of mankind<sup>43</sup>. In his extensive dominions, he built, or founded, not less than seventy cities<sup>44</sup>, the situation of which being chosen with consummate wisdom, tended to facilitate communication, to promote commerce, and to diffuse civility through the greatest nations of the earth<sup>45</sup>. It may be suspected, indeed, that he mistook the extent of human power, when, in the course of one reign, he undertook to change the face of the world; and that he miscalculated the stubbornness of ignorance, and the force of habit, when he attempted to enlighten barbarism, to soften servitude, and to transplant the improvements of Greece into an African and Asiatic soil, where they have never been seen to flourish. Yet let not the designs of Alexander be too hastily accused of extravagance. Whoever seriously considers, what he actually performed before his thirty-third year, will be cautious of determining what he might have accomplished, had he reached the ordinary term of human life. His resources were peculiar to himself; and such views, as well as actions, became him, as would have become none besides. In the language of a philosophical historian, "he seems to have been given to the world by a peculiar dispensation of Providence, being a man like to none other of the human kind<sup>46</sup>."

<sup>43</sup> Plutarch says, the nations conquered by Alexander might adopt the language of Themistocles, when, in consequence of his banishment from Greece, he was raised to great wealth and honour in Asia. "Ὁ παῖς ἀπαρχαίει, ἢ μὴ ἀπαρχαίει." "O my children! we should have been undone, had we not been undone." In the same manner, those nations, had they not been vanquished by Alexander, had not been civilised, Egypt would not boast her Alexandria, Mesopotamia her Seleucia, &c. And again, "Alexander taught marriage to the Hyrcanians, and agriculture to the Arachosii. He taught the Sogdians to maintain, and not to kill their parents; the Persians to respect, and

not to marry, their mothers; the Scythians to bury, and not to eat, their dead." Plut. *ibid*.

<sup>44</sup> Vid. Plut. de Fortun. Alexand. tit. ii. p. 327. In the language of Plutarch, he *sowed Asia with Greek cities*.

<sup>45</sup> Plut. *ibid*. Diodor. Sicul. xvii. 83. Stephan. Byzant. in voc. Αλεξανδρεία.

<sup>46</sup> Οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἐξω τῆ ὕλης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπων ἑκάστος. Arrian, p. 168. How far he was an instrument in the hands of Divine Providence, belongs not to the subject of prophane history to enquire. On this subject, the reader may see Bishop Lowth on Isaiah, xix. 18. and xxiv. 14.

From the part which his father Philip and himself acted in the affairs of Greece, his history has been transmitted through the impure channels of exaggerated flattery, or malignant envy. The innumerable fictions, which disgrace the works of his biographers, are contradicted by the most authentic accounts of his reign, and inconsistent with those public transactions, which concurring authorities confirm. In the present work, it seemed unnecessary to expatiate on such topics, since it is less the business of history to repeat, or even to expose errors, than to select and impress useful truths. An author, ambitious of attaining that purpose, can seldom indulge the language of general panegyric. He will acknowledge, that Alexander's actions were not always blameless; but, after the most careful examination, he will affirm, that his faults were few in number, and resulted from his situation rather than from his character.

From the first years of his reign, he experienced the crimes of disaffection and treachery, which multiplied, and became more dangerous, with the extent of his dominions, and the difficulty to govern them. Several of his lieutenants early aspired at independence; others formed conspiracies against the life of their master. The first criminals were treated, as we have already seen, with a lenity becoming the generous spirit of Alexander. But when Philotas, the son of Parmenio, and even Parmenio <sup>47</sup> himself, afforded reason to suspect their fidelity; when the Macedonian youths, who, according to the institution of Philip, guarded the royal pavilion, prepared to

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The faults or crimes of which he is accused,

resulted from his situation rather than from his character.

Olymp.  
cxii. 4.  
A. C. 329.

<sup>47</sup> Philotas was punished in the country of the Arii; Parmenio was put to death in Media. Curtius (l. vi. c. vii. & seqq.), who has given the fullest account of these executions, says, that Philotas deserved not the compassion of his friends: "Amicorum misericordiam non meruit." He leaves it uncertain whether Parmenio fell a sacrifice to his own treason, or to the policy of Alexander.

Arrian thinks, that the death of Parmenio was necessary to his master's safety.—Although the evidence of this general's guilt has not been handed down to posterity, Alexander, it is certain, believed him guilty. He who disdained to conquer his enemies by deceit, cannot, without proof, be supposed capable of treacherously assassinating his friends.

murder

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murder their sovereign<sup>48</sup>, he found it necessary to depart from his lenient system, and to hold with a firmer hand the reins of government. Elated by unexampled prosperity, and the submissive reverence of vanquished nations, his loftiness disgusted the pride of his European troops, particularly the Macedonian nobles, who had been accustomed to regard themselves rather as his companions, than subjects. The pretensions which sound policy taught him to form and to maintain, of being treated with those external honours ever claimed by the monarchs of the East, highly offended the religious prejudices of the Greeks, who deemed it impious to prostrate the body, or bend the knee, to any mortal sovereign. Yet

<sup>48</sup> This conspiracy is related by Arrian, l. iv. c. xiii. and xiv. The scene was Bactra, or Zariaspa, the capital of Bactria. At a hunting-match, the king, being ready to kill a boar, was anticipated by Hermolaus. To punish the insolence of the youth, Alexander ordered him to be whipped. The disgrace seemed intolerable to Hermolaus and his companions; a conspiracy was formed to destroy Alexander in his sleep. It was discovered by Ptolemy, the son of Lagus. The youths confessed their guilt, and declared that they had been confirmed in their purpose by Callisthenes, the scholar of Aristotle, an arrogant and morose man, who, sheltered by the cloak of philosophy, insolently brow-beat the prince, whom he was bound to respect (Arrian, p. 871.) The conspirators were stoned to death; a punishment common in that age, when persons accused were tried before numerous assemblies, whose indignation frequently burst forth, and destroyed atrocious offenders on the spot, with the first instruments of death that chance offered to their hands. Callisthenes was dragged round the army in chains. Such is the best authenticated account of this affair, concerning which the variations of ancient writers are innumerable. Vid. Arrian, l. iv. c. xiv. Curtius, l. viii. c. viii. Seneca Suasor. i.

Justin, l. xv. c. iii. Philostratus, l. viii. c. i. Diodor. Sicul. pp. 356, & 358. Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. Suidas, ad voc. As an example of the injustice done the character of Alexander, I shall insert the passage of Seneca. "Hoc est Alexandri crimen æternum, quod nulla virtus, nulla bellorum felicitas redimet. Nam quoties quis dixerit, Occidit Persarum multa millia; opponitur, et Callisthenem. Quoties dictum erit, omnia oceano tenuis vicit, ipsam quoque tentavit novis classibus, & imperium ex angulo Thraciæ usque ad orientis terminos protulit; dicetur, sed Callisthenem occidit." Yet this Callisthenes was a traitor, whose writings are mentioned with contempt by Arrian, loc. citat. Polybius, t. ii. pp. 64, 335. & t. iii. p. 45. Cicero ad Quint. Frat. l. ii. epist. xiii. & Longinus, c. iii. p. 14. The patriotism of the Greeks, and the envy of the Romans, could never forgive the transcendent glory of Alexander, which eclipsed their own. In speaking of Philip and his son, even Cicero (de Offic.) says, "Alter semper magnus, alter sæpe turpissimus." See likewise Livy, l. ix. c. xviii. The last mentioned writer (l. ix. c. xvii.) goes out of his way to allege very inconclusive arguments for believing, that had Alexander turned his arms against Italy, he would have certainly been conquered by the Romans.

had he remitted formalities consecrated by the practice of ages, he must insensibly have lost the respect of his Asiatic subjects. With a view to reconcile the discordant principles of the victors and vanquished, he affected an immediate descent from Jupiter Ammon, a claim liberally admitted by the avarice or fears of the Libyan priests, and which, he had reason to expect, could not be very obstinately denied by the credulity of the Greeks and Macedonians, who universally acknowledged that Philip, his reputed father, was remotely descended from the Grecian Jupiter. But the success of this design, which might have entitled him, as son of Jupiter, to the same obedience from the Greeks, which the Barbarians readily paid him as monarch of the East, was counteracted, at first by the secret displeasure, and afterwards by the open indignation, of several of his generals and courtiers. Nor did the conduct of Alexander tend to extricate him from this difficulty. With his friends, he maintained that equal intercourse of visits and entertainments, which characterised the Macedonian manners; indulged the liberal flow of unguarded conversation; and often exceeded that intemperance in wine, which disgraced his age and country.

On such occasions his guests, or entertainers, enjoyed and abused the indecent familiarity to which they had been accustomed with their kings; but which the temper of Alexander, corrupted by prosperity and flattery, was no longer able to endure. A scene of drunken debauchery, which must appear highly disgusting to the propriety of modern manners, proved fatal to Clitus, who, emboldened by wine, daringly insulted his prince, vilified his noblest actions, and derided his pretensions to divinity. The king, being likewise intoxicated, was no longer master of himself, when Clitus, who had been once carried from his presence, returned a second time to the charge, and behaved more insolently than before. In an unhappy moment, Alexander thrust a spear into the breast of his

VOL. II. 4 R friend;

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Murder of  
Clitus.  
Olymp.  
cxliii. 1.  
A. C. 328.



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friend<sup>49</sup>; but instantly repenting his fury, would have destroyed himself by the same weapon, had he not been prevented by his attendants. The bitterness of his repentance, and the pungency of his remorse, which neither flattery could soften, nor sophistry appease<sup>50</sup>, rendered his life burdensome, and his actions inconsistent. At times, he assumed the Persian dress and ornaments; displayed the pomp of oriental despotism; employed, and often preferred the Barbarians; and, in several passages of his reign, this successful, but unhappy, conqueror appears to have been beset with flatterers, surrounded by conspirators, adored by the passive submission of his eastern subjects, and insulted by the licentious petulance of the Greeks and Macedonians.

Difficulties of  
Alexand. r's  
situation, and  
the magna-  
nimity by  
which he  
overcame  
them.

The indignation or jealousy of the latter, tinged the fairest of his actions with dark and odious colours. About a year before his death, a scene was transacted at Opis on the Tigris, which shews the difficulties of his situation, and the magnanimity by which he overcame them. Having assembled the Macedonian troops, he declared to them his pleasure, that such as felt themselves unable, through age or infirmities, to undergo the fatigues of war, should be honourably discharged from the service, and safely conducted to their respective provinces. This proposal, which ought to have been accepted with gratitude, was heard with disgust. The soldiers reflected, that the army had recently increased by an accession of thirty

<sup>49</sup> Montesquieu, who (Voltaire only excepted) is the most distinguished modern apologist of Alexander, says, " Il fit deux mauvaises actions; il brula Persepolis & tua Clitus. (*Esprit des Loix*, l. x. c. xiv.) The story of the burning of Persepolis we have already related. The death of Clitus, Aristobulus, cited by Arrian, ascribes entirely to the insolence and folly of Clitus himself, and totally exculpates Alexander. But Arrian observes, like a philosopher, that Alexander was justly blameable in allowing himself to

be overcome by drunkenness and anger. Arrian, p. 84.

<sup>50</sup> Agis, an Argive poet, and Anaxarchus the Sophist, endeavoured to cure his melancholy. The latter told him, that Justice was described by the ancients as seated near the throne of Jupiter, to indicate that right and wrong depended on the will of kings, all whose actions ought to be held just by themselves and others. This flagitious servility Arrian spurns with indignation, and brands with infamy. Arrian, p. 84.

thousand Barbarians, armed and accoutred after the European fashion, trained to the Grecian discipline and exercises, and instructed in the arts and language of the victors. The king, they thought, no longer cared for the service of his veterans, and therefore dismissed them with contempt. The spirit of sedition seized the camp; the Macedonians unanimously demanded their discharge; some adding with scoffs, "That he had no farther use for *them*; his father Ammon could fight his battles." At these words, the king sprung from the rostrum on which he stood, and commanded the most audacious to be seized by his Targeteers, and conducted to immediate execution. This prompt severity appeased the rising tumult. The soldiers remained motionless and silent, doubtful or terrified. Alexander again mounted the rostrum, and spoke as follows: "It is not my design, Macedonians, to change your resolution. Return home, without hindrance from me. But, before leaving the camp, first learn to know your king and yourselves. My father Philip (for with him it is ever fit to begin), found you, at his arrival in Macedon, miserable and hopeless fugitives; covered with skins of sheep; feeding among the mountains some wretched herds, which you had neither strength nor courage to defend against the Thracians, Illyrians, and Treballi. Having repelled the ravagers of your country, he brought you from the mountains to the plain, and taught you to confide, not in your fastnesses, but in your valour. By his wisdom and discipline, he trained you to arts and civility, enriched you with mines of gold, instructed you in navigation and commerce, and rendered you a terror to those nations, at whose names you used to tremble. Need I mention his conquests in Upper Thrace, or those still more valuable in the maritime provinces of that country? Having opened the gates of Greece, he chastised the Phocians, reduced the Thessalians, and, while I shared the command, defeated and humbled the Athenians and Thebans, eternal foes to Macedon, to whom you had been successively tributaries, subjects, and slaves. But my

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His own account of the reign of Philip and himself.

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father rendered you their masters; and having entered the Peloponnesus, and regulated at discretion the affairs of that peninsula, he was appointed, by universal consent, general of combined Greece; an appointment not more honourable to himself, than glorious for his country. At my accession to the throne, I found a debt of five hundred talents, and scarce sixty in the treasury. I contracted a fresh debt of eight hundred; and conducting you from Macedon, whose boundaries seemed unworthy to confine you, safely crossed the Hellespont, though the Persians still commanded the sea. By one victory we gained Ionia, Æolia, both Phrygias, and Lydia. By our courage and activity, the provinces of Cilicia and Syria, the strength of Palestine, the antiquity of Egypt, and the renown of Persia, were added to your empire. Your's now are Bactria and Aria, the productions of India, the fertility of Assyria, the wealth of Susa, and the wonders of Babylon. You are generals, princes, satraps. What have I reserved for myself, but this purple and diadem, which mark my pre-eminence in toil and danger! Where are my private treasures? Or why should I collect them? Are my pleasures expensive? You know that I fare worse than many of yourselves; and have in nothing spared my person. Let him, who dares, compare with me. Let him bare his breast, and I will bare mine. My body, the fore part of my body, is covered with honourable wounds from every sort of weapon. I often watch, that you may enjoy repose; and to testify my unremitting attention to your happiness, had determined to send home the aged and infirm among you, loaded with wealth and honour. But since you are all desirous to leave me, Go! Report to your countrymen, that, unmindful of the signal bounty of your king, you entrusted him to the vanquished Barbarians. The report, doubtless, will bespeak your gratitude and piety<sup>51</sup>."

<sup>51</sup> It appears from Arrian, that Alexander speaks of these, as distinct from the military fund, and other revenues, employed in paying and rewarding his troops, and in executing

such public designs as seemed conducive to the prosperity of the empire.

<sup>52</sup> Arrian, p. 152, & seqq.

Having

Having thus spoken, he sprang from the rostrum, and hastened to the palace, accompanied only by his guards. During two days, none were admitted to his presence. On the third, he called the Persian nobles of distinction, and distributed among them the principal departments of military command. He then issued orders, that certain bodies of the Barbarian infantry and cavalry should be called the royal battalion; and royal cohort, and by such other names as commanded greatest respect. Apprized of these innovations, the Macedonians who had long remained in confusion before the tribunal, afraid to follow Alexander, and afraid to allow his retiring unattended, flocked around the palace, and deposited their arms at the gate, humbly requesting to see their king, and declaring that they would never stir from the place, till their tears had moved his compassion. Alexander came forth, beheld their abasement, and wept. The affecting silence, marked by alternate emotions of repentance and reconciliation, was at length broke by Callines, a man highly esteemed in the cavalry: "Thy Macedonians, O king! are grieved that the Persians alone should be called thy kindred, and entitled as such to embrace thee, while none of themselves are allowed to taste that honour<sup>53</sup>." Alexander replied, "From this moment you are all my kindred." Callines then stepped forward and embraced him; and several others having followed the example, they all took up their arms, and returned to the camp with shouts of joy, and songs.

Of all men (if we believe the concurring testimony of his historians) Alexander was the most mindful of his duty to the gods. To thank heaven for the happy issue of this transaction, he celebrated a solemn sacrifice, and, after the sacrifice, an entertainment for the principal of his European and Asiatic subjects. The Macedonians were next to his person; the Persians next the Macedonians; the

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Affecting  
scene at Opis  
on the Ti-  
gris.  
Olymp.  
cxliii. 4.  
A. C. 325.

A festival ce-  
lebrated in  
common by  
the Macedo-  
nians and  
Persians.

<sup>53</sup> Arrian says, "While none of them-  
selves ever tasted that honour." Μακιδωνων  
ἐπεω της γρηγορας ταυτης της τιμης. Arrian,  
p. 154.



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Grecian priests and Persian magi joined in common libations, invoking perpetual concord, and eternal union of empire, to the Macedonians and Persians. Soon afterwards, the invalids, whose dismissal had produced the mutiny, gladly returned home. Alexander discharged their arrears, allowed them full pay until their arrival in Macedon, and granted each soldier a gratuity of two hundred pounds sterling. He again shed tears at parting with upwards of ten thousand men, who had served him in so many glorious campaigns; and, as a testimony of his affectionate concern for their safety, appointed Craterus, whom he loved as his own life<sup>54</sup>, to be their conductor.

Division of  
Alexander's  
conquests.

Such was the life of this extraordinary man, whose genius might have changed and improved the state of the ancient world. But the spirit of improvement is transient, and demands perpetual efforts: the sources of degeneracy are permanent and innumerable. It seems at first sight to be regretted, that by neglecting to provide for the succession to his throne, he left the field open for those bloody wars among his captains, which long desolated the earth. Yet the difficulties, with which he was himself obliged to struggle, might teach him the impossibility of securing the empire for the infancy of his son Hercules, or the weakness of his brother Aridaeus. The principles of royal succession were never accurately ascertained in Macedon; and the camp of a conqueror could not be expected to prove a good school of moderation or justice. The first measure adopted by his generals was, to set aside the natural claim of Hercules, born of the daughter of Darius, and to appoint Aridaeus, together with the fruit of Roxana's pregnancy, if she brought forth a son, to be joint heirs of the monarchy. This whimsical destination announced little union or stability. Perdicas, in virtue of possessing the ring or seal of his deceased master, assumed the regency: the troops and provinces were divided among Antigonus,

<sup>54</sup> Arrian, p. 155.

Ptolemy, Craterus, and other chiefs, who, having been formerly the equals, disdained to remain the inferiors, of Perdicas. Each general trusted in his sword for an independent establishment; new troops were raised and disciplined; leagues formed and broken; the children and relations of Alexander, who became successively prisoners in different hands, all perished miserably; nor was there any cessation of crimes and calamities<sup>55</sup>, or any permanent settlement of the provinces, until the battle of Issus in Phrygia confirmed Ptolemy in the possession of Egypt, and Seleucus in that of Upper Asia<sup>56</sup>. The issue of the same battle gave Macedon and Greece to Cassander, and Thrace, with several provinces of Lower Asia, to Lyfmachus.

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A. C. 301.

The great kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, which continued thenceforward, till subdued by the Romans, to be governed by the respective families of Seleucus and Ptolemy, never generally<sup>57</sup> adopted the language or manners of their Grecian sovereigns. In Egypt, the first successors of Alexander accomplished the commercial improvements planned by that prince; and the kings both of Egypt and of Syria affected, in their magnificent courts, to join the arts and elegance of Greece to the pomp and luxury of the East. But their ostentation was greater than their taste; their liberal characters were effaced by the continual contact of servitude; they sunk

Subsequent  
history of  
Egypt and  
Syria.

<sup>55</sup> Diodor. Sicul. l. xix, & xx. passim.

<sup>56</sup> Arrian, pp. 160 & 164.

<sup>57</sup> Yet among the higher ranks of men, the Greek language continually gained ground. Before the Christian era, it was spoken by Jews, Romans, and Africans. It was the language of the learned and polite in Egypt and Syria, as well as in Italy and Carthage. It must have been understood by all ranks of men in Judæa, since the inspired writers employed it in propagating the gospel, which was to be first preached to the Jews. For this universality, the Greek seems to have been indebted, 1. To the innumerable

Greek colonies in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 2. To the conquests of Alexander, whose armies and garrisons were continually reinforced from Greece. 3. To the sociable and agreeable character of the Greeks. 4. To the excellence of the language itself (see above, chapters v. and vi.), whose duration is as wonderful as its extent. The Greek was spoken in the middle of the fifteenth century, when Constantinople was taken by the Turks; so that, from the time of Homer, it subsisted with little variation, as a living tongue, for two thousand and four hundred years.

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into the softness and insignificance of hereditary despots, whose reigns are neither busy nor instructive; nor could the intrigues of women and eunuchs, or ministers equally effeminate, form a subject sufficiently interesting to succeed the memorable transactions of the Grecian republics.

The western  
division of  
Alexander's  
empire con-  
quered by  
the Romans.

In the history of those kingdoms, the most important event is their conquest by the Romans, who gradually seized all the western spoils of the empire of Alexander, comprehended between the Euphrates and the Hadriatic sea, and successively reduced them into the form of provinces. Greece, which came to be distinguished by the name of Achaia, imparted its literature, its arts<sup>58</sup>, and its vices, to Italy. The conquest of Macedon freed Rome from the weight of taxes. The acquisition of Syria doubled the revenues of that republic. The subjugation of Egypt doubled the price of commodities in Italy. Yet whatever might be the wealth<sup>59</sup> of those nations, they are entitled to little regard from posterity, since, from the death of Alexander, they were not distinguished by any invention that either improved the practice of war, or increased the enjoyments of peace.

State of  
Greece after  
the age of  
Alexander.

The feeble mixture of Grecian colonization diffused through the East, was sufficient, indeed, to tinge, but too inconsiderable to alter and assimilate, the vast mass of barbarism. But as the principle of degeneracy is often stronger than that of improvement, the sloth and servility of Asia gradually crept into Greece. That unfortunate country, drained of its most enterprising inhabitants, who either

<sup>58</sup> Notwithstanding the degeneracy of the Greeks under the Macedonian and Roman governments, their country, and particularly Athens, was long regarded as the principal seat of arts and philosophy. But the Greek artists, as well as poets, orators, historians, and philosophers, of later times, were mere imitators, who fell infinitely short of the merit and fame of the great originals. The works of Phidias and Apelles, of Sophocles,

Demosthenes, Plato, &c. not those of the Greeks their own contemporaries, were the objects of admiration to Cicero and Seneca, to the writers of the Augustan age, to Pliny, Tacitus, &c. But of this more in the next chapter.

<sup>59</sup> Of which see an account extracted from the public registers, in Appian. Alexand. in Proem.

followed

followed the standard, or opposed the arms, of Alexander, was equally insulted by the severity and the indulgence of his successors, since, in either case, the Greeks felt and acknowledged their dependence. Reluctantly compelled to submit to a master, they lost that elevation of character, and that enthusiasm of valour, which had been produced by freedom, nourished by victory, and confirmed by the just sense of national pre-eminence. Their domestic dissensions, by carrying them in great numbers into the service of foreign princes, thereby diffused the knowledge of their tactics and discipline through countries far more extensive and populous than their own; and amidst all their personal animosities, the captains of Alexander uniformly embracing the maxims of despotism, which their master magnanimously disdained, firmly and unitedly resisted and crushed the rising rebellions of the Greeks, whose feeble and ill-conducted efforts for regaining their liberty, only plunged them deeper into servitude. Destitute of immediate and important objects to rouse their activity, the example of their ancestors at length ceased to animate and inspire them. The rewards of merit being withdrawn, men no longer aspired at excellence. The spirit of patriotism evaporated; the fire of genius was extinguished; exertion perished with hope; and, exclusively of the Achæan League<sup>60</sup>, the unfortunate issue of which has been already explained in this work<sup>61</sup>, Greece, from the age of Alexander, offers not any series of transactions highly memorable in the history of arts or arms.

<sup>60</sup> The judicious Polybius treats the Achæan league, and other collateral transactions of the Greeks and Macedonians, as episodes in his invaluable history of the pro-

gress and aggrandisement of the Roman republic.

<sup>61</sup> See vol. i. p. 388.



## C H A P. XL.

*State of Literature in the Age of Alexander—Poetry—Music—Arts of Design—Geography—Astronomy—Natural History—Works of Aristotle—Philosophical Sects established at Athens—Decline of Genius—Tenets of the different Sects—Peripatetic Philosophy—Estimate of that Philosophy—Its Fate in the World—Coincidence in the Opinions of Zeno and Epicurus—The Stoic Philosophy—Estimate of that Philosophy—The Epicurean Philosophy—Character of Epicurus—Philosophy of Pyrrho—Conclusion.*

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State of literature in the age of Alexander.

**I**N the latter years of Alexander, literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, displayed their brightest charms; yet the source of that health and vigour, from which their beauty flowed, had already begun to fail. The military expeditions of that illustrious conqueror were described, and published after his death, in the authentic and interesting narratives of Ptolemy and Aristobulus<sup>1</sup>, who had been the witnesses and companions of his victories. But his extraordinary exploits, and unexampled success, which far eclipsed the imaginary renown of the fabled heroes of antiquity, produced, even in his life-time, a crowd of writers, whose credulity, and love of the marvellous, could only be exceeded by their mean adulation, and servile superstition<sup>2</sup>. Exaggeration in matters of fact produced that swelling amplification of style, those meretricious ornaments, and af-

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, in Proöm.

<sup>2</sup> Lucian de Scribend. Histor.

fectured graces, which characterised the puerile and frigid compositions of Callisthenes, Onesicritus, and Hegesias<sup>3</sup>. The false taste of these pretended historians, to whose perverse industry must be ascribed the ridiculous trappings which have too long disfigured the august form of Alexander, was admired and imitated by many of their contemporaries. The contagion infected even the orators; and it is worthy of observation, that the verbose emptiness and bombast of the Asiatic eloquence, was first introduced into Greece, in the age which had applauded the chaste and nervous compositions of Lycurgus, Hyperides, Æschines, and Demosthenes<sup>4</sup>. So true it is, that in every country where the human genius has attained its highest point of perfection, a principle of degeneracy naturally carries things in a contrary direction; because those who are incapable of excellence, still covet distinction, and despairing to equal their predecessors in the beauties of truth and nature, have recourse to false conceits and artificial refinements.

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Under the Macedonian government, Greece produced not any original genius in the serious kinds of poetry. The tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides still kept possession of the theatre. But no lyric, no epic poet appeared, capable to adorn the exploits of Alexander, though that prince, intoxicated with the love of fame, munificently rewarded the ignoble flattery of Agis, Cleon, Chærilus, and other contemptible encomiasts; who corrupted his heart, without vitiating his judgment, since he declared, that he would rather be the Thersites of Homer, than the Achilles of Chærilus<sup>5</sup>. Yet in the same age Philemon, Antiphanes<sup>6</sup>, Lycon<sup>7</sup>, above all, the Athenian Menander, carried comedy to the highest perfection which it ever attained in any nation of antiquity. During the republican form of government, the institutions and character of the Greeks

Improvement of comedy.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, l. xiv. p. 446.

<sup>5</sup> Acro. ad Horat. Art. Poet. v. 357.

<sup>4</sup> Dionys. Halicarn. de Structura Oration. Longinus de Sublim. Cicero de Orator. & de Clar. Orator. passim.

Curtius, l. viii. c. v.

<sup>6</sup> Athenæus, l. xiii. p. 555.

<sup>7</sup> Plut. Orat. ii. de Fortun. Alexand.

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were extremely unfavourable to this species of writing. The licentious turbulence of democracy generally converted their attempts at wit and humour into petulance and buffoonery. The change of government and manners, requiring due respect to the rules of propriety and the dictates of caution, improved their discernment, and gradually made them sensible to that refined ridicule, where more is meant than said, and to those more interesting, because juster, delineations of character, which distinguished the comic strains of Philemon and Menander<sup>9</sup>.

Musie.

Alexander, during his early youth, took delight in dramatic entertainments. Theſſalus was his favourite actor, but Athenadorus was more approved by the public. To Athenadorus, the magistrates who, according to the Grecian custom, were appointed to decide the pretensions of rival candidates for theatrical fame, adjudged the prize of merit. The young hero declared, that this decision gave him more pain than he would have felt at the loss of his inheritance<sup>10</sup>. The musicians Timotheus<sup>11</sup> and Antigenides<sup>12</sup> still displayed the wonderful effects of their art; but as the severity of education and manners continually relaxed in all parts of Greece, we find that music, originally destined to purify and exalt the mind, was in later times universally employed to seduce and inflame the passions<sup>13</sup>.

Arts of design.

The arts of design, painting, sculpture, and architecture, appeared in their highest lustre in the age of Philip and Alexander, both which princes had no less taste to judge<sup>14</sup>, than munificence to reward them. The eastern expedition of the latter introduced, or at least greatly multiplied, in Greece, those precious and durable gems, which thenceforth exhibited some of the finest specimens of Grecian ingenuity. The skill and taste of Pyrgoteles were distinguished in this valuable, though minute art<sup>15</sup>. He enjoyed the exclusive ho-

<sup>9</sup> Vid. Plut. Comp. Aristoph. & Menand.

<sup>10</sup> Plut. Orat. ii. de Fortun. Alexand.

<sup>11</sup> Hephæst. de Metr.

<sup>12</sup> Plut. Orat. de Fortun. Alexand.

<sup>13</sup> Aristot. Politic. l. viii. c. vi.

<sup>14</sup> Judicium subtile videndis artibus.

Horat. Epist. l. ii. Epist. i. v. 242.

<sup>15</sup> Plin. l. vii. c. xxxvii. & Plutarch. in Alexand.

nour of representing the figure of Alexander on gems, as did Lyfippus of casting it in bronze, and Apelles of painting it in colours<sup>15</sup>. Lyfippus was juſtly admired for bringing back the art to a cloſer ſtudy, and nearer imitation, of nature, without yielding to his predeceſſors in ideal beauty<sup>16</sup>. We have already mentioned his twenty-one equeſtrian ſtatues of the Macedonian guards, ſlain in the battle of the Granicus. He is ſaid to have made ſix hundred and ten figures in bronze<sup>17</sup>; a number which, if not greatly exaggerated, would prove his facility of working to have far ſurpaſſed that of all ſtatuarys, ancient or modern. The numerous liſt of painters, contemporary with Apelles, indicates an extraordinary demand for their art; ſince no profeſſion, that is not gainful, will ever be very generally followed<sup>18</sup>. The moſt celebrated of theſe artiſts were Amphion and Aſclepiodorus<sup>19</sup>, whom Apelles acknowledged as his ſuperiors in ſome parts of compoſition; Ariſtides, the Theban, who was inimicable in expreſſion<sup>20</sup>; and Protogenes, of Rhodes, whom Ariſtotle exhorted to paint the immortal exploits of Alexander<sup>21</sup>. The inferior branches of the art, if not firſt cultivated in that age, were then carried to perfection. Pyreicus<sup>22</sup> confined himſelf to ſubjects of low life, and Antiphilus<sup>23</sup> to caricatures, which the Greeks called Grylli. The theory and practice of painting was explained in many works, the loſs of which is much to be regretted<sup>24</sup>.

Amidſt the great multitude of artiſts, and writers on art, all acknowledged the pre-eminence of Apelles, whoſe works were innumerable, and each ſufficient to eſtabliſh his fame<sup>25</sup>. His pic-

<sup>15</sup> Vid. Plin. Edit. Berolin. i. 221. iii. 217—218.

<sup>16</sup> Plin. iii. 194, & ſeqq.

<sup>17</sup> The Sieur Falconet, who made the famous ſtatue of Peter the Great, thinks the thing impoſſible, and gives a different meaning to the words of Pliny. See his obſervations on the paſſage, in his tranſlation of the books of Pliny relative to the arts. Vol. ii. Laufanne.

<sup>18</sup> Plin. iii. 222.

<sup>19</sup> Idem, iii. 226.

<sup>20</sup> Idem, iii. 215—225.

<sup>21</sup> He exhorted him to paint them “prop-  
ter eternitatem rerum!” Plin. *ibid*.

<sup>22</sup> Plin. iii. 226.

<sup>23</sup> Idem, iii. 229.

<sup>24</sup> Idem, *ibid*.

<sup>25</sup> Plin. iii. 222, & ſeqq.



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ture of Alexander, grasping a thunderbolt, was sold to the temple of Ephesian Diana for four thousand pounds. His Venus Anadyomené was damaged by accident; none would venture to restore the parts that had been effaced: so that the injury of the picture contributed to the glory of the artist. The model of this Venus was the beautiful Campaspe, the favourite mistress of Alexander. The sensibility of Apelles was too deeply penetrated with the charms which he so successfully expressed. Alexander was no sooner acquainted with his passion, than, in the language of Pliny, he made him a present, not only of Campaspe, but of his own affection, too little respecting the feelings of the beloved object, at her degradation from being the mistress of a king, to become the possession of a painter. Yet this celebrated artist, who enjoyed other striking proofs of his master's partiality and friendship, lived on good terms with his brethren. With the frankness of his age and nation, he assumed the merit which belonged to him, and freely asserted, that none of his competitors could imitate the gracefulness<sup>26</sup> of his attitudes and figures. But in some other branches of the art, he acknowledged himself inferior to several of his contemporaries. The desire of seeing the works of Protogenes carried him to Rhodes. He there found a rival not altogether unworthy to alarm his jealousy. But instead of yielding to the dictates of this unworthy passion, he drew Protogenes from obscurity; raised the price of his pictures; and taught the Rhodians, who undervalued the same talents in their fellow-citizen, which they admired in a stranger, to acknowledge and respect his merit<sup>27</sup>.

Decline of  
the arts after  
the death of  
Alexander.

Soon after the death of Alexander, painting and the kindred arts ceased<sup>28</sup>. By this expression, Pliny means not, that they ceased to be cultivated, but to make farther progress; since neither the scholars of Apelles and Lyfippus, nor those who came after them, were

<sup>26</sup> "Deesse iis unam venerem dicebat quam Græci charita vocant; cetera omnia contingisse; sed hæc solâ sibi neminem parem." Plin. iii. 222, & seqq.

<sup>27</sup> Plin. *ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> "Cessavit deinde ars." Plin. *ibid.*

capable

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capable to reach the glory of their predecessors. The Greek kings of Egypt and Syria seem to have bent their attention rather to literature, than to the arts. But, in both, the schools of Alexandria and Seleucia never aspired beyond the humble merit of imperfectly imitating those of Greece. In proportion to its neighbourhood to that country, the arts took firmer root in Alexandria than in Seleucia; and, from the same circumstance, they seem to have flourished longer and more abundantly in the little principalities of Pergamus and Bithynia, than in the wealthy kingdoms of Syria and Egypt<sup>29</sup>.

The expedition of Alexander contributed to the improvement of *Geography*, the sciences, both natural and moral. His marches were carefully measured by Diognetes and Beton. Other geometers<sup>30</sup> were employed to survey the more remote parts of the countries which he traversed; and the exact description of his conquests, which, from these and other materials, he took care to have compiled by men of approved integrity and abilities, gave a new form to the science of geography<sup>31</sup>.

After the conquest of Babylon, Alexander eagerly demanded the *Astronomy*, astronomical observations, which had been carefully preserved in that ancient capital above nineteen centuries. They remounted twenty-two hundred and thirty-four years beyond the Christian æra. By order of Alexander, they were faithfully transcribed, and transmitted to Aristotle<sup>32</sup>, who was probably prevented by his infirm state of health from accompanying his pupil to the East; or who, perhaps, voluntarily preferred a philosophical retirement in Athens, to the glory of attending the conqueror of the world.

Nor was this the only present to his preceptor, by which Alexander *Natural history* displayed at once his gratitude and love of science. Natural history

<sup>29</sup> Winkelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums, p. 711, & seqq.

<sup>30</sup> Strabo, l. ii. p. 47.

<sup>31</sup> Cassini sur l'Origine de l'Astronomie,

&c. Académ. des Sciences, t. viii. p. 13.

<sup>32</sup> Porphyr. apud Simplicium, in Aristot. de Cælo, l. ii.

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was peculiarly indebted to his curiosity and munificence. At the expence of near two hundred thousand pounds, a sum equivalent to two millions in the present age, he collected many rare productions of nature in different countries of Asia, and particularly that amazing variety of animals<sup>32</sup>, which Aristotle has described with such inimitable precision<sup>33</sup> in his work on that subject.

Moral know-  
ledge.

But whatever obligations natural knowledge owed to Alexander, it would seem that the moral sciences were not less benefited by his discoveries and conquests<sup>34</sup>. The study of human nature must have been greatly enlarged by such a wide survey of manners, institutions, and usages; nor was this advantage, perhaps, confined to those who performed the expedition, whose works have unfortunately perished; since the moral and political treatises of Aristotle discover not only more method in his reasonings, but a more copious fund of facts on which to reason, than the writings of all his predecessors together, not excepting those of the travellers Xenophon and Plato.

The greatest part of the works of Aristotle were doubtless composed before the Macedonian conquest; yet it is not improbable that this extraordinary man, whose industry was equal to his genius, continually retouched and improved them; and it cannot be imagined that the rich harvest of facts and observations collected by his learned friends who accompanied Alexander, would be overlooked by a philosopher, who seems not only ambitious to eclipse his predecessors and contemporaries, but solicitous to leave no gleanings of fame to be acquired by his scholars and successors.

Works of  
Aristotle.

"Aristotle," says Lord Bacon<sup>35</sup>, "thought, like the Ottoman princes, that he could not reign secure, unless he destroyed all his

<sup>32</sup> Plin. l. viii. c. xvi.

<sup>34</sup> See the admirable criticism on Aristotle's History of Animals, by Buffon, vol. i.

<sup>35</sup> The arts and sciences not only flourished in Alexander's time; they flourished, says Plutarch, διὰ Αλιξάνδρου. "He was the efficient cause of this effect." The passage

which follows, Καρπὸν μὲν γὰρ εὐφροσύνης, &c. should be studied by all princes who aspire to glory; a glory greater than power can give; more extensive and more permanent than conquest can confer.

<sup>36</sup> De Augm. Scientiarum, l. iii. c. iv.

brethren;" nor was his literary ambition more exclusive than exorbitant. He aspired to embrace the whole circle of the arts and sciences, and professed to explain whatever can be known concerning the moral, as well as the material, world. Not satisfied with extending his empire to the utmost verge of intellect, he boldly attempts questions beyond all human knowledge, with the same confidence that his pupil entered on a battle. But having to contend with enemies more stubborn than the Persians, his rashness was less successful than that of Alexander.

He divided philosophy into contemplative and practical. The contemplative or abstract philosophy, to which he first gave the name of metaphysics<sup>37</sup>, is obscure throughout, often unintelligible, still more chimerical, but far less agreeable than that of his master Plato. It comprehended not only the examination of those abstract ideas, *existence, substance, quality, genus, species, &c.* which were so long and so uselessly tortured by the perverse industry of the schoolmen, but the general doctrines concerning mind or spirit, particularly the mind of the Deity. The human soul is treated in a separate work; in which it must be acknowledged, that Aristotle has made new names, rather than new discoveries; and the doctrine of the immortality is no where so fully elucidated by this philosopher, as it had been by Plato.

His philosophy.

<sup>37</sup> By some writers it is supposed, that this title was bestowed on the fourteen books of Aristotle, immediately following his Physics, by Andronicus of Rhodes, a Peripatetic philosopher in the age of Augustus, who published the first complete edition of Aristotle's works. From that time, the various subjects treated in these fourteen books were conceived as constituting one branch of science. Aristotle had divided philosophy into speculative and practical. The first comprehended metaphysics, which examined the general properties of being, and the essence of things

separate from matter; physics, which examined the nature of material substances, and the human soul; and mathematics, which examined certain properties of body, abstracted from body. The practical philosophy of Aristotle, which was intended to regulate the intellectual and moral operations of men, comprehended logic, under which he seems to have included rhetoric and criticism; and morals, including economics and politics. See Strabo, p. 609.; and Bayle's Dictionary, article Tyrannion.



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Physics.

The natural philosophy of Aristotle deserves the name of metaphysic, in the modern sense of that word, since he explained the laws of the universe, by comparing abstract ideas, not by observation and experience. When he descends to particulars, he betrays more ignorance concerning the motions and magnitudes of the heavenly bodies, than many of his predecessors. With the anatomy of man and other animals, he was well acquainted, considering the gross errors which generally prevailed in the age in which he lived. Chemistry was not yet invented. Since the introduction of the ideal philosophy, men had ceased to *observe* nature; it could not therefore be expected that they should imitate her operations, and examine her by the test of experiment. In mathematics, Aristotle appears to have been less versed than his predecessors, Pythagoras and Plato; although, in the invention of the art of syllogism, he displays a perseverance of mental energy, which, had it been directed to the mathematical sciences, might have produced the greatest discoveries.

Logic.

The scepticism of his contemporary Pyrrho, and still more the captious sophistry of the Eristics, might naturally engage Aristotle to examine with more attention than his predecessors, the nature of truth, and the means of defending it against the attacks of declamation, and the snares of subtlety. He undertook, therefore, the arduous task, of resolving all reasoning into its primary elements, and of deducing from thence the rules by which every conclusion must be connected with its premises, in order to render it legitimate. This bold design he accomplished; having erected on a single axiom, a larger system of abstract truths, all fortified by demonstration, than were ever invented and perfected by any other man. The axiom from which he sets out, and in which the whole terminates, is, that whatever is predicated of a genus, may be predicated of every species and individual contained under it. But the application of this axiom is for the most part sufficiently obvious, without the rules of Aristotle; whose logic, how successful soever it might prove against the subtleties

ties of the Sophists and *Eristics*, contributes little to the formation of the understanding, and nothing to the judicious observation of man or nature, on which all useful discoveries must be founded.

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From the general wreck of literature, in which many of Aristotle's writings perished<sup>38</sup>, had nothing been saved but the works above-mentioned, it must be confessed that the preceptor of Alexander would not greatly merit the attention of posterity. In his abstract or metaphysical philosophy, we can only lament vast efforts mispent, and great genius misapplied. But, in his critical and moral, and above all, in his political works, we find the same penetrating and comprehensive mind, the same subtlety of reasoning, and vigour of intellect, directed to objects of great importance and extensive utility. The condition of the times in which he lived, and the opportunities peculiar to himself, conspired with the gifts of nature, and the habits of industry, to raise him to that eminence, which was acknowledged by his contemporaries, and admired by posterity.

His critical  
and moral  
writings.

He was born in the first year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad, at Stagira, a provincial city of Macedon, and educated at the court of Pella, where his father was king's physician. In his early youth, he was sent to Athens, and remained there twenty years an assiduous scholar of Plato, in a city where literature and the fine arts were cultivated with unexampled success, and where the philosophic spirit, though often improperly directed, flourished in the utmost vigour. Selected by the discernment of Philip, to guide and confirm the promising dispositions of his admired son, he returned to his native country, and continued eight years at the Macedonian court. Whatever benefit accrued to Alexander from the instructions of Aristotle, it is certain that the latter derived great advantages from the gratitude of his royal pupil. Of this, several proofs have already occurred; and perhaps it may be ascribed to the munificence of Alexander,

His great opportunities of  
improvement.  
A. C. 368.

<sup>38</sup> See the fate of his works carefully related in Bayle's Dictionary, article Tyrannion.

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that his preceptor was enabled to form a library<sup>39</sup>, a work of prodigious expence in that age, and in which he could only be rivalled by the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings. But the library of Aristotle was collected for use, not merely for ostentation<sup>40</sup>.

His long residence at Athens;

The last fourteen years of his life he spent mostly at Athens, surrounded with every assistance which men<sup>41</sup> and books could afford him, for prosecuting his philosophical inquiries. The glory of Alexander's name, which then filled the world, ensured tranquillity and respect to the man, whom he distinguished as his friend; but after the premature death of that illustrious protector, the invidious jealousy of priests and sophists inflamed the malignant and superstitious fury of the Athenian populace; and the same odious passions which proved fatal to the offensive<sup>42</sup> virtue of Socrates, fiercely assailed the fame and merit of Aristotle. To avoid the cruelty of persecution, he secretly withdrew himself to Chalcis, in Eubœa. This measure was sufficiently justified by a prudent regard to his personal safety; but lest his conduct should appear unmanly, when contrasted with the firmness of Socrates in a similar situation, he condescended to apologise for his flight, by saying, that he was unwilling to afford the Athenians a second opportunity "to sin against philosophy<sup>43</sup>." He seems to have survived his retreat from Athens only a few months; vexation and regret probably shortened his days<sup>44</sup>.

and death.  
Olymp.  
cxiv. 3.  
A. C. 322.  
Ætas. 63.

Philosophical sects established at Athens.

Notwithstanding the occasional persecutions of speculative men, philosophy had fixed its roots too deeply in Athens, to be extirpated by the temporary phrenzy of a capricious populace. Theophrastus

<sup>39</sup> Strabo.

<sup>40</sup> The Egyptian and Pergamenian kings were lovers rather of books than of learning. They considered a great library as contributing to the superfluous magnificence of royalty. Vid. Galen. Comment. 2. in Hippocrat. de Natur. Hom.

<sup>41</sup> Aristotle probably had many assistants in his philosophical enquiries and compositions.

Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως δύναται

θεωρεῖν\* βιβλίῳ δ' ὅπως συνεργᾷ ἐχόν. Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. vii.

<sup>42</sup> Virtutem incolumem odimus

Sublatam ex oculis quarimus invidi.

HORACE.

<sup>43</sup> Ἀμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. Ælian, l. iii. c. vi.

<sup>44</sup> Laert. l. v. in Aristot. & Auctor. citat. apud Brucker, Hîstor. Philosoph. vol. i. p. 787, & seqq.

calmly succeeded Aristotle in the Peripaton, or walk of the Lyceum, from which place their followers retained the name of Peripatetics<sup>45</sup>.

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At the same time, Zeno taught *virtue* in the Stoa, or Portico, from which his disciples derived the appellation of Stoics<sup>46</sup>. Epicurus explained *pleasure* in those well-known gardens, which were distinguished by his name<sup>47</sup>. The followers of Diogenes, the Cynic, still assembled in the Cynosarges<sup>48</sup>; Speusippus and Xenocrates succeeded Plato in the academy<sup>49</sup>; and even Pyrrho, the Elian, the founder of the sceptical sect, who had accompanied Alexander in his eastern expedition, and shared the munificence of that prince<sup>50</sup>, became, after the death of his benefactor, a citizen of Athens<sup>51</sup>. Thus did that illustrious city, after the extinction of its freedom, and of its military glory, still maintain its pre-eminence in literature, philosophy, and the fine arts. In the age of Alexander, Athens, as the seat of learning, assumed that precise form, which it exactly preserved seven centuries, till the destructive invasion of Greece by Alaric, and the Goths<sup>52</sup>. For it is worthy of observation, that the philosophers, who, during this long interval, perpetuated the several sects, submissively followed the opinions of their respective masters. Soon after the age of Alexander, genius disappeared; literature and the arts alike degenerated; no new sect arose; few innovations, and those unsuccessful, were attempted; and thus the period, which has been assigned for the termination of the present work, seems to have bounded the progress of the human mind; whether, according to the observation of Longinus, because liberty is the best nurse of genius, and singularly adapted, by cherishing the emulation and the hopes,

Olymp. cxx.

A. D. 396.  
Decline of  
genius.

<sup>45</sup> The common opinion, that the followers of Aristotle were called Peripatetics, is refuted by Cicero and others, is refuted by the authors cited by Brucker, v. i. p. 787.

<sup>46</sup> Laert. vii. 5.

<sup>47</sup> Cicero ad Attic. l. ii. epist. 24.

<sup>48</sup> Idem. ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Suidas in Speusipp. Laert. l. iv. c. 1, & seqq.

<sup>50</sup> Sextus Empiric. Pyrrhon Hypotyp. l. i. c. iii.

<sup>51</sup> Laert. in Pyrrhon.

<sup>52</sup> See Gibbon's History of the Roman Empire, v. iii. c. xxx.



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to excite the energies, of those born to true excellence"; or because, in the words of a great philosopher, "there is a pitch of exaltation, as well as of depression, to which, when any nation has attained, its affairs necessarily return in an opposite direction."

Tenets of the  
different  
sects.

Instead of examining this speculative question, which the world is perhaps still too young to enable us with accuracy to determine, it will better suit the design of an historical work, to explain the tenets of the different schools of philosophy, then first established in Athens; briefly to relate their various success in the world; and to inquire, with becoming modesty, how far those artificial systems of happiness correspond with the natural dictates of unperverted sentiment, and impartial reason.

Tenets of the  
Peripatetic  
sect.

Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatetic school, recognised, like Socrates and Plato, the dignity of human nature, and placed the chief happiness of man, not in the agreeableness of his passive sensations, but in the proper exercise<sup>53</sup> of his intellectual and moral powers. According to Aristotle, the habit of this exercise, directed by right reason, constituted the highest excellence of man, in the same manner as the excellence of other animals, and even of the vegetable and mineral kingdoms, resulted from the perfection of those qualities, by which they are respectively distinguished. Yet, as man is a compound being, consisting of mind and matter, it seemed evident that his well-being must in some measure depend on the condition of his body, and on the means necessary to maintain this inferior part of his nature in its most perfect state. The absence of disease and infirmity, and the proper constitution of all our bodily organs, are things desirable not only on their own account, but as furnishing us with the opportunity and the means to exert those

<sup>53</sup> Long. de Sublim. sect. 44.

<sup>54</sup> The Stoics adopted, on this occasion, both the sentiments and the language of Aristotle. 'Ο μιν φιλοδοξῶς αλλοτριαν εὐεργίαν ἰδίαν ἀγαθὴν ἐπαλαμῶσθαι· ὁ δὲ Φιληδῶνος ἰδίαν πεισιν· ὁ δὲ

van εἰχεν, ἰδίαν πράζειν. M. Anton. vi. 51. "The vain-glorious man places his own happiness in the action of others; the voluptuous man, in his passive sensations; the wise man, in his own active exertions."

mental

mental energies, from which our principal felicity results. In the same manner, the goods of fortune, wealth, friends, and other external advantages, are desirable not only as contributing to the supply of our bodily wants, but as the instruments through which a wise man is enabled to exercise his virtues, and accomplish his purposes. Amidst great calamities<sup>55</sup>, Aristotle required not that perfect self-command to which some philosophers pretended. He allowed a moderate degree of perturbation, as suitable to the weakness of human nature. In the present constitution of things, he thought a certain sensibility of passion not only excusable, but necessary; since resentment enabled us to repel injuries<sup>56</sup>, and grief for past misfortunes made us vigilant to prevent the evils that might otherwise overtake us. But although this great philosopher acknowledged the influence of fortune in human affairs, and thought it impossible for the firmest of men to remain unmoved amidst the miseries of Priam<sup>57</sup>; he maintained, however, that we ourselves were the principal architects of our own happiness. The attainment of this great object depended far more on our own thoughts and reflections, which were ever and intimately present with us, and on the constitution of our own minds, which were in some measure subject to our own direction and controul, than on our external situation and circumstances, which only affected us by accident, and over which we commonly enjoyed but little power, and sometimes none. The perfection of our virtue, which was entirely our own work, shone forth with peculiar lustre amidst the gloom of unmerited calamity. When we bore it with becoming patience, we rejoiced in our own fortitude; and this inward pleasure always alleviated the smart of external wounds. Assailed by the most terrible afflictions, a wise

<sup>55</sup> Ουτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινῆσθεται βλάβος, ὅτε ὑπὸ τῶν τυχερῶν ἀτυχημάτων, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν. *Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. x.*

<sup>56</sup> To bear insults tamely, was regarded as highly ungraceful, and becoming only the

character of a slave. Τοῦδε προσηλαχίζουσαν ἀνίσταται ἀνδραπεδονίδος. *Ethic. Nicom. iv. 2.*

<sup>57</sup> Ἐν τυχαίᾳ Πριάμου. *Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. p. 40.*

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man would not deserve indeed the epithet of *happy*; yet neither could he be called *miserable*, since he would still disdain to commit any thing odious or base. Philosophy, which professes to teach us the art of enjoying life, must therefore disregard such circumstances as we can neither govern nor change, and confine itself to that part which we can regulate and controul. It must withdraw our attention from external objects, and fix it on ourselves<sup>58</sup>.

Division of  
the mental  
powers.

To know himself, man must know the powers with which he is endowed. Of those, we possess some in common with other animals<sup>59</sup>, and others in common even with the inanimate parts of nature<sup>60</sup>. In none of these, it is evident, can the proper employment of man consist, but rather in such faculties as being peculiar to himself, distinguish and ennoble humanity. These characteristic excellencies of our species all refer, either to the understanding, or to the will<sup>61</sup>; the first possesses reason essentially in itself, the second is capable of being combined and assimilated with this divine principle. From the two powers of the understanding and the will, are respectively derived two classes of virtues, the intellectual and the moral. Sagacity, penetration, intelligence, wisdom, are virtues of the understanding; gentleness, temperance, fortitude, justice, are virtues of the heart. The former class consists in the proper disposition and habit<sup>62</sup> of the intellectual part of the soul; the latter, in the proper disposition and habit of the desires and affections, which being formed subordinate to reason, and capable of listening to its dictates, then only

Intellectual  
and moral  
virtues.

<sup>58</sup> In explaining the Aristotelian philosophy, the learned reader will perceive that I have endeavoured to translate, as literally as possible, the energetic expressions of its author. The outline has been traced with equal perspicuity and elegance by Dr. Adam Smith, in his Account of the Systems of ancient Philosophy, annexed to his admired Theory of Moral Sentiments. The design of my work obliges me to treat the subject more particularly.

<sup>59</sup> The το αἰσθητικῶν, the powers of sensation, &c.

<sup>60</sup> The το θρεπτικῶν, &c. the powers of nutrition, &c.

<sup>61</sup> I have ventured to use this word to express the το ορεκτικῶν of Aristotle, the seat of the appetites, affections, and passions.

<sup>62</sup> Επαινεῖται δὲ καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἑξῆς τῶν ἡθικῶν διὰ τὰς ἐπαινετάς, ἀρετὰς λογικὰς. Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. ult.

perform

perform their duty, when, like obedient subjects, they cheerfully observe the commands of their sovereign. The intellectual virtues depend chiefly on education and exercise; the moral proceed entirely from habit, from which they derive their name<sup>61</sup>. It is by practising justice, that we become just; by practising temperance, that we become temperate; by practising courage, that we become courageous. Hence the wonderful power of legislation, and early institution; by which the Cretans, the Spartans, and some other nations, were honourably distinguished among the rest of mankind; and by which such states as shall wisely imitate their example, may

<sup>61</sup> ἠθικὴ, ἔθος; moralis, mos. The same holds not in English. The words *ἀρετή* in Greek, and *virtus* in Latin, are of very general import, denoting any praise-worthy disposition, habit, or quality, of body or mind, intellectual or moral. The indeterminate use of these words has occasioned strange confusion. The late ingenious Mr. Hume, in his Inquiry into the Principles of Morals, which, in other respects, he justly considers as the most valuable of his writings, enters into a large deduction, to prove that all virtues are praised and recommended as useful or agreeable. These qualities constitute, according to him, the proper definition, the very essence of virtue; and all other distinctions are frivolous. To justify this paradox, he alleges the authority of Greek poets and philosophers, who apply the term *virtue* to bodily strength or address, to memory, judgment, sagacity, &c. as well as to justice, humanity, charity. This indeed is true; but the Greeks distinguished between the virtues of the body, and those of the mind; and the mental virtues, they divided into the intellectual and moral. Aristotle characterises moral virtue as a voluntary habit, and says, that moral approbation is excited only by the praise-worthy habit of such affections and actions as originate in ourselves, and depend on no extrinsic cause. See Aristot. Magn. Moral. l. i. c. xv. and his commentator, Andronicus Rhodius, p. 89.

and the Ethics to Nicomachus throughout. Mr. Hume, therefore, is justly reproved by Dr. Beattie, for saying, "that the ancient moralists made no material distinction among the different species of mental endowments and defects." See Hume's Inquiry, vol. ii. p. 387. But although the ancients, and Aristotle in particular, make very material distinctions between moral and intellectual virtues, yet, in his zeal for the good cause, Dr. Beattie appears to me to go too far in asserting, "that though they considered both the moral and intellectual virtues as necessary to the formation of a perfect character, and sometimes discoursed of both in the same treatise or system, yet they deemed the latter valuable only as means to qualify us for the former, and insignificant, or even odious, when they failed to answer this end." See Essay on Truth, p. 425. First of all, according to the Greek moralists, it is impossible ever to treat of the moral virtues as distinct from the intellectual, since the former could not exist without a mixture of reason or intellect. Ethic. Nicom. passim; and particularly, l. iii. c. ii. Secondly, The intellectual virtues were so far from being esteemed only as means to qualify us for the moral, that Aristotle considers the exercise of the former totally independent of the latter, as constituting our highest perfection and happiness. Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. vii.



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still reach the same elevation of character, and still acquire the same renown: "For it is not a matter of little moment, how we are accustomed in youth; much depends on that, or rather all."

Moral virtue  
neither natu-  
ral nor con-  
trary to na-  
ture.

The moral virtues, it is evident, are not implanted by nature; for that which is established by nature, cannot be essentially changed by custom. Heavy bodies, which, by the law of nature, descend, cannot be habituated to mount upwards; nor can fire, which naturally ascends, be taught by habit to move in a contrary direction. The same holds concerning all the other laws by which nature governs her works. Our senses, and other natural gifts, have the power of performing their several functions, before they exert it; and they retain this power, although we should allow them to remain inactive. But virtue, like all practical arts, can be acquired and preserved by practice only. It is neither natural, nor contrary to nature. We are born capable to attain it, but the invaluable attainment must be made and perfected by habit. Yet the greater part of those who aspire to this inestimable prize, have recourse to vain speculations, flattering themselves that this is philosophy. Their conduct resembles that of a patient, who should carefully listen to his physician, but do nothing which he prescribed. By such medicine it is not possible to cure the disorders of the body, nor by such philosophy, those of the mind.

Wherein it  
consists.

Virtue, as a matter of practice, cannot be reduced to metaphysical precision. It is to be observed, however, that all the virtues depend on the propriety of the affections from which they arise; and that this propriety consists in a certain point or centre, from which the deviations may be innumerable. The vices, therefore, many of which are without names, are far more numerous than the virtues. In general, virtue may be conceived to lie in a mean betwixt the extremes of too much and too little; and this health of the mind resembles bodily health and strength, which are destroyed by excess or defect of nourishment and exercise. Thus, to fear every thing is cowardly;

cowardly; to fear nothing is audacious; courage requires that we should fear only such objects as are truly formidable, and only in that degree in which they ought to be feared. In the same manner, he who is too much affected by objects of pleasure, and seizes every opportunity to enjoy them, is called intemperate; he who is too little affected by such objects, and refuses every opportunity to enjoy them, may be called insensible. Temperance teaches us to pursue only such pleasures as we ought, at proper times, in proper places, and on proper occasions. According to the same view of things, generosity lies in the middle between avarice and profusion; modesty, between pride and diffidence; mildness, between irascibility and softness; magnificence, between ostentation and parsimony; popularity, between forbidding disdain and officious adulation; in a word, every virtue consists in a mean, equally remote from two vicious extremes<sup>64</sup>.

Considered as the quality of an action, virtue consists in the propriety of that affection from which the action proceeds; when the affection is neither too strong nor too weak, but has precisely that degree of strength, which right reason teaches us to approve. As the quality of an action, virtue consists, therefore, in mediocrity; but as the quality of a person, it consists in the habit of this mediocrity, since, in judging persons and characters, we regard not particular acts and feelings, but such acts and feelings as are frequent and habitual. We may perform many virtuous actions, without being virtuous men. The most worthless of human kind sometimes indulge the propensity to pity and humanity. But whoever acts right merely from feeling, will also, from feeling, more frequently act wrong. The sentiments of nature, which prompt us to take care of our children, to relieve objects in distress, and to perform many important duties of morality, likewise prompt us to gratify the

How it must  
be attained.

<sup>64</sup> Ethic. Nicom. l. ii. c. i. & seqq.

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vilest and most brutal of our passions. Besides this, there are many, and those the most important virtues, the exercise of which is not at first attended with pleasure. To support labour, to endure pain, to encounter difficulties and dangers, which wisdom and fortitude, on many occasions, require, are not obviously recommended by any natural desire; nor is the practice of such duties immediately agreeable. It is still less agreeable, in the first instance, to curb and restrain our natural appetites for pleasure, which is the proper office of temperance; nor can that vigilant circumspection, and ever watchful attention to the most remote consequences of our actions, which is essential to the virtue of prudence, be acquired without trouble and care, without many painful efforts, and many difficult struggles. Yet it is the nature of all those virtues, as well as of the hardest lessons of justice, patriotism, and friendship, to become, through habit, agreeable; and the only sure test that we have acquired them, is, that they are practised with pleasure. With good reason, therefore, Plato defines education to be the art of teaching men to rejoice and grieve as they ought; for though there be three ends ultimately agreeable, the pleasant, the honourable, and useful; yet honour and utility are likewise pursued as pleasures<sup>65</sup>.

The hardest  
task of moral  
virtue.

The most extensive part of virtue is employed, therefore, in regulating our desire of pleasure, and aversion to pain. It is also the most difficult; for, as Heraclitus observes, it is harder to combat pleasure than anger. The irascible passions are always moved by some appearance of reason; and, in their most furious excesses, still affect some deference for their sovereign. They often, indeed, mistake his intentions; and, like hasty servants, fly into action, without waiting his last orders. But pleasure passively obeys sensation, without regarding reason at all. The mischief is the more dangerous, being produced by the first object of natural desire; for the love of

<sup>65</sup> Ethic. Nicom. l. viii. c. xi. & seqq.

pleasure is implanted in our frame ; the germ expands with our nature ; and unless counteracted in due time, becomes ingrained in our constitution, every part of which it impregnates and stains. Habit alone can counteract those dangerous propensities of nature. Habit can enable us to reject dishonourable or hurtful pleasures, to prefer honourable or useful pains ; for, as the poet Euenus says, “ there is a long-continued exercise of attention, which finally becomes nature<sup>66</sup>.”

The moral virtues cannot, according to Aristotle, subsist without some mixture of the intellectual ; but the latter may subsist alone and independent ; and according to both Aristotle and Plato, the purest and most permanent felicity of which man is susceptible, results from the exercise of his rational powers upon subjects of abstract speculation. The labours of the statesman or general, the exertions of the legislator or patriot, all refer to some end or purpose, the attainment of which may be prevented by fortune, or frustrated by the weakness or wickedness of man. The practice of justice, generosity, temperance, and fortitude, require many conditions, and suppose a variety of situations, which it is not always in our power to command. The just or generous man must have objects to whom he may distribute his justice or generosity ; he must possess the means by which to exercise those virtues, which all participate of frail mortality ; since, though directed by prudence, they are impelled by passion, and result from the exigencies of our present corporeal state. But the energies of contemplative wisdom are pure and simple, like the intellectual source from which they spring. Not subservient to remote purposes, or contingent ends, they are immediately agreeable on their own account ; and, on

Intellectual  
virtues the  
purest and  
most perma-  
nent source  
of happiness.

<sup>66</sup> Euenus was an elegiac poet of Paros, of whom few fragments remain. The verses translated in the text are,

Φημι πολυχρόνιον μέλειται γίνεσθαι φίλι καὶ, ὅν  
ἴατλην ἀνθρώποις τιλκυτῶσαν φύσιν ἴσθαι.

This is better expressed by another Greek proverb : Ἐν βίῳ ἀρεταί, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖσιν. Plut. Moral. p. 602. “ Choose the best life, and custom will render it agreeable.”



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every side, round and complete in themselves. If the proper exercise of every member or faculty enlivens the sense of our existence, and thereby yields us a perception of pleasure, how wonderfully delightful must be the exercise of the intellect, which renders us sensible of the divine principle within us! To live according to nature, is to live according to the noblest part of our nature, which, doubtless, is the mind. To live thus, is the life of a god; for, human as we are, we ought not, according to the vulgar exhortation, to regard only human things; but, though mortal, strive to put on immortality<sup>67</sup>; assured that, as the mind chiefly forms the man, he who most cultivates his mind, is the best disposed in himself, and the most agreeable to the gods<sup>68</sup>.

Estimate of  
Aristotle's  
philosophy.

Such is the philosophy of Aristotle, lofty sometimes, and imposing, but in general, less erect and independent than that of Socrates and Plato, who preceded him; less proud and boastful than that of the Stoics, or even the Epicureans, by whom he was followed; and on the whole, perhaps, as unexceptionable as that of any moralist ancient or modern.

Its fate in the  
world.

It is commonly observed, that Aristotle attained the same authority over the opinions of men, which his pupil Alexander acquired over their persons. But the empire of Alexander was established in his own lifetime, and perished with himself. That of Aristotle did not commence till more than a thousand years after his decease, and continued several centuries. The Peripatetic school subsisted, indeed, without interruption, at Athens; but the Lyceum never attained there any pre-eminence above the Portico and Academy. When philosophy was transplanted to a more splendid theatre in Rome, men of speculation and science generally preferred Plato to Aristotle<sup>69</sup>; while many of the most celebrated cha-

ἢ Χρη δὲ ὃ πατα τῷ παρακίβητας, ἀνθρώπων  
φρονεῖν, ἀνθρώπων οὐκ, ὅδε βήτα τῷ βήτοι· ἀλλ'  
ἐφ' ἑσόν ἐνδύχεται ἀπαθανάτιζεν, καὶ ἅπαντα ποιεῖ  
κατὰ τὸ κρατῆρον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. *Ethic. Nicom.*  
l. x. c. vii.

<sup>68</sup> Ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου, καὶ τῶν θραυστῶν, καὶ  
διακινῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ θεοφιλεστέος, οὕτως εἶναι. *Id.*  
c. x. c. viii.

<sup>69</sup> Cicero, *passim*.

masters of the republic enlisted themselves under the banners of Zeno or Epicurus. With the fall of Roman liberty, philosophy, as well as literature and the fine arts, slowly declined; and under the emperors, particularly in the second and third centuries of the Christian æra, the most extravagant of Plato's speculations were the only doctrines adapted to the condition of the times, and to the dark and shadowy minds of Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and other contemplative visionaries, distinguished by the appellation of Eclectics, or later Platonists, who possessed the wildness without the fancy, and the subtilty without the genius, of Plato<sup>79</sup>. During the succeeding centuries, the doctrines of Aristotle slowly gained the ascendancy; but, as had happened to Plato in an earlier period, the most frivolous part of Aristotle's philosophy was the highest in esteem during the darkness of the middle ages. The decisive boldness of his logic, physics, and metaphysics, suited the genius of a church which affected to be universal, and the insolence of a man who pretended to be infallible; and, while the useful and practical works of Aristotle were neglected, his speculative philosophy being thus incorporated with the Romish superstition, they long conspired, with astonishing success, to enthrall the human mind.

Zeno and Epicurus pretended, as well as Plato and Aristotle, to deduce their philosophy from experience; but their views of nature are less perspicuous, and less extensive; and their conclusions, less convincing, and less reasonable. For the infinite variety of nature, they substituted the narrowness of their own artificial systems; and it will ever be the scandal of this abstract philosophy, that men who boasted following the same path should have reached such opposite goals; the sect of Zeno having discovered, by all its researches, that pain was not an evil, and the sect of Epicurus, that pleasure was the only good; the Stoics, that virtue alone was truly

Coincidence  
in the opi-  
nions of  
Zeno and  
Epicurus.

<sup>79</sup> Besides the works of Brucker and Stanley, the learned reader may consult, on this subject, professor Meiner's *Beytrag uber die Neu Platonische Philosophie*. Leipzig. 1782.

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valuable in itself, and desirable on its own account; the Epicureans, that virtue in itself was really of no value, and merely desirable for the sake of pleasure. Yet, amidst the striking contradictions of these sects, they agreed in speculative pride, loudly asserting, that the philosophy which they respectively taught, was the exclusive road to happiness. Both required from their imaginary sage an absolute command over his passions; and both supposed, that in his present state of existence, he could attain this perfection. Zeno and Epicurus alike rejected the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, as unnecessary to their system; both justified suicide; both boasted of enjoying a felicity equal to that of the gods; and, in proportion as their principles receded from truth and nature, and flattered that factitious vanity incident to the human heart, they were diffused with greater rapidity, more zealously embraced, and more obstinately defended<sup>21</sup>.

The stoic  
philosophy.

In examining by what shew of reason, men, whose wisdom was revered by their contemporaries, could arrive at such extraordinary conclusions, the dignity of *virtue* demands the precedence for Zeno. That philosopher affected, with great accuracy, to examine the natural propensities of the human race; to observe the various changes which they underwent in their progress from infancy to manhood; to contemplate the effects produced by external causes on our internal frame; and, by comparing man with inferior animals, to display the illustrious prerogatives which he enjoyed, and the high destination which nature had assigned him. Self-preservation, he observed, was the universal and primary desire of all animals. In man, this desire respected his body, and all its different members, his mind, and all its different faculties; and prompted him to maintain the whole fabric of his complex existence in the most perfect condition of which it is capable. Nature had generally attached a plea-

<sup>21</sup> Laert. in Zenon. & Epicur. Cicero de Finibus, l. i, ii, iii. Plutarch. de Commun. Concept. contra Stoicos.

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sure to the means necessary for this purpose ; but that we desired pleasure for the sake of preservation, not preservation for the sake of pleasure, he thought evident from the first motions and efforts of all animals, tending to prevent dissolution, and preceding any distinct notions of pain or pleasure<sup>72</sup>.

Although in the order of time, man perhaps first felt the propensities requisite to the safety of his bodily frame, yet, at a very early period, he shewed himself endowed with desires of a different, and more exalted kind. Not to mention the obscure intimations of his love of truth and knowledge during his infant state, in which he applied his senses with great activity to the examination of the objects presented to him, he naturally learned the use of words to express these objects, as well as the notions of his own mind concerning them ; and had no sooner made this important acquisition, than he testified an ardent curiosity to extend his knowledge, and to enlarge his acquaintance with the nature, the causes, and dependencies of the various classes of beings which he beheld around him. From this love and approbation of what is true and sincere, rather than of the contrary, which he felt to be congenial to his own nature, he readily believed whatever those persons, with whom he conversed, thought proper to communicate to him ; a principle which, though the source of innumerable errors and prejudices, served, however, as the only foundation on which his future improvements could be built.

Love of  
truth.

In examining the nature and relations of other things, he gradually became sensible of his own. His affections, he felt, carried him beyond his own person, and he derived happiness from the happiness of others, although he received from it no advantage but the pleasure of beholding it. The sentiments of justice, grati-

Social affec-  
tion.

<sup>72</sup> The principles of the stoical philosophy are explained in Cicero de Finibus, the works of Epictetus, Arrian, Simplicius, and

Seneca. In treating of the practical duties of morality, Cicero, in his Offices, chiefly follows the principles of the stoics.



tude, and benevolence, he felt to be agreeable to his nature, to be proper and laudable; the contrary sentiments, to be disagreeable to his nature, to be improper and odious. His own good, therefore, was thus pointed out to him, by the original frame of his sentiments, to be intimately connected with the good of his family, his friends, his country, and the great society of mankind, of which he made part. Enlarging his views still farther, he perceived that every species is relative to the element in which it lives; thus fishes have fins for the water, birds have wings for the air; and that many of these species are mutually connected with, and reciprocally subservient to, each other, while all of them essentially enter into the great plan of nature, and complete the harmony and perfection of that universal system, to the stability of which the order of particular parts, or what, in each species, and in each individual, is called private good, must necessarily be subordinate. Considering the narrowness of human capacity, it is not wonderful that many of the connections and dependencies of this universal system should escape our observation. But if we confine our view to those objects of which we have the clearest apprehension, we shall find that they all depend on each other, and are united in one scheme or constitution of things. The individuals of the human race were doubtless formed not for themselves alone. In the different sexes, the external organization, and still more the inward frame, the correspondence of parts, and still more the sympathy of sentiments, indicate the male and female mutually destined for each other. The naked helplessness of infancy requires the tender cares of a parent. The decrepitude of age loudly demands the kind returns of filial gratitude. In early ages of the world, men, without uniting in small communities, must have fallen a prey to the savages of the desert; and with the growth of these communities, social affection naturally makes progress; since, with the advancement of arts and civility, the bands which unite us to our country are continually multiplied and strengthened.

In

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duty thence  
derived.

In thus contemplating the relations in which he stands, man becomes sensible of the duties required of him. The voice of nature teaches him (for this is her universal law) that the greater good is to be preferred to the lesser, and the good of the many to that of the few. In applying this rule to all the classes of objects submitted to our choice, we live consistently with nature. The goods of the mind, therefore, must be preferred to those of the body; and what is called private interest must yield to that of the public. Even in objects of the same class, the general law must be observed. We must prefer and reject, according to the rules of right reason, not according to caprice and fancy. In the primary objects of desire respecting the body, health is to be preferred to strength, and strength to agility; and in the secondary objects respecting this part of our nature, or those which may be employed as instruments to procure bodily pleasures, and ward off bodily pains, such as wealth, power, the good opinion of those with whom we live, and innumerable other circumstances of a similar kind, we must uniformly regulate our conduct by the same great principles of preference and rejection<sup>73</sup>. In thus appreciating the objects of desire, and when all cannot be obtained, in preferring the most valuable and honourable; in thus appreciating the objects of aversion, and when all cannot be avoided, in rejecting the most hurtful and odious, consist that order and harmony, that just balance of affection, and perfect propriety of conduct, which essentially contains in it whatever is meritorious, laudable, and happy. It is concerning the primary objects of desire, indeed, and the means necessary to attain them, that this propriety of sentiment and action is exercised; but as those to whom we are recommended are often more valued by us, than those by whom we were made known to them, so the duties of wisdom and

<sup>73</sup> The technical terms of the stoical philosophy, like all terms of art, sound awkward in languages in which they were not originally invented; nothing can be more natural than the Greek expressions, *ορεσις* and *ερεσις*.

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virtue, to which we have been, as it were, recommended by the original propensities of our nature, are far more estimable in themselves, than all the external advantages which they are fitted to procure. When our lives are harmonised to virtue, when we perceive the agreement of our thoughts and actions to propriety and decorum, the beauty of this concord strikes us as infinitely more desirable than all the ends which it has a tendency to promote; this concord itself becomes the great, or rather the sole, end of all our pursuits; compared with which, health and sickness, riches and poverty, pain and pleasure, are finally considered as objects of little moment, and altogether incapable of shaking the stability of our happiness.

The pleasure  
of observing  
them.

It is in vain that men seek felicity in those objects which depend not on themselves; which, even while they possess, they fear to lose; and which fortune can either give or take away<sup>74</sup>. The feelings of our own minds, which are ever and intimately present to us, must always afford the principal source of our happiness or misery. To a wise man, therefore, every condition of external circumstances, and every situation in life, must be alike indifferent, since there is none wherein he can be placed, in which he may not perform his duty, and render himself an object of approbation and applause to all rational nature. To feel in our own minds the testimony of the whole universe in our favour, and to be sensible, that whatever may be the consequences of our conduct, it has been governed by the great rules which the Divinity prescribes, affords a degree of inward satisfaction, to which the greatest outward prosperity can add nothing worthy of calculation; for as a single drop of water is lost in the broad expanse of the Ægean, as a single step is disregarded in the immense distance to India, as the light of a taper is eclipsed by the meridian sun<sup>75</sup>, so the external conveniencies of life, and the advantages pertaining to the body, are overwhelmed, obscured,

<sup>74</sup> Καὶ τα μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῶν εἰσι φύσει ἐλευθερά, ἀκωδὺλα, καὶ ἄτακτα, ἀλλοτρία. Epictet. Enchir. c. ii. 2477, ἀπαρὶςμποδιστὰ τα δὲ ὑχ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἀσθενή. <sup>75</sup> The illustrations given by Cic. de Fin.

and lost, in the transcendent excellence, and incomparable splendor of virtue.

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Those dangers which appear most formidable, and those calamities which appear most dreadful to the vulgar, cannot intimidate or deject the man, who has fortitude to despise the one, and constancy to bear the other. The sage delights in those clouds of adversity, through which his virtue beams forth with peculiar lustre; and rejoices in the kind cruelties of Fortune, which subject him to difficult and glorious combats. Sensible of his own powers, he is happy to measure them against a vigorous antagonist. The victory is not liable to contingencies, but depends on himself alone; a consideration sufficient to support him against the number and strength of his enemies<sup>76</sup>. When the firm probity of Regulus submitted his perishable body to be burned and lacerated by the Carthaginians, he well knew that those revengeful Barbarians could not torture his fortitude, his patriotism, his magnanimity. His mind, guarded by such an assemblage and attendance of virtues, bade defiance to every assault. The mind of Regulus still triumphed; and amidst the painful dissection of his frail members, he maintained and fortified the integrity of that part of his nature which properly constitutes the man, and in which alone any permanent happiness or misery can reside.

Fortitude.

From the enthusiasm naturally inspired by the beautiful and august forms of benevolence and magnanimity, the stoics again returned to the speculations of abstract philosophy. In every arrangement or combination of objects, which can be called a constitution or system, the good of each part, they observed, must be relative and subordinate to that of the whole. To illustrate in the constitution most familiar to us, the body of man, the good of each limb and member, considered as something separate and independent, consisted in preserving its natural state, and in never being subjected to any fatigue or hardship, to any pain or uneasiness. But con-

Resignation.

<sup>76</sup> Ἀνέκτος ἵνα δύνασαι, καὶ εἰς μέγιστα ἀγῶνα καταβαίνει, ὃ ἐκ τῆς ἐπὶ σοὶ πίστεως. Enchir. c. xxv.

sidered



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sidered as the part of a system, in the good of which its own is necessarily included, this limb or member must often submit to great inconveniencies. For the sake of the whole body, the foot must often trample in the dirt, must often tread upon thorns, and sometimes be burned, or lacerated, or even cut off, when such operations are requisite for the safety of the whole system. In refusing to comply, the foot ceases to be a foot; in the same manner do *you* cease to be a man, in shrinking from the hardest duties required by the interest of society. But that society itself, as well as every member which it contains, are parts of a larger system, that harmonious whole, whose admirable order and beauty evince the superintendence of infinite wisdom and goodness. Under such government, no absolute evil can exist; and what appears wrong respecting particular parts, must necessarily be right respecting the whole. A wise man will therefore be alike satisfied with every situation in which he may be placed; deeply convinced, that were he acquainted with the whole connections and dependencies of events, that situation would, even to himself, appear the most proper, that could possibly be assigned him. He uses, indeed, such means as prudence directs, to avert calamity; but when that is his lot, he cheerfully submits to the wise dispensation of Providence. The established order of the universe, he knows, is not to be changed by the prayers of men. When *he* prays to the Gods, it is not with a view to alter their wise intentions concerning him: he prays that they would show him the hardest trials with which he must contend, and the severest circumstances in which he must be placed; that by voluntarily accepting those trials, and voluntarily embracing those circumstances, he may prove his confidence in their goodness, and his perfect resignation to their sovereign will<sup>77</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> Ἀγε δὴ με, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σὺ ἡ πέπρωμένη,  
Ὅποι πόβ' ὕμιν εἰμι διατεταγμένος,  
Ὡς ἴσθαι σπουδαίος καὶ ακυρός.

The reason is subjoined,

Εὰν δὲ μὴ ἴδω, ἢχ' ἤτις ἴσθαι.  
“ We ought to be willing to obey the  
Gods, since we *must* obey them, whether we  
are willing or not.”

If our own unmerited misfortunes ought never to occasion us any uneasiness, so neither ought we to be affected by those of our relations, our friends, or our country. When calamity threatens connections so dear to us, we must exert ourselves strenuously in their behalf; but should our well-meant endeavours be frustrated by circumstances not liable to our controul, it would be highly ungraceful and improper to have recourse to unmanly lamentations. The same law of propriety which prompts our active exertions to the good of others, restrains our passive feelings at sight of their distress: the former alone can be useful to *them*; the latter would be both hurtful and dishonourable to *ourselves*.

The stoical philosophy imposed therefore an absolute silence on the soft voice of pity<sup>78</sup>, as well as on the boisterous dissonance of anger, and on all passions in general which were regarded as perturbations and diseases of the mind, that a wise man ought not merely to appease, but utterly to eradicate. As they supposed their imaginary sage capable of attaining this perfection, they inferred that all duties were alike easy to him. *His* actions were continually regulated by propriety, and all of them therefore equally laudable; whereas those of a fool, or one who substituted passion and caprice in the stead of reason and principle, were all equally blameable. This doctrine, which so nearly resembles that of many Christian divines, "that the greatest virtues of the heathens were but splendid vices," is the source to which all the other paradoxes of the stoics may be traced. Both these Christians and the stoics considered good or bad actions as relative only to the cause which produces them, the affection or character from which they proceed, not to the consequences which flow from them, the good or bad effects which they tend to promote.

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Command  
over the pas-  
sions.

<sup>78</sup> Epictetus, however, allows the *appearance* of sympathy with objects in distress, but sternly forbids the reality. Μιχρὴ μὲν τοι λυγρὴ καὶ συμπεριφέρεισθαι αὐτῇ (viz. the person afflicted) καὶ τύχῃ συνεπισημαζέαι προσεχὴς μὲν τοι, μὴ καὶ εὐώθει συνεπισημαζέαι. Epictet. Enchir. c. xxii.

C H A P. XL. These consequences and effects, it was observed by the stoics, depended not on ourselves. With regard to us, therefore, they were altogether indifferent; and as such, could not possibly constitute any part of merit or demerit, or become the proper objects of praise or censure.

Vulgar estimation of actions and characters.

The ignorant vulgar indeed, and as such the stoics considered all those who were unacquainted with their philosophy, allowed such contingent circumstances to influence their appreciation of actions and characters; and thence the extraordinary confusion introduced into religion and morality. Of two men, equally vicious, the one may be condemned to obscurity, and bereft of opportunity to exert his wickedness; the other may be raised to power, which he abuses, or entrusted with a sceptre, which becomes an iron rod in his hands. To the bulk of mankind, the second appears a greater monster than the first. To the philosopher, they appear equally criminal; but the first is a storm which spends its rage in vacuity; the second a cloud, not more tempestuous, that destroys the fair objects accidentally exposed to its violence. In the same manner two men may be equally meritorious, although the one, from the unfavourable circumstances in which he is placed, may resemble a clear stream rolling through a lonesome solitude, while the other, more advantageously situated with respect to external objects, may resemble a beautiful river flowing through a populous valley, supplying the wants of man and other animals, and diffusing abundance and pleasure through the adjoining country, which it fertilises and adorns.

Corrected by the stoics.

The injudicious estimation of virtues and vices, by the effects which they tend to produce, is the source of that extravagant admiration on the one hand, and that excessive severity on the other, which universally characterise the judgments of the vulgar. But a wise man, who examines the first principles of action in the human heart,

heart, will neither be dazzled by the splendour of heroes and patriots, nor provoked to undue revenge against illustrious criminals<sup>79</sup>. The civil magistrate, who is intrusted with the interest of society, and who has that interest always in views, must chiefly regard external actions, and consider *them* as sufficient indications of the inward affections and character. It is his business to regulate the lives, not to purify the hearts, of men. But we may be assured that He, who can penetrate deeper than an earthly judge, governs the moral world by more refined principles, and dispenses rewards and punishments according to a more accurate standard<sup>80</sup>. To avert his anger, superstition tells us to repair the bad consequences of our misconduct; and, as this is often impracticable, therefore commands an impossibility: to regain his approbation, and that of our own breasts, philosophy exhorts us to fix our chief attention, not on effects, which are transitory, but on the cause, which is permanent; to be less anxious about wiping off the stain of particular sins, than solicitous to stop the source from which they all flow. When we have accomplished this great purpose, we have reached the perfection of our nature. For the Deity, who has enjoined virtue as our duty, has placed our happiness in virtue. In performing the task assigned us, we necessarily attain our reward<sup>81</sup>.

Such is the philosophy of the stoics, which beside containing several contradictions which all the subtlety of the sect was unable to reconcile, evidently supposes a degree of perfection far beyond the weakness of humanity. The system of Epicurus is not less artificial in its texture, and, though humbler in its origin, is equally magnificent in its conclusions<sup>82</sup>. Like the lowly plant, which, at first feebly

Philosophy  
of Epicurus.

<sup>79</sup> Σοφία τρομερὴν ἔχει ὡς καὶ ψευδὴς, ὡς καὶ ἀπει-  
ρη, &c. Enchir. c. lxxii.

<sup>80</sup> Epictet. Enchir. c. xxxviii.

<sup>81</sup> Quod si ita est, ut neque quisquam,  
nisi bonus vir, & omnes boni beati sint;

quid philosophiā magis colendum, aut quid  
est virtute divinius. Cicero de Fin. l. iii.  
ad. fin.

<sup>82</sup> Diogen. Laert. in Aristip. & Epicur.



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emerging from the ground, gradually rises to a stately tree towering to the sky, the philosophy of Epicurus, at first restricting the primary objects of natural desire and aversion to bodily pleasure and pain, by degrees expands itself into the fairest forms of virtue, and enforces the severest lessons of duty. That pleasure and pain are the universal objects of desire and aversion is a truth, he observed, powerfully attested by the consenting voice of all animated nature. Not only men, but children, and even brute animals, could they emit articulate sounds, would declare and cry out, that pleasure is the sovereign good, and pain the greatest evil<sup>51</sup>. That they are, not only the greatest and most universal, but the *sole* ultimate objects of desire and aversion, Epicurus endeavoured to prove by analysing our passions, and actions, and virtues, all of which, he pretended, had, in the last instance, nothing farther in view than to procure bodily pleasure, and avoid bodily pain. If we desire power and wealth, it is because power and wealth furnish us with innumerable means of enjoyment. Sensible that the good-will of the society in which we live, is necessary to our security, we strive assiduously to acquire it, cultivate friendship, exercise benevolence, and practise with diligence and alacrity all those social virtues essential to the public safety, in which our own is included. When it is necessary to reject a present pleasure, in order to attain a greater in future, temperance must moderate the eagerness of desire; and when it is necessary to encounter a present pain, in order to avoid a greater in future, fortitude must controul the dictates of pusillanimity. Justice teaches us to abstain from injuring others, as the only condition on which we can escape being injured by them. And prudence, which, according to Epicurus is the queen of all the virtues, and to which justice, temperance, and fortitude are barely handmaids and attendants, invariably points out to us, and enforces, that course of action which

<sup>51</sup> Cicero de Finibus, l. i. c. ix. & passim.

is most conducive to our private comfort and happiness. This course of action is acknowledged by all moralists to consist in the practice of virtue; so that virtue, according to Epicurus, is the only true wisdom, and vice the most short-sighted levity and folly.

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To illustrate this doctrine, he observed, that though all the modifications of hope and fear ultimately refer to the sensations of bodily pleasure or pain, yet the pleasures and pains of the mind are infinitely more important than their originals. The body can only feel the sensation of the present moment, which can never be of great importance; whereas the mind recollects the past, and anticipates the future. If our mental frame, therefore, be properly adjusted, if our sentiments and judgments be duly regulated, it is a matter of little moment how our bodies be disposed; we may despise its pleasures, and even set its pains at defiance. If pain be violent, experience teaches us that it must be short; it cannot be continued long without becoming moderate, and admitting many intervals of ease; besides, death is always within our reach, and ready at a call to deliver us, whenever life becomes a burden.

His analysis  
of pleasure  
and pain.

By this kind of philosophical chemistry, Epicurus extracted from the grossest materials, the most sublime principles of wisdom and virtue. His philosophy imposed absolute silence on the passions; since no state, and therefore not the little republic of man, can be happy in sedition. In this tranquillity of mind, he boasted a felicity which external pleasures might vary, but could not increase; and his security of enjoyment he asserted to be equally firm and unalterable with that of the Gods, since the most unbounded duration could not afford greater happiness than arose from reflecting, that all our pleasures and pains are confined within a narrow span. Having adopted the atomic philosophy of Democritus, he rendered it subservient to his morality. The phenomena of nature, he fancied, might be explained by the figures and motions of the small particles of matter; and as the universe arose, so did it continue, without the interference

Bold pretensions  
of his  
philosophy.

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of the Gods, those celestial beings, who, enjoying complete happiness in themselves, and totally independent on the actions of men, are neither pleased with our virtues, nor offended by our crimes. Confiding in the certainty of these speculations, he trampled under foot the superstitious terrors of the vulgar, and fortified his mind against the fear of death<sup>84</sup>.

His character.

Such were the tenets of Epicurus, than whom no philosopher was ever more admired and beloved by his disciples, or more cordially attached to them in affectionate esteem. He is described as a man of the most amiable disposition, of great gentleness and humanity; and, like Eudoxus, who preceded him, and who inculcated the same loose doctrines of religion and morality, extremely temperate with regard to pleasure; a circumstance which failed not to add much reputation to his philosophy. In his character, the firm and manly, were united with the gentler virtues. When grievously afflicted with the stone, he bore the agony incident to that disease with the greatest constancy; and, in the last day of his life, when his pain had reached a degree beyond which he could conceive none greater, wrote to his friend Hermachus<sup>85</sup>, and recommended to him the children of his favourite disciple Metrodorus, assuring him at the same time, that as to himself, he still was happy, since the smart of his bodily sufferings was more than compensated by the pleasures of his mind, and particularly by the agreeable remembrance of his discoveries; a declaration, however inconsistent it may be deemed with his opinions, highly honourable to the man.

Philosophy  
of Pyrrho.

Such were the philosophical systems respecting life and happiness, by which the more liberal part of mankind long affected to regulate their sentiments and conduct. The excessive scepticism of Pyrrho, which none could reduce to practice without meriting the charge of insanity, seems never, even in theory, to have had much vogue

<sup>84</sup> Lucretius, *passim*.  
*Finibus*, l. ii. c. xxx. & *seqq.*

<sup>85</sup> Vid. Diogen. Laert. l. x. sect. ix. & Cic. de

among

among the speculatists of antiquity. In matters of doubtful evidence, indeed, a prudent suspension of judgment had been recommended by Socrates, enforced by Plato, and extended to subjects of every kind by his followers Arcefilas and Carneades<sup>86</sup>. These philosophers, however, in denying certainty, still admitted probability, which they thought sufficient for regulating our judgments and actions. But the extravagant Pyrrho was dogmatical only in maintaining, that no one opinion was more probable than another. The non-existence of sensible qualities, which had been proved by Democritus<sup>87</sup>, Protagoras<sup>88</sup>, and Aristippus<sup>89</sup>, and which is commonly supposed a modern discovery, because the contrary opinion obtained among the schoolmen, probably led Pyrrho to deny the reality likewise of moral qualities and distinctions. As heat and cold, tastes and colours, had no external existence in bodies, and were mere ideas of the mind; in the same manner, beauty and deformity, virtue and vice, happiness and misery, had no real or permanent cause, but depended, like every thing else, on relation or comparison. Upon this principle, "that all was relative"<sup>90</sup>, Pyrrho established topics for enabling his sect readily to dispute the truth of all positions whatever, and which were reduced to ten<sup>91</sup>, probably in opposition to the ten categories of the dogmatists. The great patron of Pyrrhonism boasts, that while other philosophers wandered in pursuit of a false and artificial happiness, Pyrrho alone had discovered the true and natural

<sup>86</sup> Because Socrates and Plato doubted some things, these philosophers doubted all. Vid. Cicer. Acad. l. i. They formed, what was called, the New Academy, which held the same tenets with the ancient, only asserting them still less positively.

<sup>87</sup> See Sextus Empiricus, p. 399.

<sup>88</sup> Pyrrhon. Hypot. l. i. sect. 216.

<sup>89</sup> Præterea quoniam nequeant sine luce colores [rerum

Esse, neque in luce existant primordia

Scire licet, quam sint nullo velata colore.

.....

Sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore  
Corpora prima manere; etiam secreta  
teporis,

Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, &c.

LUCRETIVS, l. ii.

<sup>90</sup> Πᾶτα πρὸς τι. Sextus Empiric.

<sup>91</sup> Sextus Empiric. Hypothet. Pyrrhon.  
l. i. c. xiv. & Diogen. Laert. in Pyrrhon.



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one, and that, by an accident similar to the painter's<sup>92</sup>, who having finished the picture of a dog all to the foam of his mouth, could not, after repeated trials, satisfy himself in painting this last circumstance. Enraged by disappointment, he at length dashed against the canvas the sponge with which he wiped his pencils. Accident produced the effect which he had vainly sought from art; and the foam was represented so naturally, that the picture, though admirable in other respects, was chiefly admired on this account. Fatigued by many painful researches into the nature of truth and virtue, Pyrrho, in the same manner, had discovered that truth and virtue were nowhere to be found; a discovery which produced that moderation and *indisfurbance*<sup>93</sup>, that happy indifference, or rather perfect insensibility, which is as naturally attended by happiness, as a body is followed by its shadow<sup>94</sup>.

Conclusion.

In concluding this work with the scepticism of Pyrrho, it is proper to observe, for the honour of Greece, that though the doctrines which that philosopher inculcated, can have no other tendency than to unhinge the moral principles, to darken and perplex the mind; yet those systems of his contemporaries, or predecessors, which have been more particularly explained in the present history, amidst all their apparent contradictions, uniformly afford such views of nature and of man, as awaken and cherish our love for both. Established on firm grounds of reason, they evince the indissoluble union of interest with duty, display the beauty of virtue in its brightest charms, and unmask the hideous spectres of fancy and superstition.

<sup>92</sup> Sextus Empiric. l. i. c. xii. Sextus calls the painter Apelles. Pliny, l. xxxv. c. xx. ascribes this accident to Protogenes, and a similar one to Nealces, in painting a horse.

<sup>93</sup> *Αταραξία*. Sextus Empiric.

<sup>94</sup> Sextus Empiric. ubi supra, & passim.

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# E R R A T A.

## V O L. I.

- Page 41, l. 7 from the top, before "generation," insert "fourth."  
 — 42, in the note, l. ult. for "uaintelligible," read "intelligible."  
 — 238, in the note, l. 5. read "*οὐρανὸν ἰσχυρόν*."  
 — 401, l. 15 from the bottom, insert "like," before "the legislator."  
 — 401, l. 13 from the bottom, insert "Pythagoras," before "enjoined."  
 — 560, l. 4 from the bottom, for "these," read "all."  
 — 642, in the note, l. 2. for "Atonic," read "atomic."  
 — 684, l. 13 from the bottom, for "they," read "the captives."

## V O L. II.

- Page 6, l. 13 from the top, for "natural," read "national."  
 — 11, l. 7 from the bottom, for "ensnare," read "ensure."  
 — 35, l. 7 from the top, for "Eumelus," read "Eumolpus."  
 — 168, in the note, l. 2. for "Phœnicians," read "Phæatians."  
 — 290, in the note, l. ult. read "*ἐνομιζόν ἐπὶ τοῖς εὐπροσδοκιστάτοις*."  
 — 558, l. 6 from the bottom, for "Delphi," read "Delphic."  
 — 559, in the note, read "*ῥεατηγόν*."  
 — 710, in the note, read "*παλινδρομῶν*."





